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1. Quest: Continuity and innovation 
 
Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/ Revue Africaine de Philosophie 
was founded in 1987 at the Department of Philosophy, University of 
Zambia, by Roni M. Khul Bwalya and Pieter Boele van Hensbroek. The 
journal soon established itself as a major context for philosophical and 
general intellectual exchange in Africa, and became the scene of several 
major debates. After Bwalya’s untimely death and Boele van Hensbroek’s 
return to the Netherlands, the latter kept the journal alive and made it grow, 
largely owing to the generous support from a network of African colleagues 
serving as contributors, members of the editorial board, and referees. 
Volume XV (2001) was the last to appear under the responsibility of Boele 
van Hensbroek, and, as he announced there, the responsibility of Editor was 
then passed on to Wim van Binsbergen. This former University of Zambia 
lecturer now combines the chair of Intercultural Philosophy at the Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam with an appointment as Senior Researcher at the 
African Studies Centre, Leiden, the Netherlands. With contributions on the 
Black Athena debate, the philosophy of interculturality, and ubuntu 
philosophy in Southern Africa, the new Editor presented his credentials to 
the Quest readership in earlier issues.  
 It is a sign of confidence, and a reason to rejoice, that all members of the 
earlier Editorial Board agreed to continue to serve the journal as members of 
the new Advisory Editorial Board, while for the day-to-day running of the 
journal an enthusiastic new Editorial Team was formed, consisting of Sanya 
Osha (Ibadan, Nigeria) and Kirsten Seifikar (Rotterdam, the Netherlands), 
besides Wim van Binsbergen.  
 Inevitably, the editorial transition caused a slight delay in the appearance 
of Quest. This will be redressed in the course of the year 2004, at the 
beginning of which the present volume XVI is published, while volume 
XVII is lined up for publication within a few months. While volume XVI 
happens to be entirely anglophone, volume XVII will return to the usual 
Quest bilingual format, and comprise contributions in French as well as in 
English. 
 In order to enhance the world-wide availability of Quest, and facilitate 
the contacts with the readership for such matters as taking out subscriptions 
and ordering back copies, and also more in general to keep up with the 




times, the first task of the new Editor has been to arrange for Quest to go 
online, in a fully bi-lingual (English and French) format. As a visit to 
Quest’s Internet domain (http://www.quest-journal.net) will bear out, this 
task has now largely been completed successfully, although the French 
sections still need to be upgraded to native-speaker level. Henceforth, 
emphasis will be on online publishing of the journal. As a result of initial 
experiments with passwords and paid subscriptions for the online version, 
we found that free world-wide availability of Quest online would best serve 
Africa’s needs of intellectual circulation, and would also reduce the journal’s 
burden of financial administration.  
 However, we do realize that Internet is not yet a viable and affordable 
option throughout Africa, where even the PDF format that is standard for 
online publications may cause difficulties (Adobe Acrobat – the software for 
reading PDF – not being available on most cybercafé computers). While 
provisions are made for unformatted .txt files, and .html Internet files, to be 
available in addition to the PDF format in the online version, Quest will 
continue to be available also in a printed form, for those (including 
individual contributors, and libraries) preferring a permanent record, and for 
those without Internet access or Internet skills. Inevitably, readers will have 
to pay for the printed version of the present, and subsequent, volumes of 
Quest, as well as for the postage. Subscriptions to the printed version of 
Quest are available on an annual basis; for details see the cover of the 
present volume, or the Quest website (http://www.quest-journal.net). 
Subscribers to earlier volumes of Quest who wish to renew their subscription 
or who have queries about the delivery of issues they have already paid for, 
will also find electronic forms for these specific purposes on the Quest 
website; alternatively, they may contact the Quest editorship by e-mail 
(editor@quest-journal.net), or by ordinary letter, to be addressed to:  
 
Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/ Revue Africaine de Philosophie,  
c/o African Studies Centre,  
P.O. Box 9555,  
2300 RB Leiden,  
the Netherlands.  
 
 As this postal address indicates, another recent development for Quest is 
that the journal has been most fortunate to secure, temporarily, the 
hospitality of the famous African Studies Centre in the Netherlands, one of 
the few remaining institutes in the world dedicated to the full-time research 
and documentation of Africa. This move will make for continuity and 
consolidation until such time when the journal’s extensive mental and social 
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base in Africa can be firmly and securely complemented with an actual 
institutional base in that continent.  
 With the present volume, which combines issues i and ii of Volume XVI 
(2002), Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/ Revue Africaine de 
Philosophie, is firmly on its feet again, ready to take the precious heritage of 
its first fifteen years to further fruition. At this point, I wish to thank a 
number of people. In the first place all those who, in previous years, have 
favoured Quest with their time, efforts, and contributions. In particular I 
wish to honour my long-standing friend and colleague Pieter Boele van 
Hensbroek, an honorary African if ever there was one, and the great, modest, 
efficient, precise and passionate force behind Quest as an impressive 
intellectual achievement. Further I wish to extend thanks to all those who 
have helped realize the transition to the new Quest, as members of the 
Editorial Team and the Advisory Editorial Board (Paulin Hountondji, as one 
of the latter’s members, is going out of his way to add his immense prestige 
and thinking power to the launching of Quest in its present, new format); as 
referees, editors and contributors to the present volume – and as funding 
agencies behind these contributors; as webmaster; and as members of the 
Leiden African Studies Centre, whose enthusiasm for Quest has meant a lot 
in this transitional period.  
 Let this volume be an invitation to all African colleagues, and to all 
Africanist1 colleagues in general, to support Quest with your contributions 
and subscriptions, and to serve the journal as referee. Only with your full 
participation can Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/Revue Africaine 
de Philosophie be, and remain, an impressive testimony of the intellectual 
and moral force of Africa. 
 
 
2. About the present volume 
 
With the present volume, Quest continues to address political and moral 
issues in contemporary Africa, a philosophical concern which has been a red 
                                          
1 Internationally, the term “Africanist” (once mainly referring to a branch of linguistics) is used to 
denote the academic study of (sub-Saharan) Africa in general, as pursued by Africans as well as 
people from other continents. It is in this disciplinary sense that the term is used here and in the 
Postscript to this volume. In this sense all authors addressing African (including South African) 
issues in the present collection, are Africanists. However, in the recent, South African context, 
deservedly dominated by the African National Congress (ANC) which brought the country to 
democratic majority rule, the term is often employed to designate opposition parties with a 
predominantly Black constituency and a political agenda focussing on the African continent, such 




thread throughout previous volumes of this journal. Once more (cf. Quest 
XV, 2001) these issues are investigated with special reference to South 
Africa, by contributors who are mainly specialists on the Southern African 
subcontinent and who therefore had little reason to provide the kind of local 
background that to the rest of our readership would have been helpful. 
Therefore, risking to state the obvious, let us give some of that background 
here.2  
 In the first half of the twentieth century CE, the Union of South Africa 
(1910-1961, succeeded by the Republic of South Africa) combined  
 
a. racism (with such expressions as spatial segregation, blatant economic 
exploitation, and gross constitutional inequality) as a general feature of 
the European colonial hegemonic presence in Africa, with  
b. by far the most developed industrial and urban infrastructure in Africa.  
 
In subsequent decades, most African countries were decolonized at least in 
formal constitutional terms, and in the process they transformed their caste-
like racism into more fluid class inequalities that only partially coincide still 
with somatic differences. In South Africa, however, settler entrenchment led 
to the capture (1948) of the South African state by the Afrikaner, White, 
Afrikaans (a creolized form of Dutch) speaking ethnic minority. The 
enactment of the notorious system of apartheid (1950) brought the 
formalization of racism to a scale scarcely precedented in world history – 
while the South African economy continued to grow and to absorb 
increasing portions of the Black, so-called Coloured, Indian and Chinese 
population segments into its working class and middle class. The 
increasingly general, heroic liberation struggle led by the African National 
Congress (ANC), and supported by intercontinental pressure, brought the 
installation of democratic majority rule in 1994. Liberated from its decades 
of international and intercontinental isolation and boycott, South Africa’s 
return to constitutional respectability resulted in one of the most significant 
processes affecting the African continent as a whole in the twentieth century: 
South Africa’s massive resources of infrastructure, education, know-how, 
constitutional and judicial procedures, science and technology, could finally 
be added to those of the African continent as a whole – but the same was 
true for South Africa’s traumatic experience of state oppression and of the 
                                          
2 For the same reason (of not making our readers captive to the self-evidences of our authors), 
technical rhetorical vocabulary, and local or regional biographical, historical, political and 
otherwise descriptive details, have been occasionally clarified in footnotes marked “(Eds.)”.  
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annihilation of historic identity during and before the apartheid era, which 
parallelled, albeit (by and large) in intensified form, the historic experiences 
of African populations throughout the continent in the first half of the 
twentieth century. From 1990 onwards, representatives of South African 
economic enterprise, academic expertise and statesmanship have travelled 
all over the African continent in order to finally establish contact, to make 
their resources available, to learn what it is to be African on a continental 
scale (and what it is to be cosmopolitan on a global scale), and to expand 
into markets and spheres of social and intellectual exchange previously 
closed to them for so long.  
 In this process, the idea of the African Renaissance, first formulated in 
the late 1940s by the Senegalese physicist and cultural philosopher Cheikh 
Anta Diop,3 was revived and adopted, as an expression of faith in Africa’s 
future in the first place, but also as another articulation of South Africans’ 
views of their country’s new, exalted mission vis-à-vis Africa as a whole, 
and even world-wide. However, it was generally and deeply realized that, 
before South Africa could convincingly play such a leading role, before even 
it could hope to function as a viable nation domestically, the nation-wide 
recent trauma of apartheid had to be faced, and South African society had to 
be reconstructed, not only along lines of constitutional equality and socio-
political empowerment, but also through confession, forgiveness, and mutual 
re-acceptance between the constituent somatic and ethnic sections of the 
population. Towards this internal process of reconstruction, Southern 
African academic thinkers elaborated the concept of ubuntu. In the Nguni 
languages (Zulu, Ndebele, Xhosa, Swati) covering part of the Southern 
African subcontinent, ubuntu literally means “human-ness, humanity”. The 
concept came to be philosophically worked into a strategy of thought 
enabling one to recognize the humanity in the Other: in village situations 
defined by time-honoured tradition where the concept originated; in general; 
and even in modern contexts where the vicissitudes of social organization 
and historic experience had led to the construction of that Other as an 
enemy. With regard to the latter kind of situations, ubuntu was argued to 
prompt restoring that Other’s humanity by extending to him, once more, the 
very humanity that had been denied, desecrated or squandered by himself in 
the first place, in the context of apartheid. The overall claim, on the part of 
the academic authors or interpreters of ubuntu philosophy, is that this 
                                          
3 Cf. Diop 1948. For an extensive bibliography of the African Renaissance concept, cf. Boele van 





concept taps very ancient, very constant, and still viable resources of 
(Southern) African culture and social organization. While deemed an 
essential tool for the reconstruction of South Africa today, the concept of 
ubuntu is also suggested to be one of Africa’s great gifts to the world at 
large, comparable to (perhaps even inseparable from) the global African 
heritage in the fields of music, dance, the plastic arts, religion, etc. 
 At the initiative and under the editorship of Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, 
the previous volume of Quest (XV, 2001) was devoted to a detailed 
examination of the concepts of African Renaissance and ubuntu as 
expressions of philosophy in Africa. The present volume, Truth in Politics: 
Rhetorical Approaches to Democratic Deliberation in Africa and Beyond 
(Quest XVI, 2002) is largely built, not around the locally emerged 
philosophical concepts towards South Africa’s current reconstruction (i.e., 
African Renaissance and ubuntu), but around that country’s 1995-1998 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as the crucial institutional 
process through which South Africans have sought to publicly and 
collectively come to terms with the experiences of apartheid, in their quest 
to build a domestically viable and internationally respectable post-apartheid 
society. In sessions that were held all over the country, thousands of 
survivors and victims, as well as perpetrators of apartheid atrocities, and 
fighters against apartheid, were heard, the victims to tell their tale, the 
perpetrators to gain amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of their deeds. 
Unique in its format, scope, and vision, the TRC has already given rise to an 
enormous primary and secondary literature, a fair selection of which is cited 
in the present volume.  
 However, this collection’s ambition goes beyond the descriptive details 
of the TRC, and this makes for both its philosophical relevance, and its 
comparative relevance for Africa as a whole. The editors and contributors 
primarily seek to answer the question:  
 
• why could the TRC play such a major role in the reconstruction of post-
apartheid South Africa, and what precisely were the communicative, 
political and legal mechanisms and strategies enabling it to play that 
role?  
 
This leads on to further questions, notably  
 
• what are the ethical/moral, and the epistemological, boundary conditions 
under which the TRC could play such a role?  
• what does it say, in general, and at the most abstract and fundamental 
Editorial 11
philosophical level, about the nature of the state, democracy, citizenship, 
reconciliation, memory, politics, and “the political” as an institutional 
field, that the TRC can be argued to have deployed such mechanisms and 
strategies as are highlighted under the contributors’ and editors’ scrutiny 
– particularly in the contributions by Salazar, Cassin, Villa-Vincencio, 
Doxtader, Lollini, Gitay, Nethersole, Samarbakhsh-Liberge, Rossouw 
and Garver? 
• what is the comparative evidence, from elsewhere in Africa (Nigeria, 
Congo-Brazzaville – discussed in this volume by the philosophers Osha 
and Kouvouama, respectively) and beyond (including the United 
Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher – in the analysis by Calder from the 
University of Zambia; archives in France today (Cassin); the outgoing 
Roman Republic under Cicero as one of its two consuls in 64 BCE – as 
discussed by the Nigerian classicist Ige; and the city state of Athens 
immediately after its defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars in 403 BCE – by 
Cassin once more), concerning mechanisms and strategies that are similar 
to those of the TRC and that can be argued to have been at work, or to 
have been sorely missing, in these concrete political settings; and what 
are the philosophical yields of such comparison? 
 
 These are momentous questions indeed. To try and answer them, the 
editors and most of the contributors deploy the time-honoured main-stream 
Western philosophical tradition of rhetoric (in the technical sense of the 
public, sustained articulation of truths – not in the vulgar sense of the florid 
articulation of untruths): 
The purpose of this volume is to try and acclimatize “rhetoric” to the philosophical scene in 
South Africa, and more in general in Africa as a whole, and to contribute a scholarly 
reflection on the emergence of public deliberation in the South African democracy by 
providing analyses from the standpoint of rhetoric. (Salazar, Foreword) 
 Not the least of this volume’s qualities derive from the fact that, 
complementary to rhetorical analysis, other, related forms of the socio-
political production of truths have entered into the collection’s scope. This 
includes Hajjar’s painstaking and passionate, yet expertly legal-scientific 
examination of state torture; this study highlights how the utterly perverted 
search for usable truths under conditions of torture has yet elicited a human-
rights thinking that directly addresses, and profoundly modifies, the 
philosophical categories of “human”, “person”, and “the state”. Similarly 
valuable is the examination (highly illuminating both from a conceptual and 
from an empirical interactional/ communicative point of view) of the forms 




and deliberation in intercultural settings (the contribution by Collier & 
Hicks).  
 This rich and excellent collection is an asset to our journal, and we are 
grateful to the contributors, and to Philippe-Joseph Salazar and Sanya Osha, 
for making the original conference papers available so that they could be 
worked into the present special issue. Let the resulting collection now speak 
for itself.  
 At the end of this volume, a Postscript will situate this collection within 
the general line of philosophical discussions that has characterized Quest: 
An African Journal of Philosophy / Revue Africaine de Philosophie over the 
years. This Postscript thus offers, effectively, a manifesto for Quest in 
coming years, as well as a vindication of the present collection’s enphasis on 
Aristotelian rhetoric, and on the South African Truth and Reconciliation 






Boele van Hensbroek, P., 2001, ed., African Renaissance and Ubuntu Philosophy, special issue of 
Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/ Revue Africaine de Philosophie, XV; also at: 
http://www.quest-journal.net. 
Diop, C.A., 1948, “Quand pourra-t-on parler d’une Renaissance africaine?”, Le Musée vivant, no. 
36-37, Novembre, pp. 57-65, translated by E.P. Modum in: Diop, C.A., 1996, Towards the 
African renaissance, London: Karnak House, pp. 33-45. 
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Men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who 
seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be 
deceived. Machiavelli (1948: xviii). 
 
In the history and philosophy of rhetoric, which overlaps with political 
theory or simply “philosophy”, the question of truth applied to the sphere of 
public deliberation, the “polis”, the social contract – whatever term is used –, 
is not new. Politics, rhetoric and truth have been linked ever since 
democracy took shape. Hannah Arendt, reflecting upon the luminous Greek 
legacy under the long shadow cast by Nazi devastation, forcefully made the 
point that the Ancient Greek belief in argued speech – “logos”, what I would 
call “deliberate deliberation” – is fundamental to any definition of 
humankind as political. To share in social life necessitates, at any level and 
in various grades of expertise, to be able to articulate thoughts into words, 
and to impart these words a “logical” strain, so as to make an impression 
upon those we address; sometimes we manage to “persuade” them, 
sometimes we fail at doing so but, even then, we leave a trace of our speech 
(“logos”) in them . Rhetoric lies, in Arendt’s vision, at the core of being 
citizens (Arendt 1993). The “logic” invoked is however not that of logicians: 
citizens are not philosophers, they do not search for universally proven 
Truth. In fact – and this is a fundamental “political fact” –, they should not. 
They utter their beliefs, expecting their fellow citizens to do the same, and to 
listen to each other’s expression of opinions which each speakers may hold 
to be true. But, and this is the other side of Arendt’s argument on 
democracy, truths expressed by citizens must somehow represent the 
diversity of the citizenry. This argument is profoundly Aristotelian: a 
democracy is made of diverse individuals. That insight applies a fortiori to 
“multicultural” societies like South Africa. In a democracy, in Ancient 
Greece no less than in South Africa today, truth is transient, fragmented, 
often community-based, it belongs indeed to the domain of prejudice, 
opinion, belief, perception (Aristotle, Politics, VII, 13). This is why 
argument and deliberation – “rhetoric” – allow citizens, and their 




representatives, to articulate such diversity. The anti-democratic peril of 
ideology consists, conversely, in the attempt to try and impose one single 
truth onto the citizenry – as in the apartheid regime, that latter-day offspring 
of fascism.  
 However, democratic citizens bear an incredible burden, if they are to 
accept that to be part of the Sovereign entails just that: a Sovereign’s duty. 
The difficulty of being a democratic citizen resides indeed in learning to 
accept that each of us, however passionate we are about “what we believe”, 
and hold to be “true”, may and will be untrue for another citizen who, like 
us, shares in the Sovereign. 
 Politics in a democracy is a contest of words about competing truths. No 
government ought ever to believe that they have “the truth”. They are merely 
the sum total of what Aristotle describes as some sort of picnic: at the 
democratic table we all bring our own food to make the party successful, in 
spite of the variety of condiments and the diversity of foodstuffs. As the 
philosopher of rhetoric Barbara Cassin, furthering this argument, points out, 
“harmony” in a democracy is the sum total of disagreements – to agree on 
ends (to live in a democracy) while disagreeing on means, and constantly, 
thanks to debate and deliberation and argument – from talk shows to 
parliaments –, to enrich such diversity (Cassin 1995: II, 3). Aristotle called 
this multifarious process of competing truths, “friendship”, politikē philia, 
“political love” (Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, IX, 6). Incidentally, there is a parallel 
here with the French Revolution’s use of the word citoyen (“citizen”). As a 
form of address this word replaced the old regime’s address nomenclature 
that fixed each “subject’s” position in social intercourse (inferior/superior); 
citoyen was a way to affirm such “political love” in a democracy – then 
aptly termed “republic”, i.e. “that which belongs to all”. A similar intent lay 
behind the use of “comrade” by the Socialist International – a “comrade” 
being someone with whom (to follow the original Latin meaning of that 
word) you share a room and a bed, in brief someone with whom you share 
your life – your political life. By implication, the accusation often levelled at 
politicians, to the effect that they resort to “rhetoric”, evinces a strange 
situation: those who proffer it,  
 
1. fail to recognize their own failure to be as persuasive as those they 
attack and,  
2.  – and this is far more dangerous for democracy – , fail to realize that 
“rhetoric” is part and parcel of public debate – unless they believe that 
there is fixed “truth” about living together in a democracy.  
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Significantly, religious zealots, who are the living remnants of pre-
democratic societies, often find themselves caught in a “deliberative 
conflict”, an argumentative tension between their faith-based belief (held as 
“the Truth”) and their citizen-based opinions. They stand astride two 
domains of truth, one which is unarguable, the other which is essentially 
argument-based. For that reason they aptly illustrate a familiar kind of attack 
on the seemingly erratic nature of political contest in a democracy: more 
forcefully than others, they try and force onto the public sphere of 
deliberation, opinions that are not presented as negotiable, and that turn out 
to be resilient to deliberation.  
 Politicians are indeed often branded as charlatans or people without 
ethics. This argument is not new either. It found its expression in the Ancient 
Greek debate between the Sophists and Plato. Arendt summarizes the 
debate: one can accuse the Sophists (those who can, ad libitum, argue for 
this or against that, and those who teach others how to perform such feats, 
not unlike today’s so-called “spin doctors” who spin words into beliefs and 
weave, or, so say their less skilled detractors, a web of deceit) of not 
respecting “truth”. But one does so at the peril of retrenching from public 
deliberation and civil life the very nature of democracy, notably our 
common ability to change our opinions and to argue for them either way. A 
basic tenet of democracy is that “virtue” (the ability to exercise common 
sense) is equally divided between all of us. This is the reason why we do 
elect representatives that are not “experts” but, just like us, able to think for 
themselves. In that light we do not and should not expect government to 
have better judgment than ordinary citizens. They are just that: ordinary 
people, who talk, exchange ideas, change their minds – they belong to 
“rhetoric”. A good citizen must then be a Sophist, who can “truly” believe in 
policy X before election time, then vote for Y even if Y has a track record 
that does not support policy X. It happens all the time. But why? Because a 
democracy is not a theocracy. The ability to exchange viewpoints with 
others, and with oneself, is the very stuff of democracy A citizen need not 
believe in truth, but merely in the value of “this” truth, correlated with the 
belief in deliberation, rhetoric, argument – which relativizes all truths and, as 
Arendt puts it, make you see the world (the political world) through 
someone else’s words. Democracy is the art of conversation. 
 The debate on truth in politics, and on the value of “rhetoric” (public 
deliberation) is therefore nothing new. But no solace is to be found in the 
fact that the issue of truth in politics is still a matter of serious contention, 
further obfuscated by the decay of rationalism in philosophy and the humane 




indicates that the theoretical stage set at the birth of democracy, in Athens 
two and a half millennia ago, has hardly moved its props. The same actors, 
the same plot, the same décor are still with us. However, Ancient theory and 
practice of democracy, or the Enlightenment’s elaboration on what we 
nowadays call “democracy” – as in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social 
Contract – dealt frontally with the question of “truth” in politics; by contrast, 
we in our time have learned not to face up to this question. We are even 
afraid of it. Unless, as in the South African case, the resilience of ideology 
and the harnessing of oppressive power to the eradication of the rule of law 
and of natural law – the touchstone of modern democracy – forced citizens 
and intellectuals as citizens to engage with “truth”. 
  
The purpose of this volume is to try and acclimatize “rhetoric” to the 
philosophical scene in South Africa, and more in general in Africa as a 
whole, and to contribute a scholarly reflection on the emergence of public 
deliberation in the South African democracy by providing analyses from the 
standpoint of rhetoric. 
 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) offered 
a particularly good start. It was a massive exercise in deliberation, a telling 
of “truth”, an exposé on a people’s diverse visions on events and history. 
Elsewhere, I have proposed a rhetorical reading of the TRC as a 
phenomenon of public deliberation. My view of the matter may be 
summarized as follows. On the one hand, there was the Platonic drift of the 
Commissioners – they wanted to unveil “the truth” of apartheid; their stance 
was itself rooted in religious or ideological beliefs impervious to the Arendt 
model. On the other hand, the People, in their submissions, held high the 
civic duty of “telling stories”, of exemplifying multivocality, thus turning 
out to be excellent Sophists (Salazar 2002). The people offered testimonies, 
they opened up a stunning treasury of words, narrations, opinions onto “who 
did what for what reason”. They acted as true Aristotelians.  
 This takes us to the subject matter of the present collection. Four papers 
(Part One) tackle, from four different angles, the re-telling of private truths 
about a public regimen of affairs in front of a public commission. In Part 
Two, public deliberation and the fashioning of truth are approached from a 
variety of perspectives, examples and situations of “rhetorical democracy” 
outside South Africa. This leads on to public deliberation as the latter plays 
itself out in political issues, such as the African Renaissance. Part Three 
attempts to offer examples of how rhetoric may be brought to bear upon 
politics in order to understand how dialogue between different levels of 
agency creates democratic negotiation and, in the process, shapes policy. 
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The volume closes on a philosophical analysis of the “ethical” dimension 
inherent to public deliberation as well as to the contest of beliefs; and on an 
examination of the volume’s contents in the light of long-standing concerns 
of African philosophy, and of Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy / 
Revue Africaine de Philosophie. 
 The editors and the contributing authors harbour the hope that this 
volume can further impress on informed readers two leading thoughts that 
have informed the intellectual exchanges leading to the present volume:  
 
1. rhetoric has a place in the construction of South Africa’s incipient 
democracy, and  
2. in a radical manner – to recall Hannah Arendt’s expression – , to 
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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 
 
THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 




ABSTRACT. This essay examines three heterogeneous models in the management of the relation 
between the past and the future which have decisive implications for the political present. These 
three different models refer to the Athenian civil war of 403 B.C., the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) of South Africa and the French management of classified archives such as 
during the Second World War. It is the author’s view that these models shed light on certain 
relations between politics, discursive practices and deliberation. 
 
For Nicole Loraux 
 
In his Life of Solon (21) Plutarch notes: “And it is political to remove from 
hate its eternity”. The treatment of hate, which goes with civil war, is one of 
the most acute current problems in deliberative politics. Why is it that 
deliberating and shedding light on events and past actions may lead a 
political community, in its very attempt at a reconstruction, to implode? 
 The management of the relation between past and future, which is 
decisive for a political present, has followed historically some very different 
models. I would like to compare three radically heterogeneous models: Two 
procedures of exception: 
 
1. in Athens, after the civil war, the decree of 403 BCE – it is as far as we 
know the first procedure of amnesty) and,  
2. in today’s South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), following the collapse of apartheid, and finally 
3. a third, “normal” procedure, that of the French management of sensitive 
archives (like those of World War II)1.  
 
I believe these three models help shed light on certain relations between 
politics, discursive practice and deliberation, and enable us gain insights into 
the ways in which truth and deliberative politics are linked. 
1 For Athens I draw on a remarkable article by Nicole Loraux (1988). For South Africa, on 
Philippe-Joseph Salazar’s books (1998 and 2002). For the use of archives I derived much from: 
Association des archivistes français 1997.  
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Example 1. Athens – amnesty – amnesia  
 
There is, at least in some languages,2 an immediate connection between 
“amnesty” and “amnesia”. It has nothing to do with chance, as it is an 
etymological doublet. But a decree of amnesia is quite different from a 
decree of amnesty. The former goes against everything which we today 
regard as the duty of memory within the sphere of public deliberation. 
 The scene is in Athens at the end of the fifth century BCE. The 
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta ends on Athens’ defeat. The 
city must demolish the Long Walls between the Acropolis and Piraeus. 
Democracy is rendered powerless. The Thirty seize power. They are not 
“oligarchs”, but well and truly tyrants. (Fifteen hundred Athenians, that is a 
considerable proportion of the citizens, perish.) The Thirty are Spartophiles, 
they are collaborators, and the enemy occupies the Acropolis. Civil war 
breaks out, bloody and brief (one year). It is from Piraeus that democratic re-
conquest starts. As soon as the democrats, led by Thrasybulus, regain power 
in 403 BCE, they promulgate a decree of amnesty. 
 
 
Stasis and discursive troubles 
 
In order for the facts to make sense it is necessary to explain how Greek and 
the Greeks represent stasis, or “civil war”, and the content of the amnesty 
decree invented to put an end to such stasis. 
 Stasis clearly is one of those Greek word names that have almost the 
inner contradictory complexity Freud taught us to associate with products of 
the subconscious. It means an act which correspond with the root estēn (“to 
hold straight, to be standing up”), signifying at once “the fact of standing 
up”, hence site, position, stability, firmness (stasimos is said of all that 
which is calm and well planted, just like stasimon in a tragedy denotes the 
text fragment which the choir sings without moving about), and “the fact of 
getting up”, hence uprising, rebellion (stasiōdēs means “seditious”). In 
political terminology the word stasis came to signify, at the public level, the 
“state” (Polybus, 16,34,11) – and at the individual level, the “position” of a 
person in society (Polybus, 10,33,6). Stasis refers therefore to state, estate, 
government, establishment, standing; sometimes the “party”, sometimes the 
“faction” (Herodotus, 1, 59), and, more generally, the “civil war” itself 
                                          





(Thucydides, History, 3, 68-86). As if the state found itself necessarily 
linked to insurrection, as to its shadow or its condition of possibility. 
 As for civil war, stasis is described as an “illness”. Thucydides sets the 
tone with an analysis of the stasis of Corcyra (3, 69-86), employing the same 
words in which he described the pest of Athens (2, 47-54). The “illness” 
(nosēma) produces “disorder”, “illegality” (anomia; 2, 53); and in the civil 
war this anomie would go to changing the normal use of language: “We 
changed the usual meaning of the words with relation to the acts in the 
justifications that we gave of it” (3, 82).  
 When Philippe-Joseph Salazar evokes the South African apartheid 
legislation, the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950, he rightly pitches his 
analysis at the level of language itself:  
One could admire the linguistic feats of the Lycurgus3 of Southern Africa (Salazar 1998: 27).  
 The South African Act is well and truly that of a “nomothete” which 
transforms the meaning of words:  
In the name of his Very Excellent Majesty the King, the Senate and the Parliament of the 
Union of South Africa, it is promulgated that: (...) A “person of colour” designates a person 
which is neither white nor native. (...) A “native” designates a person which is in fact or 
commonly considered to be from one of the aboriginal races or tribes of Africa. (...) A “white 
person” designates a person which is evidently such or commonly accepted as a white person, 
with the exclusion of any person, even in appearance being evidently white, commonly 
accepted as a person of colour.  
Thus the founding law of apartheid shows, among others, stasis as 
discursive anomie. Inversely, consider how the new president of Algeria 
appeals to “civil harmony”:  
We must (...) reinvent semantics, find the words which are not injuring neither for the one nor 
for the other. Civil harmony is neither national reconciliation, nor eradication. It is simply to 
ask the Algerians: Do you have a spare country? No, therefore admit that you are different. 
Accept it (Le Monde 1999). 
 Greek stasis is a public illness which, in its terminal phase can be 
translated as “language trouble”, akin to what the French call la langue de 
bois, a totalitarian speech artefact. In the new South Africa language was 
taken in charge very scrupulously at this level by the TRC which 
acknowledged a recourse to everyday words, to the story-telling, as an 
integral part of a “process of national healing”. 
 
 
                                          
3 Lycurgus was the legendary law-giver of Sparta in Ancient Greece, dated to the ninth or eighth 
century BCE. (Eds.) 
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“And I would not recall...” 
 
Aristotle gives the full text of the amnesty decree in the Constitution of 
Athens (39).4 The decree begins with a regulation of emigration, proper to 
assuring civil peace. Those who had remained in Athens and collaborated 
with the Thirty could, if they wished to, move to Eleusis (a nearby 
community well within the Athenian state boundaries) and keep their 
citizenship rights, their full and entire freedom and “the pleasure of their 
goods” on the only condition that they enlist within ten days and leave 
Athens within twenty days. However, the last paragraph of the decree is 
concerned with a radical regulation of memory:  
The past events, it is not permitted to anyone to recall them ‘against’ anyone.  
The verb used, mnēsikakein, glues together “memory” (mnēmē) and “evils” 
(kaka). It is a linguistic construct made of the genitive case of the thing and 
the dative case of the person: when one recalls the evils, one always recalls 
them “against”, one reproaches somebody for them, one meets out reprisals 
for them.5 However, the decree does not aim at forbidding reprisals but to 
censure them from being recalled. A proof of this is provided by Plutarch 
when he cites, as two exempla of the same attitude conducive to “forging the 
character (ēthopoiein) and the wisdom (sōphronizein)” of those of today, the 
decree of 403 BCE and the fine imposed on the tragic poet Phrynicos in 493 
BCE for having represented on stage the sack of Miletus. The theatre broke 
out in tears and Phrynicos paid a thousand drachmas for “anamnesia of the 
national evils” (anamnēsanta oikia kaka) – i.e. for “recalling home evils”. 
 The decree’s modalities of application were in themselves drastic 
enough. Archinos, says Aristotle, kalōs politheuesthai, “practiced well and 
true politics”, or “magnificent citizenship” (Constitution, 40). The elements 
of this practice include a ruse, a summary execution, and lots of realism. The 
ruse concerns extension of the deadline for enlisting (“Many dreamt of 
emigrating, but postponed their registration until the last day”). Archinos, 
having noticed how numerous they were, wanted to keep them from leaving, 
                                          
4 See also Isocrates, Against Callimachus, 25; and Andocides, Mysteries, 90, 31. The decree (hai 
suntēkai, “the conventions”) is sometimes designated (Aristotle) as hai dialuseis, “the decollation, 
the solution, the outcome”, as if the stasis was particularly a blurring of boundaries, sometimes 
(Isocrates, Andocides) by hai diallagai, “the exchanges, the circulation” (which we translate as 
“the reconciliation”), as if it was about re-establishing a circuit. 
5 See Plato, Letters 7, 336 e-337 a:  
a city in stasis does not know the end of its evils (kaka) but when its conquerors ceases 




and cut short the originally extended period during which people could still 
register. Many people were then forced to stay, in spite of themselves, until 
they were reassured”. The exemplary execution: One of those who came 
back began to recall the past (mnēsikakein). Archinos dragged him in front 
of the Council and persuaded them to put him to death without a hearing.  
It is now that we must show that we want to maintain democracy and respect the oaths; to let 
him go is to encourage the others to act like him, to execute him is an example for all. It is 
that which took place. Afterwards, no one ever again recalled the past (emnēsikakēsen) 
(ibid.).  
Finally the decree is reinforced by an oath taken in the first person. 
Andocides6 cites the text of this oath  
“which you all took after the reconciliation”: “And I would not recall the evils against any of 
the citizens (kai ou mnēsikakēsō tōn politōn oudeni)”.  
Moreover, this oath is constantly renewed, because it is this oath, falling 
within the obligations of his task, that each Athenian judge must take 
regularly before taking seat. 
 Amnesty is there to construct a community and its institutions on the 
basis of shared amnesia. Is deliberation an aporia? 
 
 
Wearing evil out politically  
 
Aristotle’s judgment on this historical decree is revealing. The Athenians, he 
says,  
thus wore out (khrēsasthai) the preceding evils in private and in public (kai idiai kai koinēi) 
in the most beautiful and the most political way; not only, in effect, did they erase the 
accusations bearing on the past, but they also took charge in common (koinōs) of the loans (ta 
khrēmata) made to the Lacedemonians by the Thirty, although the two parties (Athens and 
Piraeus) would repay the debt separately. In effect they reached the conclusion that it was in 
this manner that they would initiate consensus (tēs homonoias).  
Thus, amnesty worked as an “eraser” – names were erased, memory was 
erased –, which is the main consequence of the prescription of amnesia. But 
I would like to dwell on two other words as well. 
 The first refers to the method used by the Athenians: they “wear out”, 
khrēsasthai, the key word of relativism, which evokes the substantive 
coming from the same root, ta khrēmata (that of which we wear out the 
riches) – in this particular case the “loans”. Whatever the translation may be, 
the wording underscores what Protagoras says in his well-known phrase: 
                                          
6 De Mysteries, 90-91. 
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“Man is the measure [touchstone] of all things [pantōn khrēmatōn]”.7 The 
Athenians use evil to make beautiful politics out of it and this transformation 
or transmutation (as the adverbial adjective signifies in “the most beautiful 
way”), is lifted from the artistry of metallurgy to a major work of art: 
aesthetic politics. 
 The second term defines the aim: to initiate “consensus”, “concord”, 
homonoia, literally the sameness (homo-) of minds and sensitivities (-noia). 
This takes place through a convergence of the private (idiai) and the public 
(koinēi), as the public, the common good, prevails, in the decision to enact 
financial solidarity and to treat loans taken by adversary parties as an 
integral part of the public debt. 
 Isocrates confirms the intelligence and political beauty of this use of evil 
in a passage in Against Callimachus (46). Literally he says:  
Since, converging towards the same, we have mutually given each other the marks of 
confidence, we politicize [politeuometha, we “citizenize”, to make up a neologism] with so 
much beauty and so much community that it is as if no evil ever struck us. Before, everyone 
judged us to be the most foolish and the most unhappy, at present it well seems that we are 
the happiest and wisest of the Greeks.  
Which leads us to the following question: What is a political act? And what 
is political speech? 
 
 
What is a political act? And what is political speech? 
 
What do we learn from this first, Athenian example? 
 We can define political action as a seesaw point which “utilizes” 
(khrēsthai) an old state to pass towards a new state. Here, the old state is the 
stasis, the civil war, and the new state is the homonoia, consensus. To 
produce the transformation one has to see the “opportunity”, the “occasion”, 
the “right moment” (or kairos), at the moment of krisis, by an act of 
distinction and judgment, which marks the crisis, the critical moment, like in 
medicine, when the decision between fatal outcome and healing is produced. 
This krisis is in the event the decree of amnesty, a dated text which, like it is 
stipulated with regard to the TRC, proposes “a firm cut-off date”, a before 
and an after (Report). A political act par excellence is the one which 
manages, literally, to devastate the devastation, and to make the evil 
irreversibly become a greater good. We could propose several versions of 
                                          
7 The imagery derives from metallurgy: by scratching a coin over a suitable touchstone, the 




this. The “onto-theological” version is represented by the poetical lines 
constantly cited by Heidegger: 
Wo aber die Gefahr ist wächst das Rettende auch (“There where the danger is, that which 
saves also grows”).8 
But I much prefer the nicely punning graffiti I read on the walls of Desmond 
Tutu’s house in Cape Town:  
How to turn human wrongs into human rights. 
 Such a political act which devastates the devastation, is in one way or 
another an act of speaking. Not only is the decree written and promulgated, 
but it has the effect of stopping the characteristic words of the stasis (the “re-
semantization” of Bouteflika in Algeria) and to give them back their 
performative power: “I would not recall the evils”. This reassurance of 
speech on its semantic and pragmatic bases produces a common language; 
and it is that itself which permits the passage from the “I” to the “we”, the 
constitution of a “with”, of an “together”, of a con-sensus. 
 What is then the exact place of the truth in such a context? The reply is 
to be searched, once again, on the side of the khrēsthai, of use and utility. 
Let us return to Protagoras and to the apology which Socrates proposes for 
him, explaining, as if he was Protagoras himself, the phrase on the man-
measure in Plato’s Theaetetus (166-167):  
See how I define the wise man: all that which appears to one of us and which is evil, inverts 
the meaning of it (metaballōn), in such a way that it now appears and is good... It is from a 
given disposition to a disposition of greater value that the inversion must be made; but the 
doctor produces this inversion by his remedies, the sophist by his discourse. From a false 
opinion, in fact, we have never let a person pass to a true opinion (...). The opinions are better 
(beltiō) than the others, in nothing truer (alēthestera) (...). Those of the orators which are wise 
good make that it is the useful things (khrēsta) in the cities, in stead of the pernicious ones, 
which to him seem just and beautiful.9 
                                          
8 From Hölderlin, Vaterländische Gesänge, Patmos (Eds. ) 
9 Reflecting Professor Cassin’s expert familiarity with the original Ancient Greek, but filtered 
through the modern French in which this paper was originally written, and through the 
subsequent translation into English, her rendering of Aristotle’s text here differs considerably 
from the published English standard translations, e.g. Jowett’s, a sample of which we include here 
(Eds.):  
And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say 
that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods 
which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to my words in the letter, but to 
take the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember what has been already said, 
– that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the 
opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be 
made wiser than the other: nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one 
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This manifestation of relativism which collapses the one into the other, the 
sphere of being and that of appearance (“appearance-and-being”), refuses to 
accept that truth could be the supreme moment (Nietzsche 1952: 109). 
Simultaneously it questions the oneness and unity of good (something like 
the Idea of the Good, which could provide a Platonic guarantee to the 
oneness and unity of truth) to the profit of the “best”. Yet “the best” is no 
longer a comparative but a relative comparative – a best is “best for” 
someone, man or city, in such a circumstance and not in another. 
 In my opinion there exist two grand philosophical gestures, and two 
only, to articulate truth with public deliberative politics. The position just 
mentioned I call “the autonomy of the political”. It denies that truth and 
good are identical or, by implication, that they are mutual inferences.10 The 
second option, quite popular among philosophers, could be called “the 
heteronomy of the political”. Here ontology determines politics. Being and 
truth are the key criteria to assign value. This paradigmatic position is 
Plato’s with his philosopher-king, for whom theōria, the contemplation of 
ideas and dialectical science, is the only condition for good government. 
This option, strictu sensu metaphysical, runs from Plato to Heidegger. In this 
regard Heidegger’s perception of the Greeks and of their “grandeur”, 
including political grandeur, is revealing. When Heidegger in his 
Parmenides uses the word “polis”, he lets resound at once the Ancient 
Greek verb pelein, which signifies einai, “being”. He then infers that the 
polis in itself is but the pole of the pelein and, consequently, that “it is only 
because the Greeks are an absolutely non-political people” that they were 
able to found politics, and did in fact do so (Heidegger 1982: 142). In other 
words, the essence of “the political” has nothing to do with politics, and the 
Greeks invented “the political” to the extent that they had first invented the 
idea of Being. 
 The second option may be called the “autonomy of the political”. It runs 
along another lineage in the philosophical tradition, beginning with the 
Sophists. At that initial and radical stage, the Sophists held that the orders of 
                                                                                                                             
impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one 
state requires to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education, a 
change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change 
which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another think 
truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or think anything 
different from that which he feels; and this is always true. But as the inferior habit of 
mind has thoughts of kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have 
good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, 
and not truer than others.  




being and truth do not command the order of action, but are commanded by 
it, more precisely created by it. The Sophists proposed something like “the 
heteronomy of ontology”, a logology. With the Sophists, in effect and in 
action (in particular, discursive action), “rhetoric” indeed produces Being, 
produces reality and, notably, produces this reality, now and here – a reality 
that was until now unheard of, paralyzed by discourse and continuously 
performed – which is the polis and its consensual deliberation. If Aristotle 
carefully distinguished between ontology and logology in order to keep open 
a place for a science of being as being, at the same time he proposed, in 
utilizing the Sophists against Plato, a practical hierarchy:  
The political is the supreme architectonic science (…) The end is not knowledge but action. 
(Nicom. Ethics I, 1, 1094a 25-30).  
 Among contemporary philosophers, Hannah Arendt, in opposing 
Heidegger, explicitly sides with the Sophistic-Aristotelian tradition when she 
stipulates that  
to consider the political in the perspective of the truth means to set foot outside the domain of 
the political (Arendt 1972: 13);  
or when she refuses, for herself, to let her work be subsumed under the term 
“political philosophy”:  
The difference, you see, belongs to the thing itself. The expression “political philosophy”, 
which I avoid, is already extraordinarily charged by the tradition (...). He [the philosopher] 
does not maintain himself in a neutral way facing the political: since Plato this is no longer 
possible (Arendt 1964: 20). 
 
 
Example 2. The South African TRC and full public disclosure 
 
How do these few remarks on the Greek tradition regarding public 
deliberation, and truth, allow us to better apprehend, even if partially, the 
rationale behind that original arrangement for deliberation called the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in modern South Africa? 
 At a first glance the contrast with the Athenian decree of amnesty is 
stark. Whereas in Athens one must “not remember” nor “recall”, in South 
Africa the imperative is one of “full disclosure”. Only that which forms the 
object of such a move is capable of receiving “amnesty”. We are then 
confronted with two opposite politics of deliberative memory:  
 
1. the failure to make a claim within the statutory time-limit or anamnesia, 
the silence or the story, the closure of the past in the present, with an 
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outdated past (in German Vergangenheit), or  
2. the construction of the future by means of a living and active past faced 
with the present (a Gewesen faced with a Gegenwart).  
 
But let me attempt to reconcile both models. 
 The very order of the words, “Truth and Reconciliation”, is by itself 
already a strong indication of a possible synthesis of opposing models. The 
finality is in effect not the truth, but the reconciliation. We do not search 
truth – disclosure, alētheia – for truth, but with a view to reconciliation – 
homonoia, koinon. The “true” here has no other definition and, in any case, 
no other objectifiable status, than that of the “best for”. This “for”, in its 
turn, is explicitly a “for us”, koinōnia or we-ness. The TRC is the political 
act which, like the Athenian decree of 403 BCE, makes a cut (“a firm cut-off 
date”), and charges itself with using evil, to transform the misfortunes, 
mistakes and suffering, to make something good out of them, notably a past 
on which to construct the “we” of a “rainbow nation”.  
 This transition from a less good to a better state is analogous to the 
treatment of an illness: What is therefore envisaged is reconciliation through 
a process of national healing. It thus comes close to the discourse as remedy 
– it is there, said Protagoras, that we remember the pharmakon of the 
Sophist. At the same time11 it shows discourse as performance in all the 
senses of the term, from the pragmatic to the theatrical. It is more 
specifically in the theatrical sense that one must interpret the spectacular 
character of this commission, sitting urbi et orbi from city to city, for one 
and all, with a televised re-broadcast every Sunday evening. It is more 
specifically in the pragmatic sense that one must understand the repeated and 
nearly “incantatory” exigency to “tell the truth”, “tell their story”. Just as the 
discourses, deliberations, epideictic and judicial speeches performed in the 
Ancient Greek city – this “most talkative of all” worlds (to use a phrase of 
Burkhardt) – the act of story-telling performs the as yet unheard history of 
the South African community; and this community constitutes itself through 




Truth is a debt due to narrative 
  
I would like to reflect for a moment on a further question: in this 
                                          
11 The idea that discourse is essentially performative (the Sophistical epideixis) is related to its 
pharmakon status, “poison-remedy”, by contrast with the organon status of “instrument” of 




perspective, what could be the meaning of the injunction to speak the truth?  
Who says that which is (legei ta eonta) always recounts a story, and in this story the 
particular facts lose their contingency and acquire a meaning that is humanly comprehensible 
(Arendt 1972: 333).  
Arendt is very close, in a certain way, to tying Africa and Greece. She does 
not deal here with philosophical truth, that of the epistēmē, the dialectics or 
science of being, but rather with the truth of narrative. Again at work is the 
mimēsis which allows us to bring Aristotle’s Poetics and Karen Blixen’s Out 
of Africa together. Think of the famous Aristotelian motto: “Poetry is more 
philosophical than history”, meaning that poetry better facilitates the 
transition from the singular to the plural, and its verification through the 
success of the katharsis. It is attune to what the novelist says: “Me, I am a 
storyteller and nothing but a storyteller”, and, “All travails can be borne if 
we transform them into story, if we tell a story on them”. Under the 
novelist’s pen, the term “reconciliation” comes naturally to whisk away, to 
suppress and overcome, a statement about truth:  
To the extent where the one who tells the truth is also a story-teller, he accomplishes that 
“reconciliation with reality” which Hegel, the philosopher of history par excellence, 
understands as the ultimate goal of all philosophical thought and which, assuredly, has been 
the secret engine of all historiography which transcends pure erudition (Arendt 1972: 334). 
 Truth is certainly, for Arendt, of the order of good faith, in line with 
Kantian judgment:  
The political function of the story-teller is teaching to accept things as they are. From this 
acceptance, which we can also call good faith, the faculty of judgment springs (ibid).  
This benevolence and this way of collapsing reconciliation into acceptance, 
that is resignation, yet do not appear to be the only possible connotations, 
nor the most appropriate. A decisively more Sophistic, and less Judeo-
Christian approach, would be to accept the violence of having fiction 
constitute such narrative; or, to resort to a Lacanian orthography, to talk of 
the “fix(at)ion” of fiction – the decided, desired and accepted fabrication of 
the past and of a common history. This is also what Gorgias says, in his own 
way:  
He that deludes [hō aptaēsas, from apatē, a Greek word, more Lacanian than Freudian in 
association, which we might render by the sequence “deception, illusion, cheating, ruse, 
artifice, pastime, pleasure] is more just that he who does not delude, and he who he is deluded 
is more just than he who is not deluded” (B23 D.K.).  
Fiction is in this sense the trope by which the best (citizens) among us, in the 
sense of the “most useful” ones, make us take something to be true; or what 
is more, it is the point where that “pretty politicizing” (Bentham 1997) 
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makes an impact on the truth. 
 The civil war of Athens lasted nine months. Apartheid lasted some forty 
years. It is without doubt apt to also measure the two treatments of memory 
with this yardstick of extension over time. In the former case, the issue is not 
how to bring the past to light, everything is immediately known by 
everyone, it is forgetting that must be constructed. In the latter case, on the 
contrary, the past is a hole or a series of distortions which cannot be shared. 
Full disclosure and to tell the story are the instruments of the common 
construction of the past, to such an extent that “not having to answer to”, 
“not having to expect retaliation”, is a prerequisite for accounts to be finally 
settled and for the report to be finalized (logon didonai, for Athenian 
magistrates; accountability, for the TRC).  
 Here are two opposite prescriptions, posited centuries from each other, 
but on the base of a common horizon of speech, of deliberation – of parole 
publique – and leading up to the same kind of finality by virtue of the 
autonomy of the political. The political proximity of these two extreme 
treatments of memory appears even more clearly when we confront them 
with a third figure, the ordinary French rules concerning Archives, and how 
these rules intersect with public deliberation. 
 
 
Example 3. The closed period in French memory-archives 
 
The memory-archive that conserves traces, that classifies and that is there 
for being consulted is the normal and general memory of historical events, 
regulated by laws which display considerable similarities at least in Europe 
and the United States. 
 The regulatory structure of archiving follows a simple pattern: A closed 
period is imposed during which the archives may not be consulted. Let us 
call it, in contrast to historical time, “closed period” (when time has gone 
latent). The duration of this closed period depends on the nature of the 
archives, themselves dependent on classification, and there is always room 
for infringement. In this connection, regulation is not a mere administrative 
act, it is a political act and as such subject to change. Changes generally 
happen under the pressure of crises (like in the case of sensitive archives in 
the United States, the Pentagon Archives and those of the Vietnam War). 
There is a trend toward reducing the closed period and making archives 
public sooner than before. (Clinton ordered declassification after 10 years). 
 The recent changes in French archival regulation are worth looking into. 




1939-1940 have been open for consultation by the public since 1990. A 1979 
decree (executive order), still in force, “liberalized” the rule down to 30 
years. But simultaneously it instituted “special delays” in regard to 
documents listed in another executive order of December 1979.12 De facto, 
the orders have the effect of increasing to 60 years or sometimes 100 years 
everything that concerns the Second World War and is deemed 
“exceptional”, in particular judicial records (these documents can only be 
consulted from 2000 or 2010). The norm may be 30 years, but for medical 
files the closed period is 150 years (counting from the date of birth), for 
personal files 120 years (counting from the date of birth), down to 100 years 
for notary records, registry files, records of census and intelligence; also 100 
years (counting from the date of the last document, that is from the date of 
closure of a given file) for all justice files, including pardons; finally 60 
years for everything concerning private life, the security of the state and 
national defence. The 1979 executive orders were supplemented, but not 
repealed, by a 1998 decree under the Jospin administration. The decree 
concerns procedures of declassification. It establishes that preference must 
be given to short “closure” above long “closure”; in a way, it makes the 
exception (access granted within a closed period) the rule. As a result 
researchers’ access has significantly improved. The status quo (1979) 
nevertheless remains in force:  
 
a. Clauses of secrecy or restrictive dispositions ad actum remain 
(interest of the state, private life, industrial and commercial secrets of 
businesses);  
b. Partial lifting of restrictions is given on personal request or ad 
personam (as a result, a researcher can gain access to a specific 
document for statistical purposes, but a member of the public who 
wants to know “who did what in my village” will be refused access to 
the same document);  
c. The application procedure is rather complex (the request must be 
made jointly to the Archives of France and to the specific 
administration concerned). Today 90% of all requests are granted. The 
remaining 10% relates to unilateral archiving (the archives of the 
defence and foreign affairs ministries, the contested archives of the 
Paris police prefecture), practices of obstruction (slowness, default of 
                                          
12 Loi du 79-18 of 1979/1/3 and Décret d’application of 3/12/1979. I thank Mr Jean Pouëssel from 
the French National Archives, who facilitated access to documents and explained to me the 
regulations and their perverse effects. 
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inventory), inquiries concerning living persons and, in particular, 
persons at once “amnestied and living” (amnistiées et vivantes). 
 
 In the latter case the documents are never communicated.13 This concerns 
all the postbellum “purification” files which are not accessible until the next 
generation so that children cannot have access to information about their 
amnestied parents. In a general sense this remains the status quo of the 
programmed closed period. This delay of access amounts to suppression 
which keeps the “hot” information in limbo. The past never arrives directly 
in the present: it is a differed, disinfected dead past. Deliberation is stifled. 
To put it crudely: a past so regulated is a past for historians and statisticians, 
never a past for the citizen. 
 This is why the Athenian imperative of “I would not remember” and the 
South African full disclosure – the silence and the story – fall on the same 
side of a divide, that of a memory politically alive, while the memory-
archive is staring at the two of them from the other side, that of the written 
treatment, that seeks to “dis-interest”, to de-politicize memory. In other 
words, the Athenian stasis is in the past tense, a past definitively closed yet 
achieved in its present; South Africa’s apartheid is in the future perfect 
(anterior) tense, inasmuch as its future is constructed at present in the past; 
World War II is in the perfect tense, programmed in order never to be 
anything but a has been. The time of the public, of the citizen, is the same as 
the community’s time (I keep silent before “us”, I tell before “us”), the time 
of the historian is one with a dichotomized they/us, “they”, the specialists, 
the decision-makers, those who have access to the files, versus “we”, the 
generation kept in ignorance and denial, by forbidding the forgetting and the 
recollection for the benefit of commemoration only. 
 With reference to the Pentagon archives and the MacNamara Report, 
Arendt emphasizes the double danger of such a policy of specialists. On the 
one hand, in her view, the public or its elected representatives are denied the 
possibility of knowing what they should know in order to make an informed 
decision: the “we” is disabled. On the other hand, those in charge, who have 
access, continue to reside in their ignorance (Arendt 1972: 7-51). Without 
“us” and with none of “them” being informed (because their knowledge or 
ignorance escapes control), a politics based on non-facts is put in place, 
performed into a historical narrative by singular rather than public agents. 
As Arendt cruelly emphasizes, France, thanks to De Gaulle, is part of the 
                                          
13 There is the case a legal journalist, amnestied and alive, who wins all his court cases on the 




Second World War victors while, thanks to Adenauer, National-Socialist 
barbarism has only affected a small part of the German population. In this 
world of specialists, let us think of Braumann’s film on the archives of the 
court case of “Eichmann, a specialist”.14 
 
 
Conclusion: pardoning, repenting, and the public “we” 
 
In conclusion, let us consider a couple of points regarding reconciliation and 
the relationship between reconciliation and pardoning, which would allow us 
to come back to the question of the autonomy of the political in relation to 
what deliberation may be. At the beginning of a Memorandum on the Report 
of the TRC we read:  
It is based on the principle that a reconciliation depends on forgiveness and that forgiveness 
can only take place if gross violations of human rights are fully disclosed. What is therefore 
envisaged is reconciliation through a process of national healing. The promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Bill, 1995, seeks to find a balance between the process of national 
healing and forgiveness, as well as the granting of amnesty as required by the interim 
Constitution. 
Reconciliation and pardoning, forgiveness, are presented as closely allied 
through full disclosure. An equilibrium is to be found between national 
health and pardoning on the one hand, and amnesty on the other. However, 
when we look at the Committee of Amnesty’s three conditions with which 
an amnesty application must comply before it can at all be considered, the 
term of “pardoning” does not appear. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions are that:  
 
1. the deed is associated with a political motive;  
2. the deed took place between 1 March 1960 and the cut-off date;  
3. full disclosure has been made.  
 
But full disclosure itself apparently does not require pardoning or repenting. 
In fact: “Full disclosure (...) demands an inquiry into the state of mind of the 
person responsible for the act”. One of the most controversial issues faced 
                                          
14 These are home truths to West European readers of a mature vintage, but need spelling out for 
readers from other continents and other age cohorts. Charles de Gaulle, later President of France, 
owed his popularity to his command of French formal military forces in exile, confronting the 
forces of Nazi (National Socialist) Germany during World War II. After that war, Germany 
regained its international respectability under Adenauer as head of state. Eichmann was a high-
ranking Nazi officer in charge of industrialized mass murder especially of Jews; he was tried and 
executed in Jeruzalem, Israel, in 1961. (Eds.) 
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by the TRC had to do with this question of pardoning: faced with his victims 
or the families, must or must not the perpetrator ask for pardon? Can anyone 
tell a perpetrator to ask for pardon? 
 As far as I am concerned I would like to plead for the practical wisdom 
and the political beauty of not making repenting and pardoning compulsory. 
Here we find the autonomy of the political again, without any reference to 
ontology, but with reference to religion and ethics, enacting the difference 
between Plato and Aristotle. Think of it: there is only one Republic by Plato, 
but there are two clearly distinct works of Aristotle, The Nicomachean 
Ethics and the Politics. In my opinion, reconciliation – effectively the 
production of a “we” – is not a ethical affair but a political affair. A clear 
distinction must be made between the recognition of a fact – full disclosure – 
and contrition. The recognition of a fact is in itself a sign of belonging to a 
political community, while repenting and pardoning forms part of an entirely 
different sphere, ethical or religious. This is where Protagoras’ myth comes 
in handy, as told by Plato in Protagoras.  
 The myth tells how the human species, badly equipped on the day of its 
birth by Epimetheus the Improvident, was going to disappear from the face 
of the earth when Prometheus gave it the enteknos sōphia sun puri (“artistic 
– technological – wisdom and fire”); how humans, now equipped to produce 
and manufacture, proceeded to kill each other as they lacked “political 
wisdom”; how Zeus then gave the human species a “supplement”: aidōs 
(“scruple” or “respect” – the feeling of what one must do towards one self 
and under the gaze of the other) and dikē (“justice” – the public norm of 
conduct); how Hermes asked whether aidōs and dikē should be shared 
among all humans or given to experts, like medicine or the art of making 
shoes. As a reply, Zeus ordered that “to all and that all share them” and 
added: “that those who do not share them be put to death as an illness of the 
city” (Protagoras, 320c-322d). A paradox indeed: If everyone has it, what 
exceptions could there still be? Protagoras, in the ensuing speech explains 
and interprets his myth (Protagoras, 323b-c):  
It is about justice and, more generally, about political virtue, if a man whom we know to be 
unjust publicly comes to state the truth on his own account, that which we previously judged 
to be common sense (to tell the truth) we know judge to be mad, and we affirm that everyone 
has to confirm being just, whether they are or not, or even more that the one who does not 
infringe justice is a fool – in the idea that there is necessarily nobody who does not in a 
certain way (pōs) have justice in common without which he does not count among the 
number of men.15 
                                          




 The key to Protagoras’ paradox here (“everyone has justice, and those 
who do no have it must be killed”) is the following: Everyone is just, even 
those who are not. They must pretend to be just and that is all they need to 
be just “in a certain way”. In affirming that they are just, they recognize 
justice as constitutive of the human community and by so doing justice itself 
is integrated in the city – in a way, it is the praise of virtue by vice that 
universalizes virtue. 
 The background of the myth and of the whole dialogue between 
Protagoras and Socrates is the question of knowing “whether virtue can be 
taught”. Protagoras maintains that everyone is naturally virtuous and that 
virtue is taught according to the exact model of the mother-tongue. Everyone 
has it, and yet we do not stop teaching it, from the nanny to the teacher. This 
is why Athenian democracy is properly founded as it gives everyone 
isēgoria, equality of speech, freedom for everyone to speak in front of the 
assembly. Everyone speaks, everyone is just, everyone is a citizen. Public 
deliberation, parole publique at its best. But the fact is that some are better at 
it than others – for Protagoras they are the Sophists or politicians, and one 
had better place oneself under their tutoring, at least temporarily. Protagoras’ 
analysis goes beyond being applicable to the TRC’s practice and to the TRC 
as a model for deliberation within reconciliatory politics. It shows two 
things. Firstly, that repenting, the apology or the request of pardon, is that 
much less necessary since “the one who does not infringe justice is a fool”. 
The perpetrator who speaks in front of the TRC could well argue that his 
past acts, even if barbaric, show justice, that consistency is still interpretable 
ad majorem communitatis gloriam16 as an indication that s/he did never 
cease to act as a member of the community, thus attempting to further the 
transition from a worse to a better state. Secondly, what counts in full 
disclosure is not that one declares one’s injustice, it is that one declares 
one’s injustice.  
 This is the condition for membership of a deliberative community. 
Shared language is the minimum requirement for a “we” to appear. Such 
sharing even implies that one consents to practices such as the TRC itself, 
                                                                                                                             
....but when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that 
he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his 
dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now 
deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are 
honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, 
that a man must have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not 
to be in the world. 
16 “To enhance the glory of the community” (Eds.) 
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that one forms part of a new given. From this point of view it is fundamental 
that instances such as the TRC are not given the format of a tribunal and that 
one does not have to submit oneself to its verdict. It is this transcendental 
turn, according to which speech suffices to constrain to a “we”, which is 
comforted by the effective creation, a fixing through story-telling, of a 
shared past.  
 To return to my opening quotation from Plutarch: Speech, la parole, is 
indeed a beautiful political means to remove from hate its eternity. 
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ABSTRACT. The author seeks to explore to what extent it is possible for victims and survivors to 
“get on with life” in the shift from a systematically abusive society to what Rajeev Bhargava has 
so aptly called “a minimally decent society”. The author does so, mindful that “moving on” does 
not take place for victims or survivors in a space free from the presence of perpetrators who 
harbour their own bad memories. Sometimes victims are also perpetrators and frequently 
perpetrators are themselves victims of one kind or another. Bad memories, of one kind or 




I have deliberately avoided words like reconciliation, forgiveness and 
healing in the title of my paper. I do so precisely because of the importance I 
attach to them – and resort to them later. My concern is that they often imply 
unrealistic expectations. They are complex terms, weighed down by 
generations of usage and accretions of the ages. They often limit our ability 
to grapple adequately with the possibilities of realistic individual and/or 
national transition from a society marked by the systematic abuse of human 
rights to an existence shaped by at least the formal affirmation of human 
rights. Differently stated, in what follows I seek to explore to what extent it 
is possible for victims and survivors to “get on with life” in the shift from a 
systematically abusive society to what Rajeev Bhargava has so aptly called 
“a minimally decent society”.1 I do so mindful that “moving on” does not 
take place for victims or survivors in a space free from the presence of 
perpetrators who harbour their own bad memories. Sometimes victims are 
also perpetrators and frequently perpetrators are themselves victims of one 
1 In Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd 2000. 
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kind or another. Bad memories, of one kind or another, reside close to 
consciousness and are indeed at the centre of self-consciousness of many 
South Africans. 
 
To this end I comment on:  
 
• The ambivalent nature of memory. 
• The reality of needing to live with bad memories. 
• The importance of learning to live together with past enemies.  
 
 
Memory as pain and promise 
 
Winston Churchill, with the horrors of World War II still dominating human 
consciousness, drawing on the words of William Gladstone, expounded the 
virtue of “a blessed act of oblivion.”2 The problem, suggests Timothy Garton 
Ash, is that “often it is the victims who are cursed by memory, while 
perpetrators are blessed by forgetting.”3 The brooding presence of bad 
memories for victims and survivors is such that it insists on the need to 
know what happened, who is responsible and why it happened. “Crimes”, 
writes Michael Ignatieff, “can never safely be fixed in the historical past; 
they remain locked in the eternal present….”4 Even those perpetrators, by-
standers and passive participants in the gross violations of human rights in 
South Africa’s past, who protest the loudest in demanding that apartheid is 
over and that we now need to get on with the future, are to a greater or lesser 
extent protesting against the past that will not go away. It is this reality that 
gave rise to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the first place.  
 Justice Richard Goldstone put it this way:  
The decision to opt for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was an important 
compromise. If the ANC had insisted on Nuremberg-style trials for the leaders of the former 
apartheid government, there would have been no peaceful transition to democracy, and if the 
former government had insisted on a blanket amnesty then, similarly, the negotiations would 
have broken down. A bloody revolution sooner rather than later would have been inevitable. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a bridge from the old to the new.5 
 Over 22,000 victims and survivors made voluntary statements to the 
Commission and 7,500 applied for amnesty, indicating a willingness to 
                                          
2 In Ash 1997a: 201. 
3 Ash 1997b: 22. 
4 Ignatieff 1998: 14. 
5 Goldstone 1997. 
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make full disclosure about the past. Not all these nearly 30,000 persons who 
chose to remember or indicated a willingness to make full disclosure about 
the past did so to the satisfaction of the Commission. Some statements given 
to the Human Rights Violations Committee and some amnesty applications 
were rejected as being false. The outcome has, however, been an exercise in 
which the nation has been confronted with its past in a manner that few other 
countries have voluntarily chosen to do. Stephen Ellis, writing in Critique 
Internationale, states that the Report of the Commission  
represents probably the most far-reaching attempt by an official body to come to terms with 
the human rights abuses committed by a previous government anywhere in the world since 
the Nuremberg trials of the late 1940s.6  
Others have trashed the Report and still others have pointed to its academic 
limitations.7 Suffice it to say – for all the failures of the Commission it is 
largely as a result of its work that few, if any, South Africans can ever again 
either deny what happened, or say “we did not know” – the two standard 
responses to the Nazi Holocaust among those who identify, directly or 
indirectly, with the perpetrators.  
 In reflecting on this process all the words that I chose to avoid in the title 
of my paper, are back with us: truth, reconciliation, forgiveness, healing and 
many others. I seek to capture the essence of the debate that surrounds these 
powerful and provocative words by raising several questions:  
 
• Why not amnesia?  
• But, how reliable is memory?  
• Can another person’s story ever be adequately told?  
 
 
Why not amnesia?  
 
Is it merely because some cannot forget? Can a systematic exercise in 
remembering the past serve any good? Is there not something to be said for 
oblivion? Does not time heal? Hear the words of German Federal President 
Roman Herzog on the occasion of the Deutscher Bundestag in 1996:  
The pictures of the piles of corpses, of murdered children, women and children, women and 
men, of starved bodies, are so penetrating that they remain distinctly engraved, not just in the 
minds of survivors and liberators, but in those who will read and view accounts of [the 
Holocaust] today. (…) Why then do we have to will to keep this memory alive? Would it not 
                                          
6 Ellis 1999.  
7 See Jeffery 1999, and Colin Bundy’s academic critique (1999). 
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be an evident desire to let the wounds heal into scars and to lay the dead to rest? (…) History 
fades quickly if it is not part of one’s own experience. [But] memory is living future. We do 
not want to conserve the horror. We want to draw lessons that future generations can use as 
guidance. (…) In the light of sober description the worst barbarous act shrinks into an 
anonymous event. If we wish for the erasure of this memory we ourselves will be the first 
victims of self-deception. (Presse etc. 23.01.96. Translated and quoted in Kayser 1997/98.) 
In essence, we are told that we remember in order not to repeat past 
atrocities. Terrence McCaughey, President of the former Irish Anti-
Apartheid Movement, tells of his student days at Tübingen University in 
Germany in the late 1950s. There was a week-long film series on German 
politics from the Weimer Republic to the rise and fall of Adolf Hitler. 
Academic life almost came to a standstill. He tells of his Old Testament 
lecturer, Professor Karl Elliger, addressing his class on the morning after the 
final presentation: “You young people no doubt think we were all stupid not 
to have seen what was happening”, he said. “We have no excuses. But learn 
this, evil never comes from the same direction, wearing the same face. I 
hope you will be wiser and more discerning than our generation when the 
threat of evil next comes around. You need to be vigilant.” The professor 
turned to his notes and lectured his students on the Book of Joshua.8 
 We remember in the hope that we will not repeat past atrocities. But 
primarily we remember because we cannot, while the past remains 
unresolved, lay its ghost to rest. Pertinent in this respect are the words of 
Rebecca Hanse, a relative of Fezile Hanse who, together with Andile Majol 
and Patrick Madikane was shot dead by riot police on 17 June 1985 in 
Bongolethu, a black township on the outskirts of Oudtshoorn:  
We must preserve the bones of our children until they can rest in peace. We cannot forget. 
We must keep our children alive. They were not ready to die. There is much for them still to 
do. We are not ready to let them go.9  
Maybe a time will come when their bones will rest in peace. In time, 
hopefully, the past will no longer be with us in as excruciating way as it is at 
present.  
 Why do we remember? Ultimately the nation is called to remember for 
the sake of those who suffer. It is a manner of restoring the dignity of 
victims and survivors by ensuring that their suffering does not pass 
unnoticed. It is to say to victims and survivors, “your suffering is part of our 
healing as a nation. We remember you.” 
 
                                          
8 In Dublin, 10 March, 1999. 
9 In conversation at the grave of the Bongolethu Three, June 1996. See also TRC Report, Volume 
3, pp. 437-439. 
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But, how reliable is memory?  
 
Memory is at best a tricky thing. Memory is fraught with trauma and often 
incomprehension. Pam Reynolds reminds us that it is “raw memory” which 
emerges in testimony.10 It gives expression to the inability of language to 
articulate what needs to be said. Memory is incomplete. Its very 
incompleteness is what cries out to be heard. There is also the testimony of 
silence. There is body language. There is fear, anger and confusion. There is 
a struggle between telling what happened and explaining it away. Mxolisi 
(Ace) Mgxashe struggles with the very question of truth. “Inyani iyababa”, 
he observes, in Xhosa; this means, “truth is bitter”.  
It is so bitter [that] sometimes we find ourselves quarrelling over whether it should be told at 
all. Even when there has been some consensus that the truth should be told (…) we invariably 
disagree on the extent to which it must be told.11 
 Sometimes we involuntarily hide the truth as much from ourselves as 
others. Antjie Krog prefers not to even use the word “truth”. “I prefer the 
word lie”, she says. “The moment the lie raises its head, I smell blood. 
Because it is there (…) where truth is closest.”12 Truth rarely leaps forth to 
introduce itself unmolested by lies, confusion, forgetfulness and evasion. It 
needs to be dug out! 
 What then is the relationship between truth and fiction? Testifying at a 
Cape Town hearing of the TRC into the killing of the Guguletu Seven in 
April 1996, Cynthia Ngewu, the mother of Christopher Piet, one of those 
killed, wrestled with what had in fact happened. “Now nobody knows the 
real-real story” she noted.13 The ambiguity of memory is real. It is reality 
that is frequently exploited by those who seek to discredit those who have 
suffered and struggle to find words to articulate their deepest experience of 
what happened. Thus Anthea Jeffery attacks the Commission because 
(according to her) insufficient attention was given to the importance of 
factual or objective truth, by recognizing the importance of what the 
Commission called personal or narrative (dialogue) truth, as well as social 
truth and healing or restorative truth. The Commission deliberately chose to 
wrestle with these notions of truth in relation to factual or forensic truth.14 
The Commission was not a court of law and (for good reason) it did not 
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14 Jeffery 1999. 
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subject victim and survivor testimony to cross-examination. It did, however, 
through its corroboration assess such testimony on the basis of a balance of 
probability. Graeme Simpson is correct 
most of the legal and jurisprudential dilemmas presented by the TRC process are actually 
rooted in its own almost bi-polar roles as both a “fact-finding” and a “quasi-judicial” 
enterprise, on the one hand, and as a psychologically sensitive mechanism for story telling 
and healing, on the other.15  
The Commission resolved at its inception to provide maximum space for 
victims and survivors to speak. At the same time (prodded and forced by 
legal action initiated by perpetrators), the Commission committed itself to 
due process of law that gave alleged perpetrators an opportunity to offer 
rebuttal. The outcome was a set of findings that, given the restraints as 
identified by Simpson above, sought to “present as complete a picture as 
possible” of gross violations of human rights committed during the period 
stipulated by the mandate (31 March 1960 to 10 May 1994). There remains, 
of course, a huge amount of incomplete transitionary work yet to be 
undertaken – both by the courts with regard to “fact finding” and by 
government and civil society at the level of facilitating more story-telling 
and the promotion of healing.  
 Albert Camus has called truth “as mysterious as it is inaccessible” and 
yet, he insisted, worth “being fought for eternally”.16 Its discovery involves a 
long and slow process. It often involves debate as well as conflict around 
stories that contradict one another. This is part of the process of national 
reconciliation. The words of Donald Shriver are compelling in this regard:  
One does not argue long with people whom one deems of no real importance. Democracy is 
at its best when people of clashing points of view argue far into the night, because they know 
that the next day they are going to encounter each other as residents of the [same] 
neighbourhood.17  
The difficulties of creating democracy out of a culture of gross violations of 
human rights are immense. It can be facilitated through what the Chileans 
call reconvivencia – a process of getting used to living with each other 
again. Above all, it involves being exposed to the worst fears of one’s 
adversaries. It requires getting to know one another, gaining a new insight 
into what happened as well as an empathetic understanding of how a 
particular event is viewed by one’s adversaries.  
 The genre of memory must be allowed to flow where it will, giving 
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expression to bitterness and anger as well as life and hope. It is, at the same 
time, important to recognize that the “politics of memory” can be abused by 
politicians to fuel the fires of hatred – as seen in the case of the Anglo-Boer 
war, in Northern Ireland and the situation in the former Yugoslavia. It is 
important to include stories that embrace and affirm restoration in the 
nation’s repertoire of story-telling. Memory as justice and not least as 
healing is, at the same time, often about victims working through their anger 
and hatred, as a means of rising above their suffering – of getting on with 
life with dignity. And yet, as the title of this paper suggests, it is also 
necessary to live with bad memories.  
 
 
Can another person’s story ever be adequately told?  
 
Getting to know one another and building relationships between former 
enemies involves many things. Important among these is welding together a 
story that unites rather than one that divides. This involves the difficult 
process of moving beyond testimony, which, I have suggested, is frequently 
fraught with trauma, incompleteness and sometimes incomprehension.  
 This is perhaps where poetry, music and myth can contribute more to 
healing than any attempt to explain in some rigid forensic way “who did 
what to whom”. Antjie Krog’s celebrated novel on the work of the 
Commission, Country of My Skull,18 weaves fragments from different 
testimonies and interviews into a semi-fictional historical account of events. 
The Commission felt compelled to do both more and less than what she 
accomplished. It was, above all, obliged to be more comprehensive and thus 
compelled to reduce or translate the richness of raw memory, or what has 
been called first generation testimony, into historical narrative.  
 To tell the story of another is never an adequate substitute for primary 
testimony. The TRC Report simply gives expression to the stuff out of 
which reports are made. It is, by definition, a poor substitute for the drama of 
testimony that was acted out before the country over a two-year period. It is 
this primary testimony to which the written Report points and by which the 
success or the failure of the Commission must be judged. Questions raised 
from the relative luxury of academia concerning the work of the 
Commission and the Report of the Commission are important – they enable 
us all to take the debate further. They should never, however, be allowed to 
distract from the importance of what victims and survivors told a nation 
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struggling to make its way from the horrors of apartheid to the beginnings of 
a minimally decent society. It is difficult to conceive how any historical text 
can ever capture the pain of testimony of the heart. 
 
 
Possibilities of living with bad memories 
 
Is it ever possible, for those who truly suffer, to put the past behind them? 
Njabulo Ndebele suggests that:  
The verbalisation of pain and suffering through an official medium recognized as a result of 
change that was fought for (…) complicates relationships that were based on internalized 
assumptions. Their articulation raises the social temperature that [needs] at the same time 
(…) to be lowered (…). It should translate into visible measures for improving the lives of the 
victims of the past, who even while they are still in a state of severe disadvantage, ought not 
to experience themselves any more as victims.19 
Important words, to which I shall return. They need to be amplified and 
heard. My question concerns the extent to which the goal to which they 
point is ever fully realized. To what extent is the burden of the past ever laid 
to rest? Adjacent to Ndebele’s words, I offer those of Holocaust victim 
Primo Levi:  
This is the awful privilege of our generation and of my people, no one better than us has ever 
been able to grasp the incurable nature of the offence, that spreads like a contagion. It is 
foolish to think that human justice can eradicate it. It is an inexhaustible fount of evil; it 
breaks the body and the spirit of the submerged, it perpetuates itself as hatred among 
survivors, and swarms around in a thousand ways, against the very will of all, as thirst for 
revenge, as a moral capitulation, as denial, as weariness, as renunciation.20 
 Clearly some show a greater resilience than others, manifest in their 
ability to rise above the anguish of past suffering. Testimony that witnesses 
both to a willingness or desire to “get on with life”, as well as a reluctance or 
inability to do so, is there to be heard and analysed. I would rather offer the 
comment of a young woman named Kalu; it highlights the internalized 
emotions inherent to the transition from the old to the new: 21  
What really makes me angry about the TRC and Tutu is that they are putting pressure on me 
to forgive (…). I don’t know if I will ever be able to forgive. I carry this ball of anger within 
me and I don’t know where to begin dealing with it. The oppression was bad, but what is 
much worse, what makes me even angrier, is that they are trying to dictate my forgiveness.  
Her words capture the pathos involved in the long and fragile journey 
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towards reconciliation. No one has the right to prevail on Kalu to forgive. 
The question is whether victims and survivors can be assisted to get on with 
the rest of their lives in the sense of not allowing anger or self-pity to be the 
all-consuming dimension of their existence. When my colleague, Wilhelm 
Verwoerd, reflected on Kalu’s response, he referred to Ashley Forbes’ 
response to his torture at the hands of the notorious torturer, Jeffrey Benzien. 
Although critical of the decision to grant Benzien amnesty, arguing that he 
failed to make full disclosure, he observed:  
I forgive him and feel sorry for him. And now that the TRC has showed what happened, I can 
get on with the rest of my life. 
 Not every victim and survivor deals with his or her past in this way. It is 
important, however, for their own sake, that victims and survivors are 
assisted (to the extent that it possible) to indeed get on with life. This does 
not mean forgetting the ghastly deeds of the past. This is usually not possible 
and probably not helpful. There is indeed a place for righteous anger, which 
can be a source of self-worth and dignity. To get on with life does not mean 
necessarily becoming friends with the person responsible for one’s suffering. 
Very few accomplish this. It does mean dealing with the “ball of anger” that 
prevents one from getting on with life. And yet the graph of the journey 
forward is rarely a progressively even one. Such progress that is made in 
getting on with life tends to take place in concentric circles. Progress can be 
made. Time and circumstances of different kinds do assist the healing 
process. But there is also deep memory that reminds us that the past is never 
quite past. Bernard Langer, reflecting on the suicide of Primo Levi, forty 
years after the latter’s release from Auschwitz, speaks of the “painful and 
uneasy stress between trauma and recovery”.22 Levi’s prolific writing at no 
time fails to portray the presence of melancholy. Langer argues that:  
Levi, as a suicide, demolishes the idea that he had mastered his past, come to term with the 
atrocity of Auschwitz, and rejoined the human community healed and whole. Life went on 
for him, of course, though it is probably a mistake to think of his writings as a form of 
therapy, a catharsis that freed him from what he called the memory of the offence. It is clear 
from everything he wrote that survival did not mean a restored connection with what had 
gone before. The legacy of permanent disruption may be difficult to accept, but it lingers in 
his suicide like an abiding parasite.23 
Levi’s testimony is that of one who seeks to wash his conscience and 
memory clean. Refusing to reduce the immensity of his particular ordeal to 
“a capacity for evil buried in human nature somewhere”, he is angry at 
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society’s apparent indifference to the question as to what makes killers resort 
to the depths of humanity they do. And yet he insisted, “to a greater or lesser 
degree all were responsible”. The “greater majority of Germans”, he writes,  
“ … accepted [the persecution of the Jews] in the beginning out of mental laziness, myopic 
calculations, stupidity and national pride….”24  
 Wrestling with memories of suffering and questions concerning the 
nature of evil, he killed himself. The concentric circles of others in the quest 
to get on with life are less decisive. Joe Seremane is angry with the 
Commission for failing to probe deeply enough into death of his brother 
Timothy Tebogo Sermane in the ANC Quatro Camp in 1981. . “You owe us 
a lot”, he told the Commission. “Not monetary compensation, but our bones 
buried in shallow graves in Angola and heaven knows where else.” He 
quotes words from Langston Hughes’s Minstrel Man:25 
 
 
                                          
Because my mouth 
 Is wide with laughter 
 And my throat deep with song, 
 Do you not think 
 I suffer, after I have held 
 My pain so long? 
 
Whatever the truth of the various allegations (by Seremane and the counter 
charges by the ANC) the pathos of his words should not be missed. The 
question is: what can society do to help those who suffer to move on? In 
Ndebele’s words, the question is how to promote  
visible measures for improving the lives of the victims of the past, who even while they are 
still in a state of severe disadvantage ought not to experience themselves any more as victims.  
 
 
Learning to live together  
 
The question really is, where do we go from here? The point is well made by 
Jose Zalaquett, who, having served on the Chilean National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, thinks back on what it has accomplished. 
“Leaders”, he suggests,26 “should never forget that the lack of political 
pressure to put these issues on the agenda does not mean they are not boiling 
underground, waiting to erupt.” South Africa has bought itself time and 
24 Ibid, pp. 23-42. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Borraine et al. 1994: 15. 
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space through the TRC and other transitional mechanisms to deal with those 
issues that brought it to the brink of collapse in 1990. The issues still need to 
be dealt with. The nation must, at the same time, move on. It is time to move 
on – to get on with life. The question is how?  
 How can South Africans assist one another to do so? Story-telling needs 
to continue. We barely know one another in this country. The healing of 
memories has only just started. Economic disparity needs to be redressed. 
The needs of the poor are not likely to be addressed merely because of a set 
of socio-economic clauses in the constitution. It will take political 
organization, public pressure and (probably) a measure of militancy by the 
poor themselves. For this to happen, democratic debate and the freedom of 
speech are needed.  
 And yet, as mentioned earlier in this paper, perpetrators, passive 
participants in gross violations of human rights and bystanders who, simply, 
allowed the atrocities to occur, harbour memories in their own way. 
Sometimes they are nostalgic memories of grandeur. Often they are bad 
memories of deeds done. It was the task of the Commission not only to 
restore the dignity of victims and survivors, but also to facilitate the 
reintegration of perpetrators into society as useful participants and 
productive members of a new social order. The task is a huge one. It always 
was beyond the capacity of any Commission. I have not addressed this 
matter in this paper. Simply, again, I draw attention to perpetrator memory 
in closing, as a reminder that the healing of the memories of victims and 
survivors does not take place in a protected user-friendly environment. Such 
healing often struggles to happen in a contested terrain where, in fact, the 
entire panoply of South Africa’s past is struggling to deal with the emerging 
new reality of human existence. 
 How to heal a nation? What constitutes the material essence of living 
together? All this can probably be reduced to the seminal (but often tedious) 
debate around the question: Who is an African? It has to do with belonging 
and taking responsibility. Robert Sobukwe, the late PAC leader, thought that 
the only criterion for being an African was whether a person regarded Africa 
as his or her home. The Freedom Charter says Africa belongs to all who live 
within it. To make Africa home means to care about its problems – poverty, 
underdevelopment and alienation. It is in the self-interest of “yesterday’s 
colonizers” to take on this responsibility. Whites and people of other ethnic 
origins who choose to do so need, in turn, in their present vulnerability to be 
reassured that their vigorous participation in the African family is welcomed 
rather than tolerated. Both the born Africans and the Africans by choice are 
needed to build South Africa’s future.  
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 Questions abound: What does it mean for a nation to be reconciled? Can 
a nation confess? What does national forgiveness involve? Jakes Gerwel 
suggests that an individualistic understanding of reconciliation limits our 
understanding of what reconciliation may mean at the national level. By 
clinging to an individualistic understanding, he suggests that we risk 
“pathologizing a remarkably reconciled nation by demanding a perpetual 
quest for the Holy Grail of reconciliation.”27 Recognizing that while many 
individual victims and perpetrators of gross human-rights violations are not 
reconciled, a lot of progress has indeed been made at a national level. There 
is yet a distance to travel. Some people refuse to make the journey, 
entrenching themselves in their own closed memory. At least we are not 
killing one another to the extent that we were in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
As was recently observed by Peter-John Pearson, a Roman Catholic working 
in Bonteheuvel: 
The level of coexistence that we have attained in South Africa is not something to be taken 
for granted. It is a huge improvement on what we had prior to 1994. 
     And yet, mere coexistence robs me of the possibility of sharing in something new. It is 
tempting to settle for coexistence, and in so doing to accept the inequalities and indignities 
that continue to characterize South Africa. Our dream was for something new. It is a dream 
worth keeping alive. 28  
 Unless the South African experiment in healing reaches victims and 
survivors of the apartheid years, and beyond that heals the hardened hearts 
of both direct perpetrators of gross violations of human rights as well as the 
benefactors of apartheid, the healing process that is taking place is likely to 
be incomplete. This would be a huge tragedy for a nation that has done so 
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WORKS OF FAITH, FAITH OF WORKS 




ABSTRACT. This essay is a reflection on how South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) has articulated and defended the proposition that reconciliation affords victims of human 
rights abuses the opportunity to forgive their tormentors. While certainly not the only proposed 
benefit of reconciliation, the author believes that the controversy surrounding the TRC’s call for 
forgiveness sheds light on the “problem of persuasion” that appears when institutional and 
quasi-institutional bodies attempt to generate public support for reconciliation. 
 
 
Truth and Reconciliation. In the motion and instant of transition, this phrase 
issues a challenge to our understanding, politics, and faith. The meanings of 
its constituent terms are ambiguous, their relationship contested. How should 
we read the “and” that sits between “Truth and Reconciliation?” At times, 
these concepts and practices appear coupled; truth motivates reconciliation 
while reconciliation lends form to truth-seeking, helping to gather what 
Antjie Krog rightly sees as the dizzying and sometimes paralytic array of 
truth theory – correspondence, coherence, deflationary, pragmatic, 
redundancy, semantic, double, logical, subjective, and so on (Krog 1998: 
461). On the other side of the coin, however, these goods of transition may 
stand in opposition. It is possible that reconciliation overwhelms and 
exceeds conventional notions of truth, leading us with a vision of testimony 
in which, citing Derrida, “truth is promised beyond all proof, all perception, 
all intuitive demonstration” (Derrida 1996: 63). More troublesome, 
reconciliation has been criticized as an institutional ploy, a theo-poetic 
remnant of colonization that, according to Wole Soyinka, allows for the 
“remission of sin in the immediate context of the unfinished business of 
[such] criminality” (Soyinka 1999: 75). In this light, the sin of reconciliation 
is its omission of truth.  
 What is the truth of reconciliation? What justifies our faith in the idea 
that reconciliation can energize the work of politics? Central to the ongoing 
controversy over the form and outcome of the South African transition, these 
questions ask after the relationship between reconciliation and communica-
tion. In part, South Africa’s reconciliation process is composed of 
argumentation that calls on citizens to employ particular modes and attitudes 
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of communication. As Wilmot James suggested in 1995, reconciliation has 
entailed a “campaign of persuasion” (James 1995: 83). Citizens want to 
know why it is in their individual and collective interest to move from the 
idea to the experience to the practice of reconciliation. Certainly, such 
explanations are not easy to construct. The very occasion of reconciliation, 
historical animosity and deep disagreement over the nature of justice and 
equality, marks a moment when the grounds of collective agreement cannot 
be presupposed. Accordingly, a compelling defence of reconciliation 
requires advocates to recognize and bridge an enormous range of needs and 
opinions. Competing visions of post-apartheid democracy must be examined 
and somehow related. The contested theology of reconciliation must be 
translated into a secular language of nation-building. The dream of 
reconciliation must be explained such that it does not appear as a sacrifice 
that exacerbates the reality of apartheid injustice.  
 The potential for reconciliation has much to do with the means and limits 
of persuasion. In this essay, I want to consider how South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has articulated and defended the 
proposition that reconciliation affords victims of human-rights abuses the 
opportunity to forgive their tormentors. While certainly not the only 
proposed benefit of reconciliation, I believe that the controversy surrounding 
the TRC’s call for forgiveness sheds light on the “problem of persuasion” 
that appears when institutional and quasi-institutional bodies attempt to 
generate public support for reconciliation. Precisely, when individuals 
perceive that “God has gone missing” or at those moments when the 
expectation of repentance is left unfulfilled by an oppressor, the claimed 
(theological) value of forgiveness can appear either hollow or contingent on 
the (political) problem of how to actualize justice in the wake of oppression 
and atrocity. If so, it may be necessary for advocates of reconciliation to 
supplement their case for forgiveness. To this end, it may be useful to define 
forgiveness as a mode of discovery and invention, a speech-act in which 
victims of violence are able to re-present their historical identity in a manner 
that cultivates both the potential (dunamis) and the ēthos of collective 
(inter)action. Intended to promote dialogue between theological and 
political-theoretical views of forgiveness, and motivated by a fear that the 
South African reconciliation process is concluding prematurely, this 
redefinition of forgiveness may clarify why reconciliation is a process more 
than an act, its truth a commitment to the ongoing invention of those 
(communicative) goods that sustain political life.  
 The legacy of a negotiated revolution, an ambiguous post-amble, and 
legislation that plotted only the jurisdiction and technique of reconciliation, 
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the TRC spent considerable time explaining the nature and potential value of 
its work. One of the striking features of this campaign was the 
Commission’s claim that real reconciliation is neither cheap nor easy. At the 
first gathering of the Commission, for instance, Desmond Tutu argued that 
the “work of our Commission is helping our land and people to achieve 
genuine, real and not cheap and spurious reconciliation.” The Commission’s 
Vice-chairman, Alex Borraine, echoed this position when he noted, “It must 
be stressed as strongly as possible that reconciliation comes at a price. It is 
never cheap, it’s always costly and it is always painful” (Borraine 1998: 4). 
Later, in his introduction to the TRC’s Final Report, Tutu rendered the 
argument in more precise terms:  
True reconciliation is not easy; it is not cheap. We have been amazed at some almost breath-
taking examples of reconciliation that have happened through the Commission (…). On the 
whole we have been exhilarated by the magnanimity of those who should by rights be 
consumed by bitterness and a lust for revenge; who instead have time after time shown an 
astonishing magnanimity and willingness to forgive. It is not easy to forgive, but we have 
seen it happen. (TRC Final Report, Vol. 1; para. 71) 
By description and enthymeme,1 true reconciliation entails sacrifice. 
Frequently, the Commission argued that much of the cost of reconciliation 
would be borne by apartheid’s victims. In its call for testimony detailing the 
nature and extent of human-rights violations, the TRC asked citizens to step 
forward, document their experience, and reveal their suffering. This show of 
vulnerability – re-living past trauma on a public stage but with uncertain 
audience – led one member of the Human Rights Committee to note that the 
hearings were at times brutal and sometimes seemed bizarre and heartless 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 1996: 1).  
 In his explanations of the reconciliation process, Tutu maintained that 
while testimony might open old wounds and foster alienation, it could also 
pave the way to forgiveness (Tutu 1997: 1). Specifically, the Archbishop 
argued that the naming of offences and spoken narratives of suffering could 
motivate expressions of forgiveness that would both blunt the desire for 
                                          
1 Enthymeme is defined as (1) The informal method of reasoning typical of rhetorical discourse. 
The enthymeme is sometimes defined as a “truncated syllogism” since either the major or minor 
premise found in that more formal method of reasoning is left implied. The enthymeme typically 
occurs as a conclusion coupled with a reason. E.g. “We cannot trust this man, for he has perjured 
himself in the past” In this enthymeme, the major premise of the complete syllogism is missing: 
a. Those who perjure themselves cannot be trusted. (Major premise – omitted); b. This man has 
perjured himself in the past. (Minor premise – stated); c. This man is not to be trusted. (Con-
clusion –- stated). (2) A figure of speech which bases a conclusion on the truth of its contrary, e.g. 
“If to be foolish is evil, then it is virtuous to be wise”.  
(Cf. http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/E/enthymeme.htm ).(Eds.) 
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revenge and encourage repentance from perpetrators. A step further, Tutu 
repeatedly used the testimony of Beth Savage to support his contention that 
forgiveness was beneficial even when it did not lead perpetrators to confess 
or apologize for their crimes (TRC Final Report, V: 39). Invoking a sort of 
post-lapsarian2 logic, balanced carefully with the claim that apartheid was 
an objective evil, Tutu argued that “The victims of injustice and oppression 
must be ready to forgive. That is a gospel imperative” (Tutu 1994: 223). 
More directly, he noted in the Symposium following Simon Wiesenthal’s 
challenging work The Sunflower that,  
[F]orgiveness is not facile or cheap. It is a costly business that makes those who are willing to 
forgive even more extraordinary. It is clear that if we look to retributive justice, then we 
could just as well close up shop. Forgiveness is not some nebulous thing. It is practical 
politics. Without forgiveness, there is no future (Tutu 1998: 267-8).  
 Reconciliation is costly as it asks citizens to forgive offences that may 
well be unforgivable. At a theological level, the sacrifice is a gift, a 
conditioning cause or result of divine justification. In mainstream Christian 
doctrine, this position follows from the Pauline view that reconciliation is a 
“restoration of men to fellowship with God”, and a human effort to “restore 
community and communication between enemies” (Kistner 1995: 80; Wells 
1997: 3). Occasioned by violence, discovered at the “limits of life”, 
reconciliation is an act, not a process (Taylor 1960: 84). It occurs as God’s 
grace is received through (justified by) an “ethical” faith that facilitates the 
transcendence of conflict (ibid.: 65). Through the sacrifice of Christ and its 
remembrance, the gracious gift of reconciliation engenders human 
fellowship and restores humanity’s covenant with God (ibid.: 48-59, 100). 
Both public and personal, this sea change depends heavily on the 
“undeserved love” of forgiveness (Smit 1996: 105; O’Neill 1999: 21). The 
ability to forgive transgressions allows both the remission of sin and the 
creation of “right relations.” Moreover, as Robert Schreiter has argued, 
forgiveness is a “cause” of repentance:  
We discover and experience God’s forgiveness of our trespasses, and this prompts us to 
repentance. In the reconciliation process, then, because the victim has been brought by God’s 
reconciling grace to forgive the tormentor, the tormentor is prompted to repent of evildoing 
and to engage in rebuilding his or her own humanity. (Schreiter 1998: 45).  
 Not uncontested, this view holds that human forgiveness begins as the 
oppressed give voice to their experience of suffering. The force of this 
lament, according to both William O’Neill and Robert Shriver, yields 
                                          
2 A concept in Christian theology, referring to the doctrine of the Fall of Man and the subsequent 
expulsion from Paradise. (Eds.) 
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“memory suffused with moral judgment” and occasions contrition from 
oppressors. Far from forgetting, forgiveness is a confrontation modelled on 
God’s outpouring love (Wells 1997: 5-6). A centrepiece of his ubuntu 
theology, Desmond Tutu has relied heavily on this kenotic3 view to explain 
the value of reconciliation. An expression of human interdependence, 
forgiveness mirrors God’s self-sacrificing love. Thus, as we recognize our 
dependence on God and neighbour, forgiveness appears as a productive 
vulnerability. The abandonment of sovereign identity allows humans to 
redress oppression through a (paradoxical) relation of difference (Battle 
1997: 127). Forgiveness overcomes sin as it strives toward mutuality. The 
breaking down of the middle wall of partition” energizes the development of 
an “alternative society” (Battle 1997: 115).  
 Perhaps directed less at Tutu’s position than at so-called third-way 
theology, many South African theologians have criticized the idea that 
forgiveness is a means of mediating conflict. Written at a time when 
reconciliation was a dream within the nightmare, the 1985 Kairos Document 
issued a trenchant critique of state theology and its “mainstream-church” 
counterpart. Concerned that it had undermined opposition to apartheid, the 
authors of this short tract redefined reconciliation, in part by distinguishing 
the attitude of forgiveness from its actuality.4 The willingness to forgive 
“one another at all times even seventy times seven times”, they claimed, is 
productive only when it is preceded by the “genuine repentance of the 
apartheid regime” (Kairos 1986: 34). In distinction to Schreiter’s 
interpretation, the Kairos Document held that forgiveness was appropriate 
only when it followed contrition. 
 The Kairos Document is a reminder that the justification of forgiveness 
is risky when it justifies complacency in the face of oppression. Today, the 
signs of the times offer a similar warning: in the crucible of politics, realism 
may trump faith to the point where calls for forgiveness go unheard. 
Between the theological and the secular, citizens want to know what the 
                                          
3 The concept of “kenotic” usually refers to the minority position in Christian theology that holds 
that Christ, in becoming man, surrendered part of the divine characteristics attributed to him as 
member of what is conceived to be the Holy Trinity. In the present text passage, however, the 
term rather refers to the idea of Christ’s becoming man, tout court. (Eds.) 
4 The Kairos Document noted,  
it would be totally un-Christian to plead for reconciliation and peace before the present 
injustices have been removed. Any such plea plays into the hands of the oppressor by 
trying to persuade those of us who are oppressed to accept our oppression and to become 
reconciled to the intolerable crimes that committed against us. This is not Christian 
reconciliation, it is sin (Kairos 1986: 10). 
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“practical politics” of forgiveness will do for them in practice. In post-
apartheid South Africa, this case has not been easy to make. For one, the 
inspiration to forgive may be undercut by its very object – history. As 
Denise Ackerman points out in her discussion of narrative truth-telling, the 
experience embodied in testimony may or may not be recognized. 
Expressions of forgiveness may be overshadowed by conflicts over how to 
interpret the truth of a victim’s story. If so, the intention of forgiveness is 
subverted by its expression. What it means to forgive is at odds with its 
meaning. At a structural level, the church’s defence of forgiveness is 
haunted by its historical support of apartheid. Combined with the perverse 
consequences of apartheid theology, this legacy has led some critics to 
question whether it is appropriate for the state to sponsor a process of 
“corporate forgiveness”. Closely related, debates over the form of post-
apartheid justice have problematized the value of forgiveness. Theological 
defences of forgiveness, like those proffered by Schreiter and Wells, tend to 
assume a reciprocity that has yet to appear. The architects have not 
apologized. Contrition and repentance have been in short supply at most 
amnesty hearings. This shortfall has bolstered the perception that calls for 
forgiveness contributed to a dispensation in which, according to Ingrid 
Woolard, there is “black rule and white power.” Thus unable to see its 
transformative power, Anthony Balcomb and Hein Marais both suggest that 
forgiveness has come at the expense of social justice and material 
redistribution. Moreover, they echo Soyinka’s claim that the theological 
grounds of forgiveness include a doctrine of systemic sin that clouds the 
difference between the objective evil of apartheid’s oppression and its 
legitimate resistance. 
 The political features of transition have cast doubt on the warrants that 
back the call to forgive. A potential legitimation deficit for the TRC, this 
problem has led some to turn to Hannah Arendt’s brief explanation of why 
forgiving is a basic (ontological) truth of politics. Surprisingly, however, 
many of these appeals have not related Arendt’s account of forgiveness to 
the context in which it arises: speech and action. Creatures of plurality, 
action and speech sustain human appearance. They enact and embody 
initiative, allowing individuals to disclose an identity and enter into social 
relations. Thus, Arendt claims, speech and action are directed to the complex 
middle of human life. Beyond technical means or prescribed ends, each is a 
process that both reveals what stands between us and constitutes the 
substance of our relationships. However, this creative power is not without 
risk. Speech and action are boundless, unpredictable and anonymous. As 
such,  
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[H]e who acts never quite knows what he is doing, that he always becomes ‘‘guilty’’ of 
consequences he never intended or even foresaw, that no matter how disastrous and 
unexpected the consequences of his deed he can never undo it, that process he starts is never 
consummated unequivocally in one single deed or event, and that its very meaning never 
discloses itself to the actor but only to the backward glance of the historian who himself does 
not act (Arendt 1958: 233).  
We are doers and sufferers both and simultaneously.  
 The power of creativity, the initiative of beginning, comes at the cost of 
self-sufficiency. This lack is the motive and necessity of forgiveness, “the 
only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and thus retains, though being a 
reaction, something of the original character of action” (Arendt 1958: 241). 
A mutual release that alleviates the risk of hypocrisy and checks the will to 
violence, Arendt claims that the performance of forgiveness is a deeply 
personal enactment of love.  
For love, although it is one of the rarest occurrences in human lives, indeed possesses an 
unequalled power of self-revelation and an unequalled clarity of vision for the disclosure of 
who, precisely because it is unconcerned to the point of total unworldliness with what the 
loved person may be, with his qualities and shortcomings no less than with his achievements, 
failings, and transgressions. Love, by reason of its passion destroys the in-between which 
relates us to and separates us from others. (Arendt 1958: 242) 
 Significant ambiguity attends this view, the closure of that (relational) 
middle that sets humans into opposition and relation. On one side, 
forgiveness is a gift that may or may not be returned. Its desire, however, if 
composed as a call for the self to construct its lack through the other, may 
lend itself to a self-denigration where the possibility is ignored that love 
flourishes only as individuals cultivate and protect one another’s solitude. 
On the other side, Arendt’s notion of forgiveness is addressed to speech and 
action but appears to proceed outside of both. Or, as Jay Bernstein has put 
the matter,  
the universality of the mutual recognitions forming the community of conscience leaves 
blank the question of determining the objectivity of the actions of those agents (Bernstein 
1996: 36).  
What is the relational content of forgiveness? Can it proceed through the 
medium of speech? 
 Addressing these questions directly, Bernstein contends that,  
The act of forgiveness is an act of recognition through which, by releasing the transgressor 
from her deed I release myself from being hurt. Forgiveness must express my particularity as 
well as renounce it (Bernstein 1996: 62).  
It is precisely this dialectic which is of interest to us. Forgiveness is rooted 
first in a specific sort of remembrance, a recollection of an offence that 
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allows an individual/sufferer to re-present their experience and identity. 
Coherent but alone, this self is the hard heart of the sufficient/sovereign 
subject. Its sacrifice or renunciation, however, converts the alienation of 
melancholy into a process of mourning in which the past is remembered and 
overcome simultaneously. Thus, recalling the terms of the Kairos Document, 
the attitude of forgiveness is a moment of historical potential. In the best 
case (notably: forgiving that leads to expressions of contrition or remorse) 
this attitude reveals a shared non-identity that can be used to build norms of 
morality and justice. In the event that repentance is not forthcoming, 
however, the sacrifice of forgiveness is still productive to the degree that it 
excises the force of a transgression from the relational space of sociality, 
politics and history-making.  
 Cast as a performative act of recognition, and perhaps separated a bit 
from Bernstein’s debt to Hegel, the logic of forgiveness shows an important 
rhetorical character, a tropological movement between the discovery of 
identity and the appearance of opposition that funds the invention of human 
identification. Evident in Jesus’ last words, “Father, forgive them for they 
know not what they do”, this movement has several dimensions.  
 
1. First, the call to forgive allows individuals to narrate a reply to the 
question, What has been done? In the face of trauma, this expression of 
experience enacts a process of “name giving” and constitutes a 
(re)discovery of identity.  
2. Second, loosely analogous to consciousness-raising, this identity shows 
an oppositional form. Implicitly or explicitly, it announces a 
contradiction: the doings of an oppressor defy justification to the degree 
that they replace the relational quality of action with instrumental 
violence. In turn, concerned perhaps less with guilt than hypocrisy – the 
disparity between being and appearing – this contradiction marks a false 
appropriation of the Word, the heretical assumption that the power of 
speech and action is ours alone. Or as Walter Benjamin (1996) put the 
matter, forgiveness (retrospectively) delineates that moment when 
human action has supplanted the (relational) faith of language with the 
violence of law.  
3. Third, however, the oppositional stance of forgiveness shows a 
commitment to the vulnerability of identification. The appeal to the 
Father, the Word of God, concedes that justice is borne of relations 
which humans cannot fully control. The assumption of identity is equally 
an assumption of lack. Thus, the character of forgiveness is precisely 
that, a sort of character or ethos in which the creation of shared meaning 
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and identification rests on the willingness to concede one’s dependence 
on the other. This gesture can be read as both actual and potential. 
Lacking a corresponding expression of remorse, forgiveness is 
productive to the degree that it replaces the desire for revenge, a will to 
negation that lends standing to the very oppression it condemns, with a 
commitment to invent history. Performed in language, forgiveness is the 
act of faith needed to undertake the work of history. Alternatively, when 
forgiveness does motivate confession, it marks a common opposition, a 
condition of shared non-identity that can serve as a basis for dialogue.  
 
 If, as Kenneth Burke suggests, words about words are more than a bit 
like words about God, the distinctions that I am drawing are small but 
perhaps not insignificant. In the TRC’s effort to explain and defend 
reconciliation, the Commission has sometimes defined forgiveness as an act 
of communication more than a communicative process that takes shape over 
time. If it was/is a campaign of persuasion, this approach may have sold the 
reconciliation process a bit short. Faced with a set of publics that have good 
reasons to doubt the theological case for forgiveness, there may be some 
persuasive benefit to the idea that forgiveness is an attitude, an ethos of 
collective life.5 Both inside and outside language, perhaps across the 
political and the theological, it is an expression of faith in which the power 
of creativity is situated in a heartfelt commitment to mutuality that less fiats 
over difference than draws from it to reveal the necessity of human 
interaction. Far from closing the middle of human relations, forgiveness 
performs the middle voice and confronts us with the challenge of cultivating 
rather than declaring our politics.  
 To make an end, I want to tie these reflections to the overarching 
question that has called us together: the perplexing relationship between 
truth and politics. Viewed admittedly from a distance, the star of 
reconciliation seems to be fading. Perhaps, prematurely. With Thabo 
Mbeki’s election as President of the Republic of South Africa in 1999, the 
stress of the transition now seems to rest on the reconstruction of society – 
the counterpart of reconciliation in South Africa’s interim constitution’s 
                                          
5 This is not an empirical claim nor does it presuppose an intentionalist view of persuasion. To the 
contrary, my suggestion is simply that traditional definitions of forgiveness may generate 
controversy to the degree that they do not take into account that the reconciliation contains both a 
theological and political dimension. While this controversy may be productive, it may also 
undermine the ability of quasi-institutional bodies like the TRC to explain the civic benefits of 
reconciliation. In this sense, the proposal here must be further developed to show that forgiveness 
can function as a modality of political representation.  
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post-amble – and overcoming the legacy of apartheid economics. However, 
if civil society is to play a role in this work, if economic interest is to be 
derived from experience rather than sheer institutional (or International 
Monetary Fund) mandate, the communicative processes that compose 
reconciliation may have a role to play. The much-heralded antipathy 
between political economy and reconciliation is cemented when the latter is 
stripped of its inventional power, its ability to discern the potential for 
collective action from the midst of historical opposition and violence. In 
some small regard, as a bit more than a choice and a bit less than a duty, the 
process of forgiveness may have a role to play here. At the very least, it is 
problem that will return to the commons as the Amnesty Commission 
concludes its business and announces its recommendations. How shall we 
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CHAPTER 3 
RECONSTRUCTING THE PAST BETWEEN TRIALS AND HISTORY 




ABSTRACT. What enables democracy to develop and what allows the consolidation of new 
democratic institutions after a political transition, is the search for “truth” and not the defence of 
only one “truth”. The search for truth about the past must be considered to be a dynamic process 
that is the result of collective participation. To attain this goal, a society needs to establish a 
particular space in which to execute the fundamental public and collective process of dealing 
with the past. After examining aspects of the European reactions to World War II (handling of the 
French Resistance, war criminals, and of Holocaust deniers) in this light, the author concentrates 
on the South African TRC, concluding that it represents probably one of the most interesting 
remembrance spaces (lieu de la mémoire) of our time. 
 
 
In July 1997 the French newspaper Libération published the proceedings of 
a unusual debate. Some historians and journalists held a round table with 
two famous members of the French Resistance during World War II, Mr and 
Mrs Aubrac.1 The debate focused on delicate topics concerning the 
recollection of certain controversial episodes of the French Resistance 
history. What was discussed was the suspicion of treason and 
“collaboration” of some Resistance combatants. In general, the participants 
at the round table analysed the role that the Resistance should have in the 
French collective memory and especially, whether the history and the 
remembrance of the Resistance should be considered something 
untouchable, monolithic and “holy” as a part of French Republican cultural 
heritage. The discussion also stressed the need to write a critical history of 
the Resistance in its relationship with the construction of national identity. 
 A few months later, in the autumn of 1997, the criminal trial of the 
former official of the Vichy regime,2 Maurice Papon, started in Bordeaux. 
He was charged with complicity in crimes against humanity arising from his 
role in the Jewish deportation during World War II.3  
 Interestingly, these two events took place at the same time. Obviously 
they are not the same thing: one is simply a debate involving some 
1 See Libération 9 Juillet 1997, also at: http: //www.liberation.fr. 
2 About the Vichy regime (that collaborated with the German aggressors in France during World 
War II), see Rousso 1990, 1994. 
3 See Conan 1998; Gandini 1999. 
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specialists, while the other is an actual tribunal.  
 The round table held by the newspaper Libération was about the 
Resistance, while the latter was a the prosecution of a member of a regime 
allied with the Nazis. However, it is important to note that fifty years after 
the end of World War II a “remembrance malaise” is still perceptible. This 
“remembrance malaise” relates not only to the memory of the events of 
World War II, but also to the recollection of the political transition after the 
end of the war. In other words, what is still strongly debated is not only the 
responsibility for crimes committed during the war, but also the events that 
represented the “genesis” (or origins) of the French Republican order. What 
is bitterly debated is the “founding myth”, in the anthropological sense, upon 
which the Republican system is based. 
 In this situation there are some elements that could be compared with 
South African political transition after the dismantling of apartheid. There is 
the question of justice, there is the need for “truth” about the past and the 
need for firm condemnation of the previous regime. But there is also the 
need to talk about national liberation movements and the role that they 
played in the struggle. In fact this is not so different from what South Africa 
has experienced recently through the experience of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  
 What is completely different is that the French debate mentioned earlier 
took place fifty years after the event. South Africa is facing these questions 
during its political transition and these questions are characterizing the 
transition itself.  
 Throughout Europe and particularly in France, Germany, Austria and 
Italy, after the Barbie, Touvier, Papon and Priebke’ criminal trials, and after 
the criminal proceedings against the Holocaust deniers, in the words of the 
French historian Henry Rousso, a veritable trend toward the “legal reading 
of history” has developed.4 
 Those criminal trials were characterized by a vast historical background 
in which individual criminal responsibilities were absorbed by the 
complexity of the historical dynamics.5 For these reasons there is a risk that 
the contamination between juridical level and historic context may cause 
distortion in the application of the rules of evidence. The result could be a 
lack of legitimacy or a dysfunction of the procedural tools.  
 Some scholars have defined those trials as something like a “second 
                                          
4 See Rousso 1998: 86. 
5 For a complete panorama about the criminal trials, in Europe after World War II, and in 
particular the trials in France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany, see the bibliography in 
footnote 60 in Huyse 1999.  
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purge” after the end of World War II. This phenomenon showed a firm 
tendency to consider the discourse about the past, and to remember it from a 
legal perspective. This overlapping between trials and historiography was 
also evident during the criminal trials of the Holocaust deniers, in which 
some Courts have decided those cases by transforming historical 
interpretations into “forensic truth”.6 
 It is important to stress that a lot of European domestic criminal codes 
have introduced the offence of “Holocaust denial” in reaction to publications 
that seek to write a “different” history of the Jewish genocide. “The 
assassins of memory”, according to the historians Pierre Vidal Naquet7 and 
Yosef Haym Yerushalmi,8 are persons or organizations that deny the 
Holocaust or cast doubt on its essential aspects: the number of Jewish 
victims, and the existence of concentration camps and gas chambers. Such 
denial is unfortunately widespread not only in continental Europe but also in 
the United Kingdom and the USA.9 Another example of this complex 
situation is the recent debate about the role that the Catholic Church and 
Pope Pius XII played in the Jewish Genocide. This discussion has emerged 
after the publication of John Cornwell’s controversial book Hitler’s Pope, 
which explores the role the Vatican played in endorsing Hitler’s regime10. 
 Indeed, these examples imply that, fifty years after the end of the war, 
political transition in Europe is not yet fully concluded. The debate about the 
attribution of responsibility for crimes is still open, and it often surfaces in a 
very dangerous way as in the case of the Holocaust deniers. The European 
Union and individual countries in Europe have reacted to this deeply 
worrying situation by implementing a juridical strategy based on criminal 
trials. Forensic truth has been selected as being more authoritative than 
historical truth. Juridical tools are deemed more useful than historical 
analysis, which aims to defend the remembrance of past events. 
 Many historians have strongly criticized this way of transposing 
historical debates into tribunals. They have also strongly criticized the 
possibility of performing a thorough and rigorous historical analysis through 
the technical rigidity of the juridical tools of criminal procedures, such as the 
rules of evidence and cross examinations.  
                                          
6 For the relationship between the concept of “historic truth” and “forensic truth”, see Baruch et 
al. 1998; Le Crom & Martin 1998; Ferrajoli 1989: 18-69. 
7 See Vidal-Naquet 1985. 
8 See Yerushalmi 1982, 1998: 7-21. 
9 For a complete analysis of the criminal punishment of the crime of Holocaust denial see Fronza 
1999. 
10 See Cornwell 1999. 
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 The “winner-loser” approach is still used. In other words, today, trials 
and the authority of the judgement are one of the ways to give authority to 
the interpretation of past events. From this perspective, there is a continuity 
between the Nuremberg trials, the trials in domestic courts after the end of 
the war, the Barbie, Touvier, Papon and Priebke’ prosecutions and the 
Holocaust deniers’ trials. 
 What is important to note is that this ambiguous relationship between 
history and law is evident also in the trials of International Criminal 
Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. For example, the first part 
of the Akayesu judgement, one of the first judgements for genocide, is 
dedicated to a large reconstruction of the historic background of the 
Rwandan genocide. The same type of historic re-construction is present into 
the Tadic judgement and into the Milosevic Indictment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia.  
 In this context, two opposing forces are forging the collective memory 
structure of past dramatic experiences during and after the war:  
 
1. On the one hand, the increase in historical studies and historical research 
about the war, about the political transition after the end of the war, and 
about the responsibility for crimes committed during the war. 
2. On the other hand, the accumulation of trials and judgements on the 
same cases which are subject of the historical studies.  
 
I would characterise the first force as “the hypertrophy of historiography”, 
and the second one as “the hypertrophy of judgements”. These ways of 
dealing with the past are progressively monopolizing the discourse about the 
past. 
 However, what is important to underline is that these two ways of 
dealing with the past do not help to maintain a distance with the dramatic 
past of the war and with the history of totalitarian regimes. They do not 
represent something that can lead, for example, to the writing of a critical 
history of the French Resistance during World War II; neither are they 
conducive to wider acceptance of the fact that common people played an 
important role in genocide, as demonstrated for Germany for the same 
period in D.J. Goldhagen’s book Hitler’s willing executioners11. In other 
words, neither the strictly historical approach nor the juridical approach help 
to lift the burden of the winner–loser approach from the discourse about the 
remembrance of the war’s dramatic past; neither are they conducive to 
                                          
11 See Goldhagen 1997. 
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healing the wounds that are still open. 
 In Europe, for example, political clichés are much in circulation, and 
stereotypes about the past seem to be defended a-critically. The modern 
political system is based on conventionalised versions of history. “Fascism–
anti-fascism”, “communism–anti-communism”, “fascism–communism”, – 
these are the oppositions that even today are very often used in domestic 
political debates.  
 
These considerations can be of use for a reflection on the South African 
case. 
 For European observers, South Africa’s political transition and the TRC 
system are something that goes beyond the European approach of dealing 
with past crimes and abuses.  
 I do not wish to discuss the problem of how “transitional justice” can be 
dispensed after a previous authoritarian regime. I do not wish to emphasize 
the potentially beneficial effects of prosecution of the perpetrators, or the 
opposite idea of the importance of dealing with the past crimes through 
reconciliatory strategies like the TRC system. 
 What I would like to stress here is that the instrumental utilization of 
juridical tools and criminal trials in order to cope with mass crimes leaves a 
very unique mark on the perception of the past, and of how the past should 
be remembered. The widespread utilization of criminal trials for the purpose 
of carrying out political transition after the war has deeply characterized 
what we consider to be a “truth”.  
 Frequently the concept of “ forensic truth” is automatically considered to 
be concurrent with the concept of “historical truth”. For example, trials (like 
the Touvier, Barbie, Papon, and Priebke’ trials) have been celebrated as a 
way of reaffirming the solidity of the collective memory of the war. This is 
like saying that an “authoritative truth” is needed. This kind of truth has to 
be confirmed by other judgements when the cohesion surrounding this 
concept start to be criticized. 
 In South Africa the “Conference for a Democratic Future”, the political 
transition which has been largely negotiated and in particular the procedures 
and the objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, make up an 
experience that goes beyond the strictly juridical or historical approach12. 
The South African debate on remembrance of the past started within a 
                                          
12 For a general bibliography about the relationship between criminal trials and political transition 
see Linz & Stepan 1978; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Huntington 1991. For an analyse of the role of 
the trials during the political transitions see Kirchheimer 1961; Hannover 1966; Demandt 1990. 
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perspective of reconstruction. The process of dealing with the past has been 
developed with the aim of creating a new community. The process of nation-
building, in which the TRC has played a fundamental role, seems to be a 
veritable case of res publicam constituere, “constructing the common good”. 
For these reasons, the South African process of confronting the past had 
been necessarily to be collective and public.  
 What is more difficult to achieve is to construct a collective memory 
background that in the future will prevent the possibility of developing 
shameful responses such as the Holocaust denials. In this sense it is of the 
greatest importance that the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act ruled out the possibility of blanket amnesty. Instead, the Commission 
grants amnesty only on the basis of a strictly personal “full disclosure of 
facts”. Only in this way does it become manifest that there were people 
behind the apartheid system. Paradoxically the utilization of criminal trials 
for mass crimes has made it possible to determine the responsibilities of only 
a few commanders.  
Neither at the transnational level nor at the domestic level were criminal 
proceedings able to deal with personal guilt. The individual criminal acts 
were absorbed by the collective context of mass crimes committed by 
regimes, by military organizations and by criminal states. As we have seen 
in the European case, such ambiguity is at the basis of the need to continue 
to prosecute; this was the challenge, for example, of the Touvier and Papon 
trials. 
 The TRC findings and the final Report could be considered as a “starting 
point” for the development of the collective memory of the apartheid 
regime. By contrast, juridical decisions, largely utilized in Europe, represent 
the “final point”. The judgement is something that cannot be discussed, 
something that crystallizes the events into the concept of “forensic truth”. 
The judgement represents the negation of dialogue. In other words, trials 
simply reproduce the conflict, and they are absolutely not a collective thing. 
In trials, the judges are compelled to arrive at the sentence on the basis of 
esoteric judicial procedures, and in terms of a technical judicial language 
that is incomprehensible to the people at large.  
 This is the paradox of judgement as a conceptual category. Obviously it 
is used as a basis in juridical matters but also in historical analysis. 
Judgement makes it possible to choose rigorously between two opposite 
possibilities. In other words, it creates two radically alternatives “truths”. 
 The TRC system, in particularly in the South African form with the 
refusal of the blanket amnesty by imposing a personal full disclosure of 
facts, has probably introduced a different way of dealing with the past. The 
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panorama drawn by the TRC hearings showed that “different controversial 
realities” have co-existed. Beyond the shameful background of the apartheid 
system, other crimes have been committed, and in recent period involved a 
lot of different “histories” have been experienced. Clearly, a firm position 
must be taken in the face of crimes. Indeed, from the perspective of the 
future, what is important to note during a political transition of this calibre 
are two complementary dangers: the danger of creating “myths”, and the 
danger of the “sanctification” of only one “truth”.  
 The TRC has played a new role in the attempt to escape the Manichean13 
interpretation of the past, in particular by acknowledging the centrality of 
“victim’s words” in the process of dealing with the past. 
 In conclusion, what enables democracy to develop and what allows the 
consolidation of new democratic institutions after a political transition, is the 
search for “truth” and not the defence of only one “truth”. The search for 
truth about the past must be considered to be a dynamic process that is the 
result of collective participation. To attain this goal, a society needs to 
establish a particular space in which to execute the fundamental public and 
collective process of dealing with the past. In this sense, the TRC represents 
probably one of the most interesting remembrance spaces (lieu de la 
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ABSTRACT. The author uses two biblical descriptions of the destruction of the Temple (587 BCE) 
to elucidate the contrast between factual and poetic descriptions of disaster. Turning then to the 
testimonies heard at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission he claims that these are, in fact, 
acts of identification: between the feelings, attitude, suffering of the victims and the audience, the 
commission members, the media. Obviously this sort of identification cannot be false, it must 
manifest the truth. But truth, facts, reality, are not communicative, and hence not as persuasive as 
self-evidence. The testimonies heard at the Truth and Reconciliation sessions produce a 
rhetorical discourse that invites a rhetorical analysis mainly for the sake of studying the process 
of establishing the “story” of the nation’s collective memory through the various testimonies. 
 
 
For over a hundred generations, since 587 BCE, on the ninth day of the 
Hebrew month of Ab, which is the traditional date for the fall of Jerusalem 
and the destruction of the Temple of Solomon by the Babylonians, Jews all 
over the world gather together and read the Biblical reflection on that 
national catastrophe. 
 Interestingly enough, this historical disaster is presented through two 
different literary media in the Hebrew Bible: a prosaic, historiographical 
account (2 Kings 25; Jeremiah 52), on the one hand, and a poetical account, 
the Scroll of Lamentations, on the other. Lamentations is a poetic 
proclamation of five poems referring to the destruction of the Temple. 
 The poetic account of Lamentations, rather than the historical “factual” 
presentation, is the text read at the synagogues on the traditional memorial 
day of the fall of Jerusalem. The question is why? The historical account 
narrates the events in minute detail, intending to present an accurate and 
coherent description of the fall; why was it not chosen as the narrative that 
perpetuates the event in the course of the national reading on the memorial 
day? 
 For the sake of demonstration I shall read a few sentences from the 
prosaic narrative, and then I shall read verses from Lamentations, seeking to 
draw conclusions regarding the poetics of prose versus poetry, and the 
impact on the audience. 
Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babylon. And in the ninth year of his reign, in the tenth 
month, on the tenth day of the month, King Nebuchanezzar of Babylon came with all his 
army against Jerusalem and laid siege to it (…) on the ninth day of the fourth month, the 
famine became so severe in the city that there was no food for the people of the land … (2 
Kings 25: 1-26) 
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Now let me read the following verses from Lamentations:  
Even the jackals offer the breast and nurse their young (…) the tongue of the infant sticks to 
the roof of its mouth for thirst / the children beg for food but no one gives them anything. 
Those who feasted on delicacies perish in the streets (…) now their visage is blacker than 
soot. They are not recognized in the streets; their skin has shrivelled on their bones: It has 
become as dry as wood. Happier were those pierced by the sword than those pierced by 
hunger (…) The hands of compassionate women have boiled their own children. 
(Lamentations 4: 2-10) 
The singularity of the famine of the historical narrative has been transformed 
through the poetry of Lamentations into a universal feeling, shared by every 
human reader/listener who is shocked by the most awful expression of the 
starvation: a mother cooks and eats her baby. That is to say, the medium of 
poetry reaches for a different goal than the medium of the historical account. 
The historical medium seeks to narrate what happened while poetry re-tells 
how we feel regarding the event. The “what” is just a means of giving the 
information in a coherent way. The “how” is the happening itself.  
 The point is that in order to communicate, we need to seek a response. 
Thus, it is not enough to know what we ought to say, claims Aristotle in his 
Rhetoric (1403b), we must also say it as we ought. Aristotle explains as 
follows:  
We ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, 
should matter except the proof of those facts. Still (...), other things affect the result 
considerably … the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility (1404a).1 
However, Aristotle stresses: “Nobody uses fine language when teaching 
geometry” (1404a). Indeed, Aristotle points to the crux of the matter: there is 
a distinction between two sorts of discourse: “geometry”, and the other. This 
distinction has been elaborated further by Perelman (1982), in terms of the 
juxtaposition of scientific and non-scientific discourse. This is the distinction 
between dialectical argumentation and analytical argumentation. The 
analytical format is the scientific one, it is provable, while the non-scientific 
format utilizes quasi-logical arguments, which are not precise scientifically 
and actually are not provable. Speeches which seek to affect their listeners 
through stirring emotions utilize the dialectical approach since, at the end of 
the day, the goal is not so much to present the bare facts, e.g., the reference 
                                          
1 Clearly, W. Rhys Roberts’s English translation of Rhetorica was used and quoted literally here, 
as in: Aristotle, 2001 (1941), The Basic Works of Aristotle ed. R.M. McKeon (New York: Modern 
Library, first edition Random House, 1941, pp. 1317-1451). This translation is highly respected, 
and for good reasons, but differs considerably from the more literal one presented in: Aristotle, 
1991, Aristotle on rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse, Kennedy, G.A., ed., New York/ Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. (Eds.) 
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to the famine in Kings, but rather to evoke emotions that stimulate the 
readers to respond; a case in point is the vivid description of the famine in 
Lamentations. 
 This explains why the deliberative genre, that is, political speeches, 
differ in their literary/stylistic design from legalistic speech. Legalistic 
speech seeks to reveal the bare facts, while deliberative speech intends to 
affect, to raise sympathy, to communicate not only via the facts, each one in 
itself, but through the discourse as a whole, as a moving discourse. 
 Now, let us turn our attention to the South African scene, mainly to the 
testimonies presented in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings. 
I want to share with you a quote taken from the hearing CT/00222, which 
took place at the University of the Western Cape on 5 August 1996. This is 
the testimony of a Maureen Cupido, a mother whose son, Clive, was shot 
and killed by the police in 1985. We read the mother saying:  
Well, I was sitting, and me and my husband was sitting waiting for Clive to come home (...). 
Clive came home early (...) and then he told me this march is going to have a lot of trouble. 
Little knowing that he is going to be killed (...) and we, we wait for Clive to come home (...). 
I heard the shots (...). And then I asked God if it is my child, take him away, I don’t want him 
to be paralyzed. And just after the shots, this chaps, this children running to our house and all 
they said, Mrs Cupido is Clive here I haven’t got such brilliant children, but his whole aim 
was that he, he wanted to go and work, he was frustrated, he wanted to make his ten finished 
and then he told me, mommy you cannot afford to send me to varsity, but I’ll go and work 
and I’ll do part-time, I’ll do part-time varsity, so I am going to work to help you, you see. 
That was his aim, he just wanted to finish up his standard ten. And I mean – I feel that the 
truth must come out, people should know that it wasn’t my son that kept the policeman (...) so 
the truth must come out, it must come out (...) . 
This is not the legalistic text format of merely presenting the bare facts and 
letting the judges judge. We see through the hearing the worried mother 
speaking under the frightful circumstances, expressing her feelings. She does 
not limit her testimony – and is not asked by the committee – to the legalistic 
facts of the case. Rather she elaborates about her son’s wishes to study half 
time in order to work and help her. 
 Nevertheless, the mother insists: “The truth must come out”. For the sake 
of this truth the witness is pouring out her feelings, her fears and her son’s 
wishes. She points out how poor they were. And the committee accepts the 
presentation of the mother’s feelings, fears and compassion, recording it as 
an official document. The committee’s concern is, therefore, not only what 
happened, but to shed light on the conditions of the family as well as the 
mother’s fears in her own personal language. The trauma is revealed. That is 
to say, the word “truth” in this respect is much more than the “bare facts” of 
the shooting itself. It revolves around the tragedy of the family, of the son 
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killed, and the mother’s thoughts and fears. In this regard the following 
remark of Antjie Krog (1998: 15-16) is illuminating:  
One morning, when I was still a lecturer at a training college for black teachers, a young 
comrade arrived. He refused to enter my class. He called Afrikaans a colonial language. 
“What is English then?” I asked. “English was born in the centre of Africa”, he said with 
great conviction, “it was brought here by Umkhonto we Sizwe”2. That was his truth. And I, as 
his teacher, had to deal with this truth that was shaping his life, his viewpoints, his actions. 
“His” truth versus the historical “facts”. 
 Will the commission be sensitive also to the “truth” of, say, the young 
student? Indeed, if its interest in truth is linked not only to amnesty and 
compensation, then it will have chosen not truth, but justice. If the 
commission regards truth as the widest possible compilation of peoples 
perceptions, stories, myths and experiences, it will have chosen to restore 
memory and foster a new humanity, and perhaps that is “justice” in its 
deepest sense. 
 “Truth”, explains the Webster Dictionary, is “the quality of being in 
accordance with facts or reality; a fact, a reality that which conforms to fact 
or reality”. On the other hand, justice is not just truth. Justice is associated, 
according to Webster with “retribution, merited reward or punishment”. 
 Indeed, Maureen Cupido seeks the “truth”: “I feel that the truth must 
come out (…) so the truth must come out, it must come out”, she repeatedly 
emphasized (TRC etc.: 50). But actually she appeals to justice. The truth is 
too narrow for her. The way to seek the truth is through the reconstruction of 
the bare facts. While rhetoric is the means for seeking justice rather than 
truth. Rhetoric intends to shape, to stir emotions, to establish the collective 
memory. The “story” is the “myth that binds different people in a common 
belief, in a shared past and thus is a factor in the shaping of personal 
identities within the process of nation building.”(Peri 1999: 108). Mrs 
Cupido tells her story. 
 In conclusion, the Scroll of Lamentations, and Mrs Cupido’s testimony 
share a common aim. That is, to capture the audience’s feelings through 
“identification”, which is, according to Kenneth Burke, the fundamental role 
of persuasion. Burke writes as follows:  
As for the relation between “identification” and “persuasion”, we might well keep in mind 
that a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his act of 
persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker’s 
interests; and the speaker draws on identification of interests to establish rapport between 
himself and his audience. So there is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of 
persuasion, identification and communication (Burke, 1969: 46). 
                                          
2 The military wing of South Africa’s liberation movement. (Eds.) 
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Burke continues: “You persuade a man only in so far as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, 
identifying your ways with his” (Burke 1969: 55). 
 The point is that the testimonies heard at the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission are, in fact, acts of identification. The testimonies are not heard 
as a court case that seeks to determine the truth. Rather, the testimonies seek 
identification. That is, identification between the feelings, attitude, suffering 
of the victims and the audience, the commission members, the media. 
Obviously this sort of identification cannot be false, it must manifest the 
truth. But truth, facts, reality, are not communicative, and hence not as 
persuasive as self-evidence. The bottom line of Burke’s “identification” as 
the premise for effective communication, and hence persuasion, is the 
realization that the facts themselves do not communicate. And persuasion is 
a product of communication. This is why Perelman made the distinction 
between analytical reasoning and dialectical (Perelman 1982). Rhetoric is 
dialectical, which depends on the notion of identification between the 
addresser and the addressees. The testimonies heard at the Truth and 
Reconciliation sessions produce a rhetorical discourse that invites a 
rhetorical analysis mainly for the sake of studying the process of establishing 
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF SAYING “NO NO NO” 




ABSTRACT. The author seeks to inquire into the notion of rhetoric which impelled Mrs Thatcher to 
report to the House of Commons on Tuesday 30th October 1990 with the devastating candour that 
she employed. He first sketches in the circumstances which gave rise to the iteration “no, no, no” 
and then asks: can this justly be interpreted as an “impulsive answer”? Was the Prime Minister 
merely indulging in some tic of temperamental obstinacy? It seems unlikely. The author instead 
suggest that there is an ancestry behind that epizeuxis, which he briefly identifies. 
 
 
                                          
Proem 
 
Given the nature of our inquiry in the present collective volume on Truth 
and Politics in Africa, it would not properly be within the scope of these 
proceedings to attempt to deal comprehensively with the theme of Mrs 
Thatcher’s2 oratorical style – nor, indeed, to offer an analysis of any single 
speech (though in another setting the Bruges Speech (1988) would be a 
prime candidate for such examination). However, my first sentence will 
constitute sufficient indulgence in the scheme known as paralipsis or 
occupatio.3 What I intend to do is to inquire into the notion of rhetoric which 
impelled Mrs Thatcher to report to the House of Commons on Tuesday 30th 
October 1990 with the devastating candour that she employed. I shall first 
sketch in the circumstances which gave rise to the iteration “no, no, no” and 
1 Support by Institut francais d’Afrique du Sud and the French Embassy in Lusaka. is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2 Mrs Thatcher was raised to the peerage as Lady Thatcher (of Kesteven) in 1992. Sir Geoffrey 
Howe was ennobled as Lord Howe of Aberavon. I observe these distinctions in the paper. 
3 As a figure of rhetoric, “paralipsis” is defined as: “Stating and drawing attention to something in 
the very act of pretending to pass it over. A kind of irony”; cf. G. Burton, Silva rhetoricae/The 
forest of rhetorics, at http://rhetoric.byu.edu/. “Occupatio” is simply the Latin equivalent of 
“paralipsis”. (Eds.) 
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then ask: can this justly be interpreted (in the reductive language of Sir 
Geoffrey Howe) as an “impulsive answer”? Was the Prime Minister merely 
indulging in some tic of temperamental obstinacy?4 It seems unlikely. I 
would suggest that there is an ancestry behind that epizeuxis.5 In considering 
this matter I have been materially helped by reading Lady Thatcher’s book 
Downing Street Years; Lord Howe’s account Conflict of Loyalty has been 
almost equally illuminating. 
 
 
30th October 1990  
 
In 1956 there appeared a vividly-composed account, under the title A Night 
to Remember, of the last hours of R.M.S. Titanic. For many observers of 
British politics, and for anyone possessing a more than casual interest in the 
fortunes of the Conservative Party, November 1990 must rank as a month to 
remember. On 1st November Sir Geoffrey Howe, Lord President of the 
Council and quondam Foreign Secretary, resigned from the Government; on 
13th November he delivered his resignation speech; on 28th November the 
Prime Minister tendered her resignation to Her Majesty the Queen. 
 The deterioration in the relationship between Howe and the Prime 
Minister has been chronicled by both parties from their own points of view.6 
No doubt many rubs and irritations intruded over the period of Howe’s 
tenure of the Foreign Secretaryship and in the single year during which he 
served, nominally, as Deputy to Mrs Thatcher. But if any single occurrence 
can be said to have precipitated the Howe resignation, fatally damaging to 
the Prime Minister, it was a public oratorical act of Mrs Thatcher’s – her 
iteration of the monosyllable “no”. Mrs Thatcher’s downfall was materially 
assisted by epizeuxis. During Prime Minister’s Questions on 30th October 
she declared:  
M. Delors [the then President of the European Community (EC) Commission] wants the 
European Parliament to be the Community’s House of Representatives, the Commission to be 
its Executive, and the Council of Ministers to be its Senate. No, no, no.7 
 Lady Thatcher makes some observations on this occasion, which are of 
                                          
4 Thatcher 1993: 863. 
5 As a figure of rhetoric, “epizeuxis” is defined as: “Repetition of words with no others between, 
for vehemence or emphasis”; cf. Burton, ibid. (Eds.) 
6 Lady Thatcher pays generous tribute to Howe’s achievements as Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(1979-1983) in her memoirs. Her first choice for the Foreign Secretaryship in 1983 was Cecil 
Parkinson; sadly, personal circumstances ruled this out.  
7 Thatcher 1993. 
The Political Demise of Mrs Thatcher 77
interest in the light of her oratorical practice. She had to stand up in the 
House and report on the Rome Council that had taken place on the 27th and 
28th October. It was an occasion, the Prime Minister felt, for plain speaking. 
But this brought with it dangers to her personal position, given the fevered 
condition of her party. Nevertheless, Mrs Thatcher may have decided that, 
however perilous the situation, matters were not going to be amended by 
obfuscation. And indeed her memoirs deal with this very point.  
The Prime Minister and colleagues had asserted frequently that “a single currency [was] not 
the policy of the Government”. But two qualifications were customarily attached. First, there 
was the possibility that the Government’s proposals for a parallel common currency could 
evolve towards a single currency. Second, Ministers had adopted the habit of maintaining that 
“We will not have a single currency imposed upon us”. Inevitably, there were differing 
interpretations of precisely what that delphic8 expression meant. Such hypothetical 
qualifications could be used by someone like Geoffrey to keep open the possibility that we 
would at some point end up with a single currency. That was not our intention, and I felt there 
was a basic dishonesty in this interpretation. It was the removal of this camouflage which 
(…) probably provided the reason for Geoffrey’s resignation.9 
The imagery used in that final sentence is thoroughly characteristic of the 
author. Indeed, the quest for definition constitutes something of a 
Hauptthema in The Downing Street Years. 
 
 
The quest for definition  
 
Readers of Cicero’s Topica will recall his account of the 16 intrinsic topics 
of invention in IX-XXIII. A topic (from Greek topikos, the adjective 
associated with the noun topos, “place”; hence the Latin, locus) is  
the region of an argument, and an argument [is] a course of reasoning which firmly 
establishes a matter about which there is some doubt.10  
The intrinsic topics include definition, conjugates,11 genus, species, 
similarity, difference, contraries, adjuncts. Definition is clearly one of the 
                                          
8 “Delphic” refers to the usually ambiguous nature of oracular statements such as were delivered 
at Delphi, Ancient Greece; the ambiguity here lies either in the refusal of imposition (leaving 
open the possibility of being persuaded to comply); or in the conflation of national and European 
perspective: the United Kingdom was already enjoying, since time immemorial, a single 
currency, the pound sterling, when the statement in question was made. (Eds.) 
9 Thatcher 1993. 
10 Cicero, Topica, I.8. 
11 Ibid., III.12. “Conjugate” is the term applied to arguments based on words of the same family. 
Words of the same family are those which are formed from one root but have different 
grammatical forms” (sapiens, sapienter, sapientia). 
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most potentially productive loci:  
Sometimes a definition is applied to the whole subject which is under consideration; this 
definition unfolds what is wrapped up, as it were, in the subject which is being examined.12 
One kind of definition applies to material objects, the other to abstractions. 
Definition allows us to maintain “a clear pattern and understanding” of these 
intangibles. In terms of its operation, definition works sometimes by 
enumeration (partitio) and sometimes by analysis (divisio), which involves 
the breaking-down of genus into species. 
 Beyond doubt, Mrs Thatcher devoted a great deal of her oratorical 
endeavours to the development of lines of argumentation evolving from this 
topic; in the context of EC matters, one could mention the Bruges Speech as 
a classical instance of an oration depending largely on the locus of 
definition. But the effort to extract-– and build upon – definition is a 
persistent ingredient. Some of the most striking observations in her memoirs 
derive from what she identified as the reluctance of some of her EC 
counterparts to produce (or apparently to contemplate producing) definition 
of the cardinal terms of quotidian political discourse. There is a continuing 
strand of protest against the approach whereby  
a combination of high-flown statements of principle and various procedural devices 
prevented substantive discussion of what was at stake until it was too late.13  
 Of particular concern was the capacity of treaties and communiqués to 
generate “nebulous phrases” which later were to re-appear endowed with a 
federal significance which at the time of promulgation was entirely 
disclaimed. Accordingly, at the Dublin Council of April 1990, Mrs Thatcher 
undertook the task of definition, subjecting the crucial phrase “political 
union” to analysis. But this was done in a manner which relied heavily on a 
bravura use of the trope of ironia:14 
I said that the way to dispel fears was to make clear what we did not mean when we were 
talking about political union. We did not mean that there would be a loss of national identity. 
Nor did we mean giving up separate heads of state, either the monarchies to which six of us 
were devoted or the presidencies which the other six member states favoured. We did not 
intend to suppress national parliaments; the European Parliament must have no role at the 
expense of national parliaments. We did not intend to change countries’ electoral systems. 
We would not be altering the role of the Council of Ministers. Political union must not mean 
any greater centralization of powers in Europe at the expense of national governments and 
parliaments. There must be no weakening of the role of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
                                          
12 Ibid., II.9. 
13 Thatcher 1993: 761. 
14 As a figure of rhetoric, “ironia” is defined as: “speaking in such a way as to imply the contrary 
of what one says, often for the purpose of derision, mockery, or jest”; cf. Burton, ibid. (Eds.) 
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Organization] and no attempt to turn foreign policy co-operation into a restriction of the 
rights of states to conduct their own foreign policy. (Thatcher 1993: 761-2.) 
This represents an “unfolding” with a vengeance. For if political union were 
to be set in train, the consequences would be precisely those detailed, 
remorselessly, by the speaker. Lady Thatcher’s comment on her 
performance is that “to deliver a ten-minute speech with one’s tongue in 
one’s cheek is as much a physical as a rhetorical achievement”.15 
 
 
The genus deliberativum 
 
At this point it would hardly be surprising if some of my auditors were to 
interject: “yes, this is all very well; but if oratory is in question, you are 
picturing not a successful but a patently unsuccessful orator”. For if it is true, 
as Cicero expresses it in De Optimo Genere Oratorum, that “the supreme 
orator… is the one whose speech instructs, delights and moves the minds of 
his audience”16, then the performances on the EC stage would testify not to 
supremacy but to extreme fallibility, since these occasions indicate a 
practitioner who was unconvincing as an instructor, ill-equipped to provide 
delight, and unable to move her auditors. But before endorsing such a 
verdict, we should perhaps reflect upon the nature and demands of the genus 
deliberativum. What is the substance treated in this branch of oratory? What 
are the responsibilities placed upon its exponents?  
 The deliberative speech is so-called because it is addressed to an 
audience sitting in deliberation upon a question. What is to be done? Do we 
follow course x or y? The “end” of the deliberative speech is advantage 
(deliberandi finis utilitas); of the judicial speech, justice; of the encomiastic 
speech which metes out excessive praise, the “end” is honour (Topica, 
XC1). The adolescent Cicero maintained that both advantage and honour 
were to be regarded as ends of deliberative speaking: so the orator is 
appealing to both utilitas and honestas, whereas the encomiastic speaker is 
appealing to honestas alone.17 In a later passage from De Inventione Cicero 
writes “honour and advantage are the qualities of things to be sought, and 
baseness and disadvantage, of things to be avoided”.18 
 The pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium resolves the question 
by setting up utilitas as the end, and attributing to it the two aspects of 
                                          
15 Thatcher 1993: 762. 
16 De Optimo genere Oratorum.  
17 De Inventione. 
18 Ibid., II.lii.158. 
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security and honour.19 
 The bias in De Inventione is towards judicial rhetoric (genus iudiciale); 
so Cicero’s thoughts on genus deliberativum are welcome. As always, his 
observations repay attention. For example, he notes (II.lvi) that 
in the state there are some things that, so to speak, pertain to the body politic, such as fields, 
harbours, money, a fleet, sailors, soldiers and allies – the means by which states preserve their 
safety and liberty – and other things contribute something grander and less necessary, such as 
the great size and surpassing beauty of a city (…) and a multitude of friendships and 
alliances. These things not only make states safe and secure, but also important and powerful.  
The cardinal terms are security (incolumitas) and power (potentia): Security 
is a reasoned and unbroken maintenance of safety. Power is the possession 
of resources sufficient for preserving oneself and weakening another.20 Ad 
Herennium observes (II.3) that “to consider security is to provide some plan 
(…) for ensuring the avoidance of a present or imminent danger”. The 
deliberative speaker who addresses himself seriously to the task in hand is 
guided by three considerations – this at least is the De Inventione teaching 
grounded in the notion that honestas and utilitas are both ends to be served:  
The greatest necessity is that of doing what is honourable; next to that is the necessity of 
security and third and last the necessity of convenience.21 
So there is a descending scale: honestas – incolumitas – commoditas (the 
last term makes us think of Shakespeare’s “commodity, the bias of the 
world”).22 There is frequently a requirement to weigh the competing claims, 
for although honestas is superior to incolumitas, there will be occasions 
when the demands of the latter cannot be set aside. 
 Now, the textbooks all assume that two (or more) identifiable courses of 
action are being debated. Is it better to let Carthage stand or fall (Kartago 
[sic] tollenda an relinquenda videatur?) Should war or peace be pursued? 
But this is not the situation we encounter in these Thatcherite discussions; it 
would seem (if we adopt the testimony of Lady Thatcher in Downing Street 
Years) that “the question” was not put or indeed identified. Lady Thatcher 
protests at one point that there had been no “open, principled public debate 
(…) either nationally or in European fora” (Thatcher 1993: 767). 
 If we were to delve deeper in an effort to discover the roots of this 
strange non-dialogue we could perhaps suggest that both Mrs Thatcher and 
her interlocutors were working with differing interpretations of necessity. A 
                                          
19 Rhetorica ad Herennium, III.ii.3.  
20 De Inventione, II.lvi.169. 
21 Ibid., II.lvii.174. 
22 King John, II (Eds.) 
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passage from De Inventione (II. lvi-lvii) distinguishes between simple 
necessity (e.g. as expressed in the axiom “men must die”) and the necessity 
which is asserted under a qualification or condition:  
When (…) we use the word necessary meaning thereby that an act is necessary if we wish to 
avoid or gain something, then we must consider to what extent that qualification is 
advantageous or honourable. 
The connection between necessity/advantage/honour was clearly recognized, 
or assumed, by those EC heads of government; but the interpretation of the 
terms making up the nexus varied widely. It was not, perhaps, unreasonable 
for the British Prime Minister to seek to introduce greater rigour into the 
discussions and to urge that the ultimate destination should be identified 





It is my contention that Mrs Thatcher’s “No, no, no” is of a piece with her 
practice as a deliberative speaker. Sir Geoffrey Howe’s attempt at caricature 
testifies principally to mandarin outrage – to the dismay of the haute 
politique class on hearing an uncoded and “undiplomatic” utterance. But in 
fact, Mrs Thatcher’s epizeuxis was entirely in accord with Government 
policy as expressed in the Bruges Speech. It was, moreover, entirely in 
accord with her “Roman” approach to the genus deliberativum as an 
instrument for definition and delineation. In Mrs Thatcher’s view, it was 
essential – for the purpose of conducting any worthwhile deliberation – that 
the causa be plainly set forth. Her distaste for camouflage is apparent 
throughout The Downing Street Years. Perhaps the reproachful criticisms of 
Sir Geoffrey express the alarm of one who dreads the removal of the saving 
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ABSTRACT. Prolonged militarism within the Nigerian context damaged not only civic orders and 
institutions but public and private moralities. The political class was co-opted by the military 
rulers and then thoroughly compromised thereby destroying collective moral sense. As a result, 
the discourse of truth and reconciliation within the Nigerian milieu is doubly compounded with 





Nigeria is important for so many reasons. It is the most populous nation in 
the African continent. Further, apart from being blessed with several mineral 
resources such as petroleum and iron ore, it is also blessed with a dynamic 
and resourceful people. Thus a combination of these natural and material 
endowments ought to have paved the way towards substantial economic and 
socio-political development. Unfortunately, this has not occurred. Indeed, 
Nigeria’s problems are myriad and multi-layered, a lot of them often 
induced by poor decision-making and lack-luster management at the higher 
political levels. 
 Perhaps it is necessary to recount some of these problems. Of course an 
exhaustive account at this stage may end up being diversionary; nonetheless, 
governmental corruption would rate as a major impediment. From this 
emanate several other daunting obstacles to nation-building. Nigeria now 
ranks as one of the world’s twenty poorest nations. Adult life expectancy is 
only fifty-three years. Adult illiteracy stands at forty-three per cent while an 
estimated two-thirds of Nigerians live below the poverty line. With this brief 
sketch, other problems could be left to the imagination, in such fields as 
health, urban insecurity, unemployment etc. 
 Yet the potential of Nigeria as a nation cannot be underestimated. It has 
all the potential to assume political, moral, economic and diplomatic 
leadership in global affairs. Having said this, Nigeria is one of the best 
examples of how a nation should not be run. Its disastrous history of 
protracted military rule has virtually destroyed all facets of its national 
existence. And militarism is a scourge that mere cosmetic reforms cannot 
eradicate. Latin American nations such as Mexico have demonstrated more 
than sufficiently that militarism as a form of politics often transcends its 
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immediate spatio-temporal context. In other words, insidious modes of 
governance often carry within themselves the mechanisms of their 
perpetuation. E. Wamba-dia-Wamba illustrates this point with regard to the 
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the following manner:  
Mobutism must be understood as a body of political dictates on the post-colonial state (this as 
a historical form of politics) if we hope to clearly bring out what needs to be avoided or 
destroyed in the transformation of our society and the construction of a new state (Wamba-
dia-Wamba 1998: 45). 
Similarly, it has been noted that  
civilians internalize dictatorial military culture of immediate effect, while in their service. In 
this way, they reproduce the culture of militarism even under civil rule (Momoh & 
Adejumobi 1999: 36).  
President Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s current elected ruler, highlighted 
this ominous tendency within the first few weeks of his tenure, thereby 
eliciting charges that he was out to run an imperial presidency. The point 
was that instead of abiding by clear-cut constitutional procedures regarding 
law-making, and in dealings with elected members of the Houses of 
Assembly, he found it more than convenient to disregard them. And it is this 
tendency that all true democrats ought to discourage and eventually quell. 
Thus militarism as an institution of rulership often goes beyond itself in 
weakening vital formations of civil society. And as we have seen, civil 
society having had its basis and functions eroded by the dynamics of 
militarism, in turn mirrors and promotes the values, structures and 
characteristics of the latter. By extension, this should not be a period of 
complacency, the transition to democratic rule cannot be a superficial 
development. Rather, it should be a period of heightening and strengthening 
political vigilance among the various sectors of civil society. 
 At this juncture, some of the vital questions that form the major thrusts 
of this discussion ought to be raised. First of all, it is pertinent to note some 
of the trajectories and ravages of prolonged militarism within the Nigerian 
political context and to assess how these verities decide the ethical 
barometer, and indeed both the historical and political evolution of the 
nation as a whole. Given this somewhat broad problematique, the earlier 
observation that militarism develops innate instruments of prolongation (that 
not only contain seeds of its future birth and growth but also the structures 
for the erosion of civil society generally) becomes even more striking. 
 
 
The stakes of truth, reconciliation and restitution 
  
The discourse of truth and reconciliation has assumed topical and global 
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importance and, of course, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa has an immense bearing on this development. But in spite of 
the moral magnitude of this powerful socio-political process, the stakes of 
truth and reconciliation are not always so easy to negotiate. A number of 
recent events in contemporary global history attest to this fact. In this 
instance, the War Crime Tribunal in The Hague set up for investigating the 
injustices in former Yugoslavia and also the one established in Arusha in 
relation to Rwanda readily come to mind. 
 It has been noted by Michael Ignatieff that:  
Justice in itself is not a problematic objective, but whether the attainment of justice always 
contributes to reconciliation is anything but evident. Truth, too, is a good thing; but as the 
African proverb reminds us, “truth is not always good to say” (Ignatieff 1996: 10). 
The establishment of a truth commission in any society usually depends on 
the configuration of political forces in that society. A major problem that 
faces societies intending to reconcile their population with horrendous socio-
political histories is the temptation to separate truth from justice. In this 
regard,  
seeking truth is not an end in itself for victims; they need to feel that in some way or other the 
wrong done to them has been partially righted. At the same time, the pursuit of truth does not 
necessarily mean show trials or endless vengeance (Rolston 1996: 36).  
 Archbishop Desmond Tutu frames the problem in a somewhat different 
fashion:  
Experience world-wide shows that if you do not deal with a dark past such as ours, 
effectively look the beast in the eye, that beast is not going to lie down quietly; it is going, as 
sure as anything, to come back and haunt you horrendously (Tutu 1996: 39). 
Tutu further points out that  
in the matter of amnesty, no moral distinction is going to be made between acts perpetrated 
by liberation movements and acts perpetrated by the apartheid dispensation (Tutu 1996: 43).  
And then lending his voice to the debate, F.W. de Klerk says  
reconciliation… cannot be achieved unless there is also repentance on all sides… No single 
side in the conflict of the past has a monopoly of virtue or should bear responsibility for all 
the abuses that occurred. Nor can any side claim sole credit for the transformation belongs to 
us all (Tutu 1996: 57).  
As a final word on the functions and problems of truth commissions, 
Michael Ignatieff’s views are particularly instructive:  
The truth commissions closed many individual dossiers in the painful histories of their 
nation’s past. At this molecular, individual level, they did a power of good. But they were 
also charged with the production of public truth and the remaking of public discourse. They 
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were to generate a moral narrative – explaining the genesis of evil regimes and apportioning 
moral responsibility for their deeds (Ignatieff 1996: 112). 
Undoubtedly, the discourse on truth and reconciliation is bound to remain 
topical and would also retain its prime place on the scale of national and 
global priorities. Only recently, Wole Soyinka in a lecture appropriately 
entitled “Engaging the Past: Lessons from South Africa” revisited the issue; 
his propositions, when not thought-provoking, were decidedly provocative. 
An example of such is the view that we ought to 
globalise certain categories of crimes – that is, recognize that there are certain crimes which 
transcend the initial borders of their commission. It seems so simplistic as to be almost banal 
but nations have been plagued by a tendency to live by a false criminal dichotomy – one that 
enabled it, for so long to collaborate in the tracking down of bank robbers, murderers, 
condemned men and women, rapists, drug traffickers etc., but never, hardly ever for those 
identitical crimes when they are committed in political circumstances, or at a mass scale 
(Soyinka 1999: 26). 
Linking up with the current Nigerian political context, Soyinka warns:  
Those who are strutting around today, secure in the cloak of immunity, are ready yet again to 
act true to type if the circumstances change yet again, and their services are required in the 
course of perfidy, of large-scale robbery and a sadistic domination of Nigeria society 
(Soyinka 1999: 25). 
His simple conclusion is that all culprits currently operating in the Nigerian 
political sphere should be brought to book. It is another question entirely if 
the presently arrayed political forces would allow for such a juridical 
endeavour, or whether the required political will could be mustered for that 
objective. To be sure, several atrocities had been perpetrated by the Ibrahim 
Babangida and Sani Abacha juntas. Furthermore, there is strong evidence to 
claim that the administration of General Abdusalami Abubakar (which 
concluded a transition-to-democracy programme) carried out large-scale 
financial fraud such that can jeopardize the current political dispensation. 
Soyinka and his ilk are advocating comprehensive probes into these various 
atrocities in order to initiate what he deems to be a much-needed national 
moral rejuvenation. Others would much rather see that we forget the past 
and get on which the future. For Soyinka, “the past will always return to 
haunt us, unless we first take steps to exorcise its ghosts” (Soyinka 1999: 
25). However, our recent political history is such that entire sectors of the 
populace have been compromized and have had their moral fabrics badly 
damaged. General Ibrahim Babangida initiated and perfected the strategy of 
undermining the political class in order to prolong his dubious legitimacy, 
on the one hand, and weakening civil society, on the other. Sani Abacha was 
even more brutal in this respect.  
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 It is perhaps better to present a more systematic catalogue of atrocities of 
the Babangida and Abacha regimes so as to discern what bearing it has on 
the prevailing discourse on truth and reconciliation. 
 
 
Under the boots of Babangida and Abacha 
  
The regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha were as yet 
the most devastating in Nigeria’s tortuous political history. Both dictators 
never intended to hand over political power to civilians, yet both embarked 
on agonizing transition programmes that cost the Nigerian nation several 
billions of naira.1 Momoh and Adejumobi are categorical in stating that:  
the philosophy of the transition programme was (…) centred on economic deregulation to 
allow for capital accumulations and on the political scene, to permit authoritarianism, in order 
to allow for control of the entire populace, both military and civil. The transition programme, 
i.e. the PTP [Political Transition Programme], was therefore designed to fail. It is a malleable 
paradox that Babangida, the architect of this nebulous philosophy, was unwilling to accept 
responsibility for this and shifted the blame of his failure to the politicians (Momoh & 
Adejumobi 1999: 56). 
The duplicity of General Babangida is further underscored by the fact that he 
enlisted a core of gifted scholars to provide ideological justification for his 
deceitful programmes. Several gargantuan bureaucracies were created not 
only for the purpose of deceiving the Nigerian populace together with the 
international community, but also as avenues for massive economic 
corruption. Some of these bodies include the Political Bureau, the National 
Electoral Commission (NEC), the Directorate for Social Mobilization 
(MAMSER, i.e. Mass Mobilization for Self-Reliance), the Centre for 
Democratic Studies (CDS) and the Code of Conduct Bureau. 
 In the end, all these bloated bureaucracies turned out to be largely 
ineffectual watering-holes for political favourites. After the fall of the 
regime, they were all dissolved. Misappropriation of public funds more or 
less became institutionalized by the Babangida administration. The country 
is still reeling from its seemingly unstoppable ravages. More than anything 
else, what signified Babangida’s intention not to handle over power was his 
creation of two government-funded political parties. He had claimed he 
wanted create a new breed of politicians uncorrupted by the destructive 
divisiveness of earlier politicians. In this respect, it has been noted that; 
                                          
1 Naira: the Nigerian currency; when this volume went to the press (January 2004), NGN 1,000 
was equivalent to EUR €5.69 or US$ 7.17. (Eds.) 
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with the gradual withdrawal of state funding for the two political parties and given the 
enormous financial outlay required both to run the parties and prepare candidates for 
elections, the parties quickly relapsed into the stranglehold of the money-bags (Momoh & 
Adejumobi 1999: 136). 
Furthermore, Babangida revealed that he knew those who would succeed 
him and those who would not. As such his transition programme was strictly 
monitored and teleguided. Babangida nebulous programme ended with the 
annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election which created such a 
profound political impasse for Nigeria and which also raised immeasurably 
the stakes of truth and reconciliation in the public arena. The unfortunate 
annulment is truly a watershed in Nigeria’s political history because it 
resulted in a rigorous examination of the institutions of civil society, national 
values and priorities, conceptions of morality and accountability, the 
demands and obligations of leadership and citizenship and of course the 
military as an institution. For the sustained development of civil society, this 
examination must be carried out incessantly. And then, because civil society 
itself became enfeebled and corrupt in Nigeria, Babangida was able to 
pervert and subvert accepted norms and standards. For instance, 
“Law” for Babangida (...) does not mean respect for the rule of law or due process. It simply 
means the ability of the state to enforce obedience, obeisance, induce recognition and silence 
opposition, put people into quietism without recourse to questioning the correctness, justness 
or otherwise of the action of the state (Momoh & Adejumobi 1999: 118). 
But in spite of the progressive weakening of civil society, the pauperization 
and immiseration of the general populace coupled with the repressive tactics 
of political exclusion practiced by the regime in its bid to perspetuate itself 
in power, that regime collapsed under the weight of its intrigues. 
Babangida’s self-seeking agenda played itself out soon after the annulment 
of the June 12 presidential election after which the chimerical Interim 
National Government (ING) was installed. This questionable political 
arrangement was in turn toppled by General Sani Abacha whose regime bore 
to all intents and purposes similar traits with the Babangida junta (Osha 
1998). Wole Soyinka also noted the striking similarities between the two 
regimes in terms of methods of co-optation, entrenchment and repression. 
Nonetheless, differences can be said to exist at the level of political 
repression. It can be argued that the Abacha junta was decidedly more 
tyrannical and more disrespectful of civil liberties. The Babangida junta 
made a show of honouring human rights even though the contrary was the 
case. The Abacha junta never bothered with such false courtesies. This was 
manifest in the manner in which state repression became more pronounced 
and systematic. Consequently, such gross human-rights abuses were 
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committed that as a nation, we Nigerians have no choice but to address 
them, in order to resume the challenge of development and socio-political 
reconstruction, as well as the quest for freedom to which all democratic 
societies aspire.  
 Presently, Nigerian society as a whole faces a debilitating dilemma: do 
we just forget the past and proceed with the challenge of the future or do we 
revisit the state-engineered violations of our recent past so as not only to 
commit the same mistakes again but also to evolve an ethics of politics to 
safeguard ourselves from wanton abuses? To be sure, this dilemma is 
reflected in various regional, ethnic, religious and ideological ramifications, 
in which several collective identities are revealed. On this question, it is not 
easy to arrive at a clear-cut consensus. This is the case, in part, because 
prolonged militarism severely enfeebled civil society, and also destroyed 
basic but meaningful ethical orientations. In the process, not only values and 
institutions have been affected, but also, and even more distressingly, people 
have been implicated and compromized. 
 When General Sani Abacha assumed political power in November 1993, 
Nigeria’s socio-political situation worsened considerably. In November 10, 
1995 a shocking event jolted the international community. Ken Saro-Wiwa, 
author, environmentalist, minority-rights activist and leader of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), was subjected to 
judicial hanging along with eight co-activists. The international 
repercussions were quite tremendous. Nigeria, as a result, became a pariah 
nation. After this gross violation of human rights and of due process, the 
cycle of repression continued unabated. Even before the judicial murders of 
Saro-Wiwa and the other eight Ogoni activists, Nigeria’s current president, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, along with his former deputy, the late Major General 
Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, had been brought before a secret military tribunal 
over charges connected with a phantom coup plot. Four journalists were also 
implicated by the unfounded allegations: Kunle Ajibade, Chris Anyanwu, 
Ben Charles Obi and George Mbah. Beko Ransome-Kuti, a prominent 
human-rights activists was also charged, and sentenced to a jail term 
accordingly. Musa Yar’Adua was to die in prison custody under mysterious 
circumstances. Also killed were Alfred Rewane, an industrialist and 
prominent a pro-democracy activist; and Kudirat Abiola, wife of Moshood 
Abiola, the presumed winner of the June 12 presidential election. 
 After the death of General Sani Abacha on June 8, 1998 a lot of 
unsavoury revelations came to light. It came to be known that the late 
dictator supported several assassination squads such as the K-Squad, Strike 
Force and the Special Squad. Furthermore, his numerous security operatives 
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began to confess to numerous state-sponsored crimes. In particular 
noteworthy are the confessions of Major Hamza Al-Mustapha (the Chief 
Security Officer to Sani Abacha) and Colonel Frank Omenka (former head 
of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, DMI). Given these tarnished 
antecedents, it became apparent that some collective analysis of the events 
of our recent past was required. Gross human-rights abuses had been 
committed in the name of the state but, as yet, there is still no definite 
national policy as to strategies for investigation and redress. Quite a number 
of short-sighted politicians and unaffiliated opportunists had benefited 
financially from Abacha’s self-succession adventure, to the detriment of the 
larger society. This crop has continued to present problems for current 
democratic dispensation.  
 Thus the meaning of reconciliation has assumed very fluid dimensions in 
this context. Is it meant to be synonymous with “forgive and forget”, or 
meant to be a working through the horrendous events of our recent political 
history? These are the two main ideological proclivities of the debate in 
somewhat crude terms. It would appear as if the former discursive 
orientation is gaining the upper hand for reasons of sheer political 
expediency. The puritanical viewpoint such as is exemplified in Soyinka’s 
stance enjoys the support of staunch pro-democracy activists but wans in the 
realm of practical politics. The reason being that the regimes of Ibrahim 
Babangida and Sani Abacha were relentless in undermining the moral basis 
of the political class, and even, to a large extent, civil society as a whole. 
And yet the same compromized political class is needed in the evolution of a 
democratic political culture. For purists, the rhetoric of truth and 
reconciliation in its ideal sense ought to be pursued with utmost vigour for 
genuine national rejuvenation. This continual conflict between ideals and 
practical realities was evident during the formation of the political parties in 
which some staunch pro-democracy activists were classified as being rigid, 
while those in the opposite camp were considered unrepentant opportunists. 




Obasanjo, history and its discontents 
 
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s eventual political rehabilitation must be one 
of the more surprising events of contemporary political history. He had been 
incarcerated by the Abacha regime for allegations relating to a phantom 
coup plot, and had been suffering from ill-health. After General Abacha’s 
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death, General Abdulsalami Abubakar released him from jail and he was 
promptly convinced to launch a well-funded presidential campaign under the 
auspices of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP). It came to pass that he 
won. But the conflictual political constellations mentioned in the preceeding 
section were also at play during his eventual assumption of political power. 
General Babangida in an obvious bid to redeem his shattered political image 
is said to have persuaded Obasanjo to run for office. He was also said to 
have funded Obasanjo’s presidential bid to the tune of 50 million U.S.$ 
(Maja-Pearse 1999: 46). It should also be recalled that convincing evidence 
exists implicating Babangida in the misappropriation of 12.4 billion U.S.$ 
resulting from the Gulf War oil windfall (Maja-Pearse 1999: 46). In the 
same vein, Babangida was responsible for the annulment of the June 12 
presidential election. So for many, it was curious to have such a character 
acting out powerfully behind-the-scenes roles. Even Obasanjo has been 
castigated for his role during the annulment of the 1993 election. It has been 
proven that he had encouraged the establishment of the Interim National 
Government (ING) headed by Ernest Shonekan.  
 The point is, at what juncture can we claim to have a puritanical moment 
in our political development? It is hard to tell, and even purists would be 
hard put to answer this all-important question. An index of the complexity of 
this dilemma is the widely-touted allegation to the effect that Moshood 
Abiola was the main sponsor of Babangida’s coup in 1985, being motivated 
by differences between him (Abiola) and the Buhari/Idiagbon regime (Maja-
Pearse 1999: 19). To be sure, it is not easy to find an appropriate or suitable 
point of departure. 
 General Babangida has committed unforgivable transgressions against 
the Nigerian nation as a whole yet he has managed to influence the birth of 
the current democratic dispensation. Despite President Obasanjo’s 
antecedents as a military dictator and as a supporter of governmental 
arbritariness, he is now at the helm of affairs. And so at what point do we 
commence our much-needed national self-examination? Furthermore, even 
the regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar is being alleged to have 
carried out large scale financial fraud in spite of its relatively successful 
transition-to-civil-rule programme. Perhaps Olu Falae, a prominent 
politician, captures the ramifications of the scenario most appropriately, 
when he noted,  
what I think they may do is take off the uniform, drop the gun, put an agbada,2 grab naira 
                                          
2 Adire African Textiles, at: http://www.adire.clara.net/agbadainfo.htm: 
“Agbada is the Yoruba name for a type of flowing wide sleeved robe, usually decorated 
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and use naira as the gun to rule us (quoted in Maja-Pearse 1999: 1).  
 This perplexing dilemma illustrates what may happen when nations and 
societies put off the prerequisite rituals of criticism for too long.  
 The question then is at what point do we begin? It is unlikely that 
President Obasanjo would have a ready answer to this question. Another 
way of framing the vexatious issue of the national question is that it 
concerns 
the question of how every Nigerian can be made a citizen (in the real not the nominal sense) 
of his country and related to this, the problem of how to create an appropriate socio-political 
framework for the conciliation of interests among them (Oladipo 1999: 26).  
Still on the issue of posing questions, Jacques Derrida avers:  
Something that I learned from the great figures in the history of philosophy, from Husserl in 
particular, is the necessity of posing transcendental questions in order not to be held within 
the fragility of an incompetent empiricist discourse, and thus it is in order to avoid 
empiricism, positivism and pychologism that it is endlessly necessary to renew transcendental 
questioning (Derrida 1996: 81). 
Within the Nigerian ethical and political context this endless questioning has 





Judging from the foregoing, no approach to the Nigerian national question 
can be deemed the most appropriate or the most desirable. Civil society has 
become severely weakened and efforts must be made to rebuild and 
strengthen its various and numerious institutions; the media, the labour 
unions, the academic community, the non-military professions etc. This is 
because  
prolonged military rule has (…) attenuated the democratic and constitutional principles and 
channels of conflict resolution, which encourage political exchanges and bargains rather that 
suppression of conflicts (Osaghae 1998a: 12, cf. 1998b).  
We may even begin by addressing the question of minority rights and 
strategies of devolution and power sharing in our ongoing democratic quest. 
But the questioning must commence and for the steady growth of civil 
society it must not ever be suspended again. For sure, the appropriate 
approach cannot entail the victimization of individuals for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                             
with embroidery, which is worn throughout much of Nigeria by important men, such as 
kings and chiefs, and on ceremonial occasions like weddings and funerals.” (Eds.) 
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settling cheap political scores. It must look beyond the immediate context 
and strive to be transcendental in order not to be narrow, self-seeking and 
short-sighted. 
 Other strategies for developing a viable democratic culture together with 
strengthening civil society within the Nigerian political terrain, ought to 
include a conscious programme of de-militarization of the public sphere. 
The public sphere as it is presently constituted, is not even an appendage of 
the military: it is in fact a continuation of militarism in disguise. Once this is 
acknowledged, then the necessary vigilance for the reconstitution of the 
public sphere can be cultivated. In essence, de-militarization must entail a 
definite programme of social and political transformation. It must be 
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CHAPTER 7 
SELF-FASHIONING IN POLITICAL TURMOIL 
POWER, TRUTH, AND RHETORIC IN CICERO 
 
Johnson Segun Ige 
 
ABSTRACT. The central argument of this paper is that power within the context of Ciceronian 
rhetoric is misrepresentative and that the regime of power is not always truly represented in its 
deployment by the subject. For Foucault, power is possessed by the social individual. More 
specifically, Foucault’s position sits very well with Cicero’s rhetorical practice in affirming that 
power is everywhere and that through a nexus of relationships, hegemony is gradually produced. 
 
 
Throughout history, managing political crises is one prime requirement in 
politics that has accounted for the success or failure of most of the acclaimed 
public figures. Political opposition helps in ascertaining the political stature 
of political figures, because the situation provides a basis for comparison, 
and in the present context, makes possible a critical evaluation of the 
oratorical hegemony. Oratorical hegemony is simply the ascendancy and 
functioning of a political institution through the performance of rhetoric.  
 The main thrust of the argument in this paper is that power, in 
Ciceronian rhetoric, is misrepresentative, and that the regime of power is not 
always truly represented in its deployment by the subject (i.e. the orator). 
For Cicero to fit into the framework of the prevailing oratorical hegemony of 
the first century BCE, in publishing the speeches, he simply adopts a style of 
writing that is consistent with the position of power in which he is located. 
For the modern philosopher, Michel Foucault, the basic assumptions of both 
liberalism and Marxism in respect to power are:  
 
1. power is possessed by a social individual,  
2. power is characterized in the law, the economy, the state, and  
3. power is primarily repressive.  
 
However, Foucault maintains a mild stand on the possession and deployment 
of power. He recommends that power should be exercized rather than 
possessed; decentralized rather than exercized from top down, and 
productive rather than repressive.1 Foucault’s position fits in very well with 
1 Foucault 1980: 98.  
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Cicero’s rhetorical practice, in identifying that power is everywhere, and 
that, through a nexus of relationships, hegemony. All the dichotomies 
imaginable within the Foucaultian framework are accommodated in 
Ciceronian rhetoric, that is, it functions not seeking to be oppressive, but to 
achieve an oratorical end. Power in rhetoric is fluid, dynamic, and serves as 
a tool for constructing, legitimizing and entrenching the hegemony of the 
orator in a speech event. Furthermore, due to the psychological nature of the 
performance of rhetoric, and the deployment of power in rhetoric, there is a 
universal embrace and manipulation of all means and agents of power to 
generate some kind of movement (Latin: movere) in the perlocutionary 
phase of the delivery. This is what Mackendrick (emulating an expression 
attributed to the seventeenth-century CE French king Louis XIV) would call 
a l’état-c’est-moi approach. 
 Truth and probability have been age-old conceptual antagonists in 
rhetoric situations. Foucault’s generic idea of production of truth as a means 
of domination, i.e.,  
men [sic] govern themselves (...) through the production of truth 
is rather problematic in its rhetorical application. Indeed, rhetoric serves as a 
means of governing others, but it is advisable for the orator to avoid 
pleading with truth as the essence of his speech. The orator’s dilemma is his 
negotiation between truth and probability. Quintilian, an ancient professor of 
rhetoric, encourages the orator to operate within the bounds of probability 
rather than truth.2 Kennedy, a modern classical rhetorician, has observed that 
probability appeared to the ancients a safer rhetorical technique to use than a 
witness, because witnesses can be corrupted too easily. For him, neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant could cheaply buy probabilities. Aristotle advises 
that an orator should advance probability rather than evidence (empeiria) 
since the latter is considered as un-artistic (a-tekhnos). In other words, 
though a speaker must seek every possible means of enhancing the tenacity 
of argumentation in court, either probability (to eikos) and/or truth 
(alētheia), his main tool of persuasion must be the spoken word (logos). 
Conclusively, the major characteristic of any rhetorical delivery is the 
conflict between truth and probability. However, for Cicero, the problem 
seems quite manageable. The goal of the orator should be to achieve vivid 
description (evidentia) by his choice of words. For him, orators should strive 
at creating, avant la lettre, cinematic effects by reducing events, objects, 
people, architecture, or the world at large, to verbal (rhetorical) expressions, 
                                          
2 Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 2. 17. 30-40. 
Ige 96
which in the end create “visual” impressions through the “eye of the mind”. 
For Cicero the sensory faculty that is responsible for decoding messages in 
the listener receives clear messages in the form of striking images. These 
imaginable pictures will generate responses from the audience. It seems to 
be as a result of this that Cicero constructs power relations which are based 
on true representation but on the basis of imaginative speaking (illustris) and 
vividness (dilucidatio). Cicero’s outstanding deliveries at strategic moments 
in his life won him public acclaim. Linking this manner of speaking with 
what has been said above regarding truth, it remains for me to say that 
rhetoric, and more specifically, Ciceronian oratory, does not fall within the 
ambit of modern ethical philosophy, nor that which has been informed by 
Judeo-Christian ethics – Cicero lived before the founding and spread of 
Christianity. For me, Ciceronian oratory is a-moral since he actually says in 
his De Inventione, “the prudence of the audience has always been the 
regulator for the eloquence of the orator.” In other words, Cicero counts on 
the audience to exercize their power of knowledge to serve as a barometer 
for the eloquence of the orator. More succinctly put, truth is what the 
audience accepts as true. 
 A common paradigm locates power in the state, and thereby says that 
power is judicial and repressive. According to this paradigm, the state, and 
not the offended, must punish any injury inflicted on a citizen. The question 
that arises is quis custodes custodiet? (“who will guard the guards?”) When 
the life and/or the reputation of a notable oratorical holder of power is at 
stake, power is no longer located in the state or the law, but in the “mouth” 
of him who holds both the law and the state together. This caricature 
represents the method employed by Cicero in dealing with the Catilinarian 
conspiracy of 64 BCE.3 
 
 
Cicero and Catiline 
 
Cicero had witnessed considerable turbulence in Roman politics before 63 
                                          
3 Bell (1997) rightly says that an oratorical text is a partial record of a complex dynamic between 
actor and audience, neither of whom had the power to take action independently of the other. 
Each needs the other, simply to have dignity. What seems to be missing in Bell is that he takes for 
granted that Ciceronian oratory subordinates other institutions in a speech situation. Performance 
is aimed at dominance. The dominant role the orator plays, and the audience/actor conspiracy that 
the orator aims at do not give room for much legislative action on the part of the audience. 
Ultimately, the audience’s role is that it should “sheepishly” concur with whatever proposal the 
orator has made. 
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BCE, when he was consul. The events of the preceding years had indicated 
some likelihood of conflict resulting between Cicero and some members of 
the senate in 63 BCE. Cicero had had remarkable advancements before 63 
BCE (as a novus homo, a newcomer to Roman politics), and in this year, he 
became a consul. He was already on good terms with some top-notch Roman 
politicians of the equestrian class. His powers of oratory had won him the 
favour and following among the nobles and Roman people, respectively. 
However, in spite of all these apparent glories, Cicero’s election of 63 BCE 
is faced with illegal contestation from Catiline.4 
 Catiline was an active politician, a member of senate, a patrician, 
intelligent, and by Cicero’s description,5 an admirable personality, but at the 
same time a debauchee. He also desired the consulship, the ultimate 
magistracy in the Roman republic, which traditionally is always filled by 
two incumbents at the same time. Before 63 BCE Catiline had held both 
military and political appointments, but had failed to win the consulship, 
mainly because he was involved in unsavoury allegations and court cases. 
Catiline contested the consulship of 63, to be defeated by Cicero. This final 
defeat enraged him and he resorted to unconstitutional means to fight 
Cicero. Catiline planned an elaborate conspiracy against Cicero, with a view 
to torpedoing the latter’s period of office. Acting in the best interest of the 
state and in his capacity as consul, Cicero put up severe opposition to 
Catiline, which initially resulted in the latter’s hasty retreat and eventually, 
his demise. On 8 November, 63 BCE, Cicero attacked Catiline in the senate 
and he presented the first speech against Catiline, the first of a series of 
four.6 This set of speeches does not contain the exact words that Cicero used, 
but constitutes a rhetorical monument indicating what he more or less said 





The speeches were to be presented in the senate and general assembly 
(contio). In view of the strategic risk this entailed for Cicero’s stance as the 
consul prosecutor in the Catilinarian proceedings, Cicero’s personality 
needed proper definition in order to impress the members of the senate as 
well as the entire Roman populace, and in order for Catiline himself to 
                                          
4 Smith 1966: 107. 
5 Att. 1.2; Sull. 81 Caelio. 12ff. 
6 Smith (1966) gives a full account of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Also see Mitchell 1979: 219ff. 
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recognize by which authority Cicero speaks. Self-definition is of the 
essence,7 for Cicero is speaking primarily for himself, but presents himself 
as if speaking primarily on behalf of the state. Self-definition consists in 
what and who one is (Benhabib 1992: 104), and in this case, what I propose 
to call “self-definition of oratorical masculine individual hegemony”8 
involves the categorical stating of all relevant ramifications of power that 
have been invested in him as the custodian of the Roman republic. This 
move helps the orator to assert his authority, against the allegedly aggressive 
and lecherous Catiline and his followers. 
 In the exordium of the first Catilinarian, Cicero depicts himself as the 
authoritarian severe disciplinarian, social commentator and judge (1ff). 
Cicero’s exclamatory rhetorical questions in the opening censure Catiline’s 
indecent outrages, and how the latter has long abused the patience of the 
senate, despite the fact that, all his misdemeanours are known to the whole 
republic (1). The senate also shares considerably in the blame for condoning 
Catiline’s harassment of the whole republic. The senate’s blame emanates 
from its insouciance in dealing with Catiline’s outrages (2). In Cicero’s 
opinion, since precedence has been set, execution would be the most 
appropriate recompense for Catiline’s hooliganism. The precedent cited by 
Cicero, that is the execution of Tiberius Gracchus for undermining the 
constitution of the state, is a technical comparison intended to institute a 
charge of treasonable felony against Catiline. Moreover Cicero asserts his 
position as the consul, and declares the intolerance of his consulship to 
activities that might destabilize the public peace. His position as the consul 
is the most important in this opening. Although, Cicero reckons, it is 
possible that the senate condones his criminal acts, the two consuls have no 
good disposition towards agents of crime. Cicero’s considerations for the 
state, the senate and the position of the consuls enhance a justifiable ground 
from where he might successfully plead.  
We have, Catiline, a decree of the senate against you, a decree of authority and power. It is 
not the deliberations and decisions of this body that the Republic lacks. It is we, I say openly, 
we, the consuls, who are lacking.9 
This passage states the three functional institutions of power in the Roman 
republic, namely the state, the senate and the consuls. The senate reserves 
                                          
7 Jameson 1988: 33. 
8 These concepts are further developed in my doctoral thesis, on which the present argument is 
based.  
9 I have used the Loeb translation throughout in this paper, except otherwise stated: translation by 
Louis E. Lord. 
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the power to act, but has not acted, the public could act, although have not, 
while the consuls who should, and are prepared to, act lack the practical 
authority to do so. The implication of this statement of Cicero is that both 
the public and the senate have been passive about the Catilinarian 
conspiracy. Cicero’s ironic reference to the lack of power by the consuls, 
after the senate has granted the senatus consultum ultimum with which to 
act, is certainly an act of braggadocio.10 Cicero is simply vaunting his 
hegemonic and superior position, in this context, against Catiline. The use of 
we (nos) and its repetition for the sake of emphasis shows the attitude of 
excitement, severity, aggression and brutality with which Cicero is handling 
the proceedings. We (nos) is used to state categorically from which vantage 
point he is prosecuting, and also to establish his hegemony. 
 Cicero’s first-person plural comes in different shades, and the meaning is 
given by the context in which it is used. First, is the philosophical we which 
is mostly used at the end of an argument and as a manipulative tool to 
craftily foster the audience’s agreement with the orator. The other we is the 
loose and rhetorical form. This is used as the royal we that lends authority to 
the voice of the speaker. This is what Mackendrick terms as the l’état-c’est-
moi syndrome. This third we is neither philosophical nor rhetorical. Cicero is 
simply exploiting the authority that he possesses as consul, and making an 
hegemonic claim for him to be able to act in his official capacity. The extra 
weapon that Cicero possesses in this situation is the consular authority, 
otherwise, he and Catiline may be taken to constitute two equal hegemonies. 
This consular authority can be seen as global, because it is representative of 
all other institutions of power. Cicero’s use of name-calling as well 
identifies and isolates the culprit and craftily wins the support of the 
members of senate for himself. 
 For this self-definition to have a profound effect on the hearer, Cicero 
constructs himself as omniscient consul (6ff; 24). The consular power 
includes the control of information in the state, which includes policing of 
recalcitrant elements. Cicero, in his capacity as the consul, has some 
couriers, who work for him as informants. Cicero, before this period in 
question, had had a long-standing history of the use of informants in his 
legal practice, and he himself is a proven detective.11 Cicero’s conscious 
policy of being well-informed about socio-political developments helped 
him to keep an “eye-of-God” perspective on Rome. In the present context, 
                                          
10 Mitchell (1979: 205ff) gives a history of the senatus consultum ultimum and how Cicero was 
affected by it. 
11 In Verrem is a classic example of Cicero’s ability as a detective. 
Ige 100
despite all the factors that could have concealed Catiline’s plot, Cicero 
asserts that they are well known to the senate, as well as the public. Cicero 
claims that he has surrounded Catiline with men who would keep 
surveillance of all Catiline’s activities (6). 
For what is there, Catiline, for you to wait for longer, if neither night with its darkness can 
hide your criminal assemblies nor a private house with its walls confine the voices of your 
conspiracy, if they are patent, if all burst in view? Abandon now those foul plans of yours, be 
persuaded by me, forget murder and arson. You are encompassed on all sides; all your plans 
are clearer to us than the light of day. 
Cicero’s personification of “night with its darkness” (nox tenebris) and 
“private house with its walls” (privata domus parietibus) give a vivid 
imagination of how strong Cicero’s intelligence was. The consul’s control of 
intelligence and information is suggestive of the strength of his private 
security service in the name of keeping surveillance over Catiline’s 
nefarious activities. Cicero’s goal in this situation is to intimidate Catiline, 
and to make him feel exposed, since the walls of protection for the 
Catilinarians seem to have been removed. This passage also compares 
Catiline’s activities with darkness, and uses the paradox that all his plans are 
clearer than the light of day (Teneris undique, luce sunt clariora nobis tua 
consilia omnia: 6). The effectiveness of Cicero’s intelligence is given a 
brilliant portrait when Cicero cites an instance when his guards have 
forestalled Catiline’s assault on the state by the latter’s attempt to murder 
some Roman influential citizens. The adulation of this success does not go to 
the guards, but to Cicero by whose carefulness and diligence (mea 
diligentia) the intelligence operation was carried out successfully. The use of 
mea diligentia portrays an attitude of dogged detective moves after 
Catiline’s plans, purposes and activities. Ironically, Cicero’s so-called 
diligence in obtaining information regarding this Catilinarian conspiracy was 
enhanced by a disgruntled noblewoman Fulvia, whose lover had been one of 
Catiline’s henchmen. The lover could not meet up financially in lavish 
spending over her, and startled by the unjust means through which he hoped 
to acquire wealth, she apprised Cicero, throughout the year, of the 
Catilinarian moves to stage a major revolution.12 As far as Cicero is 
concerned, nothing can happen in the state without the knowledge of him the 
consul: “You do nothing, you attempt nothing, you think of nothing which I 
do not hear and see and understand plainly”. 
 Cicero’s nos in the passage above has metamorphosed into first person 
singular (ego...videam...sentiam) in this passage. In 24, Cicero also uses the 
                                          
12 The full gender implication of this passage are discussed in the last chapter of my thesis. 
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word sciam (“I shall know” – remarkably, in the first-person singular, here) 
to reiterate to Catiline the amount of information he has about the latter’s 
evil plans. The purpose behind the use of the first-person plural is to gain 
some authority as he commences his speech, while the first person singular 
gives a more personal touch to his testimony. This passage also juxtaposes 
Catiline and Cicero as the pursued and the pursuer respectively. The pursuer 
has all the information about the pursued while the pursued is not even 
aware that he is being watched. The change in the personage is an egoistic 
feature of Ciceronian rhetoric, which comes to the fore when the orator 
seeks to aggrandize himself. The use of ego positions Cicero at the centre of 
power, as a result of his responsibility as the watchman for the state. This 
global policing of someone like Catiline stresses how extensive Cicero’s 
satellite influence is within the context of the Catilinarian discourse.13 The 
republic’s reaction to Catiline’s outrages is simulated in 18 when Cicero 
employs prosōpopoeia (dramatic impersonation). In 17-18, Cicero assumes 
the persona of the heraldic voice of the state and addresses Catiline directly, 
as he constructs a speech for the country. 
Now your native country, the mother of us all, hates you and fears you and decides that you 
have had no single thought for a long time save for her destruction. Will you neither revere 
her authority nor obey her judgements, nor fear her power? She, Catiline, thus confers with 
you and, as it were, though silent speaks: “No crime for some years now has come into 
existence except through you, no outrage without you; you alone.” 
Since the whole country now hates Catiline, Cicero advises him to withdraw 
somewhere from the common gaze. Cicero uses direct speech here to 
simulate the reticent republic, in order to give voice to the feeling of the 
state, of which he is the mouthpiece. This heraldic role-play is an expression 
of power because it does not only enhance Cicero’s hegemony, but also 
empowers him, as consul, to extirpate Catilinarian terrorism from Rome. 
 Clearly, oratorical hegemony does not only consist in the locus of power 
that it holds, but also in its effort to monitor other hegemonies that may be 
constituting a threat to its survival. The conflicts that are generated compel a 
struggle for survival among the hegemonies and the more powerful 
triumphs. The nationalistic twist in which the self-definition is rendered 
gives a rather potent vibrancy to performance of Ciceronian ethos, and to be 
                                          
13 Historically, policing is an essential feature of the domain of men. Hearn (1992: 133) says,  
In the policing of crime, one set of men work against, and sometimes with, another set of 
men.  
Although policing is a way of keeping public order, it also serves as a means of control over other 
masculinities. 
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able to subordinate other respectable institutions of power, he employs the 
name-dropping technique. Naming is very important, because it reiterates 
the recognition of oratorical hegemony and enhances authority in the course 
of delivery and defining its territory (locus). Territoriality and area of 
jurisdiction are tacit concepts that should be noted in a conflict situation, and 
claims to resolving conflicts. In other words, hegemony clearly defines its 
scope of operation, and establishes itself as the governing authority within 




Tyrannical oratorical performance 
 
Oratorical hegemony asserts itself not only by a speaker’s explicit 
declaration to the effect that he possesses the power or the mandate to act on 
behalf of the state. The actual exercise of power in a forensic context 
translates power from mere theoretical definition to the actual exertion of 
force. This is exemplified in Cicero’s approach when he asked Catiline to go 
into exile. Verbal force in oratorical performance and physical violence are 
two concepts to be distinguished. For Cicero, force emanating from oral 
performance constitutes a greater threat to life than physical violence. 
According to Cicero, in his Pro Caecina (a speech delivered in 69 BCE):  
Force (vis) which touches our persons or our lives are not the only form of force: much more 
serious is the force which removes a man from a definite position or situation by exposing 
him to the danger of death and striking terror into his mind. Thus there are many cases of 
wounded men whose minds refuse to give way, though their bodies are weakened and who do 
not abandon the position they are resolved to defend; others, on the contrary, are driven back 
although unscathed; which proves that a greater degree of force is brought to bear upon the 
man whose mind is terror-stricken than on the man whose body is wounded. (42)14 
Cicero’s conclusion is that the violence which is applied in a verbal (in this 
case, oratorical) context, has a greater effect on one’s opponent than the 
physical violence that is applied through the use of a weapon. His 
recognition that verbal violence is more potent than physical violence may 
have propelled him to employ such force that could disorientate Catiline and 
excommunicate him from Rome. The emphasis is on displacement from a 
place (locus). In modern rhetorical terms, this is what Winifred Bryan 
Horner, a classical rhetorician, calls “subtle appeal to force”.15 Neal Wood, a 
                                          
14 Translation by Neal Wood. 
15 Horner 1990; cf. Ratcliffe 2000. 
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Ciceronian political philosopher, calls it “psychic violence”.16 Jeff Hearn, a 
contemporary scholar who works in the area of masculinity and management 
calls it “verbal, emotional, mental and psychological violence”.17 Wood 
rightly concludes in connection with this passage that Cicero considers 
psychic violence a more potent means of control and manipulation than 
physical violence. Wood also says, “We recognize it as one of the chief traits 
of the Roman political arena and the stuff of tyranny, and throughout history 
psychic violence is most prevalent among tyrannical regimes.”18 In the first 
Catilinarian speech that we are presently looking at, Cicero demonstrates 
the tyrannical side of his oratorical hegemony. One should bear in mind that 
his power of oratory is used on a par with other official mandates, which 
enhances an ethos befitting of an ordinary powerful speaker.  
 In 20ff, Cicero develops this trajectory by first pleading and reasoning 
with Catiline as to why he should leave the country, and then suddenly he 
switches to using the imperative:  
If our country speaks to you thus, as I have said, ought she to obtain her request, even though 
she cannot use force? (...) Leave the city, Catiline, free the state from fear; into exile if you 
are waiting for this word, go. What is it, Catiline? What are you waiting for? Do you notice at 
all the silence of these men? They approve it; they are silent. Why are you waiting for 
authority of the words of those whose wishes you see when they are silent? 
Cicero uses oxymoron19 to make his point here: the sound of silence. He 
plays around with the understanding of the legal maxim, tacere consentire 
est (“to remain silent is to consent”) but over and above that, Cicero makes 
an explicit mention of the auctoritas he possesses to ostracize Catiline which 
lies in the senators’ silence:  
In your case, however, Catiline, when they say nothing they express their approval; their 
acquiescence is a decree. By their silence they cry aloud. And this is true not only of these 
men whose authority is, forsooth, dear to you, whose lives are most cheap, but also those 
most honourable and noble Roman knights, and the other brave citizens who are standing 
around the senate. You could see the crowd of them, their zeal you could perceive, and their 
voices you could hear a little while ago. 
Cicero makes the occasion seem more of social rather than political 
extrication of the republic from Catiline who now constitutes a menace to 
the security of the state. Cicero uses his vantage position to manipulate the 
                                          
16 Wood 1988: 187. 
17 Hearn 1998: 88. 
18 Wood 1988: 187. 
19 As a figure of rhetoric, “oxymoron” is defined as: “placing two ordinarily opposing terms 
adjacent to one another. A compressed paradox”; cf. G. Burton, Silva rhetoricae/The forest of 
rhetorics, at http://rhetoric.byu.edu/. (Eds.) 
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silence of the senate to his advantage. For Cicero, the tacit decree of the 
senate can translate into his verbal (oral) aggression against Catiline. 
Continuing from the above passage, he goes further to say that he has kept 
Catiline away from the fury of the senators, but for the moment he would 
persuade them to accompany Catiline to the city gates. Without a doubt, 
Cicero demonstrates how manipulative, tyrannical and global his oratorical 
influence is in this situation. He has complete sway over both the senate and 
Catiline himself. He operates with the full confidence that everybody under 
his oratorical influence can be persuaded and moved to do whatever he has 
asked them to do. This claim is also an indication to Catiline to recognize his 
regime in the forensic space and his l’etat-c’est-moi position. In addition, 
Cicero’s use of the presence and consent of the senators as his inartistic 
proof strengthens his case. The consensus of the men that he clearly 
manipulates to his advantage shows to what extent the senate is supportive 
of him, but this is rigged. Cicero has indicated earlier in the speech that 
some members of senate disbelieve him. This undue manipulation of 
material to corroborate argument is another tyrannical move of Cicero to 
exert his influence against Catiline.20 
 In Section 30, Cicero constructs his own response to the earlier version 
of the appeal on behalf of the nation. Probably Cicero would have killed 
Catiline if the occasion had been given, but since there are some senators 
who are blind to the conspiracy, his action would then have been considered 
as unnecessarily vicious. Therefore he would rather Catiline left the country: 
“Under their influence, many ignorant men as well as villains would be 
saying that I acted cruelly and tyrannically if I had punished Catiline.” 
 Cicero’s concern that some men would not be favourably disposed to his 
action leads to the use of paralipsis21 that brings to light what his true 
intentions are. In this excerpt Cicero uses the word regie meaning (in the 
Republican Roman situation of that period) tyrannically, which is an 
indication of a reigning hegemony. Although he promises to use it 
sympathetically, the abuse of power that is inherent in tyranny cannot be 
divorced from its use in the present context.22 For Cicero, what will establish 
the authenticity of his claims will be Catiline’s union with his accomplices 
                                          
20 Asking the senate to vote for Catiline’s exclusion would have been another unjust move, 
because that would be very intimidating to some members of senate, who would not want to be 
seen as associating with Catiline. The attitude of members of senate cited in 16 shows how 
schizophrenic the senators were. 
21 As a figure of rhetoric, “paralipsis” is defined as: “Stating and drawing attention to something 
in the very act of pretending to pass it over. A kind of irony”; cf. Burton, op. cit. (Eds.) 
22 Earl (1966: 59) believes that regere connoted some degree of abuse.  
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when he reaches Manlius’ camp. Cicero reckons (intellego) that killing 
Catiline alone will only be a temporary measure implying further risk from 
the side of Rome’s bandits, but his expulsion along with that of his friends 
will be a more lasting solution (30). 
 As noted above, Cicero’s theory of force as a means of dislocating a 
person or persons is an important weapon; Ciceronian oratorical hegemony 
has used this weapon to displace Catilinarian military hegemony. Ciceronian 
hegemony is being established in the use of force, a means to sustaining his 
ascendancy and a way of eliminating potential rivals and competition in the 
forensic place. This enactment of the displacement of Catiline and his group 
from the city justifies the claim that Cicero’s theory is valid, but only to a 
point. In the same Catilinarian discourse, there are some inconsistencies that 
reveal that in social relations, hegemony is not absolute. While some of 
these inconsistencies can be seen as performance, others can be seen as 
genuine, which reflect the true state of the orator’s emotions. 
 
 
Oratorical hegemony as victim 
 
A paradox inherent in the hegemonic position held by Cicero, is the 
depiction of himself (Cicero), the senate, and the republic as victims of 
Catiline’s outrages (2, 8, 16). In his portrayal as victim, Cicero employs a 
rhetorical topos to romanticize Catiline’s adversarial activities in order to 
win the sympathy of the senate, and also to provide a justifiable ground for 
Catiline’s exclusion. The common concern in the present situation is the 
security of the state, and its protection against Catiline’s onslaught. In 2, 
Cicero goes so far as to declare to the senate that Catiline’s presence in their 
midst is to mark members of senate out for murder:  
Yes, truly, he even comes into the senate; he becomes a sharer in the public counsel; he 
denotes and marks out with his eyes each of us for the slaughter.  
This passage locates the enemy within the sphere of political influence, and 
makes the senate look vulnerable.23 Every member of the senate becomes a 
potential victim of Catiline’s atrocious plans, however, the senate itself has 
been passive about it, despite their knowledge of him wanting to embark on 
massive political murder. Perhaps if members of the senate feel uneasy 
about Catiline’s presence, they might be supportive of his proposal to 
excommunicate Catiline. To further corroborate his point, Cicero recounts a 
                                          
23 Vasaly (1993: 52) has expressed a similar opinion. 
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recent activity of Catiline who came to the house of Marcus Laeca, planning 
to kill the whole senate. Cicero tells of the scheme of how he has mapped 
out the city, in which areas people were to be killed; and above all, of two 
Roman knights who were designated to assassinate Cicero (8ff). 
Nevertheless, before the close of the meeting of the Catilinarians, Cicero has 
heard about the plans and has assigned armed guards to protect his house 
and before dawn he had told some eminent men in the city (10). Cicero’s 
harangue about Catiline’s victimization of the republic reaches its climax 
when Cicero claims that he had been pursued by Catiline when he was 
consul-elect, and also when he became consul (15ff). Although Catiline has 
tried several times without success, Cicero wonders why the former has not 
desisted from such moves (16). For Cicero, Catiline’s presence in the state 
threatens the stability of the state, and he should therefore leave and go into 
exile (10, 18, 21, 22, 23). Cicero suggests it would be more permissible if 
Catiline besieged the country from outside than from inside as consul: 
hence, Cicero’s prevention of Catiline from the consulship (27). 
 Such a construct of Catiline is that of military (“Rambo”) masculinity 
that is prevalent in most modern African states. Cicero suggests (somewhat 
ironically) that Catiline should save his military discipline for the hardship 
he might encounter in the bush (27). The antagonistic role that Catiline is 
assuming makes a military coup d’état a very real threat. Whether this is a 
true assertion, or Cicero is trying to pre-empt the events is a different 
ballgame altogether. The adversarial juxtaposition of Catilinarian and 
Ciceronian hegemonies in this speech typifies the contestation and rivalry 
that ensue between the military and civilians in countries where the military 
are considered powerful, but – from a constitutional and bureaucratic point 
of view – unprofessional. In addition, this situation is identifiable in areas 
where there are incessant political upheavals. The subject of victimization, 
which Cicero develops most eloquently in this speech, is in no way 
compatible with the true character of Cicero. Since the orator believes that 
the emotion is the seat of power, Cicero simply makes a pathetic appeal to 
the senate in order to win their support. For technical reasons, although 
victimized, Cicero’s consular personality still emerges as more powerful and 
influential than Catiline’s, simply because the former is backed up with a 
senatorial mandate. 
 In conclusion, I have tried to demonstrate that power has many faces in 
an oratorical context. I have also argued that the duty of the orator is to 
identify the different kinds of power that exist within the context of his 
operation, and to convert them into a manipulative oratorical tool, leaving 
the audience to grapple with the morality of his rhetoric. 
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CHAPTER 8 





ABSTRACT. The interests of sovereign states and individuals do not always agree and this 
complicates the politics of human rights at the broadest levels. Relatedly, torture is not merely the 
infliction of pain but involves complex interconnections between morality, legality and politics. 
Justice, on the other hand, is an abstract principle that is devoid of the immediacy on physical 
destruction. And on the whole, the necessity for collective security takes precedence over the 
interests and desires of the individual. 
 
There remain deep tensions between the traditional internal autonomy of 
states (sovereignty) and international concern for individual welfare, 
tensions that pervade both the law and the politics of international human 
rights and embarrass the international effort to improve the condition of 
individual human beings everywhere. (Henkin 1990: 13) 
 
Torture is the calculated infliction of pain, but it is also an emblem of 
state power. To talk about torture is not just to talk about pain but to 
enter into a complex discourse of morality, legality and politics. (Cohen 
1991: 23) 
 
[J]ustice is an abstract principle. In contrast, security is a tangible 
concern. Bombs and blood speak loudly, in clearer and more convincing 
tones than words and principles. Even from a moral standpoint, 
security’s interest in survival takes precedence over the individual’s 




Torture – the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering by agents or 
representatives of (some) authority – has been practiced in many societies 
throughout history and utilized for a wide variety of purposes: religious, 
juridical, punitive (see Peters 1985). But its construction as an “international 
problem”, which calls forth an international response, has a relatively recent 
vintage. The massive prevalence of state torture during World War II 
became one of the driving concerns behind a veritable revolution in 
1 Attendance to the international seminar organized by the Centre for Rhetoric Studies, Cape 
Town, South Africa, was made possible thanks to a generous grant by the French Institute in 
South Africa. 
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international law to create and define human rights (see Henkin 1991; 
Lauren 1998).2 And the struggle against torture figures centrally in the 
history of an international movement that has developed over the last few 
decades to promote human rights. Today, to talk about torture is to talk 
about a problem that is clearly and broadly construed as a form of human-
rights violation. Moreover, within the pantheon of human rights, the right 
not to be tortured stands out as one of very few rights that are absolutely 
non-derogatable.3  
 In this article, my central concerns revolve around three general 
questions:  
 
1. how the international legal prohibition of torture infringes upon (and thus 
alters) the sovereign powers of states;  
2. how the right not to be tortured exemplifies the ways in which human 
beings are constituted through law as “international subjects”; and  
3. how the practice of torture and efforts to enforce its prohibition affect 
and reflect struggles over rights – of humans and of states – in the 
contemporary era. 
 
 In general, the development of an international human-rights regime over 
the past fifty-odd years has encroached on the “terrain” of states by 
establishing new restrictive criteria and refining pre-existing standards of 
rule.4 Among the effects of this process are a gradual, if partial, erosion of a 
Westphalian international order5 where the sovereignty of the modern 
nation-state functioned as a supreme power and international laws were 
oriented overwhelmingly to the rights and responsibilities of states in their 
                                          
2 Human-rights laws and humanitarian laws (laws of war) have distinct histories (the latter of far 
longer genesis), although together they have become sources of reference for the humane and 
lawful treatment of human beings. 
3 According to Fitzpatrick (1994: 209), there is a core consensus in the key human-rights 
instruments of four non-derogatable rights: the right to life; the prohibition on torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; the prohibition on slavery; and the principle of 
non-retroactivity of criminal laws.  
4 The phrase “human-rights regime” is commonly used in reference to the global(ized) enterprise 
of institutions and agents engaged in processes and practices to make, monitor and/or enforce 
international human-rights laws. Although this “regime” lacks anything resembling a centralized 
structure or power base, its institutional coherency derives from a general/common mandate to 
promote and enforce human rights, as defined by international law.  
5 The international order established by the peace treaties signed in Westphalia (now a part of the 
German Federal Republic) in 1648 CE (notably at the towns of Münster and Osnabrück). Putting 
an end to the Thirty-years War and the Eighty-years War, these treaties enacted the sovereignty of 
national states as a guiding principle. (Eds.) 
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relations with one another, excluding, for the most part, matters concerning 
the relations between states and their own subjects. However, the 
establishment of a human-rights regime did not undermine the centrality of 
states to political life around the world. Rather it entailed the elaboration of 
internationalized norms of government to which all states would be expected 
to adhere,6 while preserving the general principles of states’ rights, including 
those associated with institutional sovereignty (i.e., autonomy and non-
interference).7 Human rights are contemporary international legal constructs 
which obtain their “universalizing” character from the political fact that 
people are subjects of states, and states are subjects of international law.  
 As the period/process of decolonization wound down by the 1970s (see 
Simpson 1996), the international order largely assumed a post-colonial form 
envisioned in human-rights law: a globalized array of (ostensibly) 
independent sovereign states, each bearing responsibilities to provide, 
protect and respect the rights of people within its domain. In crucial ways, 
the human-rights regime accommodates and even reinforces state 
sovereignty because it relies on individual states to behave and conform, and 
depends on the system of states to act against those that do not (see Falk 
1985). 
 Notwithstanding the persistence of state-centrism in the international 
order, the content of humanitarian laws and human-rights conventions 
promulgated in the decades since World War II signifies some important 
changes.8 By “recognizing” that people have rights as humans, and not 
merely as protected classes of subjects in relations between states, the very 
meaning of being human has been redefined in and through international 
                                          
 
6 As cAbdullahi An-Na’im explains,  
States are responsible for bringing their domestic law and practice into conformity with 
their obligations under international law to protect and promote human rights (...). This 
principle is fully consistent with the principle of state sovereignty in international law, 
since it does not purport to force any state to assume legal obligations against its will. It 
simply seeks to ensure that states effectively fulfill legal obligations that they have 
already assumed under international law (An-Na’im 1994: 167). 
7 The means of articulating and promoting international norms vary. They include the obligations 
incumbent on states as members of the United Nations (UN) to recognize the principles contained 
in the Charter and other UN conventions; activities at the international level to promulgate new 
laws and conventions, which bear the expectations that states will ratify and implement these 
laws domestically; and the far less centralized legal interpretative processes of “elevating” legal 
norms from conventional to customary status. 
8 The most important innovation in humanitarian law (laws of war) since World War II is the 
promulgation of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 protocols. All human-rights 
conventions are of this post-war vintage.  
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law.9 And through the elaboration of new standards and distinctions between 
what is legitimate or acceptable, and what is illegitimate and forbidden in the 
treatment of human beings, the meaning of state sovereignty has also been 
modified. For example, state practices like mass killings or forced 
relocations of domestic civilian populations, which once might have been 
criticized as “immoral” or “bad politics”, have been recast as state crimes, 
and their perpetrators made vulnerable to punishments and reprisals 
sanctioned by law. From the Nuremberg Tribunals of 1945 to recent 
exercises in international “humanitarian intervention”, the sanctity of the 
sovereignty principle has been circumscribed in ways that would themselves 
have been illegitimate in an earlier era (see Gutman & Rieff 1999; Minow 
1998; Neier 1998). 
 Although the principles that undergird international human rights are far 
from being “universally” embraced or accepted, there are certain general 
understandings about what those principles are. Prevailing ideas about 
human rights integrate a vision of morality, law and politics. The moral 
dimension is premised on the assertion that all people have certain rights by 
virtue of their being human; the legal dimension holds that human rights are 
those enumerated and codified in international instruments; and the political 
dimension establishes obligations to act in accordance with these laws.10 
Thus, human rights, especially those characterized as “political” or “civil” in 
nature, represent international efforts to regulate the relationship between 
states and their subjects. 
 One of the major problems of human rights is how to bring the lofty 
principles enshrined in international law to bear in the government and 
treatment of people around the world. I would highlight two aspects of this 
problem, that relate directly to the practice and the prohibition of torture. 
One is the weaknesses and inefficiency of enforcement mechanisms at the 
inter-state level capable of effectively holding states accountable to the laws. 
The second pertains to the difficulties in interpreting the applicability of 
international laws when conflicting interests are at stake. Although 
violations of human rights are condemnable, the reasons underlying the 
violations are often imbricated in legally recognizable rights and interests of 
states. International laws recognize states’ rights to act in their own interests, 
and the determination of what those interests are is left largely to the 
                                          
9 For example, Turner (1993) has suggested that a social theory of human rights can be built on 
the universality of the “frail human body” which needs protection from the vicissitudes of state 
violence and technologies of destruction. 
10 Although the ideals that comprise the range of “human rights” are contested and evolving, there 
is a core belief that certain rights are – or should be – universal. 
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discretion of states themselves (e.g., access, control and distribution of 
resources; immigration policies; criminal justice systems). Such prerogatives 
are fundamental to the politico-legal constitution of state sovereignty.  
 The potential contradictions between human rights and states’ rights are 
heightened in times of conflict, whether manifesting as international war or 
internal strife. When states deem themselves to be at risk or threatened by 
“enemies”, whether foreign or domestic, they can find substantial latitude in 
international law to justify the institution of exceptional measures to defend 
and protect “national security” as those in power perceive it (e.g., imposition 
of emergency legislation; restrictions on movement, speech and association). 
National security is generally interpreted in statist terms as the defence of 
the state itself and of the “public interests” for which the state is responsible 
(e.g., territorial integrity, law and order, national economy). The problem of 
delineating between circumstances in which a state’s restriction or even out-
right violation of human rights can be construed as legitimate or acceptable, 
and those in which such derogations would be clearly illegitimate, create an 
interpretative morass. This problem becomes even more complicated when 
the violations alleged to be occurring are so grave as to warrant legally 
sanctionable reprisals. The debates that raged over the legal justification for 
intervention in the recent conflict in Kosovo exemplify this problem of 
interpretation: Was the evidence of potential genocide and ethnically 
motivated dislocation of Kosovar Albanians by Serbian military (and 
paramilitary) forces so compelling as to create a legal imperative for 
international intervention on their behalf,11 or was foreign intervention in a 
“domestic” conflict (since Kosovar Albanians are citizens of Yugoslavia) an 
illegal violation of state sovereignty? 
 But such interpretative difficulties are also productive: they fuel 
discursive, political and legal interventions that serve, albeit in limited and 
inconsistent ways, to operationalize an international jurisdiction of law. 
Because of the institutional weaknesses of enforcement mechanisms at the 
inter-state level, non-governmental organizations that comprise the human-
rights movement have found cause and opportunity to operate in the breach 
to promote adherence to international laws (see Keck & Sikkink 1998). The 
various strategies deployed for such purposes include monitoring and 
reporting on violations to foster awareness, advocacy work to encourage 
powerful actors (namely state governments and/or the United Nations) to 
                                          
11 The actual form that this intervention took – by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
forces without obtaining the backing of the United Nations Security Council – complicates the 
issue further by raising questions about the legality of the pursued course of action. 
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intervene in ways that would curb or stop violations, and litigation to 
adjudicate the applicability of international laws. Human-rights activism and 
networking fulfil a panoptic function of international surveillance which 
feeds other types of efforts (military, diplomatic, economic) to regulate and 
“discipline” the behaviours and activities of states in accordance with the 
norms and standards of international law. 
 The issue of torture epitomizes both the challenges and the productive 
potential of human rights. The prohibition of torture, which is enshrined in a 
number of international instruments (see Kellberg 1998), extends to all 
human beings regardless of any aspect of their identity or political status 
(i.e., citizenship, nationality, race, nationality, religion, sex, etc). In so doing, 
it fortifies a universalizing conception of what it means to be human by 
constituting all people as “international subjects” with a common right not to 
be tortured. And because the prohibition of torture is non-derogatable, it 
universalizes a common restriction on all states that applies under all 
circumstances, including conflicts and wars. 
 The extent to which the right not to be tortured is violated – as it is often 
and in many places – illuminates the gap between international legal 
standards and state behaviour. The prohibition is not adequately or 
effectively enforced in such a way that torture becomes impossible, or so 
potentially costly as to be irrational. The possibilities and rationalities for 
torture persist (even as torture is publicly denied) as an “emblem of state 
power” (Cohen 1991: 23), a tactic of control engaged in by dozens of states 
around the world, and creating tens of thousands if not millions of victims. 
But the picture is not entirely bleak nor is the gap between legal principle 
and political practice static. Rather, the legal prohibition sanctions forms of 
action that carry consequences. Allegations that torture is being perpetrated 
by public agents invite (incite) incursions into the sovereign domain of 
states, at minimum in the form of invasive scrutiny, and possibly 
manifesting as a more concerted punitive approach directed against those 
responsible for torture. 
 
 
The various issues and contestations that circulate around the problem of 
torture 
 
I begin with a conceptual framework for understanding of torture within the 
larger field of human-rights law and practice. I then take up the question of 
why states torture, focusing on the connection between the politics of 
national security and the perpetration of this particular brand of violence. I 
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draw briefly on examples of torture in Latin America and Northern Ireland, 
and then turn to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza (Israel/Palestine). There is a 
good reason for using Israel/Palestine as the key example: to date Israel is 
the only state in the world to have officially sanctioned practices that 
constitute torture according to international law, albeit under the euphemistic 
label of “moderate amounts of physical pressure.” It is the publicness of 
debates and contestations over torture in Israel/Palestine that provides a 
unique insight into the more general themes of this article, particularly the 
problematic relationship between national security and human rights. I 
consider in some detail the history of Israeli torture of Palestinians and 
struggles against it by Israeli and Palestinian human-rights lawyers, activists 
and organizations. A qualified victory in this struggle was achieved in 
September 1999, when the Israeli High Court finally rendered a decision 
against the commonplace use of state-sanctioned “pressure” tactics, although 
this decision does not go so far as to close the window of opportunity for 
continuing torture. I conclude by suggesting a connection between the 
problem of torture in Israel/Palestine and recent developments elsewhere in 
the world in the struggles against human-rights violations and violators.  
 
 
Human rights and torture 
 
Many scholars who focus on human-rights issues work with an intention to 
cultivate or fortify connections between the academy and the political and 
legal terrains where struggles over rights are waged. Scholarly interventions 
can serve to substantiate exposures and criticisms of violations, and extend 
the kinds of challenges to prevailing conditions in which such violations 
occur. In my own work as a teacher, I gained a heightened appreciation for 
the utility of the problem of torture to understanding human rights from 
students in my seminar, “Human Rights in Theory and Practice”. To explain, 
most students begin the semester assuming that human rights are self-
evident, and that the central problem is that they are frequently violated. 
Within a few weeks, however, their assumptions are challenged as they 
familiarize themselves with various debates over human rights (e.g., 
universalism versus cultural relativism), as they study the problematic 
history of the enterprise (e.g., the fact that part of the world was still 
colonized when key instruments and institutions were created, or the cynical 
uses of human rights to advance Cold War agendas), and as they consider 
that even the matter of who is “human” is not a universal given. By the 
middle of the semester, many of them become uncertain about what it means 
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to be “for” human rights, or even sceptical about their legitimacy as an 
internationalized concern. It is at this point that we come to the section on 
torture. I found that as they engage with the issue of torture, they recuperate 
a commitment to the idea that human rights are important, albeit informed 
by a more critical awareness of the problems and limitations. Moreover, by 
studying the kinds of efforts that are mounted to enforce the prohibition of 
torture, their appreciation for the value and necessity of rights-oriented 
action to fight and protest against violations is bolstered. Reflecting on what 
it is about torture that has such a powerful effect on my students, I can 
identify five elements that might account for such a response.  
 First, understanding torture and its prohibition provides certain clarifying 
insights into the nature of rights in general. As juridico-political constructs, 
specific rights are “created” by specific laws, notwithstanding the kinds of 
philosophical arguments which propose that rights have a “natural” or a 
priori basis which laws merely codify. The right not to be tortured is 
established by the laws prohibiting torture. This right is tantamount to the 
outlawing of practices that constitute torture, as defined by law. According 
to Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), the practices 
prohibited refer to  
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions. 
Understanding the right in terms of prohibited practices helps to counter a 
common misconception that rights are things (that can be owned, given, lost, 
etc.). Rights are not things, despite that they are often framed and discussed 
as such because of the ways law reifies by categorizing, defining and 
delimiting its objects. Rather, rights are practices that are required, 
prohibited or otherwise regulated within the context of relationships 
governed by law. 
 It is important to note that, contrary to uses of the term “torture” in 
everyday language, its legal definition does not extend to all kinds of 
inflicted pain and suffering.12 The prohibition of torture hinges on the nature 
                                          
12 Such a “popular” rather than “legal” understanding of torture is used by Asad (1996) when he 
cautions that we should be sceptical about the universalism of the prohibition of torture because it 
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of the relationship between victims and perpetrators. For example, slapping 
someone, tying her up, denying her sleep or food, though all potentially 
brutal, dehumanizing and illegal, do not qualify legally as “torture”13 unless 
the “torment [is] inflicted by a public authority for ostensibly public 
purposes” (Peters 1985: 3).14 It is also important to note that the quantity, 
intensity and duration of pain and suffering that would qualify as torture are 
vague and contested.15 However, the prohibition is contingent primarily on 
the purpose or motivation behind the practice rather than the effects on the 
victim (see MacEntee 1996). 
 Second, the international prohibition of torture is both a product and an 
epitomization of changing ideas about legitimacy in relationships between 
states and human beings, and the rights of each. Understanding the impetus 
behind the prohibition helps to historicize the development of human rights. 
At a particular point in recent history, the practice of torture came to 
command a degree of opprobrium that transformed (elevated) it into a matter 
deemed to warrant international regulation. Torture is not necessarily the 
“worst” form of abuse that states can perpetrate on human beings – for if one 
had to rank horrors, genocide and disappearances might top the list. Rather, 
the construction of torture as an international crime hinges on the kind of 
                                                                                                                             
represents a  
modern dedication to eliminating pain and suffering [and] often conflicts with other 
commitments and values (Asad 1996: 1082).  
While his points about modern (and Western) views of pain are well-taken, he mistakenly 
conflates pain and suffering with torture in order to make an argument that understandings of and 
attitudes about pain are not universal and therefore cannot be marshalled into a “universalist 
discourse” of prohibition. It is on this basis that he can ask why sadomasochism is not prohibited 
under the rubric of torture (Asad 1996: 1099). However, torture is legally defined as a particular 
kind of political practice that depends on the nature of the relationship within which it occurs, and 
it is to this specificity that the prohibition is directed. In other words, the prohibition attends to the 
kind of practice that torture entails rather than the kind of effect it produces (i.e., pain and 
suffering). 
13 Some noteworthy efforts, especially by feminists, are being taken to expand the legal definition 
to include forms of torment inflicted by “private” actors, thereby extending the prohibition 
covered by existing laws on torture to include domestic violence and even female genital 
mutilation. See, for example, Copelon 1994; Coomeraswamy 1999. 
14 The concept of “public authority” is not strictly limited to states; it could include any organized 
movement or group that exercises a level of control and authority over populations and/or 
territory.  
15 Efforts to quantify pain are sometimes used to distinguish between “torture” and “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.” According to Rodney (1987: 80),  
only the organs of the European Convention of Human Rights have attempted to 
conceptualize the difference between the various limbs of the formula of the prohibition 
(torture, inhuman treatment, degrading treatment...). 
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relationship between people and the state that the prohibition seeks to 
regulate. It is the perpetration of pain and suffering on people who are in 
custody. This specificity distinguishes torture conceptually, empirically and 
legally from other forms of violence, such as those arising in the context of 
warfare or conflict (see Scarry 1985). Moreover, the imperative to prohibit 
this particular brand of violence has become so widely accepted among the 
international community that it has acquired the status of customary law,16 
and as such carries extra-territorial jurisdictional force that would enable any 
state to prosecute those suspected or charged with perpetrating or abetting 
torture. 
 Third, the content of the international legal prohibition of torture 
represents an “ideal” type of human-rights norm. It invests humans with a 
kind of sovereign right over their bodies and minds (albeit limited to the 
legally prescribed context). Like the principle of sovereignty governing 
relations among states, this right establishes principles of sanctity and 
security based on respect for boundaries (in this case the body and mind of 
the individual). Furthermore, this individualized sovereignty is accorded 
greater weight than the sovereign rights of states because international law 
explicitly prohibits torture under all circumstances. There are no exceptions 
(not even the famous “ticking bomb” rationale) that allow for the suspension 
or derogation of the individual’s right not to be tortured.17 If the state is the 
arbiter of legitimate violence, as is well established in international law, and 
torture is an illegal form of violence, then the state has no right to torture. 
Thus, the right of people not to be tortured marks an important line in the 
limits of states’ rights. In contrast to the ambiguities and loopholes 
characterizing many of the laws governing human rights, the legal 
prohibition of torture is “muscular” and uncompromizing. 
 There are, of course, debates over the legal parameters of the prohibition, 
notably whether it would include the death penalty or corporal punishment. 
But these debates are marginal to the discourse on torture (which is not to 
suggest that they are of marginal importance) because they conflate torture 
and punishment. Torture may be punishing in terms of the violence that it 
entails; it might provide a means to punish (e.g., its use in eliciting a 
                                          
16 For example, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the USA Court of Appeals, Second Circuit held that 
the right of freedom from torture is part of customary international law. 
17 Article 2.2 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment states:  
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture. 
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confession that is then used to secure a conviction); and its widespread use 
might be construed as producing an effect of collective punishment. But 
ultimately the practice of torture is distinct – that is, distinguishable – from 
punishment because it occurs outside the scope of judicial review and 
control.18 Torture is extra-legal. 
 Fourth, the powerful, globalized consensus to the effect that torture 
constitutes a human-rights violation exemplifies the possibilities of 
universalism in a political world defined by differences.19 No society on 
earth advances the claim that torture, as legally defined, is a valued or 
integral part of its cultural heritage or political culture. If such an argument 
could be made, it would be: the practice of torture would be acknowledged 
rather than denied. On a related point, the prohibition of torture universalizes 
a common status for human beings as “individuals with rights”. While the 
human-rights regime is rightly criticized for privileging Westernized notions 
of the autonomous individual over collective identities, there is no debate 
that the practice of torture produces individualized suffering or that the right 
not to be tortured inheres in the individual rather than some collectivity. 
 Fifth, the struggle against torture is among the most visible and 
productive manifestations of human-rights activism. The results of such 
activism have served to make a liar of every torturer who has said to his 
victim,  
Go ahead and scream. No one will hear you.  
The world has heard – has been forced to hear – if not the screams 
themselves, then at least the echoes of such screams. Through monitoring, 
reporting and documenting torture, those screams have been brought into the 
public domain where they demand and command an audience. The practice 
of torture may be denied by those who perpetrate it as well as by those who 
are indifferent to the suffering of its victims, but when torture is alleged, the 
secrecy on which it depends is challenged, and the kind of power it 
embodies is confronted. Even if the practice of torture is never completely 
eradicated, the organized, collaborative efforts to enforce the prohibition 
                                          
18 According to Garland (1990: 17),  
Punishment is (...) the legal process whereby violators of the criminal law are 
condemned and sanctioned in accordance with specified legal categories and procedures. 
See also Garland 1990: 241-47. It is worth noting that in this 300 page book about punishment, 
the term “torture” does not appear in the index and there are only a handful of passing references 
to it in the text. 
19 For a discussion of the historical roots of this universal norm, see Peters 1985. 
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empower activists around the world.20 More importantly, this empowerment 
is dynamic, as indicated by the burgeoning attention to human-rights laws 





Now we must ask, if there is such a powerful prohibition against torture, and 
this prohibition enjoys such a wide international consensus, why does torture 
remain a shockingly prevalent problem? If one were to accept state rhetoric 
at face value, there is no torture in the world. No torturing regime defends or 
even acknowledges its own torture as torture. Sometimes they simply lie. 
Sometimes they shift the blame to “aberrant” or “overzealous” agents who 
acted against orders. Sometimes they rely on euphemisms, claiming that 
their practices do not qualify as “torture” (see Cohen 1995a, 1995b, 1996). 
Yet when a state utilizes torture tactics, there are justifications at work, even 
if they are shrouded in secrecy and denied in public.  
 The justifications and rationalizations for torture are often traceable to 
raisons d’état, especially when the torturing state can claim a threat to 
national security. As Edward Peters (1985: 6-7) explains, the history of 
modern torture is integrally related to the history of the modern state. 
Much of modern political history consists of the variety of extraordinary situations that 
twentieth-century governments have imagined themselves to face and the extraordinary 
measures they have taken to protect themselves. Paradoxically, in an age of vast state 
strength, (...) much of state policy has been based on the concept of extreme state 
vulnerability to enemies, external or internal (...). By focusing on the public character of 
torture (...) we may be able to regard torture in the twentieth century no longer in the 
simplistic terms of personality disorder, ethnic or racial brutality, residual primitivism, or the 
secularization of ecclesiastical theories of coercion, but as an incident of some forms of 
twentieth-century public life (...) less observed but no less essential to the state’s notion of 
order. 
 The modern state, despite the manifold forms it takes, bases its claims to 
institutional legitimacy (domestic authority and international recognition) on 
its status and identity as the representative of the socio-political collective 
                                          
20 For example, the UN Committee against Torture (a mechanism of the Convention against 
Torture) invites and relies on information provided by non-governmental organizations that 
investigate allegations and monitor the occurrence of torture and ill-treatment.  
21 In 1984, the year the Convention against Torture went into effect, the UN created the position 
of a Special Rapporteur on Torture. Among the responsibilities of this position is an annual public 
reporting to the UN Commission on Human Rights about the Rapporteur’s interventions in 
specific countries and responses received. 
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that comprises the nation. National security, then, is grounded in a politics of 
representation – of a national “society” or “community” by the state. 
Although national security imperatives are context-specific, the extent to 
which they are invoked to justify torture raise some common questions:  
 
• what/whose interests does the state represent,  
• how can those interests be threatened,  
• why is torture perceived as a “necessary” means to combat a threat 
(whether utilized as a punitive reprisal or “defensive” strategy), and  
• who could be construed by state agents as appropriate targets for such 
practices? 
 
 The use of torture in the defence of national security contributes to the 
constitution and reinforcement of national boundaries. It establishes a class 
of innocents – those members of the nation in good standing, whose interests 
and security are the responsibility of the state. It simultaneously 
operationalizes a politics of exclusion of categories of people deemed to 
threaten the national order, who either “need” to be tortured or do not 
deserve not to be. Of course, inclusions and exclusions of various sorts are 
integral to – indeed, constitutive of – state politics, whether obtaining along 
demographic lines of national, ethnic, racial or religious difference, or along 
ideological lines of political difference. But when it comes to the 
relationship between national security and torture (and other types of gross 
violations), the politics of inclusion and exclusion manifest themselves as an 
extreme form of differentiation between the “legitimate community” and 
“enemies of the state”. Those subjected to torture are categorized as a 
dangerous or degraded “type”, and their dehumanization is confirmed 
through torture. In this regard, torture compares to warfare, since both are 
forms of violence directed at “others” (see Scarry 1985: 60-63, 139-45). But 
what distinguishes torture from warfare is the nature of the practice itself. 
The practice of torture targets individuals already in custody.  
 One of the most common forms of demonization is the charge of 
terrorism, which smacks of danger and thus provides an “ideal” justification 
for state violence and the suspension or derogation of human rights. 
Terrorism is a concept both broad and flexible enough to encompass a 
variety of challenges to the political authority of the state and/or the 
economic status quo (emphasizing violence, but not necessarily limited to 
violence). It tends to be applied to non-state actors or organizations engaging 
in struggles against the state (see Weinberg 1992). However, in national-
security discourse, terrorism often is represented as sui generis, lacking any 
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cognizable logic of its own beyond a will to terrorize, to which the state 
responds with “counter-terrorism”. Given the well-documented relationship 
between “counter-terrorism” and torture, the critical issues are how the 
casting of resistance as terrorism occludes the relational nature of violence, 
delegitimizes whatever grievances stimulate or motivate anti-state activism 
(e.g., repression, discrimination, denial of the right to self-determination), 
and contributes to the delineation between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” 
communities, leaving the latter vulnerable to state violence and perpetuating 
an atmosphere of conflict. In a 1987 report to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on Torture writes:  
Especially where civil strife has taken the form of guerilla tactics, military and security 
personnel feel threatened and may gradually fall into the practice of physical abuse and 
torture to extract information about their opponents. Every person living within the guerilla 
area may be seen as a potential enemy who withholds information and may, therefore, be 
forced to disclose it by all available means..[T]he inevitable effect of such practices is that 
mutual hatred increases and life becomes ever more violent. (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/13, ch. 
VI, para. 73, cf. Duner 1998: 120) 
 The issue of resistance by non-state groups, including terrorism, has been 
a particularly vexing problem in the interpretation and application of 
international human-rights law, and an enduring point contention between 
the international human-rights movement and state governments (see United 
Nations: General Assembly Resolution 48/122 of 20 December 1993: 
Human Rights and Terrorism, para. 2). Typically, governments criticized for 
violating the human rights of their opponents have tended to respond that 
such criticisms are biased. Such governments tend to argue that comparable 
scrutiny and criticism is not directed against violations perpetrated by non-
state groups; they may also claim that states’ own perceptions of the dangers 
their enemies pose to national security are not given adequate consideration. 
For those who champion the doctrine of national security, human rights 
themselves pose a subversive threat to limit the state’s capacity to engage in 
“counter-terrorist” activities. 
 A somewhat contradictory element in the justification of torture is the 
imperative of public denial. Because of the powerful international 
prohibition of torture, states have an interest in not being labeled as 
engaging in or condoning torture, because such labelling would make them 
liable or vulnerable to reprisals. However, as long as states can deny that 
torture is occurring, or as long as they manage to distinguish their coercive 
interrogation practices from torture, the rights of the individual can be 
subordinated to the rights of the state. According to Antonio Cassese (1990: 
91-92),  
Hajjar 122
“Modern” torture has become more “sophisticated”. Although physical pain continues to be 
inflicted, with increasingly refined instruments, often endeavours are made to use methods 
that leave no traces – and therefore no evidence – in order to avoid any possible accusation.  
The perceived need to torture and the compelling need to lie about or deny it 
are two sides of the same coin: the power and rights of the state, both in 
relation to its human subjects, and in relation to other states in the 
international order.  
 Understanding why states torture involves a consideration of the partic-
ular (context-specific) threats to national security that they consider 
themselves to face. In South America, for example, throughout the 1970s 
and’ ’80s, a number of regimes utilized torture (and other illegal practices) 
on an enormous scale, and coordinated such activities among themselves. 
Why? In A Miracle, a Universe, Lawrence Weschler (1998: 98-99) summar-
izes an explanation for the gross violation of human rights in Brazil, 
Uruguay, and elsewhere on the continent. He situates these practices within 
an interlocking national, regional and global context. Briefly, the model of 
import-substitution industrialization began to fail in the late 1950s and into 
the 1960s in country after country. The working classes and leftist groups 
were sufficiently mobilized and organized to exert strong political demands 
and claims on social goods. However, economic crises made it increasingly 
difficult for states to maintain even existing levels of health and educational 
services, and pension benefits, giving rise to political crises, including anti-
state violence. Across the continent, militaries seized power with the aims of 
ending unrest, depoliticizing assertive workers, (re-)privatizing production, 
and reinserting the national economies back into the global capitalist system. 
The resultant rampancy and scale of violations of human rights, among 
which torture featured prominently, were related to the threat to national 
security that these regimes purported themselves to be combating, namely a 
localized manifestation of “international communism”.22 Although most of 
the victims shared a common national identity with the perpetrators, the 
justification for extraordinary state violence was provided by an ideological 
differentiation demonizing leftists, communists and socialists. Those 
targeted by the military regimes were construed as national traitors and/or 
                                          
22 Within the context of the Cold War, but especially after the Cuban revolution gave 
“international communism” a foothold in the region, the USA military and intelligence services 
played an active role in bringing together and training members of the hemisphere’s militaries, 
and contributing to their indoctrination in the dangers of the communist menace and the value of 
free-market economics. The USA-run School of the Americas was one of the training grounds for 
South and Central American torturers, and USA agents played a direct and indirect role in torture 
and other gross violations throughout the hemisphere.  
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guilty by association or proximity to traitorous political movements. 
Weschler (1998: 121) describes the doctrine of national security guiding 
these military regimes as 
a fearsome piece of work. To begin with, there is the matter of sheer breadth of the threat it 
feels justified in enjoining. The enemy – the International Communist Movement – is 
perceived as covertly operating everywhere, all the time, in all fields of human endeavor. The 
threat is no longer conceived as one of conventional war, nor even as one of sedition (the 
doctrine’s word for armed insurrection), but rather as one of subversion. 
 In recent years, most of the South American military regimes have been 
replaced by civilian governments, and “international communism” has 
eroded as a feasible threat. In some countries there have been investigations 
and published reports on state violence, taking as their title “never more” 
(nunca mas, nunca mais). But a question remains whether the governmental 
transitions have sufficiently changed the relationship between people and the 
state to guarantee that the prohibition against torture will be respected in the 
future. The doctrine of national security remains strong, and the imperatives 
of fighting “terrorism” continue to be utilized to justify violent reprisals 
against insurgents.23 For example, the governments of Peru and Colombia 
have sought to isolate their own battles against guerrilla groups from the 
constraints of human rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights has avoided including terrorism into its mandate (see Tomasevski 
1998: 194-97).  
 In Northern Ireland, which has been wracked by decades of conflict, the 
main protagonists of violence were the British government, Protestant 
“loyalist” militias, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The politics of 
differentiation in Northern Ireland assumed national, sectarian and 
ideological form, obtaining as a conflict over the nature and boundaries of 
the state itself: an independent, reunited Ireland versus a permanently 
divided Ireland with the north remaining linked to the United Kingdom. 
While Britain castigated IRA resistance as nothing more (or less) than 
terrorism, the IRA has defined its cause as a political anti-colonial struggle 
against foreign rule. In Formations of Violence, Allen Feldman (1991) 
highlights the relational nature of political violence throughout Northern 
Ireland, including the state’s use of torture in the interrogation of prisoners. 
He distinguishes his concerns from those of Elaine Scarry (1985), who 
focuses specifically on the torture relationship, and for whom victims 
                                          
 
23 While charges of terrorism were leveled against opponents during the era of military regimes, 
these days anti-state activism tends to lack a popular base and/or an ideological mandate of socio-
political transformation. 
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become objects because they lose all agency as torture “unmakes” their 
world. While Feldman concurs that the infliction of pain does indeed 
objectify victims, he contextualizes torture within the broader context in 
which it occurs. He proposes that captured IRA members who were 
subjected to torture retained their subjectivity because they comprehended 
their suffering as part of the national struggle, in which they were actively 
engaged.24 
The body made into a political artifact by embodied acts of violence is no less a political 
agent than the author(s) of violence. The very act of violence invests the body with agency. 
(Feldman 1991: 7)  
It is not only a matter of what history does to the body but what subjects do with what history 
has done to the body. (Feldman 1991: 177) 
Feldman’s informants (at least the more “hardened” paramilitaries) discuss 
interrogation as a “shared political arena” in which both interrogators and 
interrogees are participants (rather than actors and objects).25 He describes 
how prisoners counteracted the violence perpetrated upon them through 
“counter-instrumentation” of their own bodies,26 for example provoking a 
beating to force the interrogator to play his “ace card” right away, thereby 
diminishing his capacity to maintain control over the interrogation (Feldman 
1991: 138-39).  
 The history of British torture of Irish prisoners in Northern Ireland bears 
some striking similarities to Israeli torture of Palestinians from the occupied 
West Bank and Gaza. First, in both contexts, as resistance against the state 
escalated over the years, governance was increasingly organized in terms of 
counter-insurgency. Second, both states fancy themselves liberal 
democracies committed to the rule of law. But both have utilized emergency 
legislation and justified their own uses of violence as legitimate and 
necessary means of dealing with terrorism. In both contexts, terrorism is 
conceived quite broadly in terms of how it is defined (opposition to the state) 
and who can be suspected of engaging in or supporting it. Third, while the 
use of “torture” is officially denied, allegations by prisoners, lawyers and 
human-rights activists have forced judicial intervention to grapple with the 
                                          
24 Scarry localizes torture in the body of its victims, expressed poignantly with the phrase “my 
body hurts me.” In contrast, Feldman’s account of torture could be expressed with the phrase “my 
cause hurts me.” 
25 In my own research among Palestinian prisoners, a number of the more highly politicized 
activists offered similar analyses of their experiences in Israeli interrogation. 
26 Other examples of IRA paramilitaries’ “counter-instrumentation” of their bodies included the 
“blanket,” “dirty” and hunger strikes. 
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contradictions between “enemy” individuals’ rights and the state’s right to 
preserve security as it sees fit. Fourth, in both contexts, the struggle against 
torture has focused domestic and international attention on the once-hidden 
world of interrogation (see Feldman 1991: 110-14; Ginbar 1996). The 
comparison falls, however, on the states’ responses to allegations of torture 
(Ginbar 1996: 5-9). A legal challenge was mounted against Britain’s “five 
techniques” in the interrogation of suspected IRA activists on the grounds 
that they violate the European Convention on Human Rights (Ireland v. 
United Kingdom).27 Although a majority decision by the European Court of 
Human Rights decided that the five techniques do not amount to “torture”, 
but to the lesser – also prohibited – category of “inhuman and degrading 
treatment”, the British government decided to forego their use.28 In contrast, 
the Israeli state, suggesting that its own interrogation tactics compare to 
Britain’s five techniques, has taken the unprecedented step of according 
public sanction for their use. This position is based in part on the European 
Court’s decision that such techniques do not constitute “torture.”  
 
 
Israeli national security versus Palestinian human rights 
 
Before proceeding with a consideration of Israel’s distinctive position on 
interrogation, it is necessary to consider briefly how the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has played out as a case study of the potential contradictions 
between national security and human rights. Since Israel is a Jewish state, 
national security is defined ethno-nationally. While the meaning of 
Jewish/Israeli security needs has changed over time, the meaning of security 
threats has remained remarkably consistent since 1948: it encompasses 
anything that can be construed as challenging Israel’s existence and viability 
as a Jewish state or the safety and well-being of members of the Jewish 
nation. Thus, Palestinians’ collective/national aspirations have been deemed 
threatening – and demonized – on the grounds that they compete and 
conflict with those of Jews, since both nations have claimed the same 
“homeland”.  
 Because Palestinians are stateless and dispersed, their struggle for 
national rights (i.e., to sovereignty and self-determination) has taken 
                                          
27 The five techniques include wall standing (i.e., position abuse), hooding, subjection to noise, 
deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and drink. 
28 The European Commission to Prevent Torture opined that the five techniques do constitute 
torture. The British government accepted the opinion of the European Commission and the 
minority decision of the European Court that the tactics constitute (or come close to) torture. 
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“unconventional” forms, including guerrilla warfare. The Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), which emerged in the 1960s to lead this 
struggle, was characterized by the Israeli state (until 1993) as a terrorist 
organization, and its members and supporters as terrorists or proponents of 
terrorism. For the Israeli state, although Palestinians are exteriorized along 
national (i.e., demographic) lines, the threat they pose to Israeli national 
security is geographically “internal” because of the large number of 
Palestinians living under Israeli rule, whether as citizens (i.e., those residing 
inside the 1949 armistice boundaries, or “Green Line”) or residents of the 
territories occupied in 1967 (i.e, the West Bank and Gaza). Since most 
Palestinians have identified with the PLO (regarding it as their national 
representative), it was easy for Israeli officials to justify the repression of 
Palestinians on the basis of Jewish/Israeli national security and the negative 
imperatives of governing a segment of “the enemy” within. As Israeli lawyer 
Dana Briskman (1987: 57) comments, 
Generally speaking, everything connected to Palestinian Nationalist [sic] activities and 
especially to the PLO was considered prima facie a threat to security which could justify 
limitations and restrictions of rights. 
 For those Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation in the 
West Bank and Gaza, their individual and collective rights are ostensibly 
guaranteed by international legal instruments, most prominently the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. However, the Israeli state has rejected the de jure 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to its rule in the West Bank 
and Gaza on the grounds that these areas are not “occupied” but 
“administered”.29 From this highly controversial interpretation of its legal 
rights and duties in these areas, the Israeli state has accorded itself the 
prerogative to define – and circumscribe – Palestinian rights on terms of its 
own choosing, rather than those set out in international law.  
 By charting such an “original” politico-legal course for itself, Israel has 
resisted the influence and authority of the international community on 
matters relating to the government of both the land and population of the 
West Bank and Gaza. This defiance suggests a larger tension between the 
principles of state sovereignty and the trend in international legal discourse 
over the last 50 years that seeks to curb the excesses of state autonomy.30 
                                          
29 This involves a complex legal, political and historical argument. See Hajjar 1994; Shamgar 
1982a; Shehadeh 1988. 
30 For example, Israel does not recognize the authority of the commissions governing the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Convention against Torture, although 
the government does submit periodic reports. 
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What makes the Israeli case so interesting and difficult is that Israel does not 
reject the importance of legality to assessments of its rule over Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza. Rather, it holds that its policies and practices are 
legally viable, if different from international opinion; that Israel has the 
right, as a sovereign state, to interpret its obligations independently because 
these interpretations arise out of the actual conditions on the ground 
(including the fight against terrorism); and that it cannot be made to do 
otherwise because alternative interpretations are advanced in attempt to 
constrain Israel politically (and perhaps to bolster or benefit its enemies) (see 
Bar-Yaacov 1990; Shamgar 1982a: 32-33; Shefi 1973; Yahav 1993). 
According to Itzhak Zamir (1989), an Israeli High Court justice, the 
privileging of national security over “basic human rights” finds very wide 
support in Israel.  
It is particularly difficult in Israel to reach a suitable balance between the interest of national 
security and that of human rights. The special conditions which prevail here foster an extreme 
approach, which tends to assign absolute priority to national security above all other interests, 
and to disregard the need to strike a balance between them. This approach finds adherence 
both among the general public as well as in ruling circles. (Zamir 1989: 376-77) 
The discourse and politics of Israeli national security incorporate an explicit 
or inferred reference to national identity and difference. This is evident in 
the ways security laws are applied, and in the ways (potential and actual) 
“victims” and “perpetrators” are construed. For example, inter-communal 
violence is regarded as a security violation if it involves Palestinian-on-
Jewish attacks, but if the protagonists are reversed, it is usually treated as a 
“crime”, the latter often bearing lesser punishments and higher burdens of 
proof for conviction. Only in the rarest of instances have Jews been accused 
of violating Israeli security, and these cases tend to involve either anti-
Zionist activities of some sort or direct attacks against the state (e.g., the 
assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin). It is by understanding the 
nature of Israeli state rule over Palestinians (especially the prerogatives that 
the state has accorded to itself in the name of security), that we can 
understand how and why Israel has sought to legally justify and politically 
rationalize its violation of Palestinian human rights, including the use of 





Generally, practices of torture are obscured by the clandestine nature of 
interrogation and the institutional insularity of security agencies. Most of 
Hajjar 128
what is publicly known about torture comes from those who have been on its 
receiving end. This was the case in Israel/Palestine until 1987. That year, an 
official commission of inquiry, headed by former High Court justice Moshe 
Landau, issued a groundbreaking report about the activities of the General 
Security Services (GSS) (Landau 1987). 
 The Landau Commission Report confirmed what had long been alleged 
by Palestinian detainees, their Palestinian and Israeli lawyers, and numerous 
human-rights organizations: that GSS agents had routinely used violent 
interrogation methods on Palestinian detainees since at least 1971, and that 
they had routinely lied about such practices when confessions were 
challenged in court on the grounds that they had been coerced.31 While the 
Landau Commission was harsh in its criticism of GSS perjury, it adopted the 
GSS’s own position on the rationale that coercive interrogation tactics are 
necessary in the struggle against “hostile terrorist activity”.32 The Landau 
Commission described GSS interrogators as “ideological criminals” who 
had erred while doing their “national duty” (see Landau Commission Report, 
pp. 31-39). According to the report:  
The investigation staff of the GSS is characterized by professionalism, devotion to duty, 
readiness to undergo exhausting working conditions at all hours of the day and night and to 
confront physical danger, but above all by high inner motivation to serve the nation and the 
state in secret activity, with “duty being its own reward”, without the public glory which 
comes with publicity. It is all the more painful and tragic that a group of persons like this 
failed severely in its behavior as individuals and as a group. In saying this we are not 
referring to the methods of interrogation they employed – which are largely to be defended, 
both morally and legally (...) – but to the method of giving false testimony in court, a method 
which now has been exposed for all to see and which deserves utter condemnation. (Landau 
1987: 4) 
The most problematic aspect of the report was not what it revealed about the 
past, but the conclusions and recommendations it offered. The report’s 
authors argued that national security imperatives demand the option of 
coercion in the interrogation of Palestinians, and that the state should 
sanction GSS agents’ use of physical and psychological “pressure” in order 
to eliminate their need to perjure themselves.  
 Before addressing the consequences of the Landau Commission Report 
and the debates and contestations that have ensued in its wake, we should 
                                          
31 In Israeli courts, rules of evidence require that a confession be given of the detainee’s free will 
in order to be legally admissible. Nevertheless, the leading school of thought in the Israeli legal 
system holds that even if coercive methods are used, the confession can be admissible if it was 
signed without coercion. See Human Rights Watch/Middle East 1994: 243-44. 
32 The Landau Commission also adopted the broad definition of terrorism utilized by the GSS, 
which encompasses virtually all forms of Palestinian nationalism. 
Sovereign Bodies, Sovereign States and the Problem of Torture 129
consider the history of torture in Israel/Palestine prior to 1987. A 
comprehensive history of Israeli interrogation has yet to be written, and the 
conditions do not exist for such an undertaking. It is useful, however, to 
compare what is known about this history with official Israeli discourse on 
the subject prior to the publication of the Landau Commission Report. 
 Between the late 1960s and 1987, numerous accounts and reports of 
Israeli interrogation methods were published, but those which claimed the 
routine use of torture and ill-treatment were officially challenged as anti-
Israel lies and smears, and refuted by arguing that such claims were based on 
pernicious fabrications by Palestinians and other “enemies of the state.” 
Since information about interrogation does rely on accounts provided by 
those who have been interrogated, for decades many international observers 
were sceptical or reluctant to label Israel a torturing state because of the 
difficulty of independently confirming such claims. For example, Amnesty 
International did not use the word “torture” in reports on Israel until 1990, 
although it had long been involved in researching and publishing on matters 
related to the interrogation of Palestinians (Cohen 1991: 24). Certainly 
another factor tempering criticism of Israeli interrogation practices was the 
zeal with which claims of torture were challenged by officials and supporters 
of the state. 
 In the early years of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, 
Palestinian resistance manifested itself predominantly as armed struggle by a 
small number of feda’yin (guerrilleros), and it was met with Israeli responses 
that were predominantly military (as opposed to legal). To the extent that 
captured feda’yin were interrogated, the main purpose was general 
information-gathering, and the use of torture tended to be “penal” (i.e., to 
punish) rather than “judicial” (i.e., to extract confessions to be used in 
court).33 There were two reasons for the limited need for “court-worthy” 
confessions during this period: one was the wide scale use of administrative 
measures such as detention and deportation to punish and deter resistance, 
and the other was a tendency among feda’yin, when captured, to readily 
admit their actions and accept the consequences because they considered 
themselves prisoners of war. 
 Eventually, the decline of armed attacks from within the occupied 
territories and the expanded capabilities of the Israeli military court system 
coupled to allow for increased use of legal (as opposed to military) means to 
deal with and punish resisters. As the demand grew for forms of evidence 
that would hold up in court, interrogation was increasingly aimed at 
                                          
33 On this distinction see Rejali 1994: 6. 
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producing confessions to be used for conviction. By 1970-71, the complete 
isolation – and thus effectiveness – of interrogation as an institutional 
component of the legal process had been achieved (Hunt 1987). Some 
lawyers representing Palestinians began reporting claims by their clients of 
the use of measures such as beatings, electric shock, death threats, position 
abuse, cold showers, sexual abuse, and denied access to toilet facilities. In 
1970, the Israeli publication Zu HaDerech reported a new policy to 
discourage military courts from investigating the conduct of interrogators:  
Noting the importance and vitality of [the GSS’s] security responsibilities in this area, it is the 
duty of the court to avoid disturbing them in their tasks (cited in Amad 1973: 19).  
 Some of the ill-treatment is merely primitive: prolonged beatings, for 
example. But more refined techniques are also used, including electric-shock 
torture and confinement in specially-constructed cells. This sort of 
apparatus, allied to the degree of organization evident in its application, 
removes Israel’s practice from the lesser realms of brutality and places it 
firmly in the category of torture (“Israel Tortures Arab Prisoners”). 
 Although the Israeli government, through its embassy in London, 
ridiculed the findings and conclusions of the article as “fantastic horror 
stories” in a published response (July 3, 1977), then-Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin personally ordered a curtailment of torture in Israeli 
prisons and detention centres.34 However, by the end of the 1970s, local and 
regional events (including intensified Jewish settlement activity in the 
occupied territories and the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty) led 
to an escalation of Palestinian resistance against the occupation, which in 
turn led to an escalating number of arrests and interrogations. By the early 
1980s, the hiatus on torture had ended.35  
 The events that precipitated the establishment of the Landau Commission 
were not directly related to the interrogation of Palestinians. Rather, two 
scandals implicating GSS agents had come to the public’s attention, one 
involving torture of an Israeli Circassian officer in the army (who had been 
                                          
34 To compensate for governmental restrictions on this means of gathering information and 
evidence, beginning around 1979 the GSS developed a new technique: the procurement and use 
of Palestinian informers in prisons. See Be’er & cAbdel-Jawad 1994: 63. 
35 An important legal development relating to interrogation was instituted in 1981; henceforth, a 
person could be convicted on the (sole) basis of a third-party confession, whereas previously a 
conviction was contingent on a first-party confession or material evidence. This legal 
development was modelled on the domestic Israeli “Law Amending the Evidence Order, 1979” 
(see Tsemel 1989: 130). This institutionalized the admissibility of hearsay and expanded the 
“benefits” accruing from interrogation. These benefits also accrue to GSS agents: each conviction 
that results from an interrogation is recorded as a credit in the personnel file of the agents who 
conducted the interrogation (see Levy 1990).  
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suspected of treason), and the other involving the murder of two Palestinians 
already in custody (they had hijacked a bus) and a subsequent cover-up (see 
Lahav 1988). The Landau Commission’s mandate was to bring to light any 
illegal actions perpetrated by the GSS and, in doing so, begin the process of 
restoring public (Jewish Israeli) confidence in the security establishment. 
However, the report of the Landau Commission, especially the recommenda-
tion that the state sanction the use of violent interrogation tactics, became a 
topic of intense criticism and debate.36 
 The Landau Commission Report advanced the argument that Israeli 
penal law could be interpreted to allow interrogators to use “moderate 
physical pressure” (as well as various forms of psychological pressure) as 
part of the fight against terrorism.37 According to this argument, the 
“necessity defence” legally permits people to use violence in “self-defence”, 
thereby mitigating criminal liability of someone acting to prevent grievous 
harm.38 However, in applying such an argument to interrogation, the “self” is 
the Jewish nation, and the “people” are Israeli state agents operating in an 
official capacity. Thus, in a single rhetorical manoeuvre, the people, the 
nation and the state are conflated and represented by the GSS. By the same 
turn, Palestinian detainees are dehumanized; they become, not people with a 
right not to be tortured, but a priori “terrorists” and “ticking bombs”. The 
Landau Commission’s rationalization for such measures is based on a three-
part contention:  
 
1. that Palestinians have no moral right to legal protection given their 
predisposition toward terrorism,  
2. that the GSS operates morally and responsibly in discharging its duties to 
                                          
36 For example, a double issue of Israel Law Review (1989) was devoted to critical assessments of 
the Landau Commission Report. See also Public Committee against Torture in Israel 1990; Cohen 
& Golan 1991, 1992; Ron 1997. 
37 The law at issue is Section 277 of Israel’s penal code, which prohibits the use of physical force 
during interrogation. According to this law, a public servant is liable to imprisonment for three 
years if s/he uses or directs the use of the use of force against a person or threatens or directs a 
person to be threatened for the purpose of extorting a confession or information relating to an 
offence. The Landau Commission suggested that this prohibition could be legally circumvented 
by utilizing a broader interpretation of the “necessity defence”, as contained in Section 22 
(Article 34 [11]) of Penal Law, 1977. 
38 The Landau Commission report suggested that the necessity defence could be interpreted to 
include not only its originally intended exception for cases of “imminent danger”, but could also 
include “the concept of lesser evil”, by which 
the harm done by violating a provision of the law during an interrogation must be 
weighed against the harm to the life or person of others which could occur sooner or 
later (p. 57, emphasis in the original).  
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preserve national security, and  
3. that GSS interrogation methods do not constitute torture (see Landau 
1987: 79). 
 
 The recommendations of the Landau Commission were adopted by the 
government, making Israel the first (and thus far the only) state in the world 
to officially sanction the use of interrogation methods that constitute torture 
according to international law. In doing so, Israel set in motion the first 
public challenge to the core principle underlying the legal prohibition 
against torture: that the individual’s right not to be tortured takes precedence 
over any possible state right or interest. The coincidental timing of the 
Report’s publication (October 30, 1987), its endorsement by the Israeli 
cabinet (November 8) and the outbreak of a Palestinian intifada (uprising) 
(December 9) bore directly on the handling of security suspects at a time 
when the number of people being arrested and interrogated was sky-
rocketing. Thus we can say that the Landau Commission Report decisively 
transformed the discourse of Israeli interrogation while preserving the 
practices. Whereas prior to Landau, the state had denied torture categor-
ically, now it denies that “moderate physical pressure” constitutes 
“torture”.39  
 The specific methods and guidelines that the Landau Commission 
recommended, and that the state accepted, were contained in a classified 
appendix to the report. Although secret, human-rights lawyers and activists 
seeking to challenge their legality have forced the state to admit or 
acknowledge that routine methods include threats and insults, sleep 
deprivation, hooding and blindfolding, position abuse, solitary confinement 
(including in refrigerated or overheated closet-like cells), subjection to 
excessively filthy conditions, and physical violence (including a method 
known as “shaking” which produces a whip-lash effect40) (see Cohen & 
                                          
39 For example, the Office of the Military Advocate General (1992: 10) stated,  
While, in dealing with hardened terrorists involved in the commission of grave security 
offences, the use of a certain degree of force is often necessary to obtain information, the 
disproportionate exertion of pressure on subjects (i.e., by torture or maltreatment) is 
strictly forbidden. Israel has repeatedly condemned all use of torture. 
40 The use of “shaking,” a method of physical violence that leaves no marks on the body, was 
extensively used after the adoption of the Landau Commission’s recommendations. In 1995, the 
Israeli cabinet approved “shaking” in “exceptional circumstances.” Following the death of a 
Palestinian detainee, cAbd al-Samad Harizat, as a direct result of shaking, the late prime minister 
Yitzhak Rabin said,  
There was a malfunction in the interrogation method. It had been used against 8,000 
interrogees and there was no problem.  
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Golan 1991, 1992; Ginbar 1996; Human Rights Watch/Middle East 1994). 
As a result of legal pressure brought on the state by lawyers representing 
Palestinian clients, the government formed a ministerial committee in 1991 
to look into interrogation. This committee’s deliberations resulted in a 
revised set of guidelines, although any changes in tactics were minimal.41 
 In 1991, the policy of permitting “moderate physical pressure” became 
more legally problematic when the Israeli Knesset42 ratified the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman 
Punishment. The government exempted itself from adhering to this 
Convention in its conduct vis-à-vis Palestinian residents of the West Bank 
and Gaza on the grounds that the political status of these areas remains to be 
determined,43 a line of legal reasoning that draws on the Israeli distinction 
between “administration” and “occupation” (Human Rights Watch/Middle 
East 1992). That year, a draft Law against Torture was submitted by Hadash 
(a coalition of leftist Israeli parties) to the Knesset, but it did not survive a 
first reading. 
 Over the decades of Israeli occupation, tens of thousands of Palestinians 
have been subjected to interrogation methods that constitute torture. 
Between 1987 and 1994 alone, an estimated 23,000 people were tortured. 
Despite the publicity surrounding this problem, the Israeli government, 
courts and a majority of the Jewish public consistently refused to accept that 
the international prohibition against torture applies to Palestinians. Even 
some leading Israeli legal liberals have refused to acknowledge and 
condemn torture by state agents. For example, Ruth Gavison, a prominent 
law professor and president of the Association of Civil Rights in Israel 
(ACRI, the country’s largest and most prestigious civil rights organization), 
was quoted as saying,  
I don’t know of any state which confronts terror attacks of the sort we deal with here, and 
which does not strike against the body or welfare of detained persons suspected of being 
connected to terrorist activity (cited in Baram 1998: 23).  
 Despite overwhelming evidence that methods used routinely in 
interrogation constitute torture, such broad and consistent refusal on the part 
of the Israeli mainstream to take a stand against torture has served to 
marginalize and even demonize those Israelis involved in the struggle 
                                                                                                                             
Interview on Kol Israel, July 29, 1995, cited in Ginbar 1996: 58. 
41 The new guidelines were issued in a classified booklet titled The Procedure for Extraordinary 
Authorization during Interrogation. See Ginbar 1993. 
42 The Israeli Parliament (Eds.) 
43 This exception takes no account of the fact that interrogation of Palestinians from the territories 
actually takes place within the territory of Israel (i.e., inside the 1949 armistice line). 
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against it. The latter have been criticized in speech and print as 




Legal challenges to torture 
 
Every year, Israeli human-rights lawyers have submitted hundreds of 
petitions to the Israeli High Court on behalf of Palestinian clients in 
interrogation;44 most of these petitions seek an order nisi (show cause) for 
incommunicado detention, and/or Court intervention to force prison 
authorities to grant a meeting with the client, and/or to challenge the use of 
violent tactics in the case of that specific client. But some lawyers affiliated 
with Israeli human-rights organizations, of which the Public Committee 
against Torture in Israel (PCATI) has been most active, have mounted a 
more aggressive and expansive litigatory campaign seeking a Court decision 
to declare the use of physical and psychological violence illegal because it 
conflicts with domestic Israeli penal law and international conventions to 
which Israel is a signatory.45 One PCATI attorney, Allegra Pacheco, 
described this work as a “Sisyphus-like struggle in the highest court in Israel 
to permanently abolish torture in Israel” (1999a: 9). 
 In 1991, PCATI petitioned the High Court to void the Landau 
Commission Report and publicize the secret interrogation guidelines. The 
petition was rejected in 1993; the Court stated that the guidelines have the 
status of an “internal directive” and therefore are not subject to judicial 
intervention. Although the justices handling the petition were privy to the 
guidelines, they did not render an opinion regarding their legality vis-à-vis 
Israeli or international laws. In 1994, PCATI brought a petition against the 
government of Israel that was even more ambitious in its aims: in addition to 
calling again on the Court to order the state to publish the secret guidelines, 
the petition challenged the GSS’s right to detain and interrogate people 
without explicit legislative authorization (see Pacheco 1999a: 10-33). The 
petition challenged the GSS’s existence as “extra-legal”46 and the content of 
                                          
44 Although Palestinian lawyers have also been involved in the legal struggle against torture, only 
lawyers who are members of the Israel Bar Association are permitted to bring cases and petitions 
before the High Court. 
45 For a collection of PCATI petitions and High Court decisions, see Pacheco 1999a. 
46 The petition pointed out that the GSS operates under the authority of the Israeli government 
and the office of the Prime Minister,  
based on the assumption that it is an executing arm of the government, carrying out the 
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its activities as “aberrant” and illegal. On this latter point, PCATI drew, in 
part, upon the new Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1994). 
According to the petition,  
[T]he fact that the government authorizes the [GSS] interrogators to harm the bodies and 
dignity of persons is a constitutional disgrace which undermines the integrity of the legal 
system and challenges its right to exist (Pacheco 1999a: 13).47  
The High Court issued an order nisi, but it left the case pending. 
 Although the High Court was not entirely immune to granting relief in 
certain cases, its general pattern of decisions and delays served to preserve 
the secrecy of GSS interrogation practices and confirm the state’s ability to 
exempt itself from adhering to international conventions in its treatment of 
Palestinian detainees. Thus, the High Court effectively added its stamp to the 
position that using violent tactics on Palestinians is legally permissible. Such 
a rationalization hinges on the notion that any harm perpetrated by 
interrogators is lesser than the possible harm that detainees pose for the class 
of innocents, those civilians who are the victims (actual or potential) of 
terrorism. Consequently, the High Court was directly contributing (rather 
than passively conceding, as is sometimes argued) to the subversion of the 
right of individuals not to be tortured, by according the state an anachronistic 
form of extreme and absolute sovereignty to do as it will to the bodies of its 
subjects. Needless to say, Israeli and Palestinian human-rights activists, as 
well as other sectors of the international human-rights movement, have been 
highly critical of the Court’s failure to apprehend Israeli torture as a crime, 
let alone act to prevent it. As one Israeli human-rights organization, 
B’Tselem, described the situation as recently as 1998:  
In Israel, torture is institutionalized, with its own routine and systematic bureaucracy. Torture 
is governed by detailed regulations and written procedures. A whole contingent of public 
officials participate in the practice of torture: in addition to the GSS interrogators who 
directly perpetrate torture, doctors determine whether a detainee is medically fit to withstand 
the torture, a ministerial committee headed by the Prime Minister oversees the procedures, 
state attorneys defend the practices in courts and finally the High Court of Justice has 
effectively legalized torture by approving its use in individual cases without ruling on its 
legality in principle. (Felner 1998: 1, 15) 
                                                                                                                             
residual jurisdiction of the Israeli government to defend the security of the state... 
(Pacheco 1999a: 12)  
What makes the GSS “extra-legal” is that, not only is there no specific law regulating it, but its 
activities usurp the jurisdiction of other bodies that are regulated by law: the GSS  
maintains a parasitical relationship with authorized authorities like the police or the 
prison service (Ibid: 16). 
47 The petition also argued that the prohibition against torture is “universal,” “customary” and 
“absolute,” and quoted from the Filartiga (USA) decision (Pacheco 1999a: 25-27). 
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 A legal breakthrough in the struggle against torture came as a result of 
several petitions challenging specific tactics referred to as shabeh. Shabeh is 
a combination method involving tying a detainee to a small slanted chair, 
keeping a filthy sack over his head, exposing him to loud music and 
sometimes extremes in temperature, and causing sleep deprivation. Drawing 
on an earlier High Court decision (Mubarak et al v. GSS) which ruled that 
painful handcuffing is prohibited, PCATI attorneys representing two clients 
(Fuad Awad Qur’an and cAbd al-Rahman Ghanimat) sought a decision that 
would serve to prohibit shabeh on the basis that it constitutes methods that 
cause pain.  
 In January 1998, the High Court combined these petitions with four 
others pertaining to interrogation, and convened an unprecedented panel of 
nine justices to consider the matter.48 At the first hearing, state attorney Shai 
Nitzan acknowledged that shabeh causes pain and affects the detainee’s 
physical and mental state, but asserted that it is not used in order to cause 
pain; rather, it is an administrative measure used to control people during the 
“waiting” period between interrogation sessions (Pacheco 1999b: 5). The 
High Court adjourned after a single day without ruling on the petitions. 
Rather, the Court issued a statement calling on the Knesset to take 
responsibility by promulgating legislation, rather than leaving it up to the 
Court to decide each petition in an ad hoc manner. While such a statement 
coming from the country’s highest judicial authority is problematic on a 
number of levels, the most glaring is its disregard for the already existing 
laws that govern interrogation: the international instruments prohibiting 
torture. 
 The nine-justice panel reconvened for a second one-day session on May 
20, 1998, at which time state attorney Nitzan offered a new explanation for 
the use of shabeh: he admitted that it was indeed a factor in the interrogation 
process rather than merely an administrative measure. Although this was, in 
effect, an admission that the government had been lying to the Court for 
years, no action was taken. The panel reconvened for a third time on January 
13, 1999. At that hearing, one of the PCATI attorneys, Allegra Pacheco, 
drew the Court’s attention to the fact that in May 1998 the UN Committee 
against Torture (the international body authorized to monitor adherence to 
the Convention against Torture) had reiterated its position that Israeli 
interrogation tactics include methods constituting torture, and should cease 
                                          
48 In an attempt to marshal public pressure and influence the High Court, B’Tselem released a 
new report, Routine Torture, the day before the scheduled hearing at a press conference during 
which actors demonstrated some of the interrogation methods regularly used on Palestinians. 
Pictures and images of these re-enactments were covered by all the major Israeli media.  
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immediately (see B’Tselem 1998: 12). One justice on the panel asked Nitzan 
to comment on this, to which he quipped,  
We all know quite well how the United Nations decides when it comes to Israel,  
thereby suggesting that the problem was international anti-Semitism rather 
than the state’s use of torture. That was the end of the discussion (Pacheco 
1999b: 1). Once again, the Court adjourned without setting a date for 
continuation. However, in February 1999, Nitzan announced a change in 
shabeh, stating that cloth hoods would be replaced by blackened goggles, 
that the small slanted chairs would be replaced by regular chairs, and that 
prisoners would not be shackled quite as tightly. Nevertheless, lawyers 
claimed that these purported changes were not, in fact, instituted in the 
treatment of most prisoners (Pacheco 1999b: 1-2).  
 Finally, on September 6, 1999, the High Court rendered a ruling 
prohibiting shabeh, “shaking” and other forms of routine violence during 
interrogation.49 Although this decision marked a victory for the thousands of 
victims of torture, as well as for human-rights lawyers and activists, it fell 
short in a number of crucial regards. It neither acknowledged that GSS 
interrogation methods constitute “torture”, nor completely forbade their 
continued use under “exceptional circumstances.” The Court’s ambivalence 
about curbing GSS prerogatives was evident in the words of Chief Justice 
Aharon Barak: “Our apprehension that this decision will hamper the ability 
to properly deal with terrorists and terrorism disturbs us.” Moreover, the 
Court suggested (again) that the government could pass legislation to 
legalize these methods. Steps to do so were subsequently prepared. 
 In recent years, the problem of torture has taken a new twist. The 
political changes wrought by the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – which 
began in 1991, produced a Declaration of Principles in 1993, and led to the 
establishment in 1994 of a Palestinian Authority (PA) with limited “self-
governing” powers in parts of the West Bank and Gaza – have not ended the 
incidence or risk of torture in Israel/Palestine. On the contrary, Palestinians 
have continued to be tortured by the thousands in the interest of Israeli 
national security, only now the torturers also include Palestinian as well as 
Israeli security agents.50 This extension of torture into the age of negotiated 
                                          
49 Two days after the decision was issued, on September 8, 1999, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
sent a letter to Yossi Beilin, Israeli Minister of Justice, urging him to submit legislation to the 
Knesset clearly prohibiting torture and ill-treatment, and begin prosecuting GSS agents 
responsible for torture. According to Hany Megally, executive director of the Middle East and 
North Africa division of HRW, “It’s up to Minister Beilin to give the ruling teeth.” 
50 Between 1994 and 2000, at least 19 Palestinians have died while in custody of the Palestinian 
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agreements stands as a scathing indictment of the “achievements” of recent 
diplomacy. PA torture, like Israeli torture, must be understood in the context 
in which it occurs: the larger political agenda of the PA, namely the 
project/process of state-building, hinges on an ability to satisfy Israeli 
security demands. Thus, torture becomes a means for the PA to demonstrate 





Torture has become an international matter through the promulgation and 
uses of international laws and conventions that prohibit it. Certainly Israeli 
and Palestinian human-rights lawyers and activists have understood the 
importance of situating their activities within a larger – global – context in 
their efforts to bring international laws and political pressure to bear on both 
the Israeli state and the PA to stop torture. In keeping with such efforts to 
situate the “local” within a “global” context, I would like to suggest a 
connection between struggles against torture in Israel/Palestine and recent 
developments elsewhere in the world. In the 1990s, the human-rights 
enterprise entered a new era. This phase is characterized by the development 
of agendas and strategies to prosecute violators of human rights.51 Many of 
the international laws governing human rights include mechanisms for 
enforcement through prosecution, but it is only recently that such options 
have begun to be exploited.52 The establishment of international tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the passing of a treaty to create a 
permanent International Criminal Court, and the arrest of former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet all indicate moves in this direction. Although 
there are serious problems with each of these examples, they represent 
significant, albeit nascent, changes at the international level: an expansion of 
the human-rights enterprise from a struggle for rights to a struggle against 
violators. I would argue that targeting violations legally (rather than 
diplomatically, economically or militarily), and charging, trying, convicting 
                                                                                                                             
Authority. 
51 In this particular regard, I would suggest a positive reading of what Carol Greenhouse (1998: 
15) more sceptically describes as an emergent “criminal trial paradigm”: “[T]he public 
fascination with spectacular public interrogations (...) suggests the pervasiveness of the criminal 
trial as a public discourse involving high stakes and emotions.” 
52 Indeed a recurring theme in human-rights scholarship published prior to the mid-1990s is 
frustration with a pervasive refusal to take seriously the legal options, thereby relegating human 
rights to the realm of moral outrage or, at best, political leverage. 
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and punishing violators in courts of law – in other words, turning the 
violence of law against the perpetrators of state violence – has a potential to 
affect and alter the ways in which state power over people is exercised. 
 Of all the human-rights violations that international laws target, torture 
lends itself most readily to a litigatory agenda. This is being vividly 
demonstrated in the Pinochet case. Pinochet was arrested in London on the 
basis of an indictment issued by a Spanish judge. He was charged with a 
number of violations of international law. The first decision by the British 
House of Lords rejected the legal grounds for the charges of genocide 
(because the victims of Pinochet’s regime do not “fit” the legal definition 
since they were not killed because of their national, ethnic or religious 
identity). But the decision upheld the indictment on the charge of torture (as 
well as attempted murder). Although this decision was overturned 
subsequently on a technicality, a second decision by the House of Lords 
narrowed the scope of indictable crimes,53 but upheld the indictment on 
charges of torture. This development has literally revolutionized the ways in 
which people around the world can imagine – hope and fear – new uses of 
existing laws. At a March 1999 conference, “Investigating and Combating 
Torture” (sponsored by the University of Chicago), Sir Nigel Rodney, UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, noted that torture is the reason Pinochet 
remains in England. 
 At this juncture, the prospect that those who perpetrate or abet torture 
might face prosecution holds forth a possibility for changing the practices 
and discourses associated with the sovereign rights of states, at least in 
regard to their treatment of people in custody. The challenge is in 
transforming the principled prohibition against torture into practice. Of 
course, states that lie, deny or euphemize about their own use of torture are 
unlikely to enforce domestically the UN Convention against Torture. But the 
enforceability of this convention is extra-territorial, a provision which makes 
geography itself a potential resource in the struggle against torture. At the 
risk of sounding glib, torturers sometimes travel. Pinochet was arrested 
during a personal trip to London. This involved a kind of “human-rights 
intelligence” to take advantage of his movement out of Chile, where he 
enjoyed an impunity of his own making.  
 In countries around the world, many torturers and their records are 
known. The first question is whether such knowledge can be translated 
effectively into a basis for action should an opportunity to use it arise. The 
                                          
53 The second decision by the Court of Lords made 1988 the cut-off year for indictable crimes, 
because this was the year the United Kingdom signed the Convention against Torture. 
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second question is how to translate the possibilities into legal obligations to 
act by those who are empowered to do so, namely the governments of other 
states. The possibilities have been illuminated by recent events and 
developments; following Pinochet’s arrest other leaders suspected of 
authorizing or perpetrating torture (e.g., from Iraq, Yugoslavia, Croatia) 
have reportedly cancelled or terminated plans to travel abroad out of fear of 
their own arrest. The translation and consolidation of these possibilities into 
broader action begs the contribution of scholars to advance substantive 
arguments that might prove influential in transforming the enforcement of 
international law from a political option into a legal duty. While it remains 
too early to tell whether torturers will face increasing risk of prosecution in 
some legal venue, this prospect should give pause to any state that uses 
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RE-CLAIMING IDENTITY AS TRUTH 




ABSTRACT. In South Africa, the politics of identity as promoted by the African Renaissance seeks 
to undermine the violence and assumptions of Western ethnocentrism regarding the African 
Other. In this way, it resembles the ideologies of négritude, the African personality and the 
Harlem Renaissance which emerged much earlier. However, the African Renaissance in 




The old English meaning of the noun truth was “trustworthy”. To establish 
trust between former enemies in order to create common ground for a 
humane future after the demise of divisive, thoroughly unjust apartheid was 
the major aim of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In tune 
with the rejection of Manichaean1 thinking, resulting from imperial and 
totalitarian perspectives up and including the Cold War, the TRC thought to 
create the condition of “being true or factual”, as implied by the Latin term 
vērus, about the violent, hidden South African past. The “theatre of pain and 
catharsis” as the Mail and Guardian (19-25/4/1996: 5), called the TRC’s 
first meeting, quotes the Anglican prelate, Desmond Tutu:  
We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past; to lay the ghosts of the past so that 
they may not return to haunt us. That it may thereby contribute to the healing of a traumatised 
and wounded nation; for all of us in South Africa are wounded people. 
Once “the truth” about atrocities committed on both sides would have been 
“confessed”, that is narrated and interpreted on the level of moral justice 
rather than legally verified or validated, reconciliation as an interactive form 
of dialogue between perpetrators of empirical and symbolic violence would 
1 Manichaean: referring to a scheme of thought associated with the name of the religious 
innovator Mani (Persia/Iran, 3rd century CE), and positing a radical division of the world into 
good and bad; in fact the scheme has much older antecedents, e.g. in Zarathustrian thought. (Eds.) 
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have been set in motion, and “nation building” on the basis of mutual 
understanding and trust could commence.  
 Evidence of the reception of this largely socio-political process 
inaugurated by the TRC suggests a rather mixed effect on the diverse 
peoples of South Africa. Although the media spectacle provoked profound 
soul-searching on the part of Afrikaans-speaking intellectuals, South African 
liberals seemed dissatisfied with the TRC’s historico-narrative paradigm. 
Whereas the former appeared deeply touched by what might be called moral 
justice inscribed in all narrative truth, the latter were concerned rather with 
legal justice, a justice less defined by taking moral responsibility than by 
verifying and apportioning factual guilt.2 Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull 
(1998) and Anita Jeffrey’s The Truth about the Truth Commission (1999) 
serve as examples, respectively. By-and-large, though, the limits of the 
desired process of reconciliation, facilitated by mutual “understanding” and 
solidarity with those who suffered under apartheid, are only too apparent in 
as much as many victims think of the TRC as “toothless” because of its 
explicit rejection of retributive justice. Others, like Mahmood Mamdani 
(1998) took the Commission to task for failing to define the terms of the 
social debate and to set the parameters for truth-seeking. Holding that, 
similar to Mamdani’s conclusion, the “truth” of colonial and neo-colonial 
racial and economic oppression has been obscured, many Black African 
intellectuals like Malegapuru Makgoba (1999) and Thami Mazwai (1999) 
advocate an African Renaissance. This rebirth is tilted towards the majority 
of Black South Africans for the purpose of releasing traditional values and 
energies from a local history of colonization and oppression. Their project, 
more than five years after the transition to democracy, coincides with Thabo 
Mbeki’s attempt to deal with the threat of exclusivist ideologies and largely 
racist extremist alliances by mapping an affirmation of cultural diversity 
(multiculturalism) across redistributive (socialist) economic transformation. 
 Following in the wake of the deliberations of the TRC, the African 
Renaissance seeks to restore the hidden, forgotten and, at the hands of the 
colonizers and Western ethnocentrism, actively discredited narrative of the 
African Other. As a recuperative move, the African Renaissance establishes 
selfhood by undertaking “the voyage in” like other anti-colonial writers and 
thinkers since the 1940s. Suffice it to mention in this regard négritude, the 
praise of the African personality, and even the Harlem Renaissance of the 
                                          
2 It has to be kept in mind, though, that the TRC was constituted by various committees, one of 
which is the Amnesty Committee whose decisions are binding. Contradictions such as between 
the main (Tutu) Committee and the rest of the Commission arise precisely from differences 
between moral and legal, narrative, obligatory and verifiable or “factual”, binding truths. 
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1920s, associated, among others, with names like Césaire, Fanon, Nyerere, 
and Langston Hughes, respectively. In the book edited by Malegapuru 
Makgoba (1999) after the September 1998 conference organised by him and 
Thami Mazwai, the African Renaissance operates with a rhetoric of self-
affirmation, of becoming subject after the colonial reduction to slave, 
subaltern or generally the non-human savage. Thus, the African Renaissance 
is  
about Africans being agents of our own history and masters of our own destiny (Makgoba 
1999: xii).  
 On the one hand, the rhetoric of the varied contributions to Makgoba’s 
book derives its persuasive force from comparisons like “as good as” or 
“better than”. Being “black in the world”, and thus an “African” means 
being as good as a “white European”, producing as good a history, a science, 
a philosophy etc., and being in possession of as good a rationality as the 
“white” man. The “white man” merely reduced the African to his inferior 
Other in the process of colonization and slavery. Now is the time to claim, or 
rather, to re-claim, the stolen past, to de-colonize the mind, and to infuse 
current Western science and everyday life with forgotten and buried 
traditional practices. With respect to human conduct and relations, ubuntu is 
superior to Western, European ethics, and, besides, it is the African people, 
in the words of Makgoba (1999: iv ff),  
that gave birth to humanity, language, science, technology, philosophy, wisdom, and so forth.  
On the other hand the rhetoric purposely shuns any relational components, 
reducing the African Renaissance to an immanent absolute. There is only the 
still-to-be-fully-restored, authentic African tradition in Africa, and if you 
don’t like – excuse the metaphor – doing like the Romans do when in Rome, 
then there is no place for you. In other words, current rhetoric employs a 
dual argument of a relational and of an exclusivist kind. This double 
argumentation makes the present debate around Africanization iridescent 
because it veils the actual aim and content of the emergent formation of an 
important and unique tradition.  
 Such construction of tradition resonates with a world-wide, 
contemporary bracketing of the ethnos, together with accompanying moves 
towards defining and establishing identity. Hence Makgoba (1999: v) 
continues in his Introduction:  
Why are the British, the Australians, the Israelis, and Germans revisiting the issue of identity 
and culture towards the end of the twentieth century? The answer is simple,  
Makgoba says, providing a bulleted three-point response:  
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• Identity and culture are important national matters. 
• When national identity and culture are not clearly defined, articulated or skewed, social 
tensions increase, national reconciliation and success (economic, educational, political) are 
stunted. 
• National culture and identity are the common thread that weaves society together and 
facilitates coherent development. 
 However, Makgoba’s somewhat simplistic answers obscure the reason 
for the current concerns with identity and culture; reasons, which I would 
argue, are to be found in increasing technological, economic and cultural 
globalization. Recently, sociologists, foremost among them Manuel Castells 
(1996-98), have pointed out that the prevailing issue of “identity” is a 
corollary of globalization which, in turn, according to Anthony Giddens 
(1990), has been facilitated by an accelerated process of modernization. 
Globalizing processes break down the historical nexus between nation, state, 
societal community and territory, and create anxiety in the face of post-
modern instabilities. An engagement with alterity, supported by 
postmodernist ethnography, in a period of decisive shifts in global cultural 
politics and values, is thus producing the reassertion of national and group 
rights to recognition and respect. With regard to Europe and Asia, economic 
globalization demands the strengthening of regions across historical state 
boundaries which globalization renders fluid and economically unnecessary. 
On the eve of the “third millennium” – as counted by the Christian calendar 
– we are in the midst of another huge upheaval in world affairs, comparable 
in impact to the urbanization process. Peoples – and governments – are 
seeking to re-appropriate and reinterpret their inherited traditions, while 
facing at the same time the complication of cultural “globalization” in a 
world-economy of hegemonic commodities and information. American-
Hispanic, African, Indian, Slavic, Islamic and Chinese peoples are asserting 
their equivalence with Europeans, Anglo-Americans and Japanese both in 
their own regions and on the world stage. Scholarly preoccupation with 
“multiculturalism” (Taylor 1992) in the wake of the Canadian debate of the 
late sixties, cross-culturalism – post-colonialism – hybridization or 
métissage, inter-cultural and intra-cultural dialogue, etc., on the one hand, 
and identity, on the other, testify to this current situation world-wide.  
 The African Renaissance can be seen, thus, as yet another symptom of 
globalization with its stress on reclaiming identity as a collective or 
communitarian rather than an individualistic affair. Since the notion of the 
individual, and individual rights, are regarded as Western imports, a return 
to the collective “we” is generally implied, in place of an individual subject 
who, as Kant has advocated, frees himself from self-imposed immaturity. 
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The African Renaissance, it seems, surmises President Mbeki’s vision of the 
new “struggle”, for he regards it as a “contribution to the recovery of 
African pride, the confidence in ourselves that we can succeed as well as any 
other in building a humane and prosperous society” (Mbeki in Makgoba 
1999). This rebirth of an African identity is seen to be the necessary 
successor to the 1994 liberation, and precursor to the success of the coming 
“African century”. Although discussion of the much desired African 
Renaissance in the main eschews reference to the TRC’s deliberations, the 
TRC’s envisaged nation-building project remains part of emerging African 
identity politics.  
 Recourse to identity thus appears as self-representation in the place of 
hegemonic representation by others like the colonial master, the ruler or the 
particular symbolic order of power. Therefore, such recourse to identity 
insists on articulating the narrative which these powers or agents of 
representation try to obscure. This is where the work of witnessing, memory, 
testimony, and solidarity achieves importance, work which the TRC 
succeeded in doing, despite Mamdani’s (1998) critique to the effect that it 
turned a political compromise into a compromised truth in order to support 
the political. In fact, contestation is the very hallmark of the domains of truth 
and identity, for, rather than constituting immutable “facts” they are 
historically contingent constructs in and through language. Thus, the anti-
Platonic turn in Western philosophy, illuminated repeatedly by, for instance, 
Richard Rorty (1999), and represented in particular by Nietzsche–Foucault, 
Marx–Althusser, Heidegger–Derrida, and Dewey–Rorty, rejects an eternal, 
essentialist (monistic) Truth; for, as Nietzsche (1979: 84) observed already 
more than a hundred years ago, truth is  
A moveable host of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of 
human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and 
embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and 
binding. Truths are illusions we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have 
become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their 
embossing and are now considered metal and no longer coins. 
 There are a number of considerations which arise from this, by now, 
famous constructionist statement:  
 
• truth is plural; 
• truth is a verbal/discursive construct referring to human relations; 
• truth is the effect of poësis and rhetoric, which is to say: truth is produced 
or created in a process of making (poësis, “the poetic” in Greek means 
condensing, whereby the poet is a “densifier” who “thickens” language). 
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The rhetorician, on the other hand utilizes persuasion in order to establish 
truth. 
• truth is the result of an (impoverishing) historical process; impoverished 
because it removes truth from a general economy, rendering its 
“sensuous force” of exchange abstract.  
 
 Most importantly, though, truth, unlike identity when locked into 
authentēs (Greek for “author”)3, has to be thought of as non-substantive and 
relational. Although truth, like identity, functions as a stable criterion within 
the flux of phenomena, truth, – unlike identity – presupposes a process in 
order to establish equivalence or congruence between two entities or 
phenomena. This process, which is more often than not an agonistic one, is a 
struggle to “match” two entities, either by way of “matching” evidence with 
the performed act in a deliberative judicial manner in order to “establish the 
truth”, as the jurist would put it. Historians usually require a match between 
an event and a document, for example, thus raising “documentation” to the 
status of proof. Proof as an important element in the construction of truth, of 
course, operates decisively in logic; thus, in the specific case of Aristotelian 
logic, truth is produced formally and purely linguistically. From a rhetorical 
perspective, truth, like the truth in or of science, can be said to be “true 
belief”, in as much as a particular scientific community can arrive at 
consensus with respect to the analysis of specific observations. Apart from 
these outcome-based constructions of “truth”, there is, moreover, truth in the 
(Heideggerean) shape of alētheia or that which is hidden from view and 
awaits being extracted or essayed from lēthe, the stream which nourishes the 
dead souls. In this sense, truth as disclosure describes best, perhaps, the 
narrative working of memory. 
 Whereas the TRC’s proceedings oscillated between these ways of 
constructing truth, allowing more weight in accordance with its intention, 
perhaps, for the construction of historical truth in pursuit of moral justice, 
the African Renaissance’s construction of identity dissolves historical or 
narrative truth in authenticity. In as much as any narrative truth aims at 
behavioural changes (which are required, for instance, for self-affirmation 
and/or reconciliation), it has a (historically) rightful place, despite its 
possible lack of legal or legally “binding” justice, something for which the 
TRC has been accused by a number of different voices including that of 
Jeffrey. Yet this does not change the specific distinction between truth and 
                                          
3 In the sense, not of literary creator, but of “actor”, i.e. “someone who carries out a deed by his 
own hand” – and most typically used for “murderer” and for “autocrat”. (Eds.) 
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identity. Whereas both may be narrative in nature, truth stands to non-truth 
in a relation of deliberation, informed by either evidence, proof or 
revelation. Identity, however, stands to non-identity in a relation of alterity. 
Moreover, where ethnos – from which derived the notion of race in the 
modern era – is figured into identity, it becomes exclusive and grounded in 
non-negotiable authenticity and not in deliberation or consensus.  
 Ethnos in the Greek polis as much as in the modern nation-state or in the 
South African nation-building project is based upon an identity shared by a 
collective. Such shared “markers” might be constituted by way of an ancient 
concept of blood-ties (e.g. clan, tribe, and current German nationality), or 
citizenship (Greek polis and Roman Empire, USA), or the essentially 
European Romantic notion of a common culture and language. In each case 
it is proof of authenticity, not proof of truth, which decides on inclusion or 
exclusion of the group. Sadly, the project of nation-building on the basis of 
reconciliation seems to have been diverted by identity politics around the 
question of authenticity with regard to who is an African. Such authenticity 
operates on the level of immanence, and is dependant on its constitutive 
parts which, moreover, have to be traceable to an origin. Authenticity, thus, 
is always onto-logically founded and non-negotiable. 
 In as much as identity requires the matching of qualities and markers to a 
perceived authenticity or an authentēs, it tends to cut itself off from other 
entities and becomes exclusively grounded in an axiology and not in justice, 
whereby differing values, including truth-values, are regarded as 
unauthentic, and hence undesirable. Identity politics establishes an absolute, 
monistic Truth, THE truth of its ontologically defining qualities which are 
closed-off from any relational aspects with which Nietzsche saw truth as 
circulating within an economy of exchange. No wonder then, that 
multiculturalism’s ethnos in the form of identity as truth, instead of fostering 
heterogeneous interactions between different identities, produces a 
flourishing cultural separatism, a kind of totalitarian particularism which, 
according to Wolfgang Welsch (1992) carries a retribalization in the form of 
discovering “roots” and “traditions”.  
 In the retrieval of the forgotten, hidden, masked and obscured stories, 
historical truth, as uncovered by the TRC for instance, can, imbued with 
moral justice, speak the truth to political power in relation to the excluded. 
In as much as the African Renaissance seeks to build an image of the 
African as one constructed by himself/herself and not by others for the 
purpose of building his/her own development with his/her own hands, the 
project is concerned, like the TRC, with historical truth. However, where the 
African Renaissance turns into identity politics in order to achieve political 
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power, the historical truth is jettisoned for the sake of exclusivity. For truth 
as seen to be residing in identity is no longer plural, relational, and 
deliberative. Instead of being a “sensuous force” of exchange between 
diverse and distinct people who have to share the same country and the 
same, increasingly globalizing world, an undue emphasis upon the claim to 
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CHAPTER 10 





ABSTRACT. The intention of this paper is to show that “truth” is not a very well-defined topic in 
the study of history. By considering “history” as interpretations of processes and interpretations 
of human experiences, we affirm here that all historians make choices between certain sources 
and certain bodies of evidence, that they make choices in their presentation and the articulation 
of facts. Pursuing these general concerns, this paper presents firstly the dominant traits of history 
teaching during the apartheid era. Then, it goes on with two specific problems within the 
historical discipline in the post-apartheid context: the evolution of history teaching at school, and 
the use of history in a particular public document, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) Report.  
 
 
“Truth and History” 1 is one of the major issues debated among historians, 
whatever their subject of research. It was the topic of the last biennial 
Conference of the South African Historical Society: “Not Telling: Lies, 
Secrecy and History” (hosted by the University of the Western Cape, July 
1999). As the title of the conference indicates, it is interesting and exciting 
for historians to demonstrate what could be considered as a lie, how other 
historians are dealing with sources and evidence and how they tell history.  
 The intention of this paper is to show that “truth” is not a very well-
defined topic in the study of history. We are not pretending that truth does 
not exist. We believe that truth does exist. But by considering “history” as 
interpretations of processes and interpretations of human experiences, we 
affirm here that all historians make choices between certain sources and 
certain bodies of evidence, that they make choices in their presentation and 
the articulation of facts. Therefore, people have to be aware that historians 
have considerable power. This power is so strong that some historians could 
use it to paralyze anyone challenging their work. Such historians could 
purposefully omit facts or people, they could whisk out of sight certain 
primary sources – because “they do not fit their view” – or they could invent 
non-existing sources in order to prove that they are right in saying what they 
say. This type of impostors does exist among historians. Even if they 
1 I thank for their support Dr Cynthia Kros, University of the Witwatersrand, Mrs Cathérine 
Blondeau, Cultural Attaché at the French Embassy and Director of the French Institute of South 
Africa, as well as Sylvie Kaninda, Marielle Martinez and Laurent Chauvet. 
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represent a minority, we should not underestimate their power. We argue 
that it is not impossible to challenge them; the point is how. 
 The topic of “Truth and History” is a false “good topic”. History is 
interpretations and tales by people who are themselves sensitive to their own 
time and society. They are themselves citizens with philosophical and 
political opinions, with beliefs and ethical principles. This influences 
inevitably the way they tell history. 
 Of course, history does not belong to historians alone, yet historians are 
particularly responsible before society for what they present and analyse as 
the past, and how they do this. Historians are always under the pressure of 
social demands and politics. This is why it is never enough to read the work 
of one historian only, on a specific matter. Different history books and 
sources provide different approaches and their combination helps to 
apprehend an epoch in its diverse dimensions.  
 This paper presents firstly the dominant traits of history teaching during 
the apartheid era. Then, it goes on with two specific problems within the 
historical discipline in the post-apartheid context: the evolution of history 
teaching at school, and the use of history in a particular public document, the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report.  
 
 
From the history of politics to the use of history as a political instrument 
 
During the apartheid era, the discipline of history was subjected to huge 
debates and arguments, precisely because the various historical discourses 
were deeply linked with fundamental political issues.  
 The supporters of apartheid were obsessed with the need to find 
historical justifications for the system, and claimed that they were telling the 
truth because they were in possession of irrefutable evidence. The historians 
who were opposed to the apartheid system as well as to its official historical 
discourse developed views that were different from those of apartheid’s 
supporters. Many of them were nourishing the desire to “restore the truth”. 
 In order to address the question of “Truth and History” in South Africa 
today, we need to recall briefly what the relationship was between truth and 
history among historians during the apartheid era. Contrary to a widely held 
view, historians who supported apartheid were not avoiding the debate on 
“Truth in History”. 
 In her paper on history teaching at the University of Durban-Westville 
during the 1960s-1980s, the historian Uma D. Mesthrie recalls the questions 
asked to students preparing their essays on history:  
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For instance, is (or was) he a scientific historian? Does he belong to a specific cultural, 
religious, or political group? Is (or was) he in a position to present his facts objectively? Has 
he been contradicted by another historian? Is he telling the truth? (Mesthrie 1999: 8.)  
It is quite incredible that such questions were being asked, considering that 
the students had only one single reference book available during the 1970s – 
for the undergraduate curriculum –, notably Five Hundred Years: a History 
of South Africa by C.F.J. Muller, a Professor of History at the University of 
South Africa (UNISA). Yet, the historians who supported apartheid 
affirmed that their historical analysis was nothing less than scientific.2 
Knowing that the diversification of sources – primary and secondary – as 
well as the critical analysis, confrontation and comparison of such sources, 
are fundamental to an historian’s work during his training and will remain so 
throughout his career, apartheid historians simply claimed that there were no 
accurate sources available regarding the pre-colonial past.  
This book recounts the activities and experiences, over a period of nearly five hundred years, 
of the White man in South Africa (…). For the history of these five centuries we have 
incomparably more reliable sources than all the centuries before the Portuguese discoveries. 
Naturally the history of South Africa did not begin with the advent of the White man and the 
non-Whites have played an extremely significant role in South Africa’s development. 
Nevertheless, reliable factual records in exact chronological focus concerning the Bantu, 
Hottentots and Bushmen are too scarce for an authoritative history of the non-White to be 
written at this stage. It must also be recognized that during these centuries, and especially 
during the 19th and 20th centuries, the White man played, and is still playing, a predominant 
role in the history of South Africa.3 
As the historians Uma D. Mesthrie and Cynthia Kros4 emphasize:  
[T]he History syllabus of the old South Africa did not (...) deny that Africans could have 
civilization, industry and perhaps, most importantly, their own “nation states” but it denied 
that it could be studied – because of a lack of evidence and sources, and denied that it had the 
same decisive importance for the nation. Furthermore, Black people were encouraged to see 
themselves as ethnically distinct from the Whites as well as other Black people5:  
It was, however, [at least, so the textbook writer alleged – Eds.] the Whites, who, in 
Southern Africa over the last century and more, have directed the historical development 
and led to a much clearer imprint of [the African’s] way of life.6 
The official historical discourse during the apartheid era was strongly linked 
to the issue of “nation building”. The South African nation is young if one 
considers the South African Union Act of 1910 as its “birth certificate”. 
                                          
2 See, for example, Grundlingh 1989. 
3 Muller 1969: 190 quoted by Mesthrie 1999: 8. 
4 Kros 1999: 7. 
5 Kros 1999: 7. 
6 Survey of South Africa quoted by Mesthrie 1999: 10. 
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From then on, nation building required an historical discourse which took 
South Africa out of the British Empire as regards “national identity” – and 
set the foundations and principles of the South African society. It was a 
society which was already deeply divided: the rule of a minority – “white” – 
over a majority – ”black” – was already effective. The development of 
Afrikaner nationalism – from the establishment of the Afrikaner republics to 
the victory of the National Party in 1948 and the installation of the apartheid 
system – was considered as the main issue of the time, despite the African 
people’s claims for land and political rights. 
 Historians have paid a lot of attention to Afrikaner nationalism, its roots, 
its rhetoric and its evolution. The more enlightened and critical of these 
historians, for instance Marianne Cornevin, demonstrated the powerful links 
between religion, history and politics in the ideology of Christian 
Nationalism; she described this discourse as a tale of mythicism, falsification 
and mystification.7. 
 South African historians today recall that the South African history 
taught during apartheid times was biased to the point of making many 
pupils and students lose interest:  
For generations history teachers in South Africa classrooms have been forced to trot out 
Afrikaner Nationalist ideology, presented as the story of South Africa’s past. The story is 
familiar to us all – South African history is dominated by 1652 when Jan van Riebeeck 
landed at the Cape to build a refreshment station. It then proceeds inexorably through a litany 
of succeeding Cape governments, slogs through a few frontier wars and reaches a high point 
with that heroic epic – the Great Trek. Thence the story winds gently down through the 
Afrikaner republics, the Anglo-Boer War, Union, Pact, various gevaar [“danger”] elections 
and the inevitable Nationalist victory in 1948. Many pupils abandon the history classroom as 
fast as their legs will carry them at the first available exit point – Standard Seven. History is 
seen as a subject choice for those not gifted enough to do Sciences or Mathematics.8 
 There was no opportunity, no space, for criticism and debate: history was 
“one” unchallengeable tale. Historians who supported apartheid were using 
their authority to impose the idea that there could be no alternative views or 
interpretations of a process, and that their conception of history was the 
relevant one. Any other historical discourse was regarded and presented to 
the students as propaganda and as “anti-scientific.”9 Until the 1970s, the 
political evolution of South Africa since 1948 – i.e. the installation of 
apartheid – was put in the context of the fight against the so-called 
Communist menace:  
                                          
7 Cornevin 1979. 
8 Kros & Greybe 1997: 6. 
9 Mesthrie 1999: 16. 
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Communism poses a threat to every inhabitant of South Africa. Under the pretext of fighting 
for the liberation of all-Africa, it has nothing less in mind than world-domination. (...) In 
1962 the South African police uncovered the Communist inspired Rivonia plot, which was 
geared for total chaos in South Africa. (...) South Africa’s fight against Communism seems 
likely, in the near future, to become a way of life.10 
In the 1980s, this issue disappeared from the syllabus, and students were 
asked questions about the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-
African Congress (PAC), Mohandas Ghandi or Tengo Jabavu, but, in spite 
of that, the orientation of history teaching remained the same. The Afrikaner 
people had brought civilization to this part of the continent and “their” 
history was the history of South Africa. It was a history of heroes, “great 
men (Kruger, Smuts, Hertzog and Verwoerd) with visions for their people”. 
History was the tale of the leader’s sacred quest (like the European medieval 
De Vita Caroli of Eginhard).  
 Uma D. Mesthrie notes that even if political protest could be strong 
among students in the 1970s and 1980s, they did not go to the point of using 
their examination papers as an opportunity to defy the official historical 
discourse. And, surely, the questions asked did not give them a chance to do 
so. However, she reports the remarks of two University of Durban-Westville 
students once daring to express their frustrations with the history curriculum:  
the majority of textbooks see the white man as the hero and always the winner. The black 
man is portrayed as a bad person who has no rights. (...) Do leaders like Shaka, Dingane or 
Moshoeshoe have no interest outside their interaction with whites?11 
and Uma D. Mesthrie adds,  
there was a call for “people’s history – not the perspective of the ruler”. 
 More recently, and regarding the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, 
historians have shown that several aspects of the conflict had been hidden, 
e.g. the “black” concentration camps, in order to victimize the Afrikaner 
community more than any other.12 This victimization was the bedrock of a 
strengthened claim for independence from the British authority. If we look at 
the official calendar, which punctuated the years during the apartheid era, 
we can see that it contained celebrations of battles – mainly, “Boer victories” 
– and religious celebrations. The monuments erected on South African soil 
were also mainly celebrating the glory and/or the martyrdom of the 
Afrikaner people. African heroes or kings were not forgotten but – as was 
mentioned before – were presented as especially evil and bloodthirsty, and 
                                          
10 Quoted by Mesthrie 1999: 10. 
11 Mesthrie 1999: 17. 
12 Kessler 1999. 
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most of all, as losers. 
 Apartheid ideologists and supporters distorted sources, evidence and 
facts, and in doing so, distorted processes of events or collective and 
individual intentions and motivations.  
 A recent study of the period of the 1920s-1930s shows that the Black 
“working class” regarded history as a story written by and for white people. 
Therefore, in reaction to what they considered as lies told by the “Whites”, 
they developed counter-discourses in order to reassert the values of the 
African indigenous historical heritage.13 These counter-histories, which were 
particularly used by trade unionists and political activists in their writings or 
speeches, intended to restore self-esteem and confidence among the people 
oppressed by the segregation. This was not aimed at dividing the African 
people: whatever their “tribe”, they would identify with the figures of late 
heroes like King Dingane or Shaka. They united against discriminatory 
policies and laws. 
 Despite counter histories and discourses, history seems to have been seen 
by people as divided, as the segregated society they were living in. People 
were more sensitive to the history or the story of their own community, tribe 
or group. History was not used to unite people: it was a tool to divide and 
oppose them just as they were divided in the society according to the 
Population Registration Act of 1950. People were sharing a history of 
conflicts, wars and violence and not a history where they found themselves 
united for – or, worse, against someone or something. This state of affairs 
produced a common representation of history seen as a jigsaw puzzle, an 
image that can be illustrated by the Report of the TRC: 
The past, it has been said, is another country. The way its stories are told and the way they are 
heard change as the years go by. The spotlight gyrates, exposing old lies and illuminating 
new truths. As a fuller picture emerges, a new piece of the jigsaw puzzle of our past settles 
into place. (TRC Report, D. Tutu, Foreword, §17) 
According to our own research, historical landmarks and reference points 
tend to fluctuate from one person to the next; and the same fluctuation can 
be observed in the individual case of each and every South African.  
 Despite the number of victims’ frustrations, the TRC has done an 
essential work in restoring knowledge about the apartheid era, especially 
regarding the 1960-94 period.  
 It must also be underlined that the existence of the TRC opened the way 
to critical historical analyses, free from the apartheid ideology as well as 
                                          
13 Ndlovu 1999. 
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other official historical discourses such as that of liberation movements.14 
Long before the end of apartheid, several historical schools of thought 
developed analyses of South African history but were not necessarily in 
agreement. Their divergence was not a problem; such divergence is part and 
parcel of history as an academic discipline. However, divergence became a 
problem a new history curriculum had to be shaped.  
 
 
Does the end of the apartheid era open up the way to the truth in the 
teaching of history? 
 
Here, we point out two different aspects of the practice and the use of 
history. First of all, the problems historians and history teachers experience 
when they seek to break away from the old contents as well as the old 
teaching methods of the history syllabus. 
 Different answers were given to the following question:  
How would we contest a particular version of South African history? Our long experience 
with Afrikaner historiography should have taught us that it is not simply by denying that it is 
“true” and parrying with an alternative version of the “truth”. (…) Laying claim to the “truth” 
is futile and can shut off the possibility of dialogue altogether.15 
The quality of history lies not only in its contents but also in the manner in 
which it is taught. Between 1993 and 1995, a group of teachers, historians 
and publishers participated in a series of conferences on the state of history 
teaching and textbooks in South Africa. In 1994, these delegates drew up a 
manifesto emphasizing the need 
• to be analytical and explanatory 
• to teach skills and contents inseparably 
• to reflect the process of writing history 
• to develop pupil’s power of empathy and moral judgement 
• to seek to reconcile different groups of people with each other 
• to show that “ethnicity, culture and identity have been constructed over time” 
• to locate South African history within regional, continental and world contexts 
• to retain a common national core but allow for regional or school-based flexibility of 
choices (…) to stimulate understanding and interpretation. 
However, many historians and history teachers or lecturers have been 
disappointed by the interim history syllabus. Research led by the History 
Workshop of the University of the Witwatersrand shows the disillusion of 
some “practitioners” of history:  
                                          
14 For example see Ndlovu 1998. 
15 Kros 1998: 15. 
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many teachers are still unhappy with the new curriculum. (...) teachers interviewed in 1995 
(…) express their opinions and outline some of the problems they experience in 
implementing the new syllabus. “I hate it. I still find the history for Standard Threes 
extremely boring.” (…) I feel you must know the truth (…) you cannot simply forgive and 
forget when you do not know what it is you are forgiving and forgetting. One of [the topics in 
the textbook] is headed The Freeburghers – The First Real South Africans – this sort of thing 
really hurts (Kros & Greybe 1997: 1).16 
They were complaining about the persistence of racial stereotypes, 
generalizations and misconceptions. The crucial question remained: 
The old history curriculum and its textbook have been universally condemned for many 
years. Teachers and the education authorities alike have acknowledged that history needs a 
thorough overhaul. This leaves us all with the question: if Afrikaner Nationalist history is 
now discredited, what should replace it? (Kros & Greybe 1997: 7) 
In post-apartheid South Africa, history has to justify its place in a under-resourced, 
pressurized curriculum (…) South African history continues to be experienced as abrasive 
and damaging for most pupils and the big question what history can offer beyond the usual 
bland platitudes, has not been addressed. At the same time we acknowledged that there are 
very difficult questions to be addressed within South African history about identity, national 
reconstruction, reconciliation, as well as those related to pupil’s cognitive growth. (Kros & 
Greybe 1997: 13) 
In other words, the problems with which the architects of the new history 
curriculum were confronted, were the strong political demands. Even today, 
the contents of history are still linked to the fundamental question of nation 
building, which is redefined in the context of a multicultural democratic 
society. South Africa is in search of its national identity, and according to its 
new Constitution, it has now to encompass ethnic, racial, gender and 
religious diversity among the South African people. But, nation building is 
not, and has never been, a natural process; it is a socio-political one.  
 The South African transition has been shaped by the consensus-seeking 
spirit – some called it “compromise” – and the historians of the History Sub-
Commission for a New Curriculum have been put under pressure by this 
consensual ideal. There were disagreements among them. The interim 
syllabus reflects their inability to find a suitable compromise.  
                                          
16 The offence to which the last sentence in this quotation refers, consists in the following: calling 
the freeburghers, i.e. White inhabitants of the Cape during the 17th and 18th century – in so far as 
they were not in the employ of the United East India Company – “the first real South Africans” 
implies a denial of the presence, and of claims to full constitutional and national status, of other 
contemporaneous groups, and of their descendants today; it thus reiterates the very foundations of 
the apartheid ideology. At the back of such a statement is another inveterate Afrikaner fiction 
about South African history: the claim that Black, Niger-Congo (“Bantu”) speaking people (as 
distinct from Khoi-San speakers, generally with somewhat lighter skin colour) arrived at the Cape 
at the same time as Europeans, instead of centuries earlier, and therefore could not lay greater 
claim to the land than the Whites. (Eds.) 
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 Its “successor”, Curriculum 2005, which is now being introduced step by 
step, integrates history and geography into a so-called Learning Area of 
Human and Social Sciences (from Grade 1 to Grade 9). Deciding in favour 
of such integration is important because it will have profound effects upon 
the contents as well as the teaching of history. The integration is worrying 
many historians and history teachers, who see it as a dilution of their 
discipline. Some blamed the African National Congress (ANC) – as the 
political organization in power – responsible for the deceptive contents of 
the interim syllabus. However, we would like to argue here that South Africa 
is in the grasp of a culture and policy of consensus, which need to be 
analyzed further than it has been so far.  
 History – seen as a tale about the past – is not only a scholarly issue. 
Many forms of media – e.g. literature, television, songs, plays, the press, 
museums, which could be called “non-professional” vehicles of the 
historical discipline – provide the people with historical knowledge or 
historical narratives. Some of these media provide narratives based on 
historical events but with a view on entertainment rather than history 
teaching per se. By the same token, they can may favour the symbolic rather 
than the realistic aspects of historical events.  
 Here, we would like to focus on a particular aspect of the “production of 
history” by “non-professionals”. Nation building also requires initiatives 
aiming at historical popularization with an aim of making historical 
knowledge accessible to a large public. However, some risks attach to the 
popularization of history: it can lead to the reproduction of 
misinterpretations, it can create stereotypes and anachronisms. History must 
often be presented in a simple way in order to be understandable; that does 
not mean dissimulating the contradictions and the paradoxes of an epoch. 
“Popularization” does not necessarily mean “simplification”. However, 
those involved in historical popularization sometimes underestimate, and 
even thwart, the capacity of the public to learn, think and analyze. 
 Those in charge of a public authority or power, foremost the government, 
also popularize history and use it in their discourses. We would like to take 
the example of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which played an 
historical role and which has provided a historical narrative.  
 
 
The TRC as a context for the production of history 
 
As the TRC commissioners know full well, the work of the Commission and 
its Report were historic and historical documents. “Historic”, firstly, because 
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of the Commission’s specific and original conditions and frame of reference 
(an emphasis on reconciliation, truth and justice, which differs from the 
European experience of the post-World War II trials at Nuremberg, 
Germany, or from the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for 
example). Secondly, because the Commission appealed to “ordinary” 
citizens to tell their stories as part of the history of the country. Moreover, 
the report is an “historical document” because it has revealed a great deal of 
information about the apartheid era as well as the immediate post-apartheid 
era and the transitional period.  
Inevitably evidence and information about our past will continue to emerge, as indeed they 
must. The report of the Commission will now take its place in the historical landscape of 
which future generations will try to make sense – searching for the clues that lead, endlessly, 
to a truth that will, in the very nature of things, never be fully revealed. (TRC Report, D. 
Tutu, Foreword, §18) 
 However, we would like to argue here that, like any historical tale and 
like any historical document, the Report’s historical point of view – 
especially on the pre-apartheid era – can be criticized. Before presenting 
some of our criticism, it must be emphasized that we see the TRC partly as 
an illustration of the culture of consensus, and, therefore, its historical 
analysis as shaped by the consensus. The latter point is acknowledged 
openly in the Report: 
We believe we have provided enough of the truth about our past for there to be a consensus 
about it. There is a consensus that atrocious things were done on all sides. We know that the 
state used its considerable resources to wage a war against some of its citizens. We know that 
torture and deception and murder and death squads came to be the order of the day. We know 
that the liberation movements were not paragons of virtue and were often responsible for 
egging people on to behave in ways that were uncontrollable. We know that we may, in the 
present crime rate, be reaping the harvest of the campaigns to make the country 
ungovernable. We know that the immorality of apartheid has helped to create the climate 
where moral standards have fallen disastrously.(TRC Report, D. Tutu, Foreword, §70) 
The existence of the Commission and its two and a half years of work have 
directed the South African public’s interest in history mainly towards the 
apartheid era. The reason for this clearly lies in political and social issues. 
Because this period is quite recent, history and politics merged in people’s 
minds. 
 The Report presents the historical context – not process – that led to the 
establishment of the apartheid regime: the history of South Africa is 
presented as a history of conflict, injustice, violence and atrocity:  
Hence the type of atrocities committed during the period falling within the mandate of the 
Commission [1960-94] must be placed in the context of violations committed in the course of:  
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• The importation of slaves to the Cape and the brutal treatment they endured between 
1652 (when the first slaves were imported) and 1834 (when slavery was abolished). 
• The many wars of dispossession and colonial conquest dating from the first war against 
the Khoisan in 1659, through several so-called frontier conflicts as white settlers 
penetrated northwards, to the Bambatha uprising of 1906, the last attempt at armed 
defence by [an] indigenous grouping. 
• The systematic hunting and elimination of indigenous nomadic peoples as such as the 
San and the Khoi-khoi by settler groups, both Boer and British, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
• The Difaquane or Mfecane where thousands died and tens of thousands were displaced 
in a Zulu-inspired process of state formation and dissolution. 
• The South African War of 1899-1902 during which British forces herded Boer women 
and children into concentration camps in which some 20,000 died – a gross human rights 
violation of shocking proportions [here is inserted a footnote: “In his evidence to a 
Commission workshop on reconciliation, Mr. Ron Viney indicated that a similar number 
of black people was exhumed from British concentration camps. (Johannesburg, 18-20 
February 1998.”) ] 
• The genocidal war in the early years of this century directed by the German colonial 
administration in South West Africa at the Herero people, which took them to the brink 
of extinction.17  
The Report tries to give information about the legacy of colonialism and 
segregation; it also seeks to emphasize the need for national reconciliation 
based on a consensus about the past.  
 This summary shows that the Commission takes up several stereotypes 
for example about the Anglo-Boer War. The Report clearly looks at this 
event from a predominantly Afrikaner perspective: the traditional Afrikaner 
belief that they were the principal victims of the war is acknowledged, and 
the mention of the black concentration camps appears merely in footnotes… 
In another part of the Foreword, we can read:  
This is not the same as saying that racism was introduced into South Africa by those who 
brought apartheid into being. Racism came to South Africa in 1652; it has been part of the 
warp and woof of South African society since then. It was not the supporters of apartheid 
who gave this country the 1913 Land Act which ensured that the indigenous people of South 
Africa would effectively become hewers of wood and drawers of water for those with 
superior gun power from overseas. 1948 merely saw the beginning of a refinement and 
intensifying of repression, injustice and exploitation. It was not the upholders of apartheid 
who introduced gross violations of human rights in this land. We would argue that what 
happened when 20,000 women and children died in the concentration camps during the 
Anglo-Boer War is a huge blot on our copy book. Indeed, if the key concept of confession, 
forgiveness and reconciliation are central to the message of this report, it would be wonderful 
if one day some representative of the British/English community said to the Afrikaners, “We 
wronged you grievously. Forgive us.” And it would be wonderful too if someone representing 
                                          
17 TRC Report I, 2: 25-27. This abstract is followed by the mention of events such as the 1913 
repression of strikes, 1920 killings, 1960 Sharpeville, 1976 Soweto uprising; then, Plaatje 1916 is 
quoted. 
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the Afrikaner community responded, “Yes, we forgive you – if you will perhaps let us just 
tell our story, the story of our forebears and the pain that has sat for so long in the pit of our 
stomachs unacknowledged by you.” As we have discovered, the telling has been an important 
part of the process of healing. (D. Tutu, Foreword, §65)  
As our own research brings out, the claim for bringing the “British 
community” to ask for forgiveness is not unanimously shared in South 
Africa. And, we can ask “who are, for instance, the ‘British/English 
community’, and who are their representatives mentioned here?” Are we 
talking about the British Queen? The English-speaking South Africans? 
And, if the answer to those questions is uncertain, who are then their proper 
representatives?… 
 Indeed, the words of the Report can be interpreted as a desire to coax the 
“Afrikaner community” (and who are, in the spirit of the Report, the 
authorized representatives of that particular community?) into accepting, 
officially and massively, the blame for apartheid. And such an effect has to 
be achieved in a consensual way. So, the report expresses sympathy with the 
excessive sense of victimization as developed by Afrikaner nationalist 
historiography, in order to make the Afrikaners agree that apartheid, too, 
was an evil regime. But, once more, who is authorized to speak on behalf of 
the Afrikaner community, and to agree or disagree with the Report on this 
matter? 
 The historian Deborah Posel emphasizes that the historical discourse of 
the TRC report is more descriptive than analytical and explanatory.18 She 
argues that the Report uses mainly a clinical vocabulary – surgery and 
psychology – to speak about the past. It speaks of “wounds” which should 
be “cleansed” by a “balm” – i.e. “the word which is delivering the truth” – in 
order to be “healed”. Because the work of the TRC was dealing with strong 
emotional issues as well as political and social ones, the way the Report 
speaks about the past is mainly emotional, even if it tries to avoid this 
tendency.19 
 Historians cannot use the terms “evil” or “healing the wounds” as they 
are used by the TRC, by a priest or by a politician. It is morally effective, 
and, as such, a similar choice of words was used, in a very different context, 
by the supporters of apartheid, in order to qualify their enemy, Communism, 
and to justify their policy. These categories of vocabulary belong to an 
emotional range, and therefore, it is inadequate for historians to use them. 
What is more, such choice of vocabulary amounts to the trivialization of 
                                          
18 Posel 1999. 
19 For an example, see the part of the Report devoted to a discussion of the different kinds of 
truth. 
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periods, of political regimes and of events such as Nazism or the apartheid 
regime; it paves the way for denial, or for normalization of the reign of the 
arbitrary. Therefore, historians have to be able to keep their sense of 
humanity, humanism (in the terms now current in South Africa: their 
ubuntu) precisely because they are dealing with human experiences, and also 
in order to avoid positions and points of view that are purely emotional. 
 History is also at stake in the TRC Report’s chapter on “Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Policy”,20 which deals with the national duty of remembrance 
and commemoration. History is seen as material for symbolic reparation: 
renaming streets and place, erecting new monuments, organizing public 
official celebrations and a National Day of Remembrance. It has to do with 
the need to “re-map” the South African landscape which was shaped by the 
Afrikaner nationalist historical discourse. 
 The culture of consensus ensures that political goals may be reached 
slowly but not necessarily surely. The time spent on trying to reach 
consensus could also be used to change the goals to be achieved. The 
practice of the political consensus led to the first democratic elections, and 
that was unquestionably a major achievement; but, given the nature of 
history as a critical academic endeavour, consensus cannot be as beneficial 
in history as it is in politics. 
 
 
In history, neither consensus nor claimed truth are accurate 
 
We would like to conclude with the words of historians of the History 
Workshop:  
• We have to get away from essentialism. It is important to acknowledge differences, but also 
to recognize that they are made over time and might be different in different times. Very 
simply, this gives us the power to believe in change. 
• As History teachers we have to get away from the idea of telling the “correct stories” –we 
don’t have to have consensus. 
• We are not to be afraid of uncertainty – uncertainty is liberating. 
• We should think of History as providing a forum for dialogues –understanding that all history 
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MAY I HAVE YOUR FAITH?  




ABSTRACT. The multiplication and expansion of forms of media have indeed created new 
universals and this obviously has far-reaching implications in philosophical terms. This paper 
contends that human rights and economic neo-liberalism are two dominant points of reference in 
the production of truth in the media and politics in the present age. However, it can be argued 





One of the characteristics of our time is that it has become extremely 
difficult to grasp the phenomena which affect our everyday lives. One of the 
reasons for this is the unprecedented scale on which various forms of media 
have made it possible to create and disseminate new universals. This 
phenomenon poses a particular challenge to the thinker: although one is 
confronted with the daunting task of analysing it, it changes so quickly and 
functions on such a large scale that it is nearly impossible to make sense of 
it. Indeed, the constellation in which truth, the media and politics function 
today has fascinating philosophical and social effects. I shall try to analyse 
this constellation in this paper, albeit rather sketchily. In this analysis I grant 
that my argument can only be a local reaction to global processes. It is thus 
not by any means my aim to wax grandiosely about these huge concepts – 
truth, media and politics – as if they were static and transparent entities. I 
must further add to this qualification that an argument like this could 
doubtlessly be enhanced with more thorough empirical examples from the 




Plato’s legacy: Reality preferred above appearance 
 
Ever since the time of Plato the distinction between appearance and reality 
has been a defining characteristic of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and 
politics in the Western philosophical tradition. This is not the place to 
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investigate how this distinction has affected these various fields. But what is 
certain, is that ever since Plato reality has been preferred above appearance. 
Throughout the history of philosophy there were numerous theories on what 
constitutes reality and appearance and on how these two affect one another, 
but the fundamental preference of reality above appearance was never upset. 
Even a critic of Plato as radical as Nietzsche did not upset this dichotomy. In 
fact, Nietzsche’s critique of Plato’s hatred of this world was based on the 
fact that Plato’s world of ideas privileged a world of appearance above the 
real world. Hence Nietzsche was more of a Platonist than Plato himself.  
 As is well-known, Plato’s theory of knowledge lay at the basis of his 
views on ethics and politics. The philosopher as the one who can lay claim 
to the highest form of knowledge in the figure of episteme, is also the one fit 
to live the good life and rule the polis. Episteme as truth is specifically 
demarcated from appearance and allied with reality, albeit that reality in the 
Platonic knowledge scheme is the world of the ideas. Although Plato’s 
world of the ideas has been severely discredited not only through the 
critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, but also by the advances of 
contemporary physics, it can be argued that these various critiques have all 
been in the name of a more realistic world-view. In fact, not only have these 
critiques upheld the Platonic preference for reality above appearance, but 
they have also served to confirm what I would like to articulate as a given of 
being human, namely that we instinctively seek out the truth, even if that 
truth might be local and historical and not necessarily as good as Plato saw 
it. Giving up the pretence to universal truth outside the realm of natural 
science, and inside the realms of ethics and politics, does not imply that 
humans are prepared to give up on the idea of truth as such. Truth remains 
an elusive ideal and a contested terrain. 
 
 
Media and politics as forms of truth-telling 
 
From this perspective some of the developments in media and politics in our 
day and age are very interesting. Both media and politics are in principle 
forms of telling the truth. The media, as the etymology of the word brings 
out, act as the relay between the reader, listener or viewer, on the one hand, 
and the original event, on the other hand. The politician, at least in a 
representative democracy, acts as the relay between, on the one hand, the 
citizens of his constituency, whose interests he must represent, and, on the 
other hand, the centres of state power. The media are judged according to the 
extent to which they reliably testify to the event, whereas the politician is 
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judged according to the extent to which he remains true to his promises as 
well as to his constituency’s interests.  
 But this similarity between media and politics as contexts of truth-telling 
should not mislead us into believing that these two spheres today rest on an 
equal footing. There was a time when the media needed politics, but today 
politics need the media. To paraphrase Régis Debray: a president visiting a 
foreign country in the 1960s might have taken two journalists and thirty 
intellectuals with him, whereas a president visiting a foreign country in the 
1990s probably takes two intellectuals and thirty journalists with him. In 
fact, as I shall try to show, certain changes that came about in the media 
since the 1980s have also had a profound effect on the way that we conduct 
politics. What are these changes in the media? 
 
 
Changes in the media since the 1980s: economic and philosophical 
  
It seems to me that there have been at least two important changes in the 
media since the 1980s, the first one being economic and the second one 
philosophical. As far as economic change is concerned we have witnessed, 
in the developed world, a major shift in the global economy in the past two 
decades away from manufacturing and towards services. In fact, although 
countries like India, Brazil and Russia still hold some of the world’s major 
mineral deposits which would position them better in a global economy 
dominated by manufacturing industries, these countries are nowhere near the 
top of the service-dominated global economic log.1 On the other hand, 
developed economies such as those of the USA, France and Britain have 
maintained their strong position in the global economy through their 
dominance of the service industries. The media are doubtlessly one of the 
dominant service industries. With the advent of cable television and the 
Internet we have seen an unprecedented growth in the profits and power of 
media companies.  
 The second, philosophical change in the media is linked to the first 
economic one, namely that the classic Platonic relation between appearance 
and reality has for the first time been inversed. The reality of the inhabitants 
of traditional societies was formed by what they experienced every day in 
their immediate vicinity, or through what they heard by word of mouth as 
news travelling through the countryside – news emanating from other rural 
communities or from remote cities. Even in the early twentieth century CE 
                                          
1 Ramonet 1999: 1. 
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this was still the case in the USA where folk music served as a medium of 
transmitting news throughout the North American heartland in the 1930s. 
However, the reality of the inhabitants of modern societies is now 
predominantly formed by the media. Whereas the inhabitants of traditional 
societies could still to some extent evaluate the importance and verify the 
truth-content of the news that reached them through traditional media, 
modern societies have to a large extent lost this control over the evaluation 
and verification of news. A woman living in Johannesburg who reads about 
an earthquake in Turkey has no means of verifying what information she has 
about this event other than through what she learns in the media. And 
whereas the priorities of news in traditional societies were largely 
determined by communal interests, communal interests today have to 
compete with profit margins in determining what is deemed to be 
newsworthy. Thus, philosophically speaking, we find ourselves at a 
historically unprecedented point: for the first time, appearance has 
supplanted reality, that is, the world as it appears to us through the media has 
come to circumscribe the world of our everyday reality. The images and 
stories that we are fed through the media are now determining our reality. Of 
course, it would be nonsensical to claim that all media information is of the 
same quality, and part of the resistance against the idea of a totally virtual 
reality does come from the possibilities that more responsible media agents 
offer. But this does not alter the fact that the modern sense of reality is 
determined by appearance; the near and the immediate are no longer 
necessarily determined by what is physically near and immediate, but by 
what is merely near and immediate in an electronic or printed form.  
 
 
The undiminished value of truth 
  
However, this supplanting of reality by appearance should not lead us to 
believe that truth has a lesser value today than what it had in traditional 
societies. On the contrary, if we accept that humans have a certain need for 
hearing and telling the truth, then the modern media are among the most 
ingenious economical schemes ever, earning a profit from this basic human 
need. It is no coincidence that the modern media’s economic muscle is 
similar to that of another major growth industry, one aiming at the basic 
human need of food, namely genetic engineering.  
 Truth, as Jacques Derrida2 showed in an unpublished lecture on the 
                                          
2 Derrida 1998. 
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politics of testimony, circumscribes all communication. Even if you are 
lying to me, you would not be able to do so if I were not believing that you 
were telling me the truth. A lie is an untruth which is presented as a truth. 
Thus even the lie, which is supposed to be the opposite of truth is in a certain 
sense defined as a lack of truth. Truth is the determining condition for the 
lie. Precisely this tension between, on the one hand, the expectation of being 
told the truth, and, on the other hand, the uncertainty of whether we are in 
fact told the truth, has led, in my opinion, to so many devices of verifying 
the truth throughout history. From torture, in which pain is bartered for truth, 
to procedures in court hearings, to the surveillance and confessional 
techniques which Michel Foucault investigated in works like Discipline and 
Punish and The History of Sexuality, humanity has invented a vast array of 
truth-telling and verification devices. The media themselves make use of 
such devices: eye-witness accounts, photographs, politicians’ public 
statements, press releases and statistics, to name some. 
 So far I have avoided speculation on why the truth is such an important 
human need. This is a question which can by itself fill many books; let it 
suffice to say that the truth is one of our most important devices for creating 
security. It is when we do not know what to believe, that we feel insecure. 
But when someone has convinced us of his truthfulness, we reward him with 
our faith in what he says. At the risk of sounding pompous: faith is a 
corollary of truth. Heidegger had good reason to state that the hero is the one 
who can remain in the in-between of postponed meaning. Perhaps this is one 
of the explanations of the growth in the media industry in especially the last 
fifteen years: the end of the Cold War and the rise of the irrational markets, 
whose determining factor is what is so aptly referred to in financial columns 
as “sentiment”, have created huge uncertainty for ordinary citizens all over 
the world. And this global uncertainty has brought growth to the truth 
industry of the media, not to speak of that other great truth-telling industry, 
religion. In this context one might well paraphrase Marx3 and say that the 
articles of faith are the opium of the people. To supply one example from 
contemporary South Africa, one could argue that – without wanting to 
dispute the valuable possibilities of the concept – Thabo Mbeki’s African 
Renaissance has not only served so far to neutralize the Africanist4 
opposition, but also has the potential of calming a population impatient for 
delivery. The truth is a wonderful tool with which chaos and centrifugal 
                                          
3 Marx, K., 1971, “Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie” (1844), in: Marx, K., Die 
Frühschriften: Von 1837 bis zum Manifest der kommunistischen Parti 1848, ed. S. Landshut, 
Stuttgart: Kröner, pp. 207-224. (Eds.) 
4 See footnote p. 7 (Eds.) 
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socio-economic forces can be contained. 
 On a more concrete level, large, and in our time increasingly unstable, 
political units do pose a serious challenge to those that must maintain 
stability. For the state, truth is an important project. The history of the rise of 
the modern media is beyond our present scope; let it suffice to say that the 
rise of the nation-state was intimately connected with the rise of the media. 
Part of the increasing instability of the state is brought about by the markets 
of multi-national companies (including some media corporations) and their 
increased influence. This once more underscores the dependence of 
politicians on the media as a tool for maintaining stability. One problem is of 
course that, as a source of further complexities, the interests of the media 
and the state do not always coincide.  
 
 
The role of power 
  
So far I have left a very important factor out of this examination of truth, 
media and politics, namely the role of power. In contemporary philosophy 
one can hardly refer to power without bringing up Foucault’s name. 
Foucault’s discussion of power has raised many questions and implications. 
However, for the purposes of this paper I want to only make a very limited 
use of two of his least problematic notions of power, namely  
 
• That there is always a certain relation between power and truth, and  
• That power must be understood from its intentionality.  
 
In the light of Foucault’s proposition on the relation between power and 
truth, and if my assumption is correct that the truth has a security effect, then 
that would in itself imply that whoever brings security by telling the truth, 
gains power in the process. As far as Foucault’s proposition on the 
intentionality of power is concerned, I briefly quote him:  
Power relations are both intentional and non-subjective (...). [T]hey are imbued, through and 
through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and 
objectives.5 
If we apply this proposition to the rise of the modern media we can perhaps 
understand that phenomenon better. In the twentieth century, firstly the 
Second World War and secondly the Cold War were important contexts in 
which the media functioned. The old notion of propaganda, of which we 
                                          
5 Foucault 1990: I, 94-95. 
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interestingly have heard so little since the end of the Cold War, was used 
primarily as a way of maintaining political order. The Western media 
themselves as a function of the political regimes which they represented, 
played no small role in mobilizing their own citizens for their good cause, 
and in undermining the communist regimes at the same time. An important 
part of the Western media message in that era was on the values of 
democracy and human rights. In fact, the states which were conceivably 
undemocratic and disrespectful of human rights were regarded through 
Western eyes as the pariahs of the world. There are, however, two important 
points that must be made with regard to this era if we want to understand 
what is taking place in the truth regime of the media in the post-Cold War 
era. The first point is that a so-called democratic upholder of human rights 
like the USA was itself involved in gross human-rights violations during the 
Cold War, notably in Indonesia during the 1960s and Cambodia during the 
1970s.6 The second point is that precisely the discourse of human rights with 
its tendency towards dualistic discrimination between “the victims” and “the 
perpetrators”, the just and the unjust, on the basis of the Western victory in 
the Cold War – once again power and truth interplaying – has been elevated 
to the status of a metaphysical blue-print in contemporary reporting. But 
before I elaborate on this point I would like to fill in a few more details of 
the new power constellation of the post-Cold War era, since that also helps 
to further understand another metaphysical blue-print of contemporary 
reporting: that of the neo-liberal market. 
 I mean that the shift from military hegemony towards economic 
hegemony has greatly added to the superpower status of the USA, which 
today is possibly exercising more global power than any preceding state in 
history. The obvious consequence of this is that what has economically 
worked for the USA is supposed to be of universal value for the rest of the 
globe. Thus we witnessed the Clinton administration pushing hard for 
changes in global commerce through the establishment of economic pacts 
like the North American Free Trade Association with Canada and Mexico, 
as well as the neo-liberal World Trade Organization. Further to that, it has 
increased its stranglehold on older economic institutions such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. And lest we might be tempted to 
think that military and political domination is unimportant for the USA, 
there is always their strength in (and sometimes, when it suits the USA 
                                          
6 On the USA’s support for general Suharto’s repressive Indonesian regime after the political 
instability during 1965-66 in which more than 500 000 people were “summarily executed” see 
Ramonet 1998: 1. On the USA’s support for the bloody Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia 
during 1978, see Chomsky 1999.  
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agenda, their defiance of) the United Nations, as well as their insistence on 
maintaining and enlarging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
which has the advantage of permitting the USA cowboy outings in places 
like Kosovo, former Yugoslavia, under the pretext of re-establishing human 
rights. It is this new power constellation that has provided the modern media 
with its two most important metaphysical categories, namely human rights 
and the neo-liberal market. 
 
 
Human rights and the neo-liberal market as contemporary conditions of 
truth 
  
This brings me to the central part of my argument on truth, the media and 
politics. For this I want to refer briefly to Foucault again. In his professorial 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970, Foucault argued that in a 
discursive field there are at any given time rules at work to determine what 
qualifies as truth and what not:  
[O]ne would only be in the true (...) if one obeyed the rules of some discursive “policy” 
which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke.7 
 Although Foucault in this lecture had the more specific fields of the 
human sciences in mind I think that this basic discursive device for 
producing the truth can be applied with fruitful consequences to what, 
broadly speaking, qualifies as truth in post-Cold War media reporting. Here I 
would like to contend that the modern media’s two most important 
metaphysical categories, namely human rights and the neo-liberal market, 
function as such Foucaultian rules of truth that must be complied with before 
something can be accepted as truth. Before I proceed to cite a few examples 
from the media on how this truth regime functions, I would like to make 
three very brief conceptual points about human rights and economic neo-
liberalism:  
 
1. Since the end of the Cold War the market economy has become the 
determining knowledge paradigm world-wide. This tendency was already 
foreseen by some of the pioneers of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, 
Adorno, Marcuse) more than half a century ago, but in our day and age 
we are witnessing the opening of this deadly flower in all its ruthless 
excess. The charismatization of religion and the commercialization of 
                                          
7 Foucault 1972: 224. 
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education, as if all knowledge was a product and all students consumers, 
are but two examples of the hegemony of this paradigm. 
2. Although the matter cannot be analysed in the context of this paper, it is 
interesting to ask ourselves, to what an extent economic neo-liberalism 
and human rights are seen as necessary counterparts. The fact that these 
two models of thought went so well together in the USA does not mean 
that this should necessarily be the case universally. And if we look at the 
USA itself, it is increasingly becoming clear that an overemphasis on the 
profit motive is beginning to undermine some of the fundamental human 
rights. Here I think of the violation of the right to privacy which is 
increasingly being undermined by companies’ surveillance of their 
employees,8 as well as the violation of the right to life which is being 
undermined by erratic civilian violence,9 not to speak of the poor quality 
of information which the American population is being treated to by their 
media.10 Then there is also the extent of socio-economic devastation that 
had been caused throughout Africa by the application of neo-liberal 
Structural Adjustment Programmes. 
3. There is no doubt that both human rights and neo-liberal economics do 
have value in the right context, but they cannot be universalized in an 
unqualified fashion. In fact, establishing these two entities as sacrosanct 
metaphysical points of reference has the effect that they simply become 
two more exclusivist principles in the long history of metaphysical 
closure, the analysis towards which philosophers like Heidegger and 
Derrida directed so much of their efforts. For example, much can be said 
about the socio-economic effects of the annual human-rights evaluation 
of countries around the world by the USA State Department; a similar 
logic is exhibited through American credit agencies’ (e.g. Moody) annual 
gradation of countries’ investment potential. Such evaluations have 




Human rights and the neo-liberal market as conditions of media truth 
  
This brings me then to four concrete examples of how human rights and the 
neo-liberal market function as metaphysical categories of truth in current 
media reporting:  
                                          
8 Duclos 1999. 
9 Hutto 1999. 
10 Schiller 1999. 
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1. The first example comes from a paper entitled The Irresponsible Citizen 
that Bronwyn Harris11 of the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation gave at a conference on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) at the University of the Witwatersrand in June 1999. 
In her paper, Harris analyzed readers’ Letters to the Editor, as well as the 
original reporting, concerning the TRC in The Citizen, South Africa’s 
second largest newspaper. What she found was a sustained effort at 
trying to prove that the real victims of the TRC hearings were not the 
people who were victimized in various ways during the apartheid 
regime, but white South Africans; allegedly, the latter were being turned 
into victims by the TRC through the fact that they were portrayed as the 
perpetrators. In other words, by trying to construct the TRC as a witch-
hunt against whites, whites were now the actual victims. What we thus 
see is a good example of how the categories of victim and perpetrator 
which are such familiar parts of the human-rights discourse were misused 
to construct a truth according to that newspaper’s reactionary agenda. 
2. A second and perhaps more disturbing example comes from a report 
published by Régis Debray in Le Monde Diplomatique in June 1999.12 
Debray relates certain events that followed on his visit to Yugoslavia and 
Kosovo during the recent war there. The purpose of his visit was 
explicitly to meet members of the Yugoslavian democratic opposition in 
Belgrade as well as to witness the situation in Kosovo on a first-hand 
basis. Following his return to France he published an open letter to 
French president Jacques Chirac on May 13, 1999, in the leading 
newspaper Le Monde, in which he argued that the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo was misguided. Immediately after the publication of this letter a 
huge controversy broke out and, from all sides in the French media, 
Debray was labelled as a sympathizer of Milosevic (the Yugoslavian 
president who instigated the Kosovo crisis) and a misguided intellectual 
romanticizing the situation in Kosovo. The explanation of this 
extraordinary outburst lies in violent disdain for a critical voice that 
questions the dominant consensus on French foreign policy. In this 
specific situation, precisely the re-establishment of human rights was 
used as a flimsy excuse for a war that eventually displaced hundreds of 
thousands of people and severely retarded the democratic cause in the 
Balkans. The Kosovo war is a particularly disturbing example of how 
twisted media reporting has become. The British Prime Minister Tony 
                                          
11 Harris 1999. 
12 Debray 1999. 
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Blair did, for example, take charge of NATO communications during the 
Kosovo war, sending more than twenty diplomats to assist NATO’s 
spokesperson Jamie Shea with the aim of providing, and I quote, “good 
speech” (bonne parole).13 Journalist Robert Fisk of South African 
newspaper The Independent reported the following: during a live 
television broadcast a NATO general admitted the use of impoverished 
uranium cancer-causing ammunition against Serbian soldiers, but this 
statement was edited away in a subsequent broadcast by the American 
news broadcasting network CNN.14 
3. As far as economic neo-liberalism is concerned, media reporting on 
Britain’s decision, in the Spring of 1999, to sell off its gold-reserves is 
also a very telling example. For a good six weeks after the decision was 
made public, the South African media nearly unanimously saw fit not to 
critically comment on this decision. Tony Blair was after all seen as a 
voice of the left and a friend of South Africa. It was only after the June 
1999 elections when the impact of the decision hit home, that further 
thought was paid to the decision. In other words, the political standing of 
a Western leader was more determining in South African media reporting 
than the actual effects that his decision would have on the South African 
economy. On a broader scale, the aftermath of the South-East Asian 
economic collapse during the final months of 1997 was also very 
revealing. Up to then very few critical voices were heard against the 
march of market economics. It was only after billions of dollars were 
withdrawn from that region and fears of a domino effect on Western 
markets started to be felt, that some of the purported free-marketeers 
started calling for the nationalization of Japanese banks. In the case of 
South Africa it is remarkable how little labour-intensive foreign 
investment has been made in the country, despite the fact that we are in 
the process of witnessing the cutting back of the state budget and the 
national budget to the sacrosanct deficit of 3%. Considering the much 
more diverse economic debate that existed in the country before 1994, 
the speed with which nearly all political and media players in South 
Africa have reached a silent consensus on the neo-liberal economic 
model remains one of the most astounding chapters in contemporary 
South African history. 
4. The last example that I want to give of the determining power of human 
rights and economic neo-liberalism’s truth effects is of a somewhat 
                                          
13 Laurent 1999. 
14 Fisk 1999. 
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different nature, namely the somewhat absurd controversy that broke out 
after Mpumalanga15 premier Ndaweni Mahlangu’s infamous statement 
that it is “OK for politicians to lie”. What I find particularly interesting 
about this whole controversy is the dishonesty that went with convicting 
Mahlangu, as if, contrary to what his evaluative statement implied, 
politicians never lie. There are after all numerous indications as to how 
low politicians world-wide have sunk in the 1990s, from the British Tory 
politician who admitted that he did work “economically with the truth”, 
to USA president Bill Clinton’s blatant lies about the Lewinsky affair, to 
politicians in Cyprus who recently defended their involvement in a share 
scandal on the grounds that it might have been unethical but definitely 
not illegal. In the sphere of politics, one has always known that certain 
truths could have far-reaching undesired effect if they were made public, 
and such truths were consequently lied about. I want to argue that the 
controversy that befell Mahlangu was rather due to the fact that he broke 
the unwritten rule of how much honesty is publicly permissible in our 
era. Mahlangu’s honesty about dishonesty threw the cosy relationship 
between politicians and the media, as well as the media’s pretence to 





In conclusion, it seems to me that we have arrived at a point where human 
rights and economic neo-liberalism have become the two dominant points of 
reference in the production of truth in the media and politics. No politician 
who wants to win an election can afford, today, to cast himself against this 
truth regime, nor can any newspaper, radio or television station that wants to 
be profitable go against this tide. In order to diagnose this regime we would 
need to pay close attention to its ecological, social and psychological effects 
on people today, be it that they are already inside the developed world, or 
still trying to get in. We shall have to ask what the values of this truth regime 
are in comparison with previous truth regimes. However – and this seems to 
me the most important point – we shall have to find new strategies for 
mobilizing citizens and protecting the ethical. The current truth regime has 
succeeded in turning the good life into a life-style adventure. Thus, appeals 
to the good life of Platonic ideals would no longer do the trick. Perhaps only 
the realization of the disastrous effects that this regime could have, perhaps 
                                          
15 A province in north-eastern South Africa, formerly known as Eastern Transvaal. (Eds.) 
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only more disruption than what we have already experienced, is our best 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE JUDGE AND THE PEOPLE 




ABSTRACT. Apartheid in both its discursive orientations and its facticity entailed the setting apart 
of people of different races. It also employed a series of mechanisms to regulate and control 
space, the rights of individuals and the scope of their movement. However, after the dismantling 
of apartheid, a policy of restitution came into existence in which land and space came to be 






Crucial recent developments in South Africa have included the advent of 
nation-wide democracy in South Africa, the development of public 
deliberation and the emergence of norms for a rhetorical culture. In the 
immediately preceding period, the South African state regulated, as is well-
known, the usage, function and allocation of space within the “population 
groups” by controlling the verbalization of space.1 The word apartheid is 
itself strictly coded: it denotes the act of literally setting people apart. Space, 
and state rhetoric,2 were indeed codified, in the apartheid era, by the 1950 
Group Areas Act,3 that determined the location of people in accordance with 
their racial classification, following on the Native (Urban Areas) Acts of 
1923 and 1945 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. The Group Areas 
Act codified space in much the same way as the Population Registration Act 
codified “race”. The Group Areas Act provided public deliberation about the 
built environment and human ecology in general with a formidable 
vocabulary. Here is, excerpted, the apartheid rhetoric concerning the non-
communal sharing of civil space:  
1 This chapter is a version, abbreviated and rewritten for the purpose of this volume, of chapter 8, 
sub-section 1 (“Space as Democratic Deliberation”) of my book Salazar 2002. Further material 
and analyses will be found in: Salazar 2000, 2002a, b, 2003, a, b, in press (a), (b); also cf. the 
French-English version of the TRC Report (in press).  
2 By “state rhetoric”, I mean: the argumentation carried by its agents to persuade the white 
minority that the apartheid policy was to its benefit. 
3 Act No. 41 of 1950. Group Areas. 
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Be it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate and House of Assembly of 
the Union of South Africa, as follows: – 1. (Definitions) In this Act, unless the context 
otherwise indicates – (...) (v) “controlled area” means any area which is not a group area or a 
scheduled native area, location, native village, coloured persons settlement, mission station or 
communal reserve (...) (ix) “group” means either the white group, the coloured group or the 
native group (...) and includes (...) any group of persons who have (...) been declared to be a 
group (...) (xv) “marriage” includes a union, recognized as a marriage (whether or not of 
monogamous nature) in native law or custom or under the tenets of the religion of either of 
the parties of the union (...) 2. [restates the racial classification under Act No. 30 of 1950] 3. 
(1) (Establishment of group areas) The Governor-General may, whenever it is deemed 
expedient, by proclamation in the Gazette – (...) (b) declare that (...) the area defined in the 
proclamation shall be an area for ownership by members of the group specified therein (...) 4. 
[Occupation in group areas] (1) As from the date specified (...) no disqualified person shall 
occupy and no person shall allow any disqualified person to occupy any land or premises in 
any group area to which the proclamation relates, except under the authority of a permit (...) 
6. [Governing body for certain group areas] (1) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette, 
establish for any group area (other than an area for the white group), a certain governing body 
to be constituted in accordance with regulation.4 
 For 40 years, deliberations on space were fed by such rhetoric, in this 
case the argued use of rhetorical commonplaces which fixed definitions of 
space, property, the transmission of rights, the rights to sojourn and the right 
to travel; and which set “the white group” apart as a spatial entity, 
autonomous, detached, removed, untouched. The main medium of this 
practice was the law and its operatives, embodied in the “permit”. 
 In democratic South Africa, public rhetoric concerning space has been 
radically displaced. Remarkably little attention has been paid to the 
“rhetorical democracy” that is at work in the debates in and around the Land 
redistribution programme.5 To begin with, the Group Areas Act has found in 
the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 its rhetorical katēgoria (retort 
and accusation):  
Chapter I. (Introductory Provisions) (...) 3. [Claims against nominees] Subject to the 
provisions of this Act a person shall be entitled to claim title in land if such claimant or his, 
her or its antecedent [“its” refers to “community” as a “person”] – (a) was prevented from 
obtaining or retaining title to the claimed land because of a law which would have been 
inconsistent with the prohibition of racial discrimination contained in section 8(2) of the 
Constitution had that subsection been in operation at the relevant time. 
The policy of restitution rights is the response to the policy of Group Areas. 
Restitution of land amounts to remixing spaces and erasing, step by step, the 
                                          
4 Act No. 41 of 1950. Group Areas. 
5 The Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights had received 11,000 claims by March 1997. 
In the 1998/99 Budget, a stated objective was to have expenditure on land redistribution and land 
reform grow from $114 million to $162 million by 2000/1. The national Budget provided for the 
expenditure of $33.5 billion for 1998/99. (Budget Speech, March 11, 1998). Act No. 22 of 1994. 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.  
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discrete cartography of apartheid. The new constitution is fittingly 
combined with a process of restitution. 
 Public deliberation regarding claims for restitution is largely restricted to 
the Land Claims Court as most cases are complex judicial matters that 
involve individuals and communities. Two examples will illustrate this 
closed and complex process of popular deliberation, by which the 
deleterious effect of apartheid upon the human ecology of space is 
somewhat nullified. Space is powerfully argued in a rhetorical tension 
between judicial6 and popular deliberation, whereby the Judiciary (here 
vested with a political mission of redress) and the Sovereign (the people who 
have been previously disenfranchized) are face to face – and try to establish 
the “truth” of claims and counter-claims. 
 
 
The Cato Manor case, Durban, 1996-1997 
 
One exemplary case pertains to an agreement reached between municipal 
agencies and private citizens. The latter had been forcibly removed, in the 
early 1960s, from the well-known African and Indian suburb of Cato Manor 
in Durban, after it had been declared a white area – until it was “de-
proclaimed” a white area and proclaimed an Indian area in 1980.7 The 
judgment offers an excellent insight into how judicial rhetoric and public 
deliberation intersect – albeit in the words of the judge who made the 
agreement an order of the court. 
 The first point is that, of the 511 respondents who opposed the municipal 
agencies’ applying, in terms of the Act, for Cato Manor not to be restored to 
possible claimants (a pre-emptive action), 510 were represented by lawyers; 
the remaining one respondent was declared by the judge to have made “a 
good impression on the Court”. In other words, before the judgment could 
enter into the details of the agreement (and just before the recounting of the 
history of the forced removal), the judge had to establish that the 511 
citizens could, by proxy or directly, show their respect for forms and 
procedures; in other words, that their deliberations were forensically 
credible. This would later impact on the Court granting an order. The judge 
                                          
6 One should say “forensic” to follow normal rhetorical usage, but the adjective is somewhat 
confusing. 
7 Land Claims Court of South Africa, case number 15/96. The agreement made an order of court 
can be retrieved (like all judgments of the Court) from the website maintained by the University 
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, at www.law.wits.ac.za. Quotations are taken from [5] to 
[25]. 
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moved on, after the historical account of the forced removal, to affirm the 
ethos of the respondents, stating that to “return to their roots” is their 
“dream” – contrasting it, in the same section, with  
the establishment [by the municipality] of a virtual city in the area with a complete 
infrastructure.  
The judge proceeded by adding and amplifying details, using both 
quantitative and qualitative commonplaces (“schools, hospitals, libraries”; 
“overseas” funding; “Reconstruction and Development”; “substantial 
employment opportunities”; “significant boost”; “upgrade” of “informal” 
settlements), as if an accumulation of details serves as ethical proof of the 
good faith of the municipal agencies, to the effect that somehow 
counterbalances “the dream”. In other words, the judge summarized two 
equal but contrasted deliberative positions, carefully balancing with his 
choice of words two “virtualities” – that of a lost past (“roots”, “dream”), 
and that of a future filled with the promise of “development” (a “virtual 
city”). The judge then recorded that the parties, having accepted oral 
evidence “to amplify the papers”, heard only two of the three municipal 
witnesses before negotiating the agreement placed before the Court. The 
judge described and recast the act of reaching an agreement as “no mean 
feat”.  
 In sum, public deliberation was validated by judicial evaluation – as a 
rhetorical exercise between two equal parties, of equal strength, with equal 
claims.  
 Yet the remit of the Court is to measure this agreement against legal 
procedures and the Act. Does the settlement meet the requirements of the 
Act? It cannot be merely a “rhetorical” agreement (in the vulgar sense of 
“deceitful”), it must be a “true” argument. It has to speak to the Act. The 
problem becomes one of how to validate public deliberation (in this sense, 
truly rhetorical). The judge has to recast, for the second time, the process of 
public deliberation.  
 This time, he has to step outside the debate between parties to measure 
its outcome against the People’s interest. He has to imagine a hidden debate 
between the parties in agreement and the People. This must take place in 
order to test whether the agreement is a false agreement, that is, an 
agreement that entrenches the status quo instead of addressing the question 
of what happens after a forced removal. It could be that the parties pretended 
to settle in order to share the spoils of the new investments in Cato Manor. 
In that case, the agreement would be not the outcome of democratic public 
deliberation, but a deal; rhetorically, an agreement in words, words that 
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pacify, obfuscate and deviate.  
 The judge therefore has to test whether the agreement is in the “public 
interest”. Public interest is, in short, the rhetorical ethos of the People, which 
the parties must show proofs of having evinced in their negotiations. The 
agreement ought not to be an agreement in words and in form only; it must 
be the result of an imaginary debate between the two parties and their 
symbolic inner self, the People. The judge has a duty to perform this 
imaginary deliberation because, worryingly,  
no argument was placed before the Court on the concept of public interest because the matter 
was settled.  
 The judge then sets about defining “public interest”; this is because the 
Act does not define it, and because the two parties in the case do not argue 
for it. The judge literally has to seek arguments that should have been 
proposed during the negotiations. He thus fails, in a manner of speaking, the 
two parties by not acting in the “public interest”, by eschewing a needed 
elaboration on precisely “public interest”. A test is needed. References are 
sought (“gleaned”) from a dictionary, cases (notably for liquor licences!), 
legal literature, and (at length) two Australian cases concerning aboriginal 
land rights. The judge then summarizes this review by affirming, 
tautologically, that a balance between private and public interest has been 
struck – “public interest” having been never defined as such, but considered 
rather as a result of factors. The inability of judicial rhetoric to extend 
beyond an extensive definition and to reach an intensive one is matched by 
the illogical conclusion that the settlement is in the “public interest”.  
 What we witness is a remarkable failure to flesh out the Act. This is 
simply due to the fact that the judge is seeking guidance from records of 
public deliberation that are mute on this crucial aspect. It is also a sign of the 
fact that public deliberation was sought as a source for interpreting the Act. 
Had the negotiators addressed subsection (6) of section 34 of the Act, the 
judge would not have had to imagine and summon piecemeal interlocutors 
so odd that they could be described as “gleaned”. The judge does not realize 
that in saying,  
against the advantages to the public interest of restoration (...) had to be weighed and 
balanced the advantages to the public interest of the development,  
he has defined neither, but is merely re-iterating the positions of both parties. 
In the end, the test is no test at all, and the weighing of public deliberation 
by judicial review was a fiction that left, in fact, the last word to the public 
deliberators. The judge, literally, rubber stamped the deliberated agreement, 
and validated the truth held by the parties. 
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 This entire case is exemplary of how popular deliberation, when it casts 
itself in terms of negotiations, agreement, balance and “good impressions” in 
Court – in short, when it appears to embody the spirit of democracy and to 
respect legal decorum – can “truly” argue for space and, literally, say what is 
the truth in terms of one case of space ecology. 
 
 
The Kruger Park case 
 
Another exemplary case concerns the claim lodged in 1995 by the Makulele 
Community and the authority controlling the world-famous Kruger National 
Park, and the ensuing judgment.8  
 The Makulele people settled in the area some two 200 years ago, but 
were removed in 1969 and forcibly settled on a farm, while their land was 
mostly incorporated into the Kruger Park. The judge sums up this brief 
history by stating that  
it is common cause that their removal was a result of racially discriminatory legislation and 
practices. 
 Reviewing the claim and reflecting on the deliberative process that had 
been conducted before the Court entered the proceedings, the judge begins 
by setting the spatial conditions within which the claim itself is located. The 
land in question is deemed of importance for “conservation (...) and the 
promotion of biodiversity”, “strategically” (it borders on Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique), “mineral deposits”, and “access” by the “broader public” (as 
it is now in a national park). The argument underlining the importance of 
this specific space runs from Nature to Public, in ascending order. This 
space is “truly” public space throughout. The judge then notes that the 
claimants are asking for a right (ownership) which they did not enjoy prior 
to their removal, and notes the complexity of having eight parties involved 
(six ministries, one provincial government and the Makulele Community). 
This forms the backdrop to the written settlement that was finally entered 
into. Given a complex space, with a complex claim, between a complex of 
parties, agreement was reached with the help of two mediators. The judge 
merely endorses the “truth” of the processes so far engaged by public 
deliberation, noting that they “presumably” followed this route as a result of 
the direction, in the Act, that stipulates that “mediation and negotiation” 
must be attempted. The qualifying adverb “presumably” is already a critique 
(from the domain of judicial rhetoric) addressed to public deliberation.  
                                          
8 Land Claims Court of South Africa, case number 90/98. Quotations from [8] to [12].  
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 What is at stake now is whether, having received the referral, the 
settlement must be made an order of the Court. In the previous case of Cato 
Manor, the judge did not question the validity of the referral, but applied 
legal reasoning to establish whether the settlement was, in substance, 
respectful of the Act. By contrast, in the present case the judge asks, in his 
review, whether a Court order is at all necessary. Two rhetorics of 
agreement are at stake. The judge asserts the Court’s role in careful terms:  
The above represents the background to this matter. What is the Court’s function when a 
matter is referred to it in terms of section 14(3) of the Restitution Act? Section 14 (3) does 
not expressly or by implication oblige the Court to make any agreement referred to it an order 
of court, notwithstanding that the parties may request it to do so. Obviously the Court must 
treat such a request seriously and only refuse it for good reason. The Restitution Act is clearly 
geared to promote the resolution of restitution claims by negotiation, mediation, agreement. 
Where the parties succeed in achieving this, the Court should as far as possible give effect to 
the intention of the parties. 
The basic argument is that there must be good reason for the settlement to 
receive Court validation, as public deliberation is then validated by a 
judiciary (imaginary) debate (as in the Cato Manor case), and the public 
admitted, as it were, to having acted as if in a court room. The Court order – 
the text that contains the judgment, its collocation of sentences and 
paragraphs – then represents the absent “oratory”; the arguments and 
exchanges of which the Court has been deprived by public deliberation 
itself.  
 The judgment is there to restore the dignity of legal rhetoric to the 
deliberative truth reached by the parties; or, as it is stated, to “give effect to 
the intention of parties”. In giving “effect to intentions”, the Court would 
show that it has been persuaded, just as the parties have been, and that, from 
settlement to court order, all rhetorical means (of which the oratory of the 
written judgment is a signal instance) have been exhausted. That the case has 
been – at the level of rhetorical expertise and not only at that of its factual 
contents – a “true” deliberation. 
 The judge then proceeds to make two “enquiries”. The judge “enquires” 
into the validity of public deliberation. Firstly, is the Court persuaded that 
the agreement entitles the claimant to a restitution? With amendments, the 
Court agrees that, on the first ground, public deliberation has been 
forensically correct, inclusive of “public interest” being served. But as 
regards the second “enquiry”, the judge hands down that the agreement itself 
cannot be made an order of the Court. Why?  
 Instead, the Court has prepared, in consultation with the parties, another 
court order. This new court order avoids legal confusion that may arise in 
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the future. Yet, rhetorically, it can also be read as the only manner in which 
the judge could assert the primacy of legal oratory and, fictitiously, 
reintroduce the parties into the courtroom and make them argue their case 





The Land Claims Court judgments may indeed be read, with regard to 
establishing the truth of land restitution claims, as deliberative sites for 
conflict, tension and resolution between two sorts of persuasion: public 
deliberation and judicial review, the latter positing itself as fulfilling the 
unfulfilled, ill-formed, misshapen words and thoughts of the former. They 
also signal that the Judiciary, when it probes into the People as a deliberative 
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CHAPTER 13 





ABSTRACT. This paper attempts to unravel the consistencies and inconsistencies in the Congolese 
public’s conceptions of truth in politics. In pursuing this approach, the author also employs his 
personal experiences as a major player in the national conference of Congo in order to reveal the 






Since 1989 and in particular since the fall of the Berlin wall and the 
acceleration of the social movements on the African continent, sub-Saharan 
African societies have been undergoing political and religious reconstitution 
linked to situations of crisis. One-party political systems crumbled during 
the national conferences which were then seen as a panacea for the socio-
political crisis. Most of these national conferences, led by men of the cloth 
and in particular the Catholic Church, were based on a political register 
(including the public denunciation of former leaders who failed), as well as a 
religious register (including the public acceptance of their faults and their 
being forgiven), and aimed for a regime based on political truth. The 
Sovereign National Conference of Congo (Brazzaville)1 occurred after its 
counterpart in Benin (1990), and lasted five months. 
 The aims of this paper are: 
 
• on the one hand, to understand the points of agreement and disagreement 
in the public statement of truth in politics,  
• and, on the other hand, to point out the difficulties related to the 
invention of pluralist democracy within a political sphere as heavy as that 
of Congo-Brazzaville; here my argument will be based on my own 
experience as a member of society and as a key player2 in the national 
conference of Congo. 
1 After a few decades of being in use, Mobutu’s designation “Zaïre” (for Congo-Brazzaville’s 
eastern neighbour state) was reverted to “Democratic Republic of Congo”; however, in the 
present paper, “Congolese” will exclusively refer to Congo-Brazzaville. (Eds.) 
2 I myself acted as adviser to the Conference as delegate of the Congo Society of Philosophy.  
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The Sovereign National Conference and the rites of politically-related 
institutions 
 
To speak about politics in today’s Congolese society presupposes that there 
are epistemological, historical and cultural implications on which that 
society is based. The epistemological basis resides in the apprehension of 
Congolese society marked, firstly, by the endogenous evolution process 
being blocked and, secondly, by colonial over-taxation. With the cultural 
basis appears the double relation of interiority and exteriority, characterized 
by the combination of two different cultures, i.e. Congolese post-colonial 
and European. The many consequences resulting from the clash and 
confrontation of the different social and cultural forces allow us to measure 
the restricting effects of colonial over-taxation and the effects of the 
demands brought about by the newly created situation, i.e. the situation of 
the Congolese production of political modernity. 3 
 Whether we refer to the political, economic, social or cultural domain, 
the existence of a hybrid area of material and spiritual activities results in a 
situation where a social endogenous logic is permanently present within 
Congolese production of political modernity. This endogenous logic is based 
on the primacy of the group and of kinship relations over the individual. But 
equally there to stay is an exogenous social logic characterized by the 
primacy of the individual over the group. The organization of material and 
spiritual activities, which is often a difficult and tumultuous process, in most 
cases involves considerable oscillation in the positions that political subjects 
take vis-à-vis these two logics, as brought out in their behaviour and 
mentality. With the disorganization of identity-related markers, the renewal 
of social and symbolic representations entails making selections from 
foreign cultural elements and from ancient Congolese cultures. Management 
of politics and democracy cannot therefore avoid the many consequences of 
the combination resulting from the uninterrupted process of endogenous 
production of political modernity in Congo. 
 The National Conference of Congo was organized in favour of mass 
movements by the then President of the Republic, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, on 
the 25th of February 1991. It took place at the convention centre of 
Brazzaville, with 1100 delegates representing political parties, workers’ 
unions, civil organizations (i.e. development NGOs, scientific associations 
and learned societies), as well as the various religious denominations, 
representatives of the state, and political and administrative personalities. 
                                          
3 Eboussi-Boulaga 1993. 
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 The desire to break away from the former system had informed the role 
played by intellectuals, syndicates, the army, Youth and Women’s 
Movements, as well as churches and religious sects. Thus, the means to 
apply political legitimacy, with a view to installing a democratic state, were 
validated through a general national Congolese convention. 
 The first visible signs of the political quest for meaning were, on the one 
hand, the affirmation of individual and collective expression and of the 
respect for discussion ethics, and, on the other hand, the elaboration of 
procedures of political truth under the chairmanship of a man of the church, 
Mgr. Ernest Kombo, in charge of the Charismatic revival movement and 
member of the Catholic Church. The quest for political truth required 
locutors not only to display logically coherent thought in accordance with 
the principles of reasoning, but also, where the substance of their verbal 
contribution was concerned, to remain in touch with unfolding past events 
which were actualized for the circumstances. 
 To prepare the ground for the unfolding of the political subjects’ 
discourse and that of civil societies, and to guaranty their immunity while 
speaking publicly to tell the truth, the first part of the national conference 
was devoted to internal regulations, proclaiming the sovereign character of 
the conference. The reports which were simultaneously given on the radio 
and television, were to include the assessments of the various delegations 
concerning the political, economic, social and cultural situation of ill-gotten 
assets, embezzlement and political assassinations. 
 During the subsequent sessions of the various commissions set up, 
including those on ill-gotten assets and political assassinations, the speakers, 
under oath, were to tell the truth. Most of the members of the various 
commissions were young intellectuals (lawyers, civil servants and 
academics). Already during the first days of the commission, Mgr. Kombo, 
who was elected unanimously as chairman, sought to channel the violence of 
political denunciation into a pacifying space, by putting before the 
Convention the following triptych: 
 
• Denunciation 
• Recognition of one’s faults 
• Asking for, and accepting, collective forgiveness.  
 
All this took place while a variety of rituals were performed, rituals which 
came from ancient Congolese as well as Christian culture. It was on the 
seventh Sunday of the beginning of the national convention that, through the 
radio and television, Mgr. Kombo called on the whole of Congo to clean 
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cemeteries and make offerings to the dead. A second event was then to take 
place when the 1100 participants were to plant a tree bearing the name of the 
commission, in a public area baptized “Garden of National Unity” for the 
occasion. By symbolically including the dead in the process of national 
reconstruction, Mgr. Kombo wanted to prepare the people to accept, before 
“invisible but present witnesses”, the statements on political truth which 
were to be made during the following weeks, including those on political 
crimes committed by former Presidents of the Republic Marien Ngouabi and 
Alphonse Massambat-Débat, as well as those of Cardinal Emile Biayenda. 
The tree could then symbolize resurrection through religion as well as return 
to life by the renewal of political institutions and individuals who were to be 
elected subsequently to ensure new governmental responsibilities. Finally, 
the third major ritual event was to unfold during the Sovereign National 
Convention’s closing ceremony, with the rite of washing one’s hands in a 
fountain. All the participants were asked to perform this act including the 
President of the Republic, Denis Sassou Nguesso, who remained in power 
during the time of the Commission. The hand-washing fountain took place 
inside the convention centre itself. The rite was supposed to mark national 
reconciliation after five months of political discussions which had become 
violent at times. 
 The Sovereign National Conference had been, from the start, a moment 
of high hopes for the Congolese population, a place in which to introduce 
the basics of pluralist democracy and the founding of a constitutional state. 
To the advantage of the people, lessons were to be drawn from the 
experience of the political, economic, social and cultural management of the 
one-party system; and it was time to democratically examine and redefine 
collective and individual responsibilities so as to eliminate all forms of 
exclusion and political violence from the new political order which was to 
be installed during the transitional period. The Convention was about 
rewriting symbolically a new social world that included all concepts, such as 
people’s sovereignty, the constitutional state, and respect for human dignity 
(beyond the visible material aspects of politics, economics and culture). The 
Sovereign National Convention undertook to fix this symbolic rewriting in 
the collective memory, by adopting a Fundamental Act. The Preamble of 
this Act, used subsequently in the Constitution which was enacted on the 
15th of March 1992 by popular referendum, stipulated the following:  
Dignity, freedom, peace, prosperity and love of the country were, under the one-party state in 
particular, hindered or held up by totalitarianism, confusion of the authorities, nepotism, 
tribalism, regionalism, social inequalities and the violation of fundamental rights. The coup 
d’état, justified in Congolese history as the only way to regain power, has destroyed all 
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democratic life. Intolerance and political violence, violation of individual and collective 
rights, the summary execution of real or assumed political opponents, the cowardly 
assassination of peaceful citizens for political ends have plunged the country deeply into 
mourning, have maintained and increased hate and division between the various ethnic 
communities making up the Congolese Nation. 
       Consequently, the Congolese people:  
• proclaim its firm desire to build a constitutional State and a united and brotherly 
Nation; 
• solemnly proclaims to rightfully disobey civil duties and to resist any individual or 
group of individuals who seize or exercise power after a coup d’état or after any 
other form of violent act; 
• reaffirm its attachment to the principles of pluralist democracy, to the rights as 
defined by the United Nations Charter of Human Rights of 1948, the African 
Charter of Human and People’s Rights adopted in 1981 by the Organisation for 
African Unity and the Charter of Rights and Freedom adopted in 1991 by the 
Sovereign National Conference. 
The Sovereign National Conference: Stating a principle of truth in politics 
by means of political denunciation 
 
The process used for the democratization of political life occurred in such a 
way that analysing it has become a delicate matter today. Indeed, it was 
based on a difficult balance between, on the one hand, the desire for a clean 
break (marked by the sustained denunciation of former state authorities, 
condemnation of summary executions, and acceptance of one’s faults), and, 
on the other hand, the former ruling class asking for forgiveness (followed 
by the unsuccessful end of the national conference). With the process of 
pacification of society and the political sphere, in the face of the crises of 
confidence and legitimacy of the former ruling class, the consensual search 
for trust, to maintain a public space for discussion, was effected through a 
third party: a man of the cloth. By adopting political ritualization with a 
reasoning based on denunciation, forgiveness and consensus in order to 
obtain political truth, the Sovereign National Convention was not able to 
achieve completely its ambitious collective goals. One reason for this has to 
do with political leaders’ concepts of power and of the state. Being in the hot 
seat and having to articulate publicly a political truth that would disqualify 
them, appeared to them as the end of their political career in Congo. 
 By going, point by point, through the locutors’ discourse, one is struck 
by the strong utilization of politics. First of all, one must understand politics 
on the basis of its double metaphysical dimension:  
 
• as a given of human nature, and 
• as the art of managing the city according to principles of equity and 
justice.  
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Then, beyond pure political theory, one must also understand politics in 
terms of a domain of action, in the sense of Max Weber, i.e. as a rational 
activity oriented towards a practical purpose. And because it calls for 
appreciation or discredit, and therefore assessment, the political act, as 
public action, refers, not only to meaning (thus revealing the particular 
dimension of human existence), but also and especially to the exercise of 
such power as is supposed to produce a new meaning having direct 
consequences for citizens’ daily lives. Because of this, the act that consists 
in speaking at the Sovereign National Convention (seen as a space for public 
debate or palaver), in order to admit one’s faults, was paradoxical in so far 
as conflict, denunciation, pluralism and consensus were coexisting.  
 Patrice Yengo, who had definite ideas on these matters, was of the 
opinion that  
the end of a one-party system does not automatically result in democracy. In Congo, it gave 
rise to the partisans of the former dictatorship, who had spread out to various regional 
political parties, to recreate the dictatorship by regenerating the ideological basis of the ruling 
class; the latter having always ignored the principle of contradiction.4 
 One of the first tasks which the Sovereign National Conference imposed 
on the Congolese population was to progressively rid themselves of the 
totalitarian image which had taken over public, cultural and scientific life, as 
well as the private lives of individuals. Indeed, individuals had lost heart for 
personal effort, moral, political and economic transparency, as well as for 
intellectual and cultural creativity.  
 But the Sovereign National Convention has also been a place of violent 
expression, where violent words condemned armed violence. In Paulin 
Hountondji’s opinion, speech, which is part of parliamentary culture, needs 
to be found not only within African cultures, i.e. palaver culture, but also 
within the French parliamentary culture of 1789, where speech was radical, 
exigent and rebellious. After recalling the Beninese experience of the 
“National Convention of Forces vives” for its exemplary merit and its true 
impact on the contemporary history of the sub-Saharan African region, 
Hountondji concludes that a conference is one way to conquer democracy 
among many others.  
While the convention was a celebration of reason, it was also a celebration of true politics, 
where language prevailed, and where pluralist democracy was suddenly rediscovered.  
But according to Hountondji,  
what is essential is precisely the conquest itself and the fact that it unfolds and becomes 
                                          
4 Yengo 1994: 9. 
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generalized in front of our own eyes. For, we undoubtedly live at the end of the 20th century 
in what is a great era, marked by a global process of democratization whose importance we 
are only beginning to understand. In the East as in the South, dictatorships are crumbling, and 
together we rediscover, with regained joy and fraternal feelings, the great principles of 
freedom and equality (...). Thus true politics was regained, a politics to be understood as a 
celebration of reason, as the happy rediscovery of great principles, as a forceful return of 
ethical exigency leading to the final condemnation of the continuous violations of human 
rights which form the basis of dictatorships. It is also to be understood as the emergence of 
morality into a domain that pretended to ignore it until then: the domain of human 
management (...). Morality is claiming its legitimacy, freeing the power of thouhgt that had 
been humiliated, that no longer dared making itself heard and that had become content to 
mutter in the loneliness of the individual conscience and the isolation of confessionals (...). 
Reason, which was choked by the sound of weapons and the ideological drone of the 
dominant thought, is finally and again going to express high and loud its reprobation and, in 
the name of a few standards and universal rules, going to say no.5 
 During our philosophical discussions which took place during an 
international conference organized by UNESCO, in Yamoussoukro, Ivory 
Coast, on Philosophy and Democracy in Africa (March 1999), Paulin 
Hountondji was less categorical about the general impact of his first 
proposal, and he invited participants to question the reasons justifying the 
return of contested, former political leaders on the political scene during 
democratic elections – elections that in themselves were sometimes 
questionable, as was the case with the first post-national conference 
elections of 1992 in Congo-Brazzaville. 
 The search for truth in politics over a period of thirty years came up 
against the refusal of political players to tell the truth about their own 
politics, despite the political and religious rituals engaged in. Indeed, neither 
truth nor the pacification of the political space were reached by the mere act 
of the “raising of the moral standards” of Congolese political life, by the 
rituals of collective cleansing, by the cleaning of cemeteries and by having 
1,100 persons plant a peace tree in the newly established “Garden of 
National Unity”. Access to political truth became a game of permutation, 
submitted to the complex combinatorial analysis of norms: those issued from 
ancient Congolese community-based cultures and those inherited from 
individual and contractual modern Congolese and European cultures. As 
soon as these norms made it possible to access truth in politics by seceding 
from democracy-related conflicts, they excluded democratic undertakings in 
the sense that certain events, and the most crucial events at that, once more 
were allowed to pass as indescribable and as “politically sacred”. 
 Yet, in political democracy one needs to invoke the social logic of the 
exercise of power. Political democracy implies the judicial equality of all 
                                          
5 Hountondji 1991: 5-7.  
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citizens in the eyes of the law. The ideology of representation consists in 
establishing rightful equality, and making such equality to be respected, 
despite the given of natural, physical inequalities; and such equality, and the 
respect it receives, depends on the pluralist and harmonious management of 
existing differences and identities that, each individually, bear on the 
representational or imaginary form of social homogeneity. 
 The Congolese nation-state has inherited two reference systems from two 
logics that are contradictory, both in their production and distribution 
systems, and in their socio-cultural framework of membership. As it 
happened, socio-economic and pre-capitalist practices based on family units, 
were combined with those governed by a capitalist form of production. As a 
result, in the state, individuals identified themselves in two ways: sometimes 
by claiming membership of a social class based on their position within the 
production process; and sometimes by referring to ethnic identity. Based on 
this, and largely dependent upon people’s political aspirations and 
involvements, differential importance was attached to different organisatory 
principles within of the structure, such as ethnic affirmation, class 
consciousness and religious belonging. In most cases, if individuals in power 
or in search of political power were using ethnicity for their own political 
ends, one could understand the purpose of their practice more easily by 
taking into account their ideologies of representational power and those of 
ethnic, religious and identity-related forms of reference. In actual fact, the 
Congolese nation-state is the inevitable result of an endogenous and an 
exogenous legacy:  
 
• on the one hand, the logic used for running and managing the political 
power of pre-colonial politically minded Congolese communities, 
characterized by the interpenetration of temporal, spiritual and religious 
power, and governed by the notion that ultimately, power is not a human 
attribute but a prerogative of God;  
• and on the other hand, a legacy based on the fact that this contemporary 
nation-state is the result of the logic used for running and managing the 
colonial power that was based on the institutional separation of politics 
and religion, as well as that of public and private spheres, among others.  
 
However, in this light, the democratic process obeys as much to the internal 
subjective causes of the dynamics of the social movements of each country, 
as to the external objective causes that result from the global democratic 
rush which has been intensified by the media. 
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Violence and the citizenship crisis 
 
After the Sovereign National Convention, the main reason for the 
exacerbation of conflicts between the various Congolese political players, 
from 1993 onwards, can be understood through each player’s conception of 
political power. Being a context for the accumulation of personal wealth, as 
well as for clientelist distribution of material and financial resources, the 
state became a stake between political groups which were fighting for 
exclusive control over it along the lines of ethno-regional rivalries. Yet, the 
two main political forces of the transition period (June 1991 to August 1992) 
already had in them the seeds of political violence, with Brazzaville as the 
main centre of activities. In April 1992, when both political parties won the 
municipal and legislative elections, they decided to give more importance to 
territorial as well as ethnic anchorage. In August 1992, the presidential 
elections were won by Pascal Lissouba, who was supported by Denis 
Sassou-Nguesso and his party (Parti Congolais du Travail, PCT). However, 
after signing the electoral and government agreement with the Union pour le 
développement et progrès social (UPADS) on 11th August 1992, the PCT 
denounced the agreement as it felt betrayed by UPADS; the latter had 
reserved, in Prime Minister Stéphane Bongho-Nouarra’s government, only 
three ministerial posts for the PCT out of 27. Without delay, on 30 
September 1992, the PCT then signed an agreement with Union pour le 
Renouveau Démocratique (URD) which included all the parties of the new 
opposition within the National Assembly, thus creating a change of majority. 
On 31st October 1992, a vote of no confidence was passed against the 
Bongho-Nouarra Government and the new majority asked for the resignation 
of the Prime Minister, as per the Constitution.  
 Since then, Congo-Brazzaville has entered a long period of instability as 
well as political and military crises. In January 1998, after Sassou-Nguesso’s 
military victory, the country held a forum on National Reconciliation, Unity 
and Democracy, which did not bring back the peace for which citizens had 
hoped so much. The South African experience of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is a source of inspiration for some of the 
Congolese political key players as well as those of civil societies. 
 Finally, while the complexity of the social and political fight for pluralist 
democracy in Congo should not be seen in a pessimist light, one must 
acknowledge the difficulties attending the realization of such a goal in the 
near future. As a result, one is left with two impressions:  
 
• firstly, the Congolese nation-state in search of democratic legitimacy 
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remains powerless, in the face of the decline of Congolese institutions 
and political life, while political wars occur time and again (1993 to 
1997, 1998 and 1999), and in the face of the implacable logic of 
international trade which imposes a negative sanction on all non-
conformist national politics ;  
• secondly, international trade (seen as an illegitimate co-sovereign), could 
end up as a complete substitute for people’s sovereignty. 
 
 Despite the war situation which is still perceptible today, and despite the 
failed attempts for “political negotiations” between the protagonists, I think 
it is important to postulate the creation of a pluralist democracy for Congo in 
the immediate future. Such a democracy should then have the following 
characteristics:  
 
• a plurality of political parties, professional and scientific associations, 
and development NGOs; 
• freedom of opinion, associations and movements; 
• the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers; 
• free elections at regular intervals, thus allowing citizens from towns, 
municipalities and regions to take collective decisions; 
• the acceptance of the alternation principle in government; 
• the spreading of a culture of democracy by fighting ethnocentrism when 
promoting regional cultural diversity, and by decentralizing the means for 
cultural action; 
• the spreading, among citizens, of a culture of democracy that is a culture 
of peace  
• the latter being founded on universal values of the respect of life, justice, 
freedom, tolerance, solidarity, human rights and equality between 
genders.  
 
This culture of democracy must truly be one of peace. Such peace has to 
spring from the fact that the behaviour of social and political key players’ is 
based respect for others, for the cultural identity of other, for the spirit of 
equity and solidarity when distributing wealth, and for the promotion of 
environmental quality for all by using science and technology rationally and 
efficiently, in the name of peace and democracy. In this way, a democracy 
based on co-operation will complement a democracy based on peaceful 
confrontation. The peaceful confrontation of ideas, and co-operation in 
solving fundamental societal problems, will be the two main ingredients out 
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NEGOTIATING CULTURAL IDENTITIES IN PUBLIC DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 
 
Mary Jane Collier & Darrin Hicks 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper is an attempt to reconcile the gap between our practical and theoretical 
knowledge. The authors begin by briefly describing and critiquing the traditional conceptualiza-
tions of democratic disagreement: conflicts of interest and conflicts of principle. They then 
propose that the dilemmas in democratic practice engendered by intercultural contact necessitate 
a new conceptualization of democratic disagreement that can account for discursive plurality. 
This account of democratic disagreement – which the authors term “conflicts over political 
speech” – demands that we turn our attention towards exploring how cultural identities are 
enacted and negotiated through plural discursive systems. The authors conclude by discussing 
the implications of these assumptions, as well as interrogating our own received presuppositions 
about the interface between cultural identity and political participation, for constructing a 
transformative model of public democratic dialogue. 
 
 
When members of different groups come together as a political community 
to solve a pressing social problem or to resolve a divisive conflict, they, 
more often than not, begin (and, too often, end) their democratic dialogues 
with the questions about what is “true”. Factual accuracy, while important, is 
simply an insufficient basis for public deliberation. Democratic commun-
ities, in particular those constituted by a diverse citizenry, face social 
problems that are simply too complex to be solved through factual inquiry 
alone. The problems, though keenly felt, are dynamic; to even begin 
engaging them mandates the creation of social learning processes.  
 Moreover, the conflicts that divide citizens are rarely conflicts over what 
is true – they are often multifaceted disputes over what is just. 
Interpretations of what is just are always conditioned by the traditions and 
social practices that constitute conceptions of the good, and these 
conceptions of the good are in turn mediated through our cultural identities. 
Therefore it stands that group members will legitimately disagree over what 
is just and that this disagreement will not be resolved through some ideal of 
universal reason or rational choice. Rather, justice, if it is to be redeemed as 
a standard that could reconcile division, will have to be understood as a 
problem of coordinating communicative action in a pluralist society.  
 In this paper we contend that inquiry about public dialogue and 
deliberation is strengthened when we recognize the current socio-cultural 
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global environment. Here technological and economic advances as well as 
changing political landscapes have made access to and contact between 
different cultural groups and multiple discursive systems the rule rather than 
the exception. As a result political discourse is marked by diversity in 
interests, principles, and in ideas about appropriate conduct and procedures. 
If scholars of and participants in public deliberation recognize that the 
interaction is inherently a process characterized by negotiating, promoting, 
and challenging group identities, they will know that such communicative 
processes involve a plurality of discursive systems and preferences. 
Unfortunately, our practical knowledge of discursive plurality – the fact that 
the forms and functions of political discourse are as plural as the conceptions 
of the good it is called on to reconcile – has yet to adequately inform the 
extant theoretical models of democratic disagreement and conflict 
resolution.  
 This paper is an attempt to reconcile this gap between our practical and 
theoretical knowledge. We begin by briefly describing and critiquing the 
traditional conceptualizations of democratic disagreement: conflicts of 
interest and conflicts of principle. We then propose that the dilemmas in 
democratic practice engendered by intercultural contact necessitate a new 
conceptualization of democratic disagreement that can account for 
discursive plurality. This account of democratic disagreement – which we 
term conflicts over political speech – demands that we turn our attention 
towards exploring how cultural identities are enacted and negotiated through 
plural discursive systems. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
these assumptions, as well as interrogating our own received presuppositions 
about the interface between cultural identity and political participation, for 
constructing a transformative model of public democratic dialogue. 
 
 
Models of democratic disagreemen (a) and (b): Conflicts of interest and 
conflicts of principle.  
 
Traditionally, political and social theorists have conceptualized democracy 
and political disagreement, in particular, from within an interest-based 
model of politics. Interest-based models understand democracy as a process 
where individuals express their preferences, compete with others so that 
their preferences will influence the formation of public policy, and register 
those preferences in a vote (Young 1996).  
 Two basic assumptions that differentiate interest-based models of 
democracy from their republican and deliberative counterparts are a 
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commitment to methodological individualism and the definition of 
successful democratic decision-making as the result of the competition 
between coalitions for self-interested votes. Interest-based models posit that 
individuals form their interests without regard to others’ needs. The rational 
political actor justifies her or his conduct by weighing the costs and benefits 
of risk and precaution in terms of “willingness to pay” and considers others 
needs, preferences and desires only when they stand to further or lessen her 
or his own. In democratic decision-making, then, individuals and interest 
groups formulate and vote for policies that will best further their own private 
interests, fully expecting that all others will do the same. Interest-based 
models conceive of politics as a contest among power seekers. Political 
power is achieved through influencing the formation of individual 
preferences and having the ability to marshal those preferences into the 
service of one’s own interests.  
 Given that the presence of a plurality of individuals and groups with 
competing interests, desires, and needs is an interminable aspect of 
democratic polities, conflict between political actors is seen as a natural and 
even necessary aspect of politics. When there is a moderate scarcity of 
desirable social goods, political actors have to compete for resource 
allocation. Moreover, when one individual’s or group’s actions restrict or 
negatively impact another individual’s or group’s actions, those parties will 
engage each other in a contest to see whose will shall prevail. Democratic 
institutions transform these contests into legal battles over the allocation of 
rights and responsibilities. These rights and responsibilities, within an 
interest-based conception, are reduced to the status of resources to be 
allocated amongst the parties. This competition for rights and resources and 
the ensuing conflicts that it engenders constitutes what is commonly 
described as a “conflict of interest”.  
 In conflicts of interest, parties contest the outcome of administrative 
decisions, and, hence the application of a set of principles for allocating 
resources. Yet, what is, for our purposes, the distinguishing feature of 
conflicts of interest, is that the parties typically respect the authority of the 
decision-making body, the procedures used to determine allocation, and the 
principles used to justify social policy. That is, while these conflicts can 
become extremely protracted, the parties do not challenge the authority of 
the decision-making body to adjudicate the dispute. There is also a general 
agreement about the procedures used to settle these disputes. The standards 
of evidence as well as the types of reasons that can be advanced are 
respected. In short, in conflicts of interest both the principles for determining 
resource allocation and for regulating the communicative actions of those 
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parties competing for advantage, are affirmed.  
 Examples of conflicts of interest abound. Many disputes over property 
rights, resource allocation, the burdens of paying for public utilities, and the 
distribution of risk can be understood as conflicts of interest (although, as we 
will argue, these conflicts have moral and communicative dimensions that 
are often rendered invisible because they are too defined as conflicts of 
interest).  
Framing political disagreement in terms of conflicts of interest also shapes 
the models of dispute resolution that we invent and favour. When political 
disagreement is understood as the competition for personal advantage, the 
favoured methods of dispute resolution will be negotiation and strategic 
bargaining. If political disagreement is understood as primarily arising from 
the problems of resource scarcity, and thus, resolved by fair and efficient 
resource allocation, negotiated rule making and arbitration will serve as the 
dominant methods of conflict management.  
 What marks each of these models of political disagreement as conflicts 
of interest, is that their success relies upon a strong, centralized and 
undisputed decision-making agent and an authoritative set of rules of 
communicative engagement. However, as we will argue, the authority of 
extant decision-making agents and rules of communicative engagement have 
themselves increasingly become the source of political disagreement, 
particularly in cases of cultural politics. In such cases, which we call 
conflicts of principle and conflicts of political speech respectively, not only 
do interest-based models of dispute resolution fail to adequately address the 
heart of the political conflict, their application may in fact work to intensify 
the conflict, as well.  
 However pervasive conflicts of interests are in contemporary societies, 
the new forms of political struggle accompanying the introduction of 
democratic norms and practices into the workplace, the family, and sexual 
relations over the last thirty years demonstrate that an interest-based model 
of political conflict fails to account for the most interesting and increasingly 
important forms of democratic disagreement. Many political disagreements 
now seem to be rooted in much “deeper” differences than conflicts of 
interest. As the cultural and religious diversity of the citizenry grows, 
through both migration and enfranchisement, the diversity of collective 
aims, moral outlooks, received knowledges, and worldviews grows. It is no 
longer reasonable to assume that a shared moral and political framework 
exists to guide public deliberation and debate. As the new social movements 
have demonstrated, the political vocabularies used to frame issues and 
propose solutions as well as the legitimacy of extant procedures for 
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resolving political conflicts, are often the source, rather than the cure, of 
political disagreement.  
 Following James Bohman (1995), we call these disputes over the 
authority of decision centres, the principles of adjudication, and the 
principles of justice underwriting social policy, “conflicts of principle”. 
Conflicts of principle differ from conflicts of interest in that parties disagree 
not only because they have divergent needs and desires but because they 
construct their identities from incommensurate moral orders and social 
grammars, an incommensurability that both constitutes and intensifies the 
divergence in their worldviews and interests. Hence, traditional methods of 
dispute resolution, which attempt to reconcile interests through formulating 
mutually acceptable compromises, are of little use when applied to conflicts 
of principle. In conflicts of principle parties not only differ in regard to some 
issue, but disagree on how to go about resolving their conflict (Pearce & 
Littlejohn 1997). They disagree over what counts as evidence and what 
conditions must hold to qualify a policy or project as just. Moreover, one or 
more of the parties often refuse to respect the authority of those who sit in 
judgment. In short, political disputes become conflicts of principle when 
they go beyond conflicts about particular beliefs or interests and focus 
directly on the principles of adjudication. Conflicts of principle, if deep 
enough, seem to radically question the very possibility of democratic 
resolutions.  
 The struggle over land rights between Australian Aborigines and a 
mining company as documented in Werner Herzog’s film Where Green Ants 
Dream is an illustrative example of a conflict of principle (Reading 1992). 
The mining company possessed “legal” ownership of the land and wished to 
begin excavation. The Aborigines, however, claimed that the land was 
sacred burial ground, and therefore attempted to stop all mining operations. 
This dispute was not simply over who owned the land, which would be a 
conflict of interest, that the notion of property as such is the locus of the 
conflict; hence, there is a conflict of principle. 
When this dispute came before the court the judge ordered the Aborigines to produce 
evidence for their claim that the land was sacred. They responded that they could not present 
the objects that could verify that the ground was indeed sacred, because to look at these 
objects was a sin that would result in the death of the viewer. At that point an Aborigine man 
referred to as the “Mute” stood up and began to speak. The judge was perplexed. He asked 
why he was referred to as a “Mute” if he could speak. The other Aborigines replied that was 
because he is the sole surviving member of his tribe, so no one else could speak his language 
and he couldnot speak the language of anyone else. The judge then turned to the Aborigines 
and told them that because they failed to produce any legal title or evidence of the lands’ 
sacredness and the “Mute’s” testimony was untranslatable, he had no recourse but to rule in 
favour of the mining company. The Aborigines implored the judge to step outside of the 
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boundaries of the law to adjudicate the dispute, but he refused.  
 Herzog’s film does not present the Aborigines as mere losers in a legal 
battle. Rather, the aborigines have been injured because the principles 
defining justice in terms of property and the evidentiary procedures used to 
adjudicate the conflict systematically divested them of the means to present 
their case.  
 We understand recent attempts to formulate a deliberative account of 
democracy as a response to the demands of the deep pluralism signalled by 
conflicts of principle (Bohman 1996; Dryzeck 1990; Rawls 1993; Gutmann 
& Thompson 1996). Deliberation is understood in these models as a process 
by which individual convictions are translated to public reasons. 
Deliberative democrats view deliberation as a method for regulating 
disagreement and resolving differences of principle through critical 
discussion, which is a method that shifts political power from a basis in 
interest groups and ethical commitments to an institutional framework 
constituted by a set of rules for managing difference.  
 We endorse deliberative approaches inasmuch as they acknowledge the 
constitutive force of communication (i.e., communication is never merely 
the transmission of information, but in most cases involves the constitution 
of a meaningful order of persons and things). This view of communicative 
action serves to re-specify justice as a problem of, and, more importantly as 
the result of, coordinating communicative interaction in a diverse society in 
which particular histories and collective memories are constituted. By 
grounding democracy on a model of public debate, rather than a model of 
strategic bargaining, deliberative models can offer a constructive answer to 
the question of how diverse groups are to mediate their differences. 
Deliberation is, thus, a superior alternative for mediating political 
disagreement in a pluralist democracy compared with strategic bargaining, 
arbitration, voting and other forms of dispute resolution, grounded in an 
interest-based conception of democracy.  
 We part ways with deliberative theories, however, when they privilege 
one form of discourse – namely critical-rational discussion – over all others. 
We concur with Iris Marion Young’s (1996) claim that the valorization of 
deliberation over other discursive forms such story-telling, rhetoric, or 
conversation (to name but a few) may actually work as a form of cultural 
imperialism, silencing minority voices by devaluing the methods of 
expression, bodily comportment, and modes of self-presentation of groups 
whose views have already been systematically disregarded in public forums. 
Thus, ironically, deliberative norms may actually foreclose the possibility of 
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a radically democratic dialogue.  
 Deliberative theories often mistakenly conceptualize discourse as a 
relatively stable, univocal, phenomenon. That is, they overlook the fact that 
modes of communication are irreducibly plural. Conversation, debate, 
discussion, narrative and poetic speech are not simply different “forms of 
expression”, but rather each of these genres of communication is constituted 
by different norms, functions and effects. Furthermore each genre activates a 
different moral and political universe establishing distinctive rights, 
obligations and orientations to the other. For instance, think of the many 
functions that the question can have and how the form, function, and effects 
of the question are shaped by the trajectory of the speech genre in which it is 
embedded. It makes all of the difference in the world if a question is part of 
a cross-examination, a narrative, a casual conversation among friends, a visa 
application, an inquisition, a doctoral examination or police interrogation. 
Each of these speech genres depends on questions to do their work, but each 
assigns radically different roles, rights, responsibilities, and strategies, to the 
speakers. To unproblematically assume that the question functions 
innocently in deliberation – and to assume questions work only to clarify 
parties’ positions – , is to turn a blind eye to the experience of having a 
discussion turn into an interrogation, a trial into an inquisition, or worse. 
 Given the irreducible plurality of religious, philosophical, political, and 
moral views animating contemporary societies, it is not surprising that 
political philosophers would theorize discourse monologically. Discourse, 
for contemporary political philosophy, serves as the Archimedean point1 by 
which the other forms of plurality can be reconciled. In other words, 
discourse must be theorized as a stable, non-plural phenomenon, for it to 
serve as the foundation of a democratic theory that fully accepts the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 1993) and that views its mission as devising a 
scheme by which these diverse views can be reconciled without coercion.  
 We need to recognize, as well, that parties in real political disputes 
operate with a number of co-present orientations to public discussion, and 
that these orientations even tend to be inconsistent. The commitment to 
politeness norms, for instance, works in tandem with the rational 
presupposition of unforced consensus. In real talk we juggle the need to 
                                          
1 The Hellenistic mathematician and physicist Archimedes (287-212 BCE) is reputed to have 
boasted:  
Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth  
Hence the common philosophical usage of the expression “Archimedean point” for any (claim of 
an) objective, fixed position from which to make a comparison or a judgement. Many modern 
philosophers, meanwhile, have come to consider such a claim unwarranted and obsolete. (Eds.) 
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make decisions based on the force of the better argument with the need to 
forge social cooperation by holding our tongues. Just how we juggle these 
sometimes conflicting interests is what makes real talk so much more 
complex than any theoretical system of designed speech. By reducing the 
complexity of actual communicative action to a relatively univocal model of 
critical discussion and by ignoring the plurality of discursive forms co-
present in any attempt to mediate differences of principle, deliberative 
models may actually negate the very advantages they purport to accrue. 
 Conflicts of principle present a formidable challenge to reflexive 
scholars and practitioners committed to designing discursive methods and 
forums capable of transforming potentially violent and divisive political 
strife into productive and peace-oriented dialogue, a dialogue in which the 
differences separating groups are seen as resources rather than obstacles for 
constructing a shared, yet heterogeneous, ethical vision. To meet this 
challenge we must first abandon the effort to justify democratic principles by 
appealing to universal standards of reason and rational choice. Instead, we 
must uncover the specific and multiple cultural and historical traditions that 
constitute a community’s political lexicon. Second, we must not make the 
mistake of reifying these traditions; instead, we must remind ourselves that 
they were constituted through searching dialogue and debate, and that only 
in the present have they become taken-for-granted procedures for 
coordinating action. The seeds of revision and reform exist in the forms of 
practical reason animating communal life. Therefore, principles of justice 
and procedures of adjudication can be remade and re-imagined in and 
through public dialogue. 
 Conflicts of interest and conflicts of principle are widely recognized as 
challenges that are faced by democratically oriented groups. Inattention to 
discursive plurality, however, often leads theorists and practitioners to 
ignore a third, and we believe an increasingly important, form of democratic 
disagreement and, hence, to overlook the communicative resources for 
constructing a transformative model of intercultural dialogue.  
 
 
Models of democratic disagreement (c): conflicts of political speech  
 
Just as the emergence of new social movements revealed the plurality of, 
and hence the conflict over, political principles, what Tully (1995) – in 
indebtedness to Taylor – calls the “politics of cultural recognition” points us 
to the plurality of, and hence conflict over, political speech. The intercultural 
demands that constitute much of contemporary politics range from the 
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establishment of schools, social services and media in one’s first language to 
the struggle for the right to  
speak and act in culture-affirming ways in public institutions and spheres (Tully 1995: 2).  
Let us grant that the right to participate in political institutions in ways that 
recognize and affirm, rather than exclude or assimilate, culturally diverse 
ways of speaking, thinking, and acting of citizens, is a prerequisite to 
political freedom and democratic governance. It then follows that many of 
our political institutions will have to be rebuilt from the ground up, because 
they were originally constructed to privilege the traditions of argumentation 
and modes of speaking of white, propertied males.  
 Moreover, that cultural groups are internally heterogeneous; they are also 
constituted in and through a plurality of ways of speaking, thinking and 
acting. Therefore, the primary mode of political disagreement in the twenty-
first century CE may be conflicts over the forms and effects of political 
speech, rather than over interest or principle. The complexity of the problem, 
most notably its recursiveness, is signalled by the difficulty in coining a 
succinct term to describe such conflicts. In conflicts over political speech, 
the rules and norms controlling the speaking opportunities afforded to 
parties, the performative standards for formulating speech acts, and the 
limits of what discourses can be heard as authentic and true are opened to 
challenge, re-evaluation, and revision. At the very least, because the 
conventions governing speech will have to be ratified to some degree by all 
parties prior to engaging in deliberation over interest or principles, 
discursive conflicts will come to occupy a great deal of time and energy of 
both established and newly forming democracies.  
 
 
Cultural group identification and discursive plurality 
 
When community members meet and deliberate with one another, they do so 
as individuals who speak as, and speak for, various groups. Group or cultural 
identities are enacted through the social discourse, and are both the 
foundation from which and the creative ongoing accomplishment in which 
political standpoints are articulated. Group members speak, in part, with 
voices based on who they are and what they know, and norms that group 
members bring to public meetings about what is appropriate and effective 
conduct. In addition, inter-group norms are contested and co-constructed by 
multiple parties in their discourse throughout their contact, and are as varied 
and diverse as the individuals that comprise the groups. 
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 Cultural identities in these contexts are broadly viewed as ongoing 
problematics, social enactments, and performances, in the sense that group 
identifications are social and observable. When members of different groups 
meet, the engagement is a  
participatory ritual performance in which actors not only pursue interests strategically and 
display themselves expressively, but reproduce and reconstitute social and political 
relationships with one another (Forester 1996: 309) 
Cultural identities are enacted in spontaneous as well as strategic forms, and 
are featured, hidden, challenged, and negotiated, in the emerging discourse 
as members of the public engage each other. 
 Culture is more than visible group affiliation in that it is a set of enduring 
and changing, ideological and institutional, interpretive, constitutive, and 
creative, situated norms and practices, shared by a group of people who 
enact their paradoxical affiliations with, and distinctions from. other groups 
(Collier 1999a). Our approach to culture focuses primarily upon the 
communicative or discursive system that constitutes identity affiliation or 
characterization; but this is not to suggest that multivocality or individual 
differences within the group are not acknowledged. It is to say that patterns 
among those who affiliate with a particular group, as well as individual 
differences, do emerge, and those patterns are apparent to insider members 
of the group as well as outsiders. Tajfel (1978), Tajfel & Turner (1979), and 
Giles (1980) discuss the tendency among humans to define social identities 
in inter-group terms and to use social comparisons to designate group 
insiders and outsiders. What interests us is the multiple forms and outcomes 
in which the character of the group identities and the relationships between 
groups emerge in democratic dialogues. 
 If we recognize that language is articulate contact (Stewart 1995), it 
follows that discourse is used to construct “realities”, that include histories, 
relationships, and social identities (Shotter 1993). Symbolic activity is the 
forum through which we come to know about ourselves and others, as 
individuals and members of multiple groups, and we learn and revise what is 
valued, prescribed, and prohibited.  
 Discourse, therefore, is the means through which we constitute and 
negotiate political and institutional policies as well as norms for localized 
political practice. Billig (1995) as well as Jenkins (1997) point out that 
nationalism and ideology as broader structural processes, are reflected in 
situated discourse about what is strongly valued, moral, normal, respectable, 
and sinful. Van Dijk (1993) specifically points to the forms and functions of 
elite discourse dominating newspapers, televised news, as well as textbooks 
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and conversational texts, which become the sites of cognitive transformation 
and racism as well as the reproduction of ideologies and institutional policies 
within and across groups in various kinds of social contact. 
 Let us agree that cultural norms and premises emerge in discourse that is 
constrained by histories and past experiences, present power relations, 
externally imposed ascriptions, and internally avowed boundaries. Let us 
moreover agree that such norms and premises are enacted within co-
constructed relationships. Then it becomes evident that we must incorporate 
multiple levels of analysis into an approach to cultural identity negotiation in 
public democratic dialogue. Therefore, following Giddens (1984), we 
recognize the role of the institution, group and relationship, and the 
individual, in interaction and production of discursive systems. For example, 
sometimes privileged groups exert influence upon groups and individuals 
through establishing a particular norm of conduct that becomes rewarded, if 
not the required standard within many institutions.  
 In the traditional deliberative model in the USA, individualism is valued 
and privileged, and the ability to be a strong adversary and have a critical 
voice is esteemed. Tannen (1998) describes this tendency in the USA as “the 
argument culture”. Basing her conclusions on popular discourse in multiple 
forms, she describes the educational as well as political systems as 
institutions that socialize USA Americans to value individually-expressed 
critical ability.  
Our glorification of opposition as the path to truth is related to the development of formal 
logic, which encourages thinkers to regard truth seeking as a step-by-step alternation of 
claims and counterclaims. Truth, in this schema, is an abstract notion that tends to be taken 
out of context. (Tannen 1998: 260).  
She also notes what she describes as seemingly automatic inclinations 
among individuals in the USA to oppose, criticize, and verbally assault 
political leaders. 
 In summary, as humans, we constitute our political standpoints, make 
community decisions, and constitute our group identities and relationships 
with each other in historical, institutional, and structural contexts, as well as 
in everyday contact with one another. Cultural identity is the character of the 
communicative system that is contextually constructed by those affiliating 
with a particular group in social contact such as that in public deliberation. 
Below, we describe several of our assumptions about how cultural identities 
are enacted and negotiated through plural discursive systems, and discuss the 
implications of such assumptions for political dialogue. 
 In meetings in which community members gather to make decisions, 
cultural identities are avowed and proclaimed by “insider” group members 
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as well as ascribed by “outsiders” and “Others”; and often such avowals and 
ascriptions are quite different and become contested. Cultural identities are 
thus constructed in the “spaces” and “moments of time” in contact between 
group members. A second assumption we make about intercultural contact is 
that cultural identities are constituted over time and to some degree, endure 
as well as change (Collier & Thomas 1988; Hecht et al. 1993). Cultural 
identities are enacted in local, dynamic contexts, in which histories are 
invoked as well as futures predicted. Such contexts include and go beyond 
the immediate environmental context (such as who is interacting with whom 
in what location), and also include the chronology of past, present, and 
predicted future, that are socially constructed. Histories of groups both 
enable and constrain actions, they determine to a considerable extent who 
says what to whom, what kind of relationship is created, as well as what 
consequences emerge.  
An illustration will be taken from a pre-conference session for representatives from 
organizations working with youth in Israel and Palestine in 1998. The location of the 
meeting, Jerusalem, was not only contested and difficult, if not impossible, for some of the 
Palestinians to visit, but also the definitions of what the meeting meant to each group, and 
histories about such meetings, were understood very differently. For many of the Palestinians, 
it was precluded that the pre-conference session could produce satisfying contact and 
dialogue, not only due to conflicts of interest and principle, but based on such interpretations 
of the past and predictions for future dialogue as would limit their agency, and silence or 
disconfirm their preferred identities (Collier 1999b).  
 A further assumption important in this context is that we assume the 
existence of multivocality within as well as across cultural group members. 
Martin (1997), among others, researching Whites in the USA, points out that 
while members of high status and privileged groups acknowledge the 
diversity and a range of voices within their own group, they often minimize 
the multivocality present in out-groups, and view out-group members as 
almost faceless representations, as “Others” who are essentially alike. These 
kinds of categorizations are often expressed in over-generalized and overly 
simplistic stereotypes, and serve to discount individual agency, limit the 
potential for counter-hegemony, and minimize the heterogeneity of group 
voices. In this way, the discourse is the means through which some voices 
are privileged and others may be silenced. 
 Other important assumptions we make about cultural identity negotiation 
in intercultural democratic dialogue are that individuals have more than one 
cultural identity that may be potentially enacted in each situation; and that 
multiple cultural identities affect and emerge in group members’ conduct 
across contexts. McClintock (1995), in a feminist critique, calls for 
researchers to recognize the intersections and relationships between gender, 
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race, and class characterizing our contact. She discusses the voices of 
women of colour who challenge Eurocentric feminism, who argue that it is 
inappropriate to talk of an essential female (or male) character, to privilege 
gender over other conflicts, or continue using the categories of race, 
ethnicity and class to benefit and justify the existence of the middle and 
upper classes.  
 The range of cultural identities that can be salient, and the twists and 
turns in identities being featured, depend upon topic, context, and the 
emerging patterns in the dialogue. In a 1992 study of South Africans, focus 
group participants avowed their ethnic identity in explicit ways using 
phrases such as “As an Afrikaner...” or, “I am Zulu and we believe in...” 
Racial designators were more commonly used when describing others. 
Topics such as “the new South Africa being constructed in 1992” brought 
out variations in avowed and ascribed identities ranging from recognition of 
shared nationality, ascription of distinct differences in race, ethnicity, and 
social class, as well as disagreement about what it meant to be male or 
female (Collier & Bornman 1999). One “Coloured” young woman described 
in the same study said,  
I am like many people in one person. I am South African, Coloured, speak three languages, 
am middle class, a woman, and hope to be a mother who will have a successful career. I 
sometimes speak from one of these and at other times, I am all of these.  
This example illustrates how, from the perspective of individual group 
members at a community meeting, one or a few cultural identities may take 
precedence or become more salient than others. It also illustrates the 
possible consequences when recognized leaders/facilitators of public 
meetings, with intentions for fairness and justice, design and implement 
agendas and procedures to meet the needs for the different race groups 
represented at the meeting may in practice, limit the agency of some group 
members to feature class or gender identities and issues. 
 If individuals have a range of cultural identities, this does not imply that 
ontologically we assume all people to have the ability to change identities 
like chameleons change colour to blend into their surroundings; nor does it 
imply that humans react to others and/or the environment in mere 
deterministic fashion. We presume that individuals have individual agency 
as well as interact in social contexts that are constrained by histories, social 
structures, institutions and ideologies. Some individuals have greater 
freedom and choice to feature particular identities and ignore others.  
In our personal case as authors of this paper, as scholars who are European American, our 
respective ethnic heritages are not particularly salient to either one of us in our everyday 
conduct, and we can choose to feature or not mention our ethnic heritage as we so desire. 
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This kind of agency is a form of unearned and often unrecognized advantage for members of 
some groups, i.e., it does not occur to most Whites in the USA that race is important or that it 
is the standard by which other groups are judged, since it becomes “invisible” and a “taken 
for granted” (Hitchcock & Flint 1997). 
 As Foucault has pointed out, discourse is the site or process in which 
resources are sought, maintained, allocated to others, and contested; 
therefore, in the context of public and democratic deliberation, we need to 
acknowledge the role of power and privilege in negotiating multiple 
identities through discourse. Individuals constitute who they are as group 
members, in part through what resources they have and are given by others, 
and through the ability to obtain or distribute resources. We also agree with 
McClintock who calls on scholars to study  
...a more diverse politics of agency, involving the dense web of relations between coercion, 
negotiation, complicity, refusal, dissembling, mimicry, compromise, affiliation, and revolt 
(McClintock 1995: 15). 
 Sometimes cultural identities are contested and conflict with one another. 
Hegde (1998a) found that while Asian Indian women immigrants in the 
USA may be rewarded within their own community when they take on more 
traditional roles and a fortiori when, in the process, they produce sons, their 
success as women is also measured by the standard set by European 
American women who are expected to combine motherhood with having a 
respectable job or profession. 
 A common pattern in intercultural relationship development is based on 
initial negative, over-generalized, stereotypes about the “Other”. Collier 
(1998a) describes the discourse of Israeli, Palestinian and Palestinian/Israeli 
young women who worked on various projects and spent time together; the 
avowals and ascriptions that made up their discourse were complex, 
paradoxical, and sometimes brought up in-group conflict as well as in-group/ 
out-group conflict. Hybridity of identities was apparent in the voices of 
Palestinian/Israelis who live in Israel and have Israeli identification cards 
and trace their ancestry and cultural roots to Palestine. They described their 
identities as  
“living in two worlds” or “seeing things from both sides as well as the middle” and “having 
no home and nobody who accepts us, not Israelis because of our roots, not Palestinians 
sometimes because of where we live” (Collier 1999b). 
 The process of intercultural identity negotiation is a complex and 
multifaceted one. For every individual representing a group, multiple 
identities may emerge as salient, and some identity norms for what is viewed 
as appropriate conduct may conflict. Relationships with other individuals as 
well as inter-group dialogue require an appreciation for the many levels of 
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discourse and variations in normative force across institutions, communities, 
relationships and individuals. 
Intercultural identity negotiation and conflicts over political speech 
 
Robert Reed’s (1990) investigation of the counter-revolutionary effects of 
formal rules of debate in Portuguese Municipal Assemblies provides a 
telling example of an intercultural identity conflict over political speech. In 
1976, two years after Portuguese military officers overthrew Antonio 
Salazar’s six year corporatist regime in a bloodless coup, the Portuguese 
people ratified a revolutionary constitution. The latter established a 
democratic government comprised of a system of municipal assemblies. “In 
these assemblies, people of all walks were to meet as equals to discuss and 
resolve local issues” (Reed 1990: 134). To fulfil the revolution’s promise, 
the new Assembly had to make decisions based on a fair hearing of 
members’ opinions. To organize discussion and to adjudicate conflicts of 
opinion the Assembly adopted Robert’s Rules of Order.2 
 The adoption of Robert’s Rules, however, created a division within the 
Assembly. On the one hand, there were members who were comfortable 
using Robert’s Rules and were adept at manipulating them to their 
advantage. These members were referred to as Politicos (“real politicians”). 
On the other hand, some members were extremely uncomfortable using 
Robert’s Rules. These members, referred to as “Officeholders”, refused to 
conduct their discussion according to the formal rules and generally 
remained silent during Assembly meetings. Reed (1990) found that the 
distinction between “Politicos” and “Officeholders” cut across class, 
cultural, and political lines. The cleavages between members was, instead, 
primarily constituted by the desire to use formal rules of deliberation, and 
the capacity for manipulating them. Though Robert’s Rules are designed to 
ensure that all members have an opportunity to engage in a fair and efficient 
form of political debate, they set an “admission price” that is much costlier 
to some members than others.  
 Reed argues that the reason that “Officeholders” did not comply with 
Robert’s Rules is that these formal conventions struck them as a  
strange, confusing, and very artificial way of organizing debate. At times the Rules strike 
them as simply unfair (Reed 1990: 137).  
                                          
2 In 1876, USA army general Henry M. Robert set out to bring the rules of the American 
Congress to members of ordinary societies with the publication of Pocket Manual of Rules of 
Order. It sold half a million copies even before its revision in 1915, and made Robert’s name 
synonymous with the orderly rule of reason in deliberative societies. (Eds.) 
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 The introduction of formal procedural constraints into public debate in 
the Portuguese Assembly thwarted the peoples desire that all members have 
an equal voice. Thus while the Assembly members may have been equally 
elected, the imposition of Robert’s Rules insures that they are not all equally 
effective. In this sense, we can say the introduction of a deliberative model 
of democracy, albeit in a very particular form, was counterrevolutionary.  
 Reed’s (1990) description of the ways that procedural constraints can 
silence some participants and disregard their cultural identities shows how 
conflicts over political speech can cripple democratic hopes. Moreover, it 
shows how the effects of conflicts over political speech, not to mention their 
suppression, give us reason to pause in our endorsement of deliberative 
theories. 
 One could object to this line of argument by claming that the example of 
the Portuguese Assembly is stilted because it involves the adoption of a 
highly standardized, very formalistic model of parliamentary procedure. Yet, 
it was not anything inherent to Robert’s Rules that led the “Officeholders” to 
reject them. The conflict over Robert’s Rules is emblematic of an even 
deeper division among the members of the Assembly. The fundamental 
disagreement concerns the role of the assembly, the cultural identities of 
office holders and politicos, and the nature of public and intercultural debate 
in the assembly. Robert’s Rules are not inherently discriminatory; if all 
parties agree to their use, and have equal adeptness, skill and knowledge 
about their use, they can be applied in a fair and neutral manner. The 
“Officeholders” rejected Robert’s Rules because they were forced to 
abandon the ways of speaking that constituted their political and cultural 
identities.  
 We propose that the deliberative model is not actually a “one system fits 
all” model and that it gives some group members advantage over others. 
Presuming a universal value to be inherent in one model of public decision 
making overlooks the existence of multiple group norms and multivocality 
within each group; in the same way, such a presumption misrepresents and 
oversimplifies the process of negotiating group identities, relationships and 
resources. Although discourse itself is marked by an irreducible plurality, 
and our forms of talk are as pluralistic as the commitments we hold, it still is 
the foundation for a radical democratic politics. If participating in political 
debate comes at the price of giving up the form of life that members wish to 
assert and protect, then public political participation is simply too costly. 
Yet, to give up our faith in deliberation – in other words, our faith that 
disagreement can be settled in democratic, and potentially non- violent ways 
– is also too costly, for without full and equal participation in a culturally 
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diverse public dialogue of all citizens, the hope for a radical democracy is 
sure to perish.  
 The challenge, then, is to look to our conversational practices for some 
guidance in inventing and implementing dialogic methods and forums that 
can make good on deliberation’s promise. What is needed in such contexts is 
a way to facilitate a means through which multiple voices may fully 
participate in order to coordinate their action. Such dialogue would require 
and become transformative in our recognition of multiple cultural voices, 
norms for conduct, and emerging community.  
 
 
Transformative public, political dialogue 
 
Engaging discursive plurality in intercultural dialogue 
Public dialogue is always intercultural and plural to some degree. Along 
with Hegde (1998b) we distinguish between pluralism as an ideal social 
philosophy (separate and supposedly equal, “I’m OK and You’re OK”) and 
plurality, the recognition of differences and social structural hierarchies. 
Discursive plurality emerges when the dialogue is critical, engaged and 
ongoing; and, in addition, the alternatives are, as Edward Said describes, 
acknowledged as “real forces” (Wicke & Sprinker 1992). 
 Moving beyond Buber (1972) who features mutual and positive 
intentions for each other and the relationship in his approach to dyadic 
dialogue, we define intercultural dialogue as a process in which each of the 
participant individuals speaks both as an individual and as a group that is 
identified in institutional and historical contexts. Intercultural dialogue is 
transformative in that it is an emergent and dynamic communicative form, a 
constituted space that is a borderland (Anzaldua 1987), and a “third space” 
(Bhaba 1994). Such dialogue is a discursive accomplishment in which ideas 
and alternatives are engaged, diverse voices and identities speak as well as 
listen, reflexivity encouraged, and procedures and norms are continually 
deconstructed and reconstructed. 
 
Reflexively examining implicit assumptions and privilege 
Because we want to study, understand, write about, as well as facilitate the 
development of dialogic processes that incorporate discursive plurality and 
recognition of multiple cultural identities, we found it useful to begin our 
collaborative discussions by interrogating our assumptions about knowledge, 
academic inquiry, as well as praxis about this topic. We recommend a 
similar reflexive move for scholars and/or practitioners. Deconstructing such 
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“taken-for-granted” assumptions and practices reveals alternatives.  
 As scholars we, the authors of this paper, bring our cultural identities and 
all their paradoxical contradictions and tensions to the study of intercultural 
political discourse with all of its inherent contradictions and tensions. Our 
identities are also politicized and a product of multiple forms of 
socialization. For example, as USA authors, we recognize that institutions 
and ideologies in the USA teach whites to be racist, males to be sexist; by 
the same token, these institutions and ideologies reinforce special norms in 
which women of colour are marginalized and immigrants are made to feel 
oppression. Such ontologies shape our epistemological assumptions and 
methodological preferences as academicians and facilitators of dialogue. 
 In the same vein, we recognize that each of us brings to the study and 
practice of discursive plurality and public dialogue, evaluative standards of 
what is central and “normal”. Such standards emerge in contexts and 
processes of contested power and privilege. We agree with Hitchcock & 
Flint (1997), who argue that  
Those in the center, those who occupy a dominant status such as whiteness, experience the 
center not so much as a consciously acknowledged status, but rather a complex of features in 
their social experience that have surrounded them since inception. (Hitchcock & Flint 
1997: 1).  
In public dialogue, the discourse of whites in the USA becomes that which is 
established as the standard to which all other groups should be held. 
According to Hitchcock and Flint (1997), this standard defines is what is 
normal, distinct from outsiders, what is comfortable, legitimate, obvious, not 
open to contradiction, and often, ordained by God.  
 Negative consequences occur when those of us with some degree of 
power and privilege fail to ask such questions as “Who am I and what 
privileges do I take for granted? What are my invisible standards?” (Martin 
1997; Hitchcock & Flint 1997). The danger lies in reinforcing class-ism, 
racism, sexism, and all the other forms of elitism that silence voices and 
disconfirm identities, not to mention prohibit democratic deliberation. 
 In general, viewing discursive and cultural plurality as a resource 
involves asking outsiders as well as insiders to explicitly answer the 
following question, 
What are the implicit and taken-for-granted assumptions as well as the norms for the 
dominant voices/group members, and who is regulated or left out? What are the results?  
Such interrogations need to be built into public dialogues as ongoing 
processes, in order to discourage one group of individuals from setting 
agendas to speak for others, or from presuming that one norm or procedure 
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is always best. 
 Consequently, along with Hooks (1989), we recommend dialogue 
between all parties regarding the experience of exploitation, oppression, and 
dominance in order to identify spaces for understanding each other. We also 
advocate what Delgado (1994) describes as deconstruction of discourses of 
power as well as reflexivity in discussing the importance of being open to 
critiques of implicit privilege and alternative interpretations. Building such 
reflexive intercultural dialogue into the overall public deliberation process 
transforms the process; Hasian describes this as reframing  
…partial visions into larger representations that are in constant need of critical interrogation, 
through political intervention rather than description or ahistorical explanation. (Hasian, in 
press: 8)  
In order to encourage such reflexive dialogue, we specifically recommend 
that such processes of intercultural dialogue are monitored by intercultural 
teams of facilitators, and that there are explicit opportunities for participants 
to describe and evaluate the ongoing process 
 
Recognizing Contradictions in Intercultural Relationships.  
Creating as well as maintaining intercultural borderland spaces/moments 
requires redefinition and transformation of what so far have been dualistic 
orientations, not only in what we know about others, but also in how we go 
about the being and becoming (Sacks 1984) of our relationships. 
Relationships are characterized by contradiction, multivocality, flux and 
flow (Baxter & Montgomery 1996). Therefore, also in such public contexts 
the initiation and maintaining of relationships is an ongoing predicament, in 
which group representatives are constituting, through ascription and avowal, 
their group identities as well as their relationships with each other. 
Intercultural relationships are therefore negotiated in both dynamic flux and 
coordinated patterns. 
 Constant tensions and contradictions characterize relationships and 
groups. Baxter (1998) identifies three contradictory tensions that apply in 
public relationships: 
 
• connection and autonomy,  
• novelty and predictability,  
• and openness and privacy.  
 
 Collier & Thompson (1997) identified several dialectic tensions in the 
interview discourse and open-ended survey responses of adolescent friends 
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in the United Kingdom. Those relevant to public dialogue include the 
tendency toward openness and receptivity to others, to be contrasted with a 
tendency toward closed-ness and privacy. A third dialectic tension is 
linguistic convergence/divergence, which is a tendency toward use of the 
high-status group’s language and the contradictory tendency to diverge and 
use one’s own primary language. Jones and Bodtker (1998) found dialectical 
tensions in their examination of an international collaboration and social 
justice project in South Africa related to degrees of belonging, engaging and 
speaking. 
 These kinds of dialectic tensions and contradictions illustrate the value of 
transforming dualistic, polar opposite categorizations such as true/untrue, 
good/bad, individual/group, centre/margin, insider/outsider to both/and 
possibilities in our views of intercultural dialogue. Such scholar and 
practitioner descriptions may minimize essentializing, and recognize 
hybridity. When multivocality as well as group memberships are 
acknowledged, descriptions of discourse are more valid and coherent with 
everyday discourse.  
 In addition, re-categorization, or the featuring of the community group as 
salient along with or over other group identities, can be encouraged, 
whenever appropriate, by describing or asking group members to articulate 
what their stories have in common. Making community identities salient 
may also offer a way of applying appreciative inquiry to celebrate what the 
community members can avow and perhaps collaborate to achieve (Pearce 
& Littlejohn 1997). 
 
Continually re/constructing structures and norms 
In this kind of dialogue, the role of discourse in constituting “truths” is 
recognized and therefore, multiple truths and norms for conduct are 
presumed. Multiple political standpoints that may change over time are 
acknowledged as constituent groups approach decisions and goal 
achievement. A flexibility of structures may best serve the democratic 
community, i.e., we suggest beginning with an assumption that one 
procedure may not fit all (and then again, it may...). What we think of as 
traditional norms and procedures need not be replaced with another newer 
norm or procedure, but questioned along with posed alternatives. Lederach 
(1995) calls a similar principle “recycling” and defines it as the mixing of 
old, used things with fresh ingredients, to recreate a new product. 
 
Translating 
When multiple cultural systems and identities are being enacted through 
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multiple discursive frames, various forms of translation may be necessary. 
Translation may be needed across languages and across the “grammars” and 
structures that undergird language systems (Pearce & Littlejohn 1997). For 
instance, concepts such as sovereignty or reconciliation mean quite different 
things to different groups in South Africa. In addition, the traditional may 
need to be translated and reconstructed into the situated, and into the present. 
Academics may need to translate what they do to be more relevant to 
practitioners and community residents. Local residents may need to translate 
how they are speaking as officeholders. 
 
Co-creating New Political Rituals 
Forester (1996) recommends the creation of deliberative political rituals in 
order to create political transformation. He makes several suggestions. The 
first is letting the “messiness” and details surprise and teach us. The second 
is to allow stories and narrative accounts to supplement rationality as sites of 
values and identities. Third is to encourage some transformation of 
relationships and identities over time, as well as to recognize that emergent 
issues, agendas, and goals/ends may alter ideas about what is at stake. 
Finally, he outlines what he calls structuring of unpredictability as a ground 
for learning and decision making. 
 As we define the goals of intercultural democratic dialogue, they include 
a commitment to find ways of living together in just and reasonable ways, 
even when differences seem irreconcilable. Cornel West describes, for 
example,  
...solid and reliable alliances of people of colour and White progressives guided by a moral 
and political vision of greater democracy and individual freedom in communities, state, and 
transnational enterprises (Cornel West 1993: 217)  
Intercultural democratically-based relationships and communities require us 
to embrace the plurality of discourse systems and to define the differences as 
potential resources rather than obstructions to the process. Transformation of 
our contact into borderland dialogues can occur through reflexive 
interrogation of privileged assumptions, uncovering alternative modes of 
discourse, and the willingness to reconstruct and add to the more traditional 
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Part Four: Conclusion 
 
TRUTH IN POLITICS 




ABSTRACT. The central claim of this discussion is that the deliberative process makes our desires 
and opinions ethical as much as it makes them rational, as it makes a plurality of people into a 
community. Every community is limited as it is constituted by things it knows and cannot know. 
Making our desires and opinions ethical can mean hardening them into prejudices as well as 
making them the basis for deliberation towards truth. 
 
 
Dans l’amitié comme dans l’amour on est souvent plus heureux par les 
choses qu’on ignore que par celles que l’on sait.  
La Rochefoucauld, Réflexion morale, 441. 
 
Aristotle does not give solutions to contemporary political problems. He 
could not have imagined them, and so does not speak to them. However, the 
world in which he operated, and what he made of it, are so different from 
our world, that his very singular mode of thought can be useful. Among 
other things, he surprises us by emphasizing the role of friendship and trust 
in politics.  
Friendship would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem to be more 
concerned about it than about justice. For concord [homonoia, literally, being of one mind] 
would seem to be similar to friendship and they aim at concord above all, while they try 
above all to expel civil conflict, which is enmity. Further, if people are friends, they have no 
need of justice, but if they are just they need friendship in addition; and the justice that is 
most just seems to belong to friendship (Ethics VIII.1.1155a22-29; see EE VII.1.1234b23-
32). 
 The modern state has figured out ways of living without friendship. 
Consider the contrast to Machiavelli, who says that a good state needs both 
good laws and good arms, but where good arms are found, good laws follow 
automatically, while without military strength, good laws are worthless. 
Nothing about friendship and trust there. It is the genius of liberalism to 
dispense with friendship and to found communities on rights and thus on a 
form of justice that can do without friendship.  
 Periodically, though, the richer form of community associated with 
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friendship rather than justice alone, has its revenge. Periodically, we 
rediscover that even minimal communities of strangers depend on trust. We 
become aware of this when trust breaks down. I want to look at a peculiar 
sort of breakdown of trust.  
 Truth is disruptive. Most of the time, communities get along by looking 
for agreement and consensus instead of truth. They reasonably assume that 
“what everybody knows” really is true, and so take agreement as a sure sign 
of truth. The community can tolerate peaceful dissent, because 
disagreements are differences of opinion or taste that are not worth fighting 
over. Different people see some things differently, and that by itself need not 
threaten the community.  
 To take a very mundane example, some years ago E.D. Hirsch wrote a 
series of books that were very influential in the United States of America. In 
these books he claimed that citizenship depended on common education, 
which in turn depended on common knowledge among citizens. To live 
together we have to share background knowledge without which 
communication is impossible, as everyone knows who has tried to 
communicate with a computer. Everyone in the USA must know that George 
Washington was the first President, that there is a story that he chopped 
down a cherry tree when a boy, and that crossing the Delaware river was an 
important event in the Revolutionary War. I cannot remember what its 
importance was, but that does not disqualify me from USA citizenship. I can 
understand the public deliberations of my fellow-Americans. When they 
refer to Washington crossing the Delaware I know what they are referring to. 
Knowing such facts supplies a background knowledge that allows us to 
understand each other as fellow-citizens. Anyone who has ever lived in more 
than one country can see the appeal of what Hirsch is claiming. I can 
understand French perfectly, yet sometimes get terribly confused in France 
because I do not know the French equivalents of Washington chopping 
down a cherry tree. Hirsch produced book after book containing long lists of 
things everyone needed to know.  
 George Washington never did chop down a cherry tree. It is a fable 
invented a few generations later as part of a campaign to deify the first 
President. Its truth does not matter for it to be effective. To be an American 
and to speak to and understand fellow citizens, everyone needs to know it. In 
addition to knowing it, you might also believe it, while I regard it as a moral 
fiction. That does not matter. This civic knowledge is like knowing a 
language.1 English is no more the language of truth than Tswana, but for us 
                                          
1 This emphasis on agreement at the expense of truth is not inherent in liberalism – one need only 
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to get along in the United States, we are told, everyone must speak English.  
 At its extreme, this picture of democracy resting on agreement rather 
than truth is embodied in Richard Rorty’s idea of conversation. The enemy 
of civilization is seriousness. Like the Enlightenment polemics against 
“enthusiasm”, Rorty thinks that serious people cannot be part of a 
community, since they insist on being right. We should not adjudicate 
among our differences but should celebrate them, in epideictic rhetoric,2 just 
as we celebrate the variety of fictions in great literature. 
 We often think that we can do without political trust, that justice without 
friendship is a perfectly adequate kind of justice. According to Ernest 
Gellner, “it is effective government which destroys trust” by making it 
superfluous.3 Liberalism has made government “effective”. Trust in other 
human beings reduces complexity, but effective government does a better 
job of that reduction. On reflection, though, we discover that even our 
relations with strangers and enemies is based on trust. We most commonly 
become aware of the need for trust when it breaks down. And just as we 
often think that we can do without political trust, we often think that trust 
does not need to have anything to do with truth. Trust is generally based on 
agreement. We trust people who are like us, since we can rely on them and 
predict what they will do. So we trust people who look like us, talk like us, 
and share the knowledge that George Washington crossed the Delaware. In 
order to understand you, I have to assume that you agree with me on a whole 
mass of background knowledge. This background knowledge that we share, 
whether it is true or not, enables us to trust one another. But sometimes4 trust 
                                                                                                                             
think of Mill – but it is part of liberalism’s contemporary configuration. To parallel this 
philosophical change, consider the changes in the rationale for insisting on English asthe USA’s 
official language. Early in the 20th century, immigrants were told that they had to learn English 
because it was the language of democracy and of human rights, while today the justifications are 
pragmatic and conventional. As with Hirsch, we have to have something in common in order to 
get along, and it does not matter much what that something is. For a nice review of the history of 
the “English only” movement, see Nunberg 1992. 
2 The Greek epideictic means “fit for display”. Thus, this branch of oratory is sometimes called 
“ceremonial” or “demonstrative” oratory. Epideictic oratory was oriented to public occasions 
calling for speech or writing in the here and now. Funeral orations are a typical example of 
epideictic oratory. The ends of epideictic included praise or blame, and thus the long history of 
encomia and invectives, in their various manifestations, can be understood in the tradition of 
epideictic oratory. Aristotle assigned “virtue (the noble)” and “vice (the base)” as those special 
topics of invention that pertained to epideictic oratory;  
cf. http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Branches%20of%20Oratory/Epideictic.htm. (Eds.) 
 
3 Gellner 1988: 143. 
4 Ethics I.6.1096a16-17:  
It would appear desirable, and indeed it would seem to be obligatory, especially for a 
philosopher, to sacrifice even one’s closest personal ties in defence of the truth. Both are 
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relies on a deeper truthfulness, and is endangered when agreement as 
exposed as common error. 
 Sometimes, what everybody knows is not good enough. Sometimes truth 
and not just agreement becomes important. The myths about the first 
President are harmless, but some collective opinions are not. If “everyone” 
believes that God intends the races to be separate, then that consensus is not 
good enough, and has to be disregarded in the name of truth. By the same 
token, what everyone knows about the relations between the sexes might not 
be knowledge but prejudice. In general, the background knowledge that 
binds us together is both essential to our living together and always in 
danger of turning out to be prejudice. The recent popular studies that claim 
to prove that religious belief is good for your health say nothing about the 
truth or even the content of those beliefs. In that case, religious beliefs are 
like the “knowledge” that George Washington chopped down a cherry tree. 
Sometimes what matters about a religious belief is whether it is true or false, 
and sometimes what matters about a political belief is not whether it is 
widely held but whether it is true.  
 It is tempting to present the relation between truth and agreement in a 
Kuhnian narrative. Kuhn built his influential argument on the periodic 
alternation of paradigms in science on the distinction between “normal 
science” and “revolutionary science”. By analogy, let us say there is “normal 
community”, in which people work towards agreement. There are no 
epistemological crises of members of that community wondering whether 
their agreements track truth. Periodically, however, there are “revolutionary 
movements”, in which disruptive truths destroy the existing community. 
Since normal communities define what counts as rational, these injections of 
truth cannot be rational. They are emotional appeals to take seriously the 
pains of the victims or the needs of the neglected. The scientific analogues 
are inspired guesses that run far ahead of the evidence. After the revolution, 
these new truths are assimilated. They become domesticated, civilized, and 
rationalized. Truth becomes commonplace. There is a new consensus. The 
community returns to a new stable existence founded in a new set of 
agreements. On this account, revolution is the antithesis of community. 
There are no communities of truth, only of agreement. Hobbes’ sovereign 
defines right and wrong, just and unjust. New sovereigns define truth again 
for the community, but until they succeed in becoming sovereign, they offer 
not truth but force. On that picture, competing interests, tastes and desires 
                                                                                                                             
dear to us, yet it is our duty to prefer the truth.  
The question is when we have such an obligation, and what actions that obligation entails. 
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can co-exist in a community, but competing truths are in a state of nature 
towards each other. The modern state is an alternative to civil war because it 
reduces truth claims, and claims to justice and other values, to interests, 
tastes and desires.  
 Aristotle’s idea of rhetoric offers some help in understanding how 
communities can aim at truth – and agreement based in truth, and agreement 
to pursue the truth – and not merely agreement. The kind of practical 
rationality suitable for aiming at agreement is different from practical reason 
aiming at truth. In the former case, Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium 
is what we want. The purpose of democratic deliberation and public 
reasoning is to preserve and harmonize as many widely held beliefs as 
possible to arrive at a consensus, separating those areas in which we must 
agree to disagree from those where compromise and common deliberation 
are possible. By contrast, Aristotle helps us to expand rationality beyond 
instrumental rationality and so extends justice to include friendship. Truth 
and not merely agreement enters a community when it moves beyond justice 
to friendship, and beyond a limited kind of instrumental rationality to the 
fuller practical rationality that includes appeals to character and emotion. As 
I will show later, Aristotle’s Rhetoric is especially useful for us today 
because there the appropriate kind of political friendship does not already 
presuppose a moral consensus and violate democratic values of pluralism, 
equality and freedom.5 In that way, a community based in truth need not be 
more homogeneous or uniform than a community of pure agreement, not a 
community of friendship less amenable to pluralism and diversity than a 
community of pure justice.  
 The purpose of the modern liberal state is to have justice without 
demanding friendship. Aristotle would regard the liberal community not as a 
community in his sense at all but as an alliance, a peace treaty or a 
                                          
5 For one observation of the difference in practical reason that aims at agreement and that which 
aims at truth, David Strauss argues that formalistic legal reasoning has its place when agreement 
is the goal.  
Issues of equality and reproductive freedom (...) elicit strong reactions. In these contexts, 
people are less likely to accept a solution just for the sake of having the matter resolved 
with minimal friction. They are willing to live with controversy as the price of trying to 
resolve the issue in the way they think is right. They are therefore much more likely to 
force the issue by directly addressing the moral rights and wrongs. But in dealing with 
separation of powers issues it is more important that the issue be settled than that it be 
settled just right – so that we know which acts are valid, which political actor must make 
which decision, and so on. Consequently our practices are more formalistic. That is what 
conventionalism predicts, and that is our practice. The more important the provision, the 
less formalistic its interpretation. (Strauss 1996: 918). 
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commercial treaty. Fellow citizens in his community “care about each 
other’s virtue” (Politics III.9.1280b5-12). That is just why liberalism 
revolted against Aristotelianism. To care about one another’s virtue is, from 
the modern point of view, to impose my values on you. The appeal to truth 
rather than agreement has no place in a liberal democracy. In a liberal state 
governed by instrumental rationality, you and I discover that through 
working together, dividing our labour and exchanging goods, each of us can 
get more of what we want. Which things you think are good and which 
things you desire is of interest to me because I can deliberate about which of 
your desires I can satisfy at what price. Whether what you want is truly good 
or not is no concern of mine.  
 If you are my friend, though, rather than my potential customer or 
trading partner, I care about whether what you desire really is good. It is for 
this reason that truth is so dangerous and so potentially disruptive. There is a 
limit to how many friends I can have because there is a limit to how many 
people I can put up with caring about what is good for me. This is the appeal 
of liberalism, with its pluralism and tolerance, its legalism. But such peace 
comes at a price, and the price is the sacrifice of truth for agreement. Claims 
about truth and not merely agreement usually come, paradoxically, from 
excluded outsiders rejecting the myths that reject them, and such outsiders 
are the last people rulers usually regard as friends – hence my Kuhnian 
picture – but the turn to truth is a reconstitution of community in the name of 
friendship and not only justice. 
 Justice and agreement require a narrow sense of what counts as rational. 
Liberalism shows its origin as an alternative to religious civil war. In such 
situations, truth, justice, and stability require that everyone be rational in the 
narrowest possible sense, appealing only to impersonal evidence and ways 
of thinking, in order to deliberate about ends all agree to. Justice is severed 
from friendship and re-defined in terms of what is legally available. It is the 
genius of liberalism to make a political ideology out of this narrowing of 
rationality to instrumental rationality with criteria for rationality such as 
publicity, impersonality and universality. Yet there is a price to pay for such 
narrowing of practical reason, and that price becomes evident periodically 
when we do have to worry about truth.  
 A concern for truth rather than agreement changes the nature of 
community, as well as the nature of political argument and democratic 
deliberation. The important issue is how a community can orient itself to 
truth without destroying the freedom that is modern liberalism’s gift to the 
world. Agreement-seekers speak the language of freedom, democracy and 
constitutionalism, while truth seekers speak the totalitarian language of 
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coercion, whether in the name of national unity or some higher purpose. 
Here I think Aristotle can help. In the Rhetoric, there are three sources of 
persuasion: argument (logos), emotion (pathos) and character (ēthos). My 
thesis is that the friendlier we are, the more my legitimate and rational 
rhetorical appeals to you can be emotional and ethical. The more we are 
strangers, or enemies, or simply mistrust each other, the more emotional and 
ethical appeals are illegitimate and outside the art of rhetoric, and the more 
rhetoric is confined to logic. In situations of suspicion and mistrust which set 
the problem that liberalism was designed to solve, appeals to character and 
emotion as ways of encountering and communicating truth make things 
worse. 
 Disputes which are more intractable when framed in terms of an 
opposition between the rational and the emotional become more productive 
when we talk about the Aristotelian trio of ēthos, pathos and logos. Modern 
psychology encourages us to think solely in terms of a choice between the 
rational and the emotional. If those are the alternatives, then the Kuhnian 
vision of periodic alternation between rational argument about agreement 
and irrational appeals to truth makes sense. It is part of Aristotle’s genius 
instead to talk about his trio, ēthos, logos, and pathos, and it is ethical 
argument that is the way of moving from justice to friendship, from 
agreement to truth. 
 There is a circularity here, which shows why there are no simple 
solutions to the problems of truth in politics. The friendlier we are, the more 
our emotional and ethical appeals are rational and argumentative rather than 
irrational appeals to personal experience or authority. Without friendship, 
potentially rational appeals are perceived as emotional and so as potentially 
coercive. What counts as a conversation-stopper and what as a contribution 
to deliberation cannot be determined outside of context. But while, on the 
one hand, it depends on how friendly we are whether emotional and ethical 
appeals are licit, on the other hand, friendship in the relevant political sense 
depends on our having this broader sense of rationality that includes the 
emotional and the ethical. With a broader sense of rationality, we can see the 
concern for truth as a form of common reasoning and not as its own form of 
violence.6 There is, thus, a circularity between truth and reconciliation. 
                                          
6 Rorty 1994: 4: 
Moral decisions that are to be enforced by a pluralistic and democratic state’s monopoly 
in violence are best made by public discussion in which voices claiming to be God’s, or 
reason’s, or science’s, are put on a par with everybody else’s. 
For another account of how the less trust, the more narrowly logical and formalistic practical 
reasoning must be, see Strauss 1996: 924:  
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Hence the important truth behind the cliché of “confidence-building 
measures”. 
 There is always, within practice, a difference between the rational and 
the irrational, and that boundary is always subject to revision and criticism. 
Since to call something irrational is pejorative, everyone wants to claim 
rationality for themselves and to characterize others as irrational. People in 
power get to define what is rational, but that does not mean that rationality is 
only a matter of power. Concretely, modes of argument are not owned by 
one side or another, and so a way of arguing that a ruler introduces can be 
adopted by a dissenter for her own purposes. I can testify personally that the 
“same” words, drawn from the “same Bible”, sound and mean something 
completely different when they are a reading from the Old Testament during 
a Catholic mass and when they are a reading from the Hebrew Bible at a 
synagogue service.7 As Dewey put it,  
                                                                                                                             
7
When a nation does not have well established traditions, the words of its constitution are 
correspondingly more important in providing something on which people can agree. 
When a nation is just starting, it is important for political actors to be able to point to the 
text of the constitution to justify their actions. Creative interpretations of that text will 
breed distrust and make it more likely that whatever consensus exists will dissipate. 
Once people think that their political opponents are playing fast and lose with the text, 
all consensus is more likely to break down because there is so little to fall back on. Only 
by staying very close to the text – being as formalistic as possible – can political actors 
in an immature regime convince others that they are acting in good faith. By contrast, 
once a society develops political traditions, political actors can be more confident that 
their opponents, even if arguably departing from the text, will operate within the 
traditions, or will be reined in by other forces in society if they do not do so. 
Kent Greenawalt 1995:157:  
At least for many religious arguments, the speaker seems to put himself or herself in a 
kind of privileged position, as the holder of a basic truth that many others lack. This 
assertion of privileged knowledge may appear to imply inequality of status that is in 
serious tension with the fundamental idea of equality of citizens within liberal 
democracies. 
 Saperstein 1989: 59-60:  
Though one frequently hears the assertion that Christians share with Jews a profound 
commitment to the Bible as the Word of God, a cautionary note is in order. We must not 
forget that the Hebrew Bible is not the same as the Christian Old Testament, even 
though it may contain precisely the same books.…The essential story of the Hebrew 
Bible as read by Jews is quite different from that of the Old Testament as read by most 
Christians. For Jews, it is essentially a book of history and of law, providing an account 
of a people’s origin and golden age and the constitution of the legal system. For 
Christians, it is essentially a book of prophecies and types, a preparation for things to 
come, important not as history in its own right but as prefigurement and prophecy of a 
new dispensation which would make the old obsolete. Reading the same words, the 
content turns out to be quite different. 
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Even when the words remain the same, they mean something very different when they are 
uttered by a minority struggling against repressive measures, and when expressed by a group 
that has attained power and then uses ideas that were once weapons of emancipation as 
instruments for keeping the power and wealth they have obtained. Ideas that at one time are 
means of producing social change have not the same meaning when they are used as means 
of preventing social change.8 
 While I think the Aristotelian idea of ethical argument can help us to see 
how a community of truth is possible, I do not want to oversell ēthos as a 
panacea. There are certain community-building things that only ēthos can 
do, but each of Aristotle’s three sources of proof, logos, ēthos and pathos, 
can be used to make a community more open or more closed. Each can be 
used in the name of progressive and retrograde causes. Nietzsche talks about 
reasoning as a weapon of the weak, to be used against people who are strong 
enough not to need to give reasons. The strong never apologize, never 
explain. On the other hand, being rational is a mark of a ruling class, who 
rely on calm reason instead of the messy emotionalism of outsiders, whether 
women or other groups that the powerful want to think of as less civilized.9 
 Just as the purely rational can sometimes insure the stability of 
communities, sometimes restrict entrance into communities, and sometimes 
provide access to the weak, so both ēthos and pathos can be sometimes 
community building and sometimes community destroying. Consider, on 
pathos, these lines from the late US Supreme Court Justice Brennan:  
The framers [of the US Constitution] operated within a political and moral universe that had 
experienced arbitrary passion as the greatest affront to the dignity of the citizen(...). In our 
own time, (…) the greatest threat (…) is formal reason severed from the insights of passion.10  
Intensity of emotion can gain hearing for a cause where reason alone 
produces indifference. Protest movements such as prohibition of alcohol, 
anti-abortion, or vegetarianism depend on shocking the feelings, not on 
rational appeals. On the other hand, feelings of offence and outrage have 
been used to justify the status quo, as in laws against inter-racial marriage or 
homosexuality.  
 And so too for ēthos. Rational appeals to character or ethical arguments 
                                          
8 Dewey 1987, XI: 291. See too Balkin 1993: 869-891. Contrast the variability that Dewey 
observes to the demand for replicability in the sciences. 
9 Bohman 1997: 332:  
Deliberative democracy should not reward those groups who simply are better situated 
to get what they want by public and discursive means; its standard of political equality 
cannot endorse any kind of cognitive elitism. 
10 Brennan 1988: 17. Similarly, just as ēthos, logos and pathos can all be used to advance 
progressive or retrograde causes, there is nothing inherently superior about narrative rather than 
argument. For this see Garver 1999. 
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are both useful and dangerous. They can constitute and can destroy 
communities. In both cases, they are especially powerful:  
[There is persuasion] through character (ēthos) whenever the speech is spoken in such a way 
as to make the speaker worthy of credence (axiopiston); for we believe and trust (pisteuomen) 
fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in 
general and completely (pantelōs) so in cases where there is not exact knowledge (akribēs) 
but room for doubt (...) character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion. 
(I.2.1356a5-13, cf. I.9.1366a28, II.6.1384a23).  
Like logos and pathos, ēthos can cut both ways. All practical reasoning is 
based on opinions, and which opinions count – those which Aristotle calls 
endoxa – is an ethical question. Character, ēthos, and trust have been used to 
defend privilege against outsiders. “Trust me. I know what is best, and I will 
act in the interest of all, not just of one group.” On the other hand, personal 
testimony has often been used by outsiders to gain a hearing. While 
established and reputable opinions seem to limit practical reasoning to 
agreement instead of truth, the word of outsiders presents character and 
personal experience that seems to supersede reasoning in the name of truths 
accessible by more noble methods than the rational calculation that is the 
method of agreement. The friendlier we are, the more I interpret what you 
say charitably. But, too, the friendlier we are, the angrier I became when I 
think you have wronged me.  
 Character as a source of belief, conviction and persuasion sets the 
boundaries within which reasoning might then work. The certainty of 
knowledge and testimony beyond criticism can make deliberation 
unnecessary, but it can thereby destroy community. To present oneself with 
self-certainty as uniquely possessing the truth is to withdraw from 
community, and so create suspicion. Both the power and the danger of ēthos 
comes from its being beyond criticism, since we deliberate about things that 
can turn out in different ways but often need to act with single-minded 
decisions. Character is a principle from which reasoning starts. But character 
itself is not derived from reason. Because of this finality, sometimes the 
ethical – the character we impute to someone – is another name for 
prejudice; sometimes it is a form of knowledge that cannot be reduced to the 
purely rational. Because he thought that all true communities were founded 
on truth, however partial that truth sometimes is, and not merely on 
agreement, Aristotle did not need to worry about distinguishing ēthos from 
prejudice; we do.11 
                                          
11 There is thus an affinity between ēthos, as simultaneously historically contingent and 
constitutive of practical rationality, and Vico’s sensus communis and its adaptation in Gadamer. 
In opposition to the Kuhn-inspired picture of alternation between normal communities of 
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 Ethical arguments are especially worthy of attention because they occupy 
the essential political middle ground between rights and politeness, between 
instrumental rationality and the sort of friendship and love that dissolves 
personal identity, the kind which Plato thought essential to a good state and 
which Aristotle thought reduced political association to a family. 
Aristotelian political friendship is not an alternative to justice, but its 
fulfilment. Ethical argument will help us see how to aim at and acknowledge 
truth without destroying community. It allows us to negotiate the relations 
between truth and agreement as goals of political argument. The crucial 
rhetorical question for ethical argument is not whether I have a right to 
speak, or you have a duty not to prevent my speaking, but whether I should 
listen. The issue is the same whether I am talking about the ēthos which 
comprises aristocratic privilege and accumulated experience or the 
experience of the victim. For logic in the narrow sense, there is no difference 
between the question of whether I have a right to speak and whether you 
should listen. That logic is universal and so does not have to worry about 
audience, about relations between speaker and hearer. Thus the criteria for 
rationality I mentioned above, universality, publicity, independence of point 
of view, impartiality. Ethical argument allows us to raise the crucial question 
of what is worth listening to. What should I hear? What can I hear? To use 
another American example, one person might feel great pain at being 
excluded from military service because he is a homosexual, while another 
feels equally great pain when she learns that homosexual males are allowed 
to serve in the military, but we still have to answer the political question of 
which feelings of pain deserve our attention. It is only the ēthos of the 
community that can decide which emotions, and which reasons, we should 
listen to. The dispute about homosexuals in the military is precisely a dispute 
about the American ēthos.  
 The Rhetoric offers a resource, certainly indirect, for confronting the 
circularities I mentioned, that the more friendship in a community, the more 
ethical and emotional appeals count as rational, while friendship requires 
taking someone else’s discourse, be it emotional or ethical, as rational, the 
circularity that what we share is rational, and so rationality varies with 
community. It is often assumed that ethical arguments, appeals to character, 
to what “goes without saying”, “what everybody knows” are feasible only in 
a community characterized by homogeneity and consensus; in the same vein, 
it is assumed that modern states are instead characterized by a diversity that 
                                                                                                                             
agreement and period disruptions in the name of truth is the idea that criticism is possible only 
within a community of discourse, an idea elaborated in MacIntyre 1988 and 1990. 
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makes appeals to ēthos and pathos unpersuasive and sometimes coercive. 
That is why liberalism limits practical reason to instrumental reasoning, 
reasoning about means to ends we all agree on. The more diverse the 
community, the argument goes, the more limited rationality must be. 
 For Aristotle, the ēthos that is, and ought to be, the most powerful and 
authoritative source of belief must be an ēthos created by the argument. If 
we are talking about relying on a pre-existing ēthos of reputation or shared 
beliefs, then of course homogeneity and consensus are necessary for making 
ethical appeals. Just when we need ēthos the most, we cannot have it or use 
it. We have to choose between the community in which people care about 
each other’s virtue and the community which values privacy and personal 
freedom. But if by ēthos we mean ēthos created by the argument itself, then 
that presupposition of uniformity disappears.12 Rhetorical trust is not trust in 
people who agree with us, or who look like us, but trust that someone is 
speaking the truth.13  
 This limitation of ēthos to rational ēthos offers a way of understanding 
trust and friendship, the terms I have been stressing, that avoid the 
awkwardness, or worse, of imposing Aristotelian ethical concerns on 
                                          
12 Just as in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the only ēthos that counts as part of the art of rhetoric is ēthos 
constructed in argument, so in the Ethics and Politics homonoia, “being of one mind,” the closest 
Aristotle comes to talking about agreement and consensus, is not a matter of sharing beliefs, but 
of sharing dispositions to act, that is, sharing practical knowledge.  
Homonoia is not merely sharing a belief, since this might happen among people who do 
not know each other. Nor are people said to be in concord (homonoia) when they agree 
about just anything, e.g. on astronomical questions, since concord on these questions is 
not a feature of friendship. Rather a city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree 
about what is advantageous, make the same decision, and act on their common 
resolution. (Ethics IX.6.1167a22-30).  
See also Ethics IX.6.1167b3-4: Concord, then, is apparently political friendship (philia) 
(...) for it is concerned with advantage and with what affects life.  
McKeon 1957: 99. To be of one mind is not to be of one opinion. Men are of one mind 
when they possess reason to judge statements of truth, understanding to appreciate 
statements of their own values and those of others, desires ordered under freedom, and 
love of the common good for which men are associated. When men are of one mind in 
these abilities, they can be of different opinions without danger to society or to each 
other. 
13 Fuller talks about the difficulty of assessing intent in economic regulation and other non-
criminal parts of the law. He says that  
the required intent is so little susceptible of definite proof or disproof that the trier of fact 
is almost inevitably driven to asking, “Does he look like the kind who would stick by the 
rules or one who would cheat on them when he saw a chance?” This question, 
unfortunately, leads easily into another, “Does he look like my kind.” Fuller 1969: 72-3. 
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modern liberal democracies. A rhetorical reading of trust and friendship, like 
a rhetorical understanding of character, avoids the more substantively moral 
meaning of friendship, which is inappropriate for liberal democracy. Thus I 
look to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and not to his Ethics. If friendship means 
presenting one’s beliefs, desires and values as arguments and charitably 
interpreting another’s appeals as arguments, then it does not have to extend 
past the rhetorical situation itself. Similarly, there does not have to be any 
affection in the friendship and trust that are tied to argument. Rhetorically, 
when friendship is tied to argument, it is also limited to argument, recalling 
the connection, in Greek, between pistis as trust and pistis as persuasion. We 
do not have to yearn for Aristotle’s imagined polis. Caring about one 
another’s virtue, making political participation into a positive good – these 
can be interpreted rhetorically so that they do not carry connotations of 
community inappropriate for pluralistic democracy. This sort of friendship 
does not mean affection. It means treating each other as rational agents.14  
 Truth is always potentially disruptive of community. But, just as there is 
a difference in rhetoric between the kind of ēthos produced by argument and 
ēthos as pre-existent reputation, so there is a difference between an appeal to 
truths which trumps public reason – “Because of my position, or because of 
my suffering, you must defer to what I say” – and appeals to truths which 
expand public reason, and so which do not destroy community but deepen it. 
 Therefore the appeals to character that enhance deliberation and 
community are those in which such ēthos is rational, rationally generated 
and rationally received. On the other hand, and this seems to me the more 
interesting conclusion, the ultimate criterion for what counts as rational is an 
ethical criterion. There is no criterion for practical rationality apart from 
                                          
14 Politics VII.6.1327b24-1328a7: 
Thymos is the faculty of our souls which issues in love and friendship; and it is a proof 
of this that when we think ourselves slighted our spirit is stirred more deeply against 
acquaintances and friends than ever it is against strangers (...).This faculty of our souls 
not only issues in love and friendship: it is also the source for us all of any power of 
commanding and any feeling for freedom (...). It is thymos that causes affectionateness, 
for spirit is the capacity of the soul whereby we love (...). It is from this faculty that 
power to command and love of freedom are in all cases derived ).  
A city is maintained by proportionate reciprocity. For people seek to return either evil 
for evil, since otherwise [their condition] seems to be slavery, or good for good, since 
otherwise there is no exchange (Ethics V.5.1132b32-1133a2).  
Civic friendship (politikē) looks at the agreement (homologia) and to the thing (to 
pragma), but moral friendship (ethikē) at the intention (prohairesis); hence the latter is 
more just – it is friendly justice (dikaiosunē philikē) (E. E. VII.10.1243a32-34). 
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specific deliberative situations. What Arthur Fine says about scientific 
objectivity seems to me to apply equally to practical rationality, namely that 
there is no simple criterion for the rational, but that it is “trust-making”, that 
is, ēthos-making. Objectivity, he says, is  
that, in the process of inquiry, which makes for trust in the outcome of inquiry. Here 
objectivity is fundamentally trust-making not real-making (...) . There is no list of attributes 
of inquiry that necessarily make it objective. What counts as an objective procedure is 
something that needs to be tailored to the subject-matter under consideration in a way that 
generates trust. It follows that attributes like ‘unbiased’ or ‘impersonal’ may be objective here 
and not there (...) . In every case the question is whether a process marked out as objective 
makes for trust in the product.15  
The Rhetoric does not presuppose a definition of what is rational, prior to 
considerations of effective persuasion. Criteria for rationality develop as the 
art of rhetoric explores the nature of deliberation in its political context. 
What counts as rational is itself negotiated in the process of persuasion. That 
is how truth need not destroy community, even a liberal community founded 
in freedom.16 
 There is a specifically practical reason why practical rationality is 
ultimately an ethical idea. Democratic or public knowledge is not only 
knowledge that everyone has. Normally, in the individual case, if I know 
something I also know that I know. Similarly here for communities. If we 
know something, we have to know that we know. There are things that each 
of us might know, but which we do not know because it is not public 
knowledge, not democratic knowledge. We cannot acknowledge that we 
                                          
15 Fine 1998: 18. Cohen 1996: 100:  
Which considerations count as reasons? A suitable answer will take the form not of a 
generic account of reasons but of a statement of which considerations count in favour of 
proposals in a deliberative setting suited to free association among equals, where that 
setting is assumed to include an acknowledgment of reasonable pluralism. This 
background is reflected in the kinds of reason that will be acceptable. In an idealized 
deliberative setting, it will not do simply to advance reasons that one takes to be true or 
compelling; such considerations may be rejected by others who are themselves 
reasonable. One must instead find reasons that are compelling to others, acknowledging 
those others as equals, aware that they have alternative reasonable commitments, and 
knowing something about the kinds of commitments that they are likely to have – for 
example, that they have moral or religious commitments that impose what they take to 
be overriding obligations. If a consideration does not meet these tests, that will suffice 
for rejecting it as a reason. If it does, then it counts as an acceptable political reason. 
16 That criteria for practical rationality are themselves rhetorically negotiated is reason to reject 
Habermas’ hopes for a universal, procedural criterion for practical reason. The difference 
between the rational and the coercive is neither universal nor purely procedural. I agree with 
Habermas in finding the root of community in argument, and thus in practical rationality, but I 
think that ethical argument is fully rational without needing to be universal and procedural. 
Garver 234
know it, and it cannot figure in our practical deliberations. There is an 
extensive literature on the difference between public and private preferences, 
but the relation between private and public knowledge has not been explored 
in analogous ways. As an outsider, it would be silly for me to explore South 
African examples. In general, however, each citizen can know something, 
and there still can be a value to official demonstrations and symbolic 
affirmations which convert knowledge from something that each person 
knows to something that everybody knows and which therefore can figure in 
deliberations. The art of rhetoric can play a useful role in understanding how 
to convert widely distributed knowledge into shared knowledge, a rhetorical 
and rational version of Rousseau’s conversion of the will of all into the 
general will. To pick a non-controversial example from the United States, 
each citizen of that country might know that, statistically, women live longer 
than men, and white Americans longer than black Americans. However, as a 
public we are ignorant of these data. We cannot use them, for example, as 
the basis for arguing that women should pay more or less into retirement 
accounts than men, or that blacks should pay more or less than whites for 
medical insurance. Explanations of international problems in terms of 
national character no longer have a place in our public discourse. We are 
democratically ignorant of these facts, as of many other facts about race, 
gender and class. Maybe we should be. But whether we should be or not, the 
reasons we can share depend not only on what the reasons are but on who 
we are.17  
 Thus democratic knowledge is the result of argument, in which what 
each knows, becomes something that everybody knows, and so becomes part 
of the ēthos that constitutes community and is the basis for reasoned 
deliberation. That movement from the will of all to the general will should 
sometimes be resisted. This at least is what Socrates advocates when, in the 
Apology, he asks jurors to stop relying on what everybody knows and 
instead to judge as individuals. He tries to dissolve democratic knowledge 
into knowledge by individual citizens, and replace prejudice by judgment on 
                                          
17 EE VII.12.1244b29-34:  
If one were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge (to ginōskein auto kath’ auto) and 
its negation (...), there would be no difference between absolute knowledge and another 
person’s knowing instead of oneself; but that is like another person’s living instead of 
oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable.  
If it be true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of 
opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on 
the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion (Madison, 
Federalist 49). 
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the evidence. It is debatable, and was the subject of the jury’s deliberations 
in judging Socrates, whether this dissolution of democratic knowledge 
builds community or destroys it. In that case, as in every case, it is debatable 
whether truth is simply disruptive or can constitute community. 
 We may entertain the idea that democratic knowledge has as its 
counterpart democratic ignorance: things that each of us might know but 
which we as a community cannot know, and so cannot use as the basis for 
deliberations. This idea is clearer in judicial than in deliberative contexts. 
There are truths that are not admissible as evidence. If I am trying to prove 
that you are a rapist, I may not be allowed to show photographs of the 
violent effects of the assault in question, since they say nothing about 
whether you are guilty. In legal language, the “prejudicial effect” of these 
truths outweighs their “probative value”. My examples of actuarial 
differences between men and women, blacks and whites, might fit the same 
description. Articulating these differences in public is likely to have 
prejudicial effects that may outweigh any value of using knowledge of these 
differences as the basis for deliberation.18 Democratic ignorance is often the 
realm of the private. And so juries are routinely told to ignore something 
they just heard. This is a demand, not of amnesia, but that something not 
become common knowledge.19 What democracies know and what they do 
not know, what they should know and should not know, is an ethical 
question. 
 Communities of diversity and plurality are constituted by argument, 
rational processes that are oriented to truth as well as agreement. My picture 
of the nature of democratic deliberation is different from another currently 
popular supplement to liberalism, which can be traced back to the American 
political writer James Madison in the Federalist Papers (1787-1788), in 
which the process of rational deliberation takes those given preferences, 
desires and opinions of citizens, and transforms them through deliberation 
into rational desires and opinions, subject to rational criticism.20 Brute 
desires give way to rational desires. Selfish preferences are replaced by 
judgments about what is best for all. Thus Aristotle in the Politics talks 
                                          
18 There are other grounds for the inadmissibility of truth in law. One of the most interesting for 
our purposes is privilege. I cannot be forced to offer true evidence, and in some cases may not 
offer it even if I want to, if I came to know something in a manner whose confidentiality prevents 
disclosure. 
19 See Stephen 1995. One might also consider the example of the American ritual of Catholic and, 
to a lesser extend, Jewish nominees to the Supreme Court promising that their religious beliefs 
will be irrelevant to their performance as Justices. See Levinson 1990. 
20 See especially Sunstein 1984, 1986, 1991, 1996. 
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about the advantage of democracy coming from an addition of partial 
opinions into a superior joint judgment (III.11.1281b1-10; cf. III.13.1283b 
27-34). Within a stable democracy it naturally makes sense to work along 
these lines of transforming preferences into reasons through deliberation. 
But, even in stable democracies, we should be mindful of ways that the 
opposite process can occur. By being aggregated, preferences become more 
fixed, less open to criticism, less revisable. They become consensus and 
prejudice. Thus Socrates’ strategy of dissolving community into individuals 
claiming truth outside endoxa. In the Apology, Socrates tries to remake the 
jury into a set of individuals rather than a corporate body. 
 Socrates’ example should make us pause: sometimes instead of a gain in 
rationality, deliberation results in agreement that is equivalent to prejudice. 
It is not selfishness that is sacrificed but truth. What makes community 
rational is the outsider attacking community in the name of truth, as Socrates 
does. On my account, the deliberative process makes our desires and 
opinions ethical as much as it makes them rational, as it makes a plurality of 
people into a community. Every community is limited, as it is constituted, by 
the things it knows and cannot know. Making our desires and opinions 
ethical can mean hardening them into prejudices as well as making them the 
basis for deliberation towards truth. 
 And so the ominous truth of the La Rochefoucauld epigram which I set 
at the top of this article. If friendships are sometimes enhanced by ignorance, 
it is often just the kind of ignorance I am describing here, where both friends 
may themselves as individuals know something, but, by leaving it unsaid, 
stop the knowledge from being shared, reciprocal knowledge. Each knows, 
but they do not know that the other knows, or at least do not have to 
acknowledge that the other knows. Communities in a similar position 
possess democratic ignorance.  
 But this idea of democratic knowledge, as well as democratic agreement, 
gives grounds for hope as well. What we know and who we are vary 
together. The process of bringing truth to a community is not finished when 
each becomes aware of something. It is the community as a whole which 
must do the knowing. That is a job for rational persuasion, for trust and 
friendship, that goes beyond ēthos in the individual and community-
disrupting sense. The interesting challenge for truth in politics is to move 
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POSTSCRIPT 
 
ARISTOTLE IN AFRICA 
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE AFRICANIST1 READING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION  
 
Wim van Binsbergen2 
 
ABSTRACT. In this Postscript to the collection Truth in Politic: Rhetorical Approaches to 
Democratic Deliberation in Africa and beyond, the author argues that its project, while at first 
superficial glance appearing to deal with abstruse topics of limited applicability (a reading of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in terms of Aristotelian rhetoric), in fact 
addresses phenomena of the greatest significance for the African continent as a whole, thus 
taking up major debates in Quest over the years. These include: the reflection on the 
philosophical canon (in this case: Aristotle and rhetoric); the development of an African 
philosophy that is relevant to major current transformations on the African continent – in this 
case the viability of the state, democracy, reconciliation and freedom; that is critically and 
radically aware of the global hegemonic context in which it is being produced; and that yet 
situates itself, globally, in the field of tension between the universal and the particular. In this 
way, this Postscript both situates, and vindicates, the present collection, and offers a manifesto 
for Quest in the future. 
 
 
Introduction: Why this Postscript 
 
I whole-heartedly share the conviction of my fellow-editors (Philippe-Joseph 
Salazar and Sanya Osha), as to the quality and the relevance of this 
collection. Its project, i.e. seeking to elucidate contemporary African politics 
(and particularly the epoch-making 1994-1998 Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa) in the light of Aristotelian rhetoric, directly 
addresses the raison d’être of Quest as an African journal of philosophy. 
Especially in this first issue of Quest under my responsibility, I feel it is not 
out of character (to use an expression from Aristotle’s philosophy of virtue) 
for me to examine, in this Postscript, this collection as a coherent whole, and 
to highlight its dilemmas and solutions. I thus build on the shorter overview 
presented, in the Foreword, by Philippe-Joseph Salazar, who was the main 
intellectual and organizing force behind the conference on which the present 
1 Cf. the footnote on p. 7 of this volume.  
2 I am indebted to my fellow-editors Philippe-Joseph Salazar and Sanya Osha for constructive 
remarks on an earlier version of this argument. However, the responsibility for this argument’s 
shortcomings and one-sidedness is entirely mine. 
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collection is based. Far from disqualifying the various contributions in this 
volume for the specific disciplinary and geographical and temporal focus 
they each take, my aim is to bring out their potential to contribute to what, 
through major debates featuring some of the great names in African 
philosophy, have been the leading themes in Quest through the years:  
 
1. the reflection on the philosophical canon, both in the North Atlantic and 
in Africa (with possible extensions towards the world’s other philosoph-
ical traditions, in Islam, Judaism, India, China, the New World, etc.);  
2. the conceptual and theoretical effort to develop African philosophy into a 
tool that illuminates, by comparison and contrast, current socio-political 
developments on the African continent; 
3. the critical reflection on the North Atlantic dominated, hegemonic 
context in which African knowledge production takes place today, and 
the formulation of radical anti-hegemonic alternatives; and finally 
4. the exploration of the possibilities for an intercultural production of 
knowledge that, while affirming its specific (e.g. African) roots in space 
and time, yet situates itself in the field of tension between the universal 
and the particular. 
 
 Applying these themes to the present volume implies assessment, and 
therefore deviation from the editorial pretence of neutrality. Considering the 
seriousness of the matters we are dealing with, such may be inevitable. Even 
in a book centring on rhetoric, elegance cannot always take precedence over 
what is perceived (albeit from an individual standpoint) as relevance. While 
most authors in this collection prefer the Aristotle of Rhetoric,3 exploring 
(by Aristotle’s own definition4) the possibilities of persuasion, others feel 
more comfortable with the Aristotle of Organon,5 exploring the possibilities 
of arriving at a literal truth through formal procedures. The latter approach 
implies a more compelling, less malleable and less performative conception 
of truth than the former, even6 in intercultural matters like those at stake in 
this volume. The four objectives outlined above are full of contradictions, 
                                          
3 The locus classicus of rhetoric is, of course, Aristotle’s book of that name, available in a number 
of modern editions and translations, including: Aristotle 1926, 2001, 1991. In the present volume, 
the contributions particularly by Salazar, Cassin and Garver contain essential pointers to the main 
issues, and important classic and recent writings, in the field of rhetoric. For the application of 
rhetoric as an analytical tool in the South African context today, see the brilliant Salazar 2002. 
For an excellent recent collection also cf. Bernard-Donals & Glejzer 1998.  
4 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1, 1355b26.  
5 Cf. Aristotle, Organon, numerous editions e.g. Aristotle 1938, 1960. 
6 van Binsbergen 2003b. 
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each in themselves and the four of them in their combination; so is 
contemporary Africa, South Africa, the relation between South Africa and 
the rest of the African continent; so is my own (and our contributors’!) 
personal and professional positioning in all these issues. It would be a 
miracle, indeed a rare feat of rhetoric, if we had managed to keep all these 
contradictions nicely tucked under the blanket of polite but superficial 
editorial apotropaic formulae (or of silence, which is even more polite).  
 Avoidance of critical elements would also have been counter-productive, 
considering the fact that from its inception Quest has boasted to be a context 
of philosophical discussions – which necessitates bringing out contradictions 
into the open, not in order to force them in a particular direction that happens 
to suit a particular author’s personal, political and disciplinary outlook, but 
so that they can be further addressed by regular and respectful debate. 
Therefore, this Postscript is not intended to overrule the preceding 
contributions with a last word of editorial power, but to honour them by 
initiating the discussion to which they, and the major issues they deal with, 
are entitled.  
 Indeed, considering the robust foundation of the present collection in a 
well-established philosophical tradition (that of rhetoric) which is gaining 
more and more in recognition and popularity in recent years, and in 
profound and unmistakable, responsible scholarly grappling with the 
democratic transformation of South Africa as one of the most significant 
processes affecting the African continent in recent decades, there is no 
reason why the debate to which the present collection seeks to contribute, 
should not already begin within the pages of the present collection, in this 
Postscript. In fact, that debate already started during this collection’s original 
conference. I was not there, but if I had been there, my paper and my 
contribution to the discussions would have been along the following, mainly 
constructive lines. Part of what I have to say, serves to bring across my own 
professional views of Africa to rhetoricians; but much of what I have to say 
is rather intended to elucidate, and vindicate, the rhetoric deployed in the 





The rhetorical tradition emerged nearly two and a half millennia ago in 
Ancient Greece, founded by the Sophists (foremost Protagoras), developed 
and formalized by Aristotle of Stagira, and further taken up by, among 
others, Cicero in Rome two centuries later. After a chequered existence in 
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subsequent centuries it recently received a new lease of life in the context of 
Nietzsche-inspired relativism and anti-foundationalism, postmodernism, 
globalization, and the proliferation of intercultural and transcultural 
communication settings. This volume’s arguments are inspired, not by the 
Aristotle of Organon but by the Aristotle with a keen sense of the practical 
negotiation of truth in concrete political deliberation – a practice he got to 
know inside-out as a Macedonian migrant spending much of his working life 
in distant Athens. Little surprisingly, Aristotle, like Plato,7 was rather critical 
of the dēmokratia of his time.8 Having participated in that city’s intellectual 
life for decades (the last twelve years as head of the Lukeion school), 
Aristotle finally became more or less democracy’s victim himself when, 
after his former pupil Alexander the Great’s death in 323, and, “lest Athens 
should sin twice against philosophy” (the first time being the judicial murder 
of Socrates in 399 BCE), our philosopher had to flee that glorious city for 
the Aegean island of Euboea, where he died within a year.9  
 The Stagirite’s ghost may rest in peace: given Alexander’s short life this 
time table forensically exonerates Aristotle from the Afrocentrist allegations 
to the effect that he stole the contents of his books from “Africa”, i.e. from 
the Ancient Egyptian temple academies (prw cankh, “houses of life”) 
subjugated through Alexander’s conquest of Egypt. Such allegations were 
initiated by the great USA Black emancipationalist Marcus Garvey (1887-
1940), subsequently elaborated by G.G.M. James,10 and since enshrined in 
the Afrocentric canon. Lefkowitz and Howe have convincingly refuted them. 
However, the well-informed initiator of the Black Athena debate, Martin 
Bernal, treats James’ allegations with considerable patience. And for some 
reason:11 although the specifics of an Egypt-Aristotle connection are 
extremely improbable, yet it is with the present state of scholarship simply 
undeniable that already before the Hellenistic amalgamation of West and 
East, the Ancient Near East including Egypt was a major source for the 
emerging Greek mythology, philosophy, science, technology, and aesthetics. 
The extent to which Ancient Egypt can count as an integral part of “Black”, 
sub-Saharan Africa is a different question, and one so complex and so highly 
politicized that we cannot treat it within the present, limited scope.  
 Therefore, whatever (pace Nethersole, this volume) the considerable 
                                          
7 Plato, Republic.  
8 Cf. Aristotle Politics (1932) IV (VI) 1, VI (VII) 1-8 ; Bierens de Haan 1943. 
9 McKeon 2001. 
10 James 1973. 
11 Lefkowitz 1994, 1996; Howe 1999. For the opposite view, see Bernal 1987-1991; cf. van 
Binsbergen 1996, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, where I identify as a moderate Afrocentrist myself. 
van Binsbergen 242
merits of the Afrocentrist position in general, Africa cannot appropriate 
Aristotelian thought as if the latter could only be fully understood against an 
African background.12  
 Alternatively, however, much of the present volume would appear, if 
only at first and superficial glance, to revive the opposite, Eurocentric 
dream: the view that processes in contemporary Africa may be uniquely 
understood by the application of models of democracy, politics, rhetoric and 
public truth evolved (perhaps even initiated) in Ancient Greece, – the very 
same Ancient Greece that was alleged by Eurocentric identity construction 
from the 18th to the 20th century CE (and even in some passages in the 
present book – as if the Black Athena debate never took place) to be the 
unique cradle of European civilization, two and a half millennia ago.  
 With its reliance on rhetoric as a philosophical sub-discipline, this 
volume’s intellectual genealogy goes back directly to the origins of the 
Western philosophical tradition. This suffices to indicate the philosophical 
relevance of the present collection. Given the orientation of Quest: An 
African Journal of Philosophy, it is the African relevance that may still need 
to be argued, beyond the over-obvious point that South Africa (whose 1994-
1998 Truth and Reconciliation Commission – TRC – features centrally in 
this collection) is a part of Africa and that therefore the recent developments 
in that country are African issues. Beyond the wider issues enumerated in 
the four points above, this volume’s more specific, and especially 
comparative, Africanist relevance can be argued on at least two counts:  
 
                                          
12 This does not rule out that the Ancient Greek democratic structures, and their rhetoric, as 
described by Aristotle, originally may have sprung from a very wide-spread and ancient complex 
of pre-statal local democracy, in which local communities largely run their own affairs on the 
basis of the peer deliberations of local men in frequent assemblies from which women in 
reproductive age, children, and strangers, are excluded. Traces of this complex which may still 
found in rural communities all over the Mediterranean including North Africa. But in fact its 
distribution is much wider and includes much of rural Asia and rural Africa. In the latter 
continent (but in close parallel with, for instance, Ancient Germania) the man’s assembly – often 
included in a small local sacred forest area – is a common feature in many village environments, 
and the community process largely hinges on village moots. The complex is even found in the 
New World. Therefore it is likely to go back to the Upper Palaeolithic, like most cultural and 
linguistic Old-World communalities that are not due to recent globalization. From the bird’s eye 
perspective of the several millions of years of human cultural history, Ancient Athens and village 
Africa far from belong to totally different worlds. Bernal (1993) suggests specific Phoenician 
influence on the democratic patterns of Greek city states, but while this is in line with the general 
Asian and African formative influence on emerging Ancient Greek culture and society, it is – as 
usual with Bernal – too narrow an explanation in that it misses the point that Ancient Greece 
shared a common linguistic and cultural origin with many Asian and African societies even 
before the three components in this equation started to specifically influence each other.  
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a. the need for socio-political reconstruction throughout the African 
postcolony13 of the 1990s and 2000s, and 
b. the possibility that, despite the glorious transition to majority rule, and 
despite whatever healing and morale-boosting effects the TRC, the 
African Renaissance, and ubuntu may have had, South Africa since the 
advent of democratic majority rule in 1994 may yet have proceeded 
somewhat in the direction of becoming another African postcolony. 
 




The TRC and Africa (a): Reconstruction in the African postcolony? 
 
In the first place, myriad threads of demographic, linguistic, cultural and 
historical continuity link South Africa with the rest of Africa, and since the 
establishment of majority rule even South Africa’s social exclusion from 
that continent has been lifted. However, the wider comparative African 
applicability of the TRC case, and of a rhetorical approach to the TRC, as 
advocated in the present collection, goes further than this nominal point. 
Considering the global flow of information and political aspirations, it 
cannot have been by accident that the beginning of the end of apartheid in 
South Africa (Nelson Mandela’s release from long-term imprisonment in 
1990) followed shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall, and more or less 
coincided with massive national democratization movements elsewhere in 
Africa. These movements (to which Kouvouama’s contribution in the 
present collection refers) clamoured against the devastation of African 
postcolonial polities as a result of such national ills as constitutional 
unaccountability, large-scale corruption and embezzlement, illegal use of 
violence, capturing of the state by a minority defined in ethnic, region or 
class terms, etc.  
 The experiences of “the African postcolony” in the 1980s very clearly 
demonstrate that apartheid may be a sufficient condition to corrupt and 
destroy a state, but that it was, and is, not a necessary condition: other 
African states have collapsed, in the same period and more recently, due to 
the very different factors listed above. These processes have often acerbated 
in the 1990s, have combined with global pressures wrecking African 
national economies and facilitating civil war, and as a result in nearly a 
                                          
13 Cf. Mbembe 1992, 2001; Osha 2000; Werbner 1997; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999.  
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dozen African countries (out of just over fifty) the state now only exists on 
paper. There, the socio-political fabric is destroyed by internal strife and 
absence of consensus, and a national reconstruction comparable to what was 
envisaged in the TRC would be called for.  
 In the present collection, the contributions by Osha (Nigeria) and 
Kouvouama (Congo-Brazzaville) briefly explore this parallel between these 
two African countries, and South Africa under the TRC; but also other 
countries come to mind, e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Congo-
Kinshasa, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Burundi, while a reconstruction process 
actually is going on in Rwanda and Uganda. Both authors go about their 
analysis in a remarkably un-rhetorical fashion: they identify themselves as 
African actors, and they parade, in their argument, other such actors who, in 
the democratization wave of the early 1990s and in Nigeria’s more recent 
return to democracy, insist on the literal, metaphysical and moral truth in 
politics, and on seeing that truth brought out and lived by in everyday 
political life. Also, both authors forego the chance of comparatively 
assessing, reversely, what the Nigerian and Congolese experiences could 
mean for our understanding of South Africa.  
 The very rhetoric explored in the present volume in itself aptly describes 
(in its dissociation of politics and ethics, in its view of truth as primarily the 
outcome of the skilful situational management of words) some of the main 
perversions of politics in the African postcolony – the kind of perversions 
the democratization wave of the early 1990s battled against throughout 
Africa. These perversions also seem to indicate some of the possible steps in 
what racialist opponents of African democratic majority rule in South Africa 
have always invoked as an doom scenario, notably that country’s possible 
transformation into a (special type of) postcolony: 
The key to Protagoras’ paradox here (“everyone has justice, and those who do no have it must 
be killed”) is the following: Everyone is just, even those who are not. They must pretend to be 
just and that is all they need to be just “in a certain way”. In affirming that they are just, they 
recognize justice as constitutive of the human community and by so doing justice itself is 
integrated in the city – in a way, it is the praise of virtue by vice that universalizes virtue 
(Cassin, this volume).  
 Plato failed, practically (in the Syracuse episodes, 367 and 361-360 
BCE) to install philosophers at the head of the state, just as he fails to 
convince, theoretically (in his Republic),14 that such would be a desirable 
arrangement. However, when philosophers/rhetoricians begin to articulate, 
as established socio-political practice and perhaps even as a form of social 
                                          
14 Plato 1975. Popper 1957 is a major and passionate critique of Plato’s position on this point.  
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virtue, the very sleight-of-hand in the public negotiation of truth for which 
politicians have been notorious for millennia, including modern African 
politicians, then we have a very different proposition from Plato’s, notably: 
philosophers who “tell it like it is” and who thereby may well deserve their 
seats next to the actual rulers: 
Protagoras’ analysis goes beyond being applicable to the TRC’s practice and the TRC as a 
model for deliberation within reconciliatory politics. It shows two things: Firstly, that 
repenting, the apology or the request of pardon, is that much less necessary since “the one 
who does not infringe justice is a fool”. (Cassin, this volume; italics added WvB) 
 African philosophers, including Hountondji, Gyekye and Osha,15 have 
spoken out vehemently against African politicians’ unconstitutional and, in 
general, unlawful use of power, and against the high levels of corruption that 
are usual in that context. While the rhetoric-based approach is undeniably 
realistic and illuminating as a description of practice, does it merely 
identify an evil to be exposed? or should it be considered to offer a model 
for emulation?  
 In the words of Philippe-Joseph Salazar, this collection’s emphasis on 
rhetoric has the explicit aim of contributing to the instruments that may 
enable South Africa to become and remain a viable democracy. Can we 
extend the application of rhetoric to postcolonial Africa as a whole? Let us 
realize that many Africans, including South Africans, and especially those 
outside the circle of elites controlling or at least exploiting the state and the 
economy, have a less cynical understanding of democratic politics than the 
one advocated by Protagoras. This is in fact a contrapuntal theme running 
through this entire collection, in complement to the element of a-moral 
verbal manipulation studied by rhetoric. In Garver’s words (this collection):  
On the other hand, and this seems to me the more interesting conclusion, the ultimate 
criterion for what counts as rational is an ethical criterion. 
And the same dilemma of moral truth that is capable of being transmuted, in 
the hands of politicians, into a usable, manipulative truth that no longer 
                                          
15 Hountondji 1991; Gyekye 1997; Osha 2004. It is important to note that these African 
philosophers condemn corruption and the abuse of power, not so much by reference to any 
traditional, precolonial African value or philosophical thought, but by cosmopolitan reference to 
such modern principles implied to be more or less universal: constitutional order, justice, and 
human rights. In Kouvouama’s words (this volume):  
But the Sovereign National Convention has also been a place of violent expression, 
where violent words condemned armed violence. In Paulin Hountondji’s opinion, 
speech, which is part of parliamentary culture, needs to be found not only within African 
cultures, i.e. palaver culture, but also within the French parliamentary culture of 1789, 
where speech was radical, exigent and rebellious. 
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unites but divides and excludes, informs Nethersole’s contribution, where 
(critically continuing the debate on the African Renaissance), she concludes 
that  
In the retrieval of the forgotten, hidden, masked and obscured stories, historical truth, as 
uncovered by the TRC for instance, can, imbued with moral justice, speak the truth to 
political power in relation to the excluded. In as much as the African Renaissance seeks to 
build an image of the African as one constructed by himself/herself and not by others for the 
purpose of building his/her own development with his/her own hands, the project is 
concerned, like the TRC, with historical truth. However, where the African Renaissance turns 
into identity politics in order to achieve political power, the historical truth is jettisoned for 
the sake of exclusivity. For truth as seen to be residing in identity is no longer plural, 
relational, and deliberative. Instead of being a “sensuous force” of exchange between diverse 
and distinct people who have to share the same country and the same, increasingly 
globalizing world, an undue emphasis upon the claim to ethnic, authentic identity is in danger 
of rendering the “coin” of truth into useless “metal”. (Nethersole, this volume)  
Rhetoric helps us to pinpoint some of the defects of the political situation in 
the African postcolony, and (when rhetoric is applied to a process of national 
reconstruction like the South African TRC) it clearly offers us perceptive 
insights into some of the remedying mechanisms.  
 
 
The TRC and Africa (b):The model of the African postcolony as a sword of 
Damocles hanging over democratic South Africa 
 
Meanwhile, in the second place, in addition to the possible application of the 
TRC model to other African countries, the new South Africa has been up 
against cynical, anti-democratic and racialist critics who have suspended the 
threatening model of the African postcolony over South Africa, and who 
cannot wait to see this sword of Damocles drop and destroy all that hope, 
heroism, generosity and hard work have built and are still building. So far 
they have been proven wrong, yet it is generally admitted that there are 
worrying tendencies in post-apartheid South Africa, in such respects as the 
eroding national consensus; the widening gap between generations, classes, 
and genders; the excessive crime rate; the oligarchization and primitive 
accumulation attending the partial Africanization of the elite; the progressive 
installation of a politics of make-believe (as in state pronouncements on 
HIV/AIDS); and the rigid (although inevitable, and democratically 
supported) control over the South African state by the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC).  
 Osha in his contribution explains why the equivalent of South Africa’s 
TRC could not work in a post-colony like Nigeria today, despite a return to 
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democracy: the new regime is too closely associated with the ancient regime 
than that it could afford “full disclosure” on TRC lines. But was the South 
African situation with the TRC really fundamentally different?  
 
 
When does disclosure bring catharsis?  
 
Did the TRC’s “full disclosure” bring the catharsis that was hoped for and 
that – many would deem – was indispensable for the country’s future? The 
fact that, traded off against “full disclosure”, the perpetrators of apartheid 
got away with amnesty without further incrimination or punishment, might 
lead one to suggest that also in the South African case there was – under 
comparable conditions of successfully established post-conflict democracy – 
a comparable kind of continuity with the evil past, a comparable 
impossibility of making a clean break, as in Nigeria. This is a crucial 
question to ask in relation to the TRC. If the answer would turn out to be 
affirmative, in the sense that the TRC (rather than constituting a cathartic 
break with the past) would be found to be primarily a manipulative cover-up 
of the past, then not only our image of the new South Africa would be 
tarnished, but also many of the rhetoric-inspired contributions in the present 
collection would have to be faulted for being over-optimistic and idealistic. 
We therefore will let the argument have its full contradictory course, before 
finally coming to a conclusion that confirms the TRC to be a fundamental 
and historic transformation of South African society – in fact (or so I will 
argue) the very birth of the South African nation – in, through such a 
conclusion, the value of the rhetoric approach will be highlighted. 
 First then, as from the devil’s advocate, some of the doubts which too 
positive a reading of the TRC would have to accommodate.  
 As stressed by Barbara Cassin in the present volume, in the TRC there 
was the nominal equivalent of the Ancient Greek isēgoria,16 the fundamental 
democratic right to speak; but what is the benefit of such speaking, when it 
only lifts the burden of not having spoken out from one’s pained heart, while 
one’s words – one’s disclosures and accusations – carry no effect in the 
sense of legal action being taken against the perpetrators? Does not such a 
right to speak amount, after the lifting of apartheid, to a new subordination, 
this time justified not by reference to alleged “racial”17 inferiority but by 
                                          
16 Albeit that, in ways that could have been acknowledged more explicitly in this collection, such 
a right was reserved to male free citizens, excluding women, slaves and foreigners (metoikoi), 
who together formed the great bulk of the Athenian population, and the heart of the economy. 
17 Contrary to such concepts as “class”, “caste”, “ethnic identity” etc., “race” is not a scientific 
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reference to the common good of living together peacefully? Is the common 
good consciously perceived by all South Africans, and by all in the same 
terms?  
 These are some of the questions I will consider in the following pages. 
For answers, it is simply not good enough to appeal (as our contributions 
frequently do) to Hannah Arendt’s notion of politics as “story-telling”, if we 
wish to bring out all the layers of power, agency and pain that are involved. 
Was the TRC’s “full (but repercussion-less) disclosure” perhaps a case of 
repressive tolerance, so that peaceful transition to democratic rule could be 
forced down the throat of the majority of the population, despite its long 
years of suffering and its pent-up indignation – thus leaving the country’s 
infrastructure and basic class structure largely intact, at the price of a 
substantial replacement of White by Black elites? For clarity’s sake: we are 
still in with the devil’s advocate, still in the process of setting up our 
argument’s props so that the final, positive conclusion can be reached (in the 
section of the nation’s birth pangs, below). I am not advocating that South 
Africa’s coming to terms with the perpetrators of apartheid should have 
been more revengeful and bloody. But if the frame of reference for such 
coming-to-terms appears to be one-sidedly set by the political desire to 
placate Christian,18 upper-class and White19 concerns, and to ignore the 
historic African tradition except by pressing into service the nice, forgiving 
                                                                                                                             
concept but, instead, a local collective representation, explicitly and consciously (in 
anthropological parlance, “emically”) used by members of specific societies in the past and at 
present in order to articulate and explain, among themselves, socially constructed difference. 
South Africa and the USA are among the few societies today where “race” functions as such a 
collective representation at the emic level, in the sense that it can still be used in polite 
conversation and in official expressions. Unfortunately, Afrocentrists have often copied this 
usage, even though it lies at the root of the very oppression they are battling against.  
18 As Doxtader quotes Tutu (1994: 223) in the present collection: 
The victims of injustice and oppression must be ready to forgive. That is a gospel 
imperative. (Italics added, WvB). 
Despite the presence of historic African and Asian expressions and the local growth of Islam, 
there is no denying that Christianity has established itself as the dominant public expression of 
spirituality in South Africa throughout all segments of the population. Considering that it was 
also invoked to justify apartheid, an appeal to Christian imperatives is not exactly without 
contradiction. But an important point, and I will repeat it throughout this article, is that 
Christianity never was the only spiritual expression in South Africa, especially not in the 
uncaptured recesses of private life, among people of African descent in rural areas and informal 
urban communities, and among Asian-derived segments of the population.  
19 As Osha quotes Tutu (1996: 43) in the present collection:  
in the matter of amnesty, no moral distinction is going to be made between acts 
perpetrated by liberation movements and acts perpetrated by the apartheid dispensation.  
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aspects of ubuntu,20 then how can one expect true cleansing and liberation 
from the past, genuine catharsis to have taken place? How can such a move 
be conceptualised? This is the central question I shall try to answer in this 
paper. The rhetoric-inspired analyses in the volume will help us greatly in 
finding the answer, but in the process we will have to add to them – at least, 
that was my impression – a conceptual analysis in terms of the varieties of 
transcendentalism and immanentalism, which help pinpoint the specific 
frame of thought, and the specific context of political organization 
(appreciably different from that of Ancient Greece and Rome), in which 
apartheid, as well as the TRC, can be more precisely situated.  
 Doubt that the TRC was effectively, and exclusively, about a catharsis of 
forgiving that was inevitably to take place, is not entirely absent in the 
present volume. Thus Samarbakhsh-Liberge points out the aporia that arises 
when, like in the case of the TRC, excessive emphasis on national consensus 
thwarts the formulation of profoundly unwelcome home truths – of which, 
of course, apartheid offered one interminable series. From Villa-Vicencio’s 
sensitive contribution we glean:  
I would rather offer the comment of a young woman named Kalu; it highlights the 
internalized emotions inherent to the transition from the old to the new: (...) 
What really makes me angry about the TRC and Tutu is that they are putting pressure on 
me to forgive (…). I don’t know if I will ever be able to forgive. I carry this ball of anger 
within me and I don’t know where to begin dealing with it. The oppression was bad, but 
what is much worse, what makes me even angrier, is that they are trying to dictate my 
forgiveness.  
Her words capture the pathos involved in the long and fragile journey towards reconciliation. 
No one has the right to prevail on Kalu to forgive. (Villa-Vicencio, this volume).  
 
“Pain is not an argument” 
 
This passage from Villa-Vicencio is one of the few instances in this 
collection where disloyalty is shown vis-à-vis an otherwise carefully 
maintained consensus among the contributors: the view that a person’s pain 
and sorrow do not constitute grounds for political, legal or historical 
consideration.  
 In the more technically rhetorical pieces, the position is advocated that 
                                          
20 While ignoring a major Southern African historic value, very much implied in ubuntu: the 
adamant refusal to give quarter to sorcerers – as the perpetrators of apartheid are from a 
traditional perspective, having indulged in a cult of power that transgresses the codes of 
humanity. Cf. van Binsbergen 2001.  
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such consideration would rent the fabric of the political community – like 
the Athenians’ argument on amnesia and amnesty in 403 BCE, elegantly and 
illuminatingly analysed in this collection by Barbara Cassin, in the footsteps 
of Nicole Loraux. Such a position does not preclude even, apparently, a 
measure of technical admiration for the craftsmanship invested in the 
instruments through which pain and sorrow were inflicted:  
When Philippe-Joseph Salazar evokes the South African apartheid legislation, the Population 
Registration Act 30 of 1950, he rightly pitches his analysis at the level of language itself:  
One could admire the linguistic feats of the Lycurgus of Southern Africa (Salazar 
1998: 27).  
The South African Act is well and truly that of a “nomothete” which transforms the meaning 
of words... (Cassin, this collection). 
 Aristotle provides21 extensive discussions of emotions, and the political 
implications of his views have been receiving renewed attention recently.22 
It is not he who rules out emotions from the political domain. That they are 
yet largely absent from this collection,23 may be due to the fact that in this 
book Aristotelian rhetoric is often filtered through a remarkable combination 
of French rationalist thought (which ever since Descartes has had no room 
for emotions), and the more general North Atlantic tradition of positive law, 
where the impassionate and the objective represent lofty ideals, and contain 
the promise of a solution, a way out. Hence the paucity of references to the 
existential dimension of pain and suffering even in Hajjar’s excellent socio-
legal piece on torture as an aspect of, particularly, the suffering of the 
Palestinian people, in the present collection. The same view (“pain is not an 
argument”) is also manifest in Samarbakhsh-Liberge’s piece on the 
representation of history in the recent South African situation. Inspired by 
the millennia of suffering of the Jewish people, Jitay’s contribution comes 
perhaps closest to articulating the alternative view. He typically does so by 
reference to a long-ago situation (the destruction of the Temple of Solomon 
in 587 BCE), at a time when, and in a place where, politics and law had not 
yet completely fissioned into domains of their own to such an extent that 
they could already be thought of as (semi-)autonomous vis-à-vis religion, or 
                                          
21 Notably in his Nicomachean Ethics, and Rhetoric.  
22 Cf. Sokolon 2002, and extensive references cited there. 
23 Cf. Garver, this collection: 
but we still have to answer the political question of which feelings of pain deserve our 
attention. 
But his answer, however sympathetic, is in terms of a rationality away from pain.  
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vis-à-vis the everyday life of production and reproduction. For only when 
such complete fission is a fact, can the political domain pretend to be 
impervious to pain.  
 What, then, are the preconditions for such impermeability? Still slowly 
proceeding towards the promised, positive conclusion concerning the TRC’s 
significance, we will try identify these preconditions in the following 
discussion of transcendence in the statal domain.  
 
 
The transcendent state as a precondition for apartheid 
 
One of apartheid’s main justification strategies was its painstaking legalism, 
which added the pretence of utter legality to everything done in the name of 
apartheid, and to the format in which it was done. This has further enhanced 
tendencies already excessively developed in North Atlantic modern society: 
the reliance on the written word as an immensely powerful source of legal 
authority;24 on the constitutionally empowered institutions to create, 
maintain and legitimate (through words) such legal authority; and on formal, 
bureaucratically-organized organizations in which this word is carried out to 
become practice. Like its cousin, nazism, apartheid, with its illusory 
legalism, is not just a form of barbaric atavism and nothing more. Both 
forms of political perversion could only be a product of a modern, rationally 
organized, highly literate society, where the power of the written word 
carries the transcendence needed to be able to think and act beyond the here 
and now of personal relationships, beyond personal identification and 
charity based on face-to-face contact, in which the recognition of shared 
humanity is normally inevitable. Apartheid did not preclude condescending 
friendly relations between bosses and workers, between nannies and their 
charges; but neither did such relations preclude apartheid.  
 Transcendence is not a universal capability of human thought – on the 
contrary, it is a very specific mental stance which, although universally 
implied in the capacity of words to refer beyond the here and now, only 
comes to full fruition in concrete historical settings that are informed by 
writing, the state, an organized priesthood, and science. These institutions 
are achievements that, in human history, only emerged (in highly productive 
combinations) in the Ancient Near East c. 5,000 years ago. These institu-
tions have informed the thought and action of selected (especially literate) 
minorities of specialists in all continents including Africa in the subsequent 
                                          
24 Weber 1969.  
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millennia, endowing them with the capability of controlling (even 
vicariously and virtually, in their absence or after their death) socio-political 
situations, and of freely experimenting with thought, science and religion 
through the power of the abstract word. (In the most literal sense the word, 
and especially the written word, is mightier than the sword, for it is only the 
word that enables people to exercise command across vast expanses of space 
and time, whereas sheer violence is confined to the here and the now. 
Therefore, it is the word, not physical violence, that creates the trans-
cendence of states, although violence is an almost indispensable factor in 
maintaining such transcendence.) However, outside such specialist minority 
contexts, human thought and action have remained, in great majority, geared 
to the immanence of immediacy, personal experience, and the human scale. 
Only relatively exceptionally, through generalized literacy, extensive 
involvement in formal organizations (of the state, private enterprise, and 
religious, professional and recreational self-organization), and extensive 
conversion to formalistic, abstract participation in world religions, could this 
immanence significantly give way to transcendent stances among the 
majority of local populations. Cities and the formal sector are the world’s 
seats of transcendence. Villages and kin groups tend to remain the seats of 
immanence. Since human reproduction usually takes place in the intimate 
circle of kin groups, humans almost invariably start life as immanentalists,25 
only gradually learning language, which although usually limited to 
everyday immanentalist contexts, does opens the door towards writing, the 
state, the law, science, and God – in short, towards transcendence.  
 By implication, the dissociation of the political sphere from the 
productive and reproductive sphere is very far from a universal given, but 
occurs only in contexts where transcendence (notably, in the form of the 
state) is firmly established as a historical achievement.26  
                                          
25 There is nothing more immanentalist than the infant engulfed by its mother’s total presence. By 
the same token, there is nothing more transcendentalist than male attempts to conceal, through the 
power of their word, the fact that they lack the essential organs (uterus and breasts) of visible, 
undeniable reproduction. This suggests that a gender contradiction may often attend the 
contradiction between immanentalism and transcendentalism. Such a contradiction is very 
conspicuous in the creation stories of the Ancient Near East, which belong to the initial period of 
the emergence of writing, the state, organized priesthood, and science. In these stories’ most 
sophisticated recensions, male gods (such as Marduk, and YHWH) establish their right to rule 
through an act of creation, not from their own body or from that of the earth, but by the power of 
their word. Note that the immanently reproducing female (Tiamat, the earth, the snake, 
Leviathan) is such gods’ moral enemy, even if in the Genesis account of the creation of man an 
older, female dispensation still shimmers through. Cf. Fromm 1976: 231f; Pritchard 1969. 
26 Pace Cassin, who in her paper repeatedly assumes “the autonomy of the political” to be a 
universal given that may be invoked with the same confidence in the case of modern South Africa 
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 The apartheid state (with its abstract denial of the common, violence-
shunning humanity on which life in villages and kin groups tends to be 
based) is, even more than most other states, based on transcendence. Only 
under conditions of extremely entrenched transcendence is it possible to 
arrive at such a dissociation of the legal sphere and of the political sphere, 
that these spheres become totally impervious for the charitable and 
communicative values that usually inform the intimate spheres of production 
and reproduction.27  
 
 
The Ancient world’s limited relevance for an understanding of today’s issues  
 
Still on our way towards a conclusion on the TRC, and having made 
substantial progress, we will now make a slight diversion to argue a point 
that seems to counter some28 of the implications of the rhetoric-based 
contributions in the present collection: the Ancient world’s limited relevance 
for an understanding of today’s issues.  
 As stressed in Garver’s thoughtful contribution to this volume, Aristotle 
uses the concept of “friendship” to denote, with a term derived from the 
informal domestic sphere, a fundamental prerequisite which he attributes to 
the political sphere. Clearly, therefore, the dissociation between these 
spheres was considerably less developed in Aristotle’s time than it came to 
be in post-Renaissance Europe, when the rationality of the absolutist state 
made a claim to total transcendence, thus paving the way for such 
aberrations as the nazi state and the apartheid state.  
 The incomplete dissociation of the legal and the political spheres in 
Aristotle’s time – the basis of his political “friendship” – informs his 
rhetoric. It is the rhetoric of the assembly, before the same free males who 
only hours earlier found each other on the market-place, and who only hours 
later will re-adjourn in the gymnasium, in the public spaces of leisurely 
philosophical discussion, or in the seedy mature male comforts of banquets 
spiced up with willing boys and girls – banquets served and paid for partly 
                                                                                                                             
(on good grounds) as in the case of Ancient Athens (on far more dubious grounds).  
27 In principle, the transcendent (and violent) dissociation of the political sphere from the sphere 
of production and reproduction is typical of statehood in general, and has nothing to do with 
apartheid as such. For a detailed analysis of a precolonial South Central African state along such 
lines, cf. van Binsbergen 1992 and especially 2003d.  
28 By no means all, as is indicated by Garver’s sobering opening remark (this volume): 
Aristotle does not give solutions to contemporary political problems. He could not have 
imagined them, and so does not speak to them.  
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by slave labour. Only by taking Aristotle’s rhetoric out of that historic 
context, translating it into a modern Western Indo-European language, 
appropriating it by formalized, discipline-based (“transcendent”) scholar-
ship, assuming that it addressed political conditions comparable to those of 
modern statehood, and endowing it with a postmodern reservation vis-à-vis 
truth and institutional order, can we make Aristotelian rhetoric at home in 
the modern, transcendent state contexts of today. In a comparable way, 
Herodotus and Thucydides may be called the first historians yet no modern 
historian would academically survive if her methods and concepts were not 
fundamentally different from those of these two illustrious “founding 
fathers”; by the same token, the Olympic Games only in name, and 
nostalgically, revive an Archaic Greek custom going back to the eighth 
century BCE. By innovatingly applying Aristotelian rhetoric in a political 
context that is mainly in name (“democracy”) comparable with Aristotle’s 
elitist city-state, modern rhetoricians create (as is perfectly justifiable) an 
essentially new conceptual framework in order to illuminate (as the present 
volume beautifully demonstrates) the political aporias of today – while 
endowing that framework with the illustrious genealogy that its rootedness 
in Aristotle’s writings can provide.  
 Inherent in this intellectual trajectory is the difficulty modern rhetoric 
will have to appreciate that the transcendent power of the modern state 
cannot be relegated, for the full one hundred percent, to the dextrous 
performance of political oratory and other strategies illuminated by rhetoric. 
Such strategies continue to play a major role (as modern media research 
indicates, referred to in this volume by Rossouw’s piece), but instead of 
being responsible for creating, praxeologically, the entire political space an 
actor may have, they only serve to assert and actualize such political space 
as that actor already, transcendentally, derives from the letter of the law, 
from political and legal institutions. The praxeology, the dramaturgy and the 
aesthetics of verbal contests of rhetoric, and the generation of power in such 
contexts as a mere dextrous display of individual agency (as analysed in the 
present volume by the Nigerian scholar Ige for Cicero’s Catilinarian 
orations) tends to be only one side of the medal – the other, necessarily 
complementary side being established, institutionalized legal authority in the 
Weberian sense.29  
 In the wake of recent Ciceronian scholarship which he cites, Ige presents 
                                          
29 Weber 1969. For a recent argument on the limitations of agency and the remaining need for a 
structural and institutional analysis, in the context of African national states and traditional 
leaders today, see van Binsbergen 2003c.  
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the famous case of Cicero’s four orations against Catiline as a mere verbal 
contest along rhetorical lines between two individuals, Cicero and Catiline, 
who are alleged to be essentially each other’s exact match. Bringing only 
Cicero’s own text to support this reading (and Cicero is one of the founders 
of rhetoric; however, there is also Sallust’s contemporaneous account of this 
episode) leads Ige to depart from the traditional reading of the case. The 
latter has largely been in terms of the challenge of  
 
• a recognized social and political misfit who made a mess of his military 
commission, had a sex scandal involving a most sacred Vestal virgin, and 
otherwise was involved in such unsavoury court cases as to be even 
ineligible to put himself up as a candidate for the exalted state office of 
consul (Catiline), by  
• one of the two recognized supreme officers of the state (Cicero) 
deploying – not only his oratorical skill but especially his formal legal 
powers as invested in his exalted office.  
 
 Rhetoric does help us understand the taxonomics and the dramatics, the 
deployment of words and gestures, in such a contest, in other words to see 
how the letter of the legal word is turned into actually exercised socio-
political power. But despite these helpful pointers, the question remains: Do 
the praxeological dynamics captured by rhetoric need an indispensable basis 
of institutionalized legal authority, or can they create power fully at their 
own impetus? Perhaps rhetoric was actually more autonomously effective in 
Cicero’s time (when the Roman Republic was collapsing after half a 
millennium) than (under conditions of far more developed trancendentaliz-
ation of the state) in the England of Margaret Thatcher (pace Calder in this 
volume), and perhaps (as Ige perceptively suggests, and as can be further 
articulated in terms of my notion of immanentalism) there is, in this respect, 
a parallel between Cicero’s Rome and a contemporary African postcolonial 
state threatened by a military coup d’état.  
 It is time, however, to terminate our excursion into the Ancient world, 




What the immanentalist domain brought to the TRC  
 
In this connection, let us first pose an utterly, but (see below) understandably 
forbidden question in the South African context: “To what extent did the 
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population of South Africa constitute ‘one nation’ under apartheid, and to 
what extent was it really one nation that came to the TRC to be healed (and 
to be healed by whom, and by what)?”  
 Drawing on parallels in Greek Antiquity when the Athenian nation was 
divided over the differential response (collaboration or patriotism) to the 
attacking foreign force from Sparta, or proclaiming that the TRC was really 
about “how to heal a nation”, etc. – all this begs the question as to whether 
South Africa was arguably one nation under apartheid. The aporias of the 
apartheid state play us tricks here and prevent us from giving an 
unequivocal answer to this question. Apartheid legislation, pass laws, the 
creation of bantustans, were all based on the malicious, paper-thin 
(“transcendent”) fiction that only Whites were the lawful citizens of South 
Africa, and that all others belonged to other nations. The rhetoric (in the 
vulgar sense) of “Two Nations” or of a multiplicity of nations was the stock-
in-trade of White minority discourse in South Africa and South Central 
Africa throughout the twentieth century CE, replicated in book titles, 
journalistic products etc.; even the designation “rainbow nation” for the 
democratic, new South Africa (evocative of a plurality of colours, castes, 
“races”, somatic appearances) still appears to carry a distant echo of such 
usage. Against this background, admitting that South Africa was not one 
nation under apartheid would imply siding with the very forces of 
apartheid. But alternatively, affirming that it was a nation even under 
apartheid, would amount to a somewhat unrealistic denial of the gross 
constitutional and socio-economic inequalities, and of the resulting 
exclusion and humiliation to which the vast majority of that alleged “nation” 
was subjected.  
 At any rate, clearly the main purpose of the TRC was to make South 
Africa much more of a nation. Provided we define what we mean, the idiom 
of healing is not inappropriate here. Healing may well be defined as the 
process of catalytically facilitating the transition from a defective state to a 
state of greater completeness: thus, in this connection, from not-yet-a-nation 
to more-of-a-nation, or to nationhood, tout court. Much like a sangoma 
(Southern African diviner-priest) may be said to “heal a person” spiritually 
by bringing a human being who is too damaged to count as a full person, 
into contact with such symbols, words, arguments, images for identity and 
emulation, and by inducing her (or him) to engage in such rituals and 
concrete practical acts, that she can finally become the person she could not 
yet be before.30 
                                          
30 Archbishop Tutu presided over the first ever meeting TRC hearing under a huge banner whose 
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 Let us now try to cast some more light on what, outside the 
transcendental state, would be the informal, immanentalist sphere of 
everyday life of production and reproduction – where pain is very much an 
argument – , a sphere which some victims and survivors cannot have failed 
to bring to the TRC.  
 In the comparative Africanist perspective we have become aware, since 
the late 1970s, of the differential degrees in which the modern, transcend-
entalist central state has actually been able to capture the lives and the minds 
of its citizens in African contexts. Empirical studies of state penetration have 
shown that, especially in rural areas and in informal urban communities, 
state penetration is usually the case to a limited extent only.31  
 These findings carry an important message for South Africa as, 
primarily, another African country. One of the most conspicuous, and 
deceptive, features of the South African situation is that the state, and 
modern formal organizations in government, services, industry, religion, 
sports, etc., are so well established and have such a grip on public life, that 
(for risk of ridicule and anger, and also for the more internalized sanctions 
that attend collective representations, i.e. a community’s socially-
constructed self-evidences) it is difficult to think of South Africa in other 
terms than as a fully-fledged modern country, – a country that happens to be 
in Africa but that should really be counted in the ranks of the North Atlantic 
region, or of Australia and New Zealand (where, however, somatically 
conspicuous descendants of the pre-conquest population, and their cultures, 
are – already for sheer numbers – much less visible in the public life than is 
the case in South Africa). It appears to be almost impossible (also for those 
reflecting on the South African socio-political order in writing, as Southern 
African intellectuals – perhaps with the exception of left-wing anthropol-
ogists) to see through the illusion of the transcendent, self-evident order 
which this state of affairs engenders, and to entertain, instead, an awareness 
of immanentalist alternatives: of people who (despite the unusual – but 
manifestly failed – insistence on the part of the apartheid state on 
penetrating into, and controlling, all aspects of life) do not consciously 
pattern their life and their self-identity in terms of that transcendent order. 
                                                                                                                             
central text read “HEALING OUR PAST”. The choice of words is remarkable: one may attempt to 
heal people, even a nation, from the undesirable effects of the past, but healing something as 
virtual as the past itself can only amount to the attempt to change the past, which is not in the 
nature of things; or to change whatever is painful in the representation of the past, which is where 
rhetoric comes in. Picture at: http://www.megastories.com/safrica/rainbow/finals/truth.htm. 
31 Bratton 1980; Cliffe et al. 1977; Geschiere 1984; Hyden 1980; Hyden & Bratton 1992; van 
Binsbergen et al. 1986. 
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Here I am referring to people who do not see themselves primarily as 
citizens of the state and participants in the national economy, who are 
largely strangers to that order and its highly specific procedures,32 but who 
instead define themselves in much more idiosyncratic and local terms; and 
who primarily pursue the symbolic projects proper to their own idiosyncratic 
local horizons rather than the symbolic projects of the state, national politics, 
industry, and mass consumption.  
 Treating the whole of South Africa as effectively one nation has the 
advantage of avoiding the trap of fragmenting divisiveness which the 
apartheid state has dug, but has the disadvantage of denying and muting of 
these centrifugal idiosyncrasies.  
 In my cultural analyses of modern Southern African societies, especially 
their urban sectors, I have often found it illuminating to depict the situation 
of historic local culture as one of “having gone underground” – an imagery 
akin to that of uncapturedness (Hyden). It is not that such cultural 
knowledge, and the related practices, have been completely eclipsed by the 
onslaught of the modern state, education, world religions, the capitalist 
economy, urbanization, globalization, consumerism etc. It is rather that the 
latter complex of forces has created a context in which expressions of 
historic local culture (such as the allegiance to puberty rites, ancestral cults, 
High God cults, beliefs and practices relating to sinister aspects attributed to 
the unseen – witches, familiars, ghosts – , traditional healing, traditional 
leadership, clan structures) are no longer socially permissible, can no longer 
be negotiated to the public domain (except perhaps in some highly 
                                          
32 The present collection offers an interesting case (in the contribution by Collier and Hicks) of 
what happens when, taking for granted the utter transcendence of the modern state, procedures of 
deliberation are introduced there that have no roots in immanent, everyday local experience. 
When after the lifting of fascism in Portugal in 1974 CE municipal assemblies adopted Robert’s 
Rules to structure their internal deliberations, this disadvantaged many of the local delegates 
because these formal procedures, which USA Army General Roberts had derived from USA 
Congress procedure in the late 19th century, were bewilderingly alien to them. The case is doubly 
instructive, because, as affirmed USA intellectuals of the late 20th century CE, the authors from 
whom this example is derived do themselves not even seem to realise the element of cultural 
alienness involved here: planting an Anglophone nineteenth-century North American ruling-class 
set of procedures into a Lusitophone twentieth-century popular Southern European environment. 
Those bewildered in this case became disadvantaged strangers to the political culture they were 
supposed to carry. We must not assume that the rules and the stakes of the democratic process are 
the same everywhere and at all times, and immediately obvious to all participants. In most North 
Atlantic countries democracy as representative government through universal franchise is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, less than a hundred years old; it had to be learned from scratch, in 
ways that differed only slightly, in scope and in time scale, from the ways in which very similar 
democratic procedures had to be learned by most Africans in the main wave of Independence 
around 1960, or by South Africans other than Whites in the early 1990s (van Binsbergen 1995). 
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fragmented, folklorized, commodified form), without serious negative 
sanctions for the social actors involved, in terms of ridicule, shame, 
suspicion, allegations of backwardness, of tribalism, of satanism, etc.33 
 The same factors that caused these centrifugal expressions to go 
underground and to be banned from the public space, have led to their 
conspicuous absence from mainstream scholarship in South Africa, 
including that addressing the TRC.  
 
 
The TRC as a nation’s birth pangs  
 
On the other hand, if one does acknowledge these centrifugal, immanentalist 
elements (of a linguistic, cultural, ethnic, religious, and lifestyle nature), and 
if one accepts that they are especially to be found among the South African 
people of African and Asian background who were the principal victims of 
apartheid, then one must inevitably acknowledge34 that different people 
brought very different things to the TRC.  
 The TRC was, therefore, not a well-defined arena where (in ways open 
to transparent rhetorical analysis) some already established ritual of “healing 
the nation through full disclosure and amnesty” could be effectively staged 
along lines that were clear to all participants, and on which they all agreed. It 
was primarily (but also that seems to be something rhetoric can handle) a 
place of utter confusion, staged by people who (as literates, as citizens 
conscious of their constitutional responsibilities, as academics, as adherents 
of world religions) identified with the idea of the transcendent state after the 
imported North Atlantic model, and who saw it as their main task to usher 
into greater allegiance to that model, those for whom the transcendent state 
was far less self-evident: those who were entertaining the centrifugal, 
idiosyncratic, implicitly African and Asian, orientations indicated above, and 
whose main life experience with the state had almost destroyed them, to 
                                          
33 Cf. van Binsbergen 1993, 2001, 2003b espec. chs 5 and 6. 
34 As implied, albeit not with specific reference to the TRC, by Collier & Hick, this volume: 
Many political disagreements now seem to be rooted in much “deeper” differences than 
conflicts of interest. As the cultural and religious diversity of the citizenry grows, 
through both migration and enfranchisement, the diversity of collective aims, moral 
outlooks, received knowledges, and worldviews grows. It is no longer reasonable to 
assume that a shared moral and political framework exists to guide public deliberation 
and debate. As the new social movements have demonstrated, the political vocabularies 
used to frame issues and propose solutions as well as the legitimacy of extant procedures 
for resolving political conflicts, are often the source, rather than the cure, of political 
disagreement.  
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boot, being apartheid’s designated targets and victims.  
 It now finally becomes possible to state what, beyond the content-less, 
truth-less game of rhetoric (but in a formulation that owes a lot to this 
volume’s rhetorical analysis – including the occasional remarks on sacrifice 
scattered there), and beyond the preservation of White, Christian and elite 
interests (but in a formulation that also owes a lot to Christianity), may have 
constituted the true stakes and the true heroism of the TRC: 
 Of course, the past was not healed. Neither was the nation healed, 
certainly not in the way Tutu suggested (notably, by speaking out without 
negative consequences for the perpetrators). No, the nation was born. 
Speaking out was no longer the issue. Pain resides, and is domesticated and 
healed, at a profound inner level where words scarcely penetrate.35 People 
who had no reason at all to trust the state, in whatever trappings, yet showed 
themselves generous and courageous enough to prefer the perpetrators’ 
undeserved amnesty to civil war. The victims and survivors thus sacrificed 
such revenge as they were entitled to. They could only hope to heal 
themselves through the act of such generosity – but also, in this very act, 
they effectively created the nation of South Africa for the first time. In doing 
so, they extended to the perpetrators of apartheid once more the humanity 
which the latter had lost by denying it to their victims. And thus the victims 
and survivors who spoke during the TRC, affirmed their own humanity 
(ubuntu), which is the moral hub of any nation, any political system worth 
considering.  
 What a huge moral and constitutional responsibility this generates for 
South Africa’s current majority government! What a package for 
Aristotelian rhetoric yet to accommodate in its attempts to make itself 
relevant to the world today!  
 
 
Counter-hegemonic challenge as a principal task for African intellectuals  
 
This collection’s rhetoric-inspired reading of the TRC seems to be based on 
the assumption that the Aristotelian rhetorical perspective, increasingly 
popular again in recent years, is so universal and so perennial that applying 
it to contemporary South Africa is neither an anachronism, nor a distortion, 
nor an act of naïvety, nor a hegemonic imposition. Depending upon one’s 
                                          
35 Here we touch upon a major shortcoming of current, main-stream political analyses: their lack 
of appreciation of the deeper, subconscious or unconscious levels of the political actors’ 
personality as a determinant of political behaviour. For attempts at remedy, cf. Gay 1985; Fromm 
1973.  
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epistemological and political position in the intercontinental construction of 
knowledge, however, the project of analysing contemporary South Africa 
through the spectacles of Aristotelian and Ciceronian rhetoric would not be 
entirely impervious to such allegations, however much the integrity and the 
scholarship of the authors involved are beyond doubt – and however much, 
as we will see below, such allegations can be countered by an higher-order 
intercultural philosophical argument.  
 We have already touched on historical reasons of specific differences in 
political structure, for taking a somewhat more relative view of the relevance 
of Ancient Greek and Roman models for present-day issues. But there are 
also important epistemological and knowledge-political reasons which – far 
more than the historical ones – relate to the very raison d’être of Quest: An 
African Journal of Philosophy.  
 In the course of the twentieth century CE, main-stream North Atlantic 
philosophy has largely given up the idea of the possibility of a privileged 
vantage point36 from where to overlook the world and mankind objectively, 
dispassionately, and authoritatively.37 Aristotelian rhetoric, or main-stream 
Western philosophy in general, cannot be claimed to be such a vantage point 
any more, – but neither can, of course, any other intellectual perspective that 
is brought to bear on the issues at hand, including African philosophy, 
African political science, African Studies in general. The point is not to deny 
the validity of any particular perspective, including Aristotelian rhetoric, but 
to deny any perspective’s claim to a monopoly over validity.  
 Meanwhile, especially with regard to Africa, universalist claims 
emanating from the North Atlantic tradition cannot fail to arouse deep-
seated sensitivities. It is only two centuries ago that Hegel – still considered 
a giant of the Western philosophical tradition, usually without further 
questions being asked – denied Africa a proper place in the history of 
mankind; and less than half a century since the prominent British historian 
Trevor-Roper expressed himself in similar fashion.38 Ever since the 
                                          
36 Popularly referred to as “the Archimedean point”, although this was meant, by Archimedes, as 
a mathematico-physical, not as an ontological, construct.  
37 For a Foucaultian critique of this illusion, based on the concept of genealogy (which is 
ultimately Nietzschean), see: Rabinow 1984; Foucault 1977. Cf. also Kimmerle 1985; and: 
Nietzsche 1887. The impossibility of an epistemological Archimedean point is also argued in: 
Rorty 1979; and from a totally different point of view in: Putnam, 1978, 1981. Such 
impossibility, in other words, is a received idea in contemporary philosophy.  
38 Hegel 1992; for a critical distance from the perspective of contemporary intercultural 
philosophy, cf. Keita 1974; Kimmerle 1993; Verharen 1997; also Eze 1996, 1997b. H.R. Trevor-
Roper, then Regius Professor of History at Oxford, United Kingdom, soon to be knighted Baron 
Dacre of Glanton, said in a Britsh Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) television broadcast in 1963: 
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Renaissance, Europe has constructed its own exalted image of itself by 
contrasting it with a correspondingly negative image of Africa and its 
inhabitants – the Invention of Africa (Mudimbe) has amounted to the 
construction of North Atlantic identity, culture, history, science, philosophy, 
religion, and statehood, by denying these same achievements to Africans.39 
The denial and the suppression of African knowledge, initiative, dignity, 
language, culture and identity were ubiquitous aspects of the colonial 
experience in Africa, including post-conquest South Africa, and of White 
racialism vis-à-vis persons of African descent in Europe and the New World. 
Needless to say, the inhabitants of the other continents received very much 
the same treatment at the hands of Europeans and of the latter’s descendants 
in the Americas. Complementing Mudimbe, South Asia particularly has 
produced its own highly illuminating and highly indignant reflection on 
these processes, in the form of Postcolonial Theory, where “hegemony” and 
“the subaltern” are key concepts.40 In the present collection, only Nethersole 
makes reference, dismissively, to this set of ideas, however much they form 
the obvious context to look at formerly colonized societies. And even41 
Africanist anthropology, which through its elaborate methodologies of 
fieldwork would claim to have avoided the violence of representation that is 
otherwise inherent to North-South knowledge construction, could be argued 
to have fallen into the same hegemonic subordination of Africans and their 
life worlds.  
 
 
Intercultural knowledge between universalism and particularism  
 
One cannot simply send Aristotle, without elaborate preparation and protect-
ion, into such a global mine field, and trust that he will escape unscathed.  
                                                                                                                             
Perhaps in the future, there will be some African history to teach. But, at present there is 
none: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness, like the 
history of pre-Columbian America, and darkness is not a subject for history (published 
in Trevor-Roper 1965). 
However, in extenuation we may plead, firstly, that Trevor-Roper here expressed himself – in the 
best tradition of British empiricist scholarship – on the then unavailability of high-quality African 
historiography rather than (like Hegel did) on the ontological impossibility for Africans to have 
history or histories; and, secondly, that one of his students has been Terence Ranger, who became 
a great historian of Africa, contributing to the creation of precisely what Trevor-Roper claimed 
did not yet exist.  
39 Mudimbe 1988, cf. 1994.  
40 Cf. Bhabha 1986, 1995; Rattansi 1994; Spivak 1987, 1988, 1990. 
41 This is the Leitmotiv in: van Binsbergen 2003b.  
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 The present argument provides, inter alia, such preparation and 
protection. For there is one attractive perspective under which the 
rhetoricians’ appeal to Aristotle in order to illuminate current South African 
conditions need not be hegemonic nor suspect, even though Europe has 
constructed itself by monopolising the Ancient Greek heritage, and by 
dissimulating the fact that this heritage in itself was greatly indebted to Asia 
and Africa.  
 Philosopher of science Sandra Harding42 has cogently argued that the 
claims of modern, North Atlantic dominated, science of being objective, 
rational, and universal, are largely a myth springing from the fact of North 
Atlantic actual hegemony. Largely – but not entirely, and after elaborate 
attempts to argue the opposite, she has to admit that, especially in the natural 
sciences, the truth claimed by science is at least partly justified, i.e. is at 
least partly underpinned by the validity of its epistemological procedures, 
independently from such power as the North Atlantic region is capable of 
investing in its science, or is capable of deriving from its science. Identifying 
with women in science, and with people in science other than from the North 
Atlantic region, Harding sees this conclusion as a reason for hope and as 
empowerment for these long excluded groups. By contrast, yielding to the 
postmodern tendency towards complete fragmentation and relativism (as if 
anything else were a suspicious Grand Narrative in Lyotard’s sense)43 she 
sees as unacceptable disempowerment: as if global scientific knowledge, 
long wielded by North Atlantic males as their main source of power, all of a 
sudden has to be declared useless and merely local, an ethnoscience among 
myriad others at the very moment that previously excluded groups begin to 
gain access to such knowledge.  
 Harding’s argument exemplifies the tension of universalism (“Aristotle 
is universally applicable and universally illuminating”) versus particularism 
(...“but only with regard to Ancient Greece and not to Africa today”...), 
between which intercultural scholarship situates itself.44 Many centuries of 
scholarly transcendentalism have made it utterly uncomfortable for us as 
globally-orientated modern intellectuals to live (at least, to live 
professionally) with what yet makes up the standard experience of social life 
and what is practically accommodated as such in the immanentalism of 
informality: contradiction. In the quest for consistency at the level of words, 
we are inclined to try and lift the contradiction by destroying either of the 
                                          
42 Harding 1997; cf. van Binsbergen 2002. 
43 Lyotard 1979. 
44 Cf. van Binsbergen 2003b.  
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two poles between which it is stretched and creates tension. Our very 
difficult task however, when seeking to make sense of the complex 
phenomena of our global life world by bringing to bear upon them points of 
view and modes of thought from a plurality of life worlds belonging to 
different locations in space and time, is not to destroy the contradiction, but 
to make the best of it, indeed to thrive by it, in an act of balancing and 
negotiation. In this specific case this means both qualifying Aristotle’s 
alleged universality, and yet identifying the specific conditions under which 
his thought would be illuminating beyond Ancient Greece, even when 
applied to Africa today. Lest North Atlantic scholars be suspected that what 
they have cherished for centuries while they could still monopolize it, loses 
its attraction for them now that they have to share it intercontinentally, let 
them not throw Aristotle out at the very moment in history when African and 
Asians have gained the scholarly access to expertly read, criticize and apply 
Aristotle.  
 And let African and Asian scholars act in the same spirit. If “The master 
of those who know”45 can be seen as part of mankind’s shared, global 
heritage of thought, then there is no reason why he should not be applied to 
African conditions. But then, of course, it can also be admitted that the great 
gap that separates Athens and the TRC in time and space, realistically 
requires major adaptations, as well as an awareness of genuine differences. 
In an inclusive, global perspective Aristotle’s thought could not remain un-
adapted, let alone that it could be thought of as sacrosanct and all-
explaining. Therefore, the application of Aristotle in a contemporary African 
context could never be a one-way process, conducted by scholars who know 
all about Aristotle, nearly all about formal legal texts as produced in formal, 
bureaucratic legal settings under the aegis of the transcendent state – and 
virtually nothing about the life worlds, the cosmologies, the languages, 
kinship systems, political and legal institutions, day-to-day struggles, 
pastimes, religious, artistic, culinary, sexual expressions, etc., of the African 
people whose life is greatly affected (but far from completely determined – 
my refrain of centrifugal immanentalism again) by such formal settings. 
Considering the sensitivities attending the situation, the suggestion of 
another hegemonic assault, this time in the name of Aristotle and rhetoric, 
must be avoided at all cost. Hence this Postscript.  
 In other words, from the same inclusive, global perspective, the 
continued relevance of African models for African life, and the potential 
                                          
45 Dante, La Divina Commedia, Inferno IV: 131, referring to Aristotle: 
‘...’l maestro di color che sanno’. 
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relevance of comparative Africanist models, not only to other parts of Africa 
but also to the rest of the world, need also be admitted, and explored in 
concrete terms.  
 
 
Learning from the rest of Africa in order to better understand South Africa  
 
The point is, therefore, not that the contributors to this volume (which, as is 
relevant at this point, contains one of the most subtle recent analyses of 
intercultural communications and deliberations, in the contribution by 
Collier and Hicks) should be faulted for advocating a rhetoric-based 
perspective; the point is that they have just left it to others to sort out how 
such a perspective could be combined with other valuable perspectives such 
as the anti-hegemonic and comparative Africanist one. Considering the great 
investments of expertise and experience already needed to cover one field of 
scholarship, such an academic division of labour is perfectly acceptable, 
provided other disciplines, other perspectives, other political commitments, 
other identities, move in, in order to complement and complete what 
rhetoricians on their own disciplinary impetus cannot adequately cover or 
represent.  
 What could we learn then, finally, if we complemented a rhetorical 
perspective with a comparative Africanist one?  
 
a. It would bring us to explore the specifically African forms of rhetoric, 
such as employed in traditional African polities and in African traditional 
courts of law (also, albeit in modified form, in South Africa), and would 
throw additional light on the modalities of story-telling and of public 
construction of truths that constituted the TRC exercise.46  
b. It would allow us to identify and study, in addition to the Christian 
models informing Archbishop Tutu’s TRC frame of reference, and the 
Athenian models informing Salazar’s, Cassin’s and Garver’s rhetorical 
analyses of reconciliation in the present book, specifically African forms 
of reconciliation, and appreciate that these have constituted, for 
centuries, “African technologies of sociability” of great and proven 
effectiveness.47 If such models were not explicitly mobilized in the TRC 
                                          
46 African rhetoric: Cf. Bloch 1975; Knowles-Borishade 1991; Finnegan 1970. Also cf. Comaroff 
1975, for traditional oratory in the South African context; van Binsbergen c.s. 2003a, with 
extensive bibliography, for recent studies of traditional leadership and customary law in Africa; 
Oomen 2003 for an insightful study of South African rural local courts today.  
47 Van Binsbergen 1999, revised version incorporated in van Binsbergen 2003b: 349-374; cf. van 
Binsbergen 2003b: Introduction, pp. 32f.  
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exercise, they may yet have been implied in what some of the victims 
and survivors brought to its sessions.  
c. It would have made us realize that the widely attested failure of the 
Westminster model of parliamentary democracy throughout postcolonial 
Africa suggests deep-seated structural incompatibilities. In view of our 
argument so far, we can now suggest that these incompatibilities have to 
do with the impossibility of planting a modern state in a local context so 
saturated with immanentalism that the transcendence of the state finds 
insufficient support there (mainly, but not exclusively, because of a 
difference in mode of thought, but also for historical reasons: because of 
the pain which earlier experiences with the state have inflicted). This 
would make us think twice before arguing, as a matter of course and as 
an automatism, the obvious applicability of the original, Athenian model 
of democracy, or of the modern Westminster model, to South Africa, as 
another part of Africa. In particular (since evidently, these 
incompatibilities exist at the level of socio-political structure, not of 
individual innate ability) it would force us to reflect on the structural 
preconditions for transcendence (through effective and prolonged 
participation in a viable state and in viable formal organizations – in such 
fields as health services, education, religious life, sports and other 
recreations – , high and sustained levels of literacy, effective divulgation 
of modern cosmopolitan science), and to direct citizenship training 
accordingly.  
d. It would have made us explore – in addition to the Athenian democratic 
model which has been effectively (albeit at the price of considerable 
misrepresentation) appropriated by the North Atlantic tradition (and 
which, therefore, is difficult to detach from Eurocentrism) – historic 
African ways of going about democracy, popular participation, social and 
political justice, constitutional law, dating from before the imposition of 
the transcendental colonial state, and in part surviving (in more or less 
adulterated, neo-traditionally encapsulated, and perverted, forms) in the 
niches of the colonial and the postcolonial state. Africanist political 
anthropology (some of whose finest classic products48 happen to deal 
with Southern Africa) and African philosophy (including the ubuntu 
variant) have done much to put these African political forms and 
conventions on the map. We cannot simply ignore their existence. 
Neither can we simply take for granted that in the national reconstruction 
of post-apartheid South Africa such African elements are necessarily 
                                          
48 Gluckman 1958, 1969; Krige & Krige 1943; Kuper 1969; Schapera 1938, 1943, 1963, 1970.  
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without the slightest relevance, and are completely absent from the 
minds and the feelings of especially the survivors and victims of 
apartheid – many of whom have retained (within the local horizons that 
are the home of immanentalism) a modicum of knowledge of and of 
allegiance to time-honoured Southern African cultural traditions. (Again 
we must add: “in whatever selected, newly-invented, or perverted way” – 
of course, the point is very sensitive since a major strategy of the 
apartheid state was to justify the spatial, social and constitutional 
distinction between Whites and Blacks, by artificially furthering the 
ethnic distinctions between Black Africans, in a policy of divide and rule 
that, in retrospect, has made any expression of historic local or regional 
cultural identity in South Africa today, suspect as a possible product of 
the apartheid state.) Characteristically, sangomas, although specialists in 
the dynamics of collective healing and reconciliation at the level of the 
kin group and the local community in Southern Africa, were virtually 
absent from the TRC process, whereas the concept of ubuntu was only 





I have attempted to show how the present collection’s project, while at first 
superficial glance appearing to deal with abstruse topics of limited 
applicability (a reading of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in terms of Aristotelian rhetoric), in fact addresses phenomena 
of the greatest significance for the African continent as a whole, thus taking 
up major debates in Quest over the years: the reflection on the philosophical 
canon (in this case: Aristotle and rhetoric); the development of an African 
philosophy that is relevant to major current transformations on the African 
continent – in this case the viability of the state, democracy, reconciliation 
and freedom; that is critically and radically aware of its hegemonic context; 
and that yet situates itself globally, in the field of tension between the 
universal and the particular.  
 In this way, this Postscript both situates, and vindicates, the present 
collection, and offers an manifesto that may serve as Preface for future 
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